Document Type
Note
Abstract
This note will argue that government and regulatory authorities should focus on easing access to downstream innovation by broadening research exemptions to patent infringement. Part I of this note will focus on the current state of patent protection and exclusivity afforded to pharmaceutical companies. Part II will discuss incentives created that lead rational actors to engage in M&A instead of through internal R&D. Part III will address the development of innovation as a standalone theory of harm in merger review, and the fallacies associated with labeling certain transactions as “killer acquisitions.” Finally, Part IV of the note will look at the intersection of pharmaceutical transactions and intellectual property protection, and how encouragement of collaboration between firms may offset the negative externalities associated with high costs to consumers and terminated R&D projects.
Recommended Citation
Timothy J. Haltermann,
The High Cost of Pharmaceutical Acquisitions: Increasing Social Welfare or Furthering Inequality?,
4
Notre Dame J. on Emerging Tech.
92
(2023).
Included in
Health Law and Policy Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Pharmacoeconomics and Pharmaceutical Economics Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, Social Welfare Commons