New People and Old Ideals in the Soviet Union

Helmut Dahm

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I. THE PRESENT DISCONTENT

DURING THE LAST TWO or three years a doubtful character has established himself in Soviet literature intended for youth:

He has already become a tradition, so much so that this state of affairs demands intensive critical examination. In the fifth decade of Soviet power, significantly enough, many books think a young man worthy of mention in a particular fashion only when his inner world is confused, unclear, and full of contradictions, when he scarcely knows what he is to do, when he wavers back and forth in his search for the right path.¹

The disagreement about the novel Ticket to the Stars, published in the Moscow monthly magazine for youth, Junost', focused attention on this new phenomenon.² With this novel Vasilij Aksenov, a twenty-eight-year-old doctor, gambled away the good will of the critics which he had earned in 1960 by his first work, The Colleagues. At the same time his book was not alone. There had also been A. Gladilin's Chronicle of the Times of Viktor Podgurskij, A. Kuznetsov's Continuation of a Legend, and N. Dement'ev's I Step into Life. Of these and similar stories and fables Jurij Andreev observed in Moscow's Komsomol'skaja pravda of December 23, 1961, "Although the various books deal with different people the conflicts described bring out remarkably similar traits... How can this remarkable monotony of themes be explained?"³

What was Aksenov's Ticket to the Stars about? L. Stishova in Molodoj kommunist, the theoretical monthly of the Soviet youth organization, summarized it as follows:

Three friends, Dimka Denisov, Alik Kramer, and Jurka Popov, and a girl, Galja Bodrova, decide after graduation from a Moscow high school to begin life not as their parents advised, but independently. Why not?

In youth one wants to find security from the frequent importunate demands

2. See Vasilij Aksenov, Zvezdnij bilet [Ticket to the Stars], Junost' (Moscow), no. 6 and 7 (1961).
of one’s elders and to arrange one’s life after one’s own fancy. This is completely natural.

“Independent” life for the heroes of Ticket to the Stars begins with a voyage into the Baltic. Restaurants, cafes, and card-playing soon fill the days and nights of the four vagabonds who only yesterday sat at school desks and who are now completely occupied with the assertion of their right to live “according to their own taste” and “without any orders from others.” Dimka Denisov thinks it better to idle away his time and pull off fiascos than to remain a child always following the decisions of others. He loses his girl, Galja Bodrova, who has been meant for him from childhood, as she follows the first call of a forty-year-old playboy and renounces the purity of her first love.

The author takes pains to make us understand the “romantic” desires of his seventeen-year-old heroes and to do this bestows on them a highly dubious philosophy of life: “You can get into the Institute up to thirty-five... We still have eighteen years to go.”


With the spending of the last ruble the “sweet life” on one’s own comes to an end. “What will happen now? After all, one must eat.” The will to live forces the travelers to try their hand at work. The glamorous life now turns into life in a fishing kolkhoz. They still drink a lot, but now it is not cognac, but plain vodka. Yet Vasilij Aksenov has described the sweet life of his young loafers with relish and unashamed sympathy. He has made his “Teddies” into heroes to whom decent Russians, described by him as cranks, won’t give a chance.4

Soviet critics reproached Aksenov because his presentation was completely “abstract.” They accounted for this by observing that they were dealing with literature of the sixties, a time already forty years after the October revolution. They concluded that the characters currently being proposed as heroes were not to be admired by anyone caught in conflict between individualism and collectivism.

There is no doubt that, with the elimination of the personality cult of Stalin, events related to this upheaval had a somewhat negative effect on youth who were not ideologically stable. The theoreticians of culture, who were loyal to the Party, were ready, then, to agree that the novelists’ interest

in the development of the characters of young people was perfectly natural. What was unnatural to them was that persons and situations of this kind should on occasion enjoy an offensive and thoroughly unjustifiable preference in modern Soviet literature. The uneasy critics noted that now “People are frequently in the foreground who do not know anything sensible to do, while the stronger spirits, the heroes with a clear head [in the sense of the Party] are among the characters on the fringe.” If the unreasonable and impressionable readers of such works should object to the critics that it is impossible to portray everything simultaneously, the critics would have a good answer: “Isn’t our objection true not only in one case, but in two or three cases, indeed in dozens? Isn’t the whole effect to give a false picture of reality?”

It is not without reason that Jurij Andreev reminds young authors, “Never forget the most important law of art: a distorted esthetic principle always has a distorted ethical principle as a consequence.” The real hero of the age is the modest doer who observes the commands and prohibitions of the Party given to preserve and further the interests of the Communist autocracy. When an author, whether on purpose or not, turns these real heroes of the Party into pale sketches, while he describes life so pregnantly that his readers find the novel’s hero appealing from a human as well as from a social viewpoint, “then the author willy-nilly leads his readers to imitate those non-Party models who appear in his work as cleverer, more interesting and more memorable.”

That such models may function as guides to the people cannot be accepted by the regime.

It is no wonder that *Molodoj kommunist* last year described *Ticket to the Stars* as “false romance” and declared:

> Let us admit frankly that it is embarrassing that *Junost’* had no inhibitions in presenting to its readers a literary product which glorifies the adventures of a group of youth with nihilistic views, and did this only a month before the publication of the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the greatest document of the epoch, which clearly defines the moral code of the builders of Communism. The author sets his hero “above society” and apparently “forgets” that the Soviet people know only one common goal in life and that the same ethical norms, binding them all without exception, are “honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, simplicity, and modesty in social and in private life.”

Material in writing professionally aimed at youth confirms the impression that the novelists are not creating purely fictional characters. Consider this letter from a young reader to the editors of *Komsomol’skaja pravda*, the daily

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6. *Idem*.
7. Stishova, *op. cit. supra* note 4, at 127f.
newspaper which is the organ of the young Communist organization: "We
stand for moral freedom. Our motto is 'Enjoy life.' We pursue no political
goals, only respectable ones. In short, we follow the rule that each should
amuse himself in his own way. One gets drunk on wine, another goes crazy
over rock and roll, the third surrenders to the pleasures of love."8

Consider also these words as reported verbatim in the same paper. A
former student, Galina, meeting her old teacher by chance, tells him:

You naturally have not forgotten the good image I, in those days,
always showed you of Soviet youth. You always gave me the best grades
for my answers with a noble, moral leaning. At the time I spoke sincerely,
without any hypocrisy. I believed that I expressed my convictions. Yet
underneath a longing swelled in me to arrange my future so that I could
make an unconditional swap with life: all my preparation, giving it its
full due, in return for all pleasures up to the dregs. So, on the one hand,
I gave approval to great and noble feelings, on the surface, while, on
the other hand, I envied the "nice" life, however aristocratic it might be.
My heart rejected all the self-sacrifice which our Soviet books talk about
so much. That's not all. I was already beginning to philosophize about
the question with my girl friend Rimma: How much longer will this
readiness for sacrifice be asked of the people? Won't it be just the same
after the transition to Communism? Won't the hero himself, or rather
his welfare, his time, his health, his peace, always have to be uncondi-
tionally surrendered? At Rimma's parents', a small circle of engineers
and co-workers from the plant administration gathered occasionally. They
talked about this once around the table without noticing us. I thought,
That's the way the teachers are, too. They convince us, partly because
they feel they have to, because the curriculum prescribes it for them.
What one gets in movies, books, lectures and classes is nothing more than
propaganda.9

A similar doubt about the purpose of much Soviet education is expressed
in fictional form in the work of a well-known Soviet author Vladimir Ten-
drjakov, The Hastening Day, which was published in installments in the
Moscow literary monthly for youth, Molodaja gardija, in 1959. The hero
of the novel is a teacher named Birjukov. He faces his classes for five years,
murmuring, day after day, between his teeth, "Last time we went over...."
The phrase conceals the resignation of a mediocre blunderer. The novel and
the attitude it represents were criticized by M. Tsentsiper, a director of a
Moscow high school, in Izvestia of March 10, 1960. He quoted from Birju-

8. N. Aleksandrova & L. Pochivalov, "Otstupnik — tak on i nazyvaetsja" [He's Rightly
Called a Scoundrel], Komsomol'skaja pravda, July 9, 1958.
9. V. Turunin, "Prishlesh li ty pis'mo o svoem schast'e?" [Will You Write Me If You Are
Happy?], Komsomol'skaja pravda, November 28, 1957.
kov's impressions: "The classes were over. Sometimes I had the impression I was an old horse who was forced to turn a millstone round after round; to breathe; to pause; and again to turn another round, until strength was gone." The teachers began to look abominable to him, and classes more hopeless. And Birjukov made some highly undesirable observations, "Our pupils all live with their families. What unites them is education. Yet the entire education rests on a single maxim: Take care of yourself. . . . But who," asks Birjukov, passionately repeating the old question of Herzen, "is to blame for this hopeless and selfish existence? Is there no help here? Is there no way out"?

The insistence of Soviet literary critics that what the students complain of is imaginary is also challenged by such a representative of the younger generation of authors as Evgenij Evtushenko. His poetry has caused a good deal of critical jousting. Junost' recently published his poem, "Hold Me a Communist." In it he proclaims that history has given him a difficult mission: "May I clearly choose to wage a just war against every lie and roguery." But where does Evtushenko find lies and villainy, if not in the men of his own environment? The poem presents a grotesque gallery of "shining liars" as the usual participants in socialistic reality.

Evtushenko dedicated his poem to the memory of Vladimir Majakovskij. This gesture was not unreasonably interpreted to his discredit. V. Ruzhina of the Kherson Institute, a teachers' school, observed that Evtushenko was seemingly invoking the bitter complaint of Majakovskij that "there is a whole troop of rascals let loose on our earth." According to Ruzhina, this opinion of Majakovskij was appropriate at the time of its assertion in 1929, "a time of

the fiercest class battles in the Soviet Union," but is inappropriate for the socialist society of the present.¹³

A Russian proverb says, "It tears where it is thin." There are other young people who seem to invoke Majakovskij. Take the case of those daring "poets," who began to philosophize about progress and justice at the foot of his statue in Moscow. People like these poets have been criticized in the press. A typical comment is entitled "Headlong from Parnassus" in the January 14, 1962, issue of Komsomol'skaja pravda:

Naturally the promoters of "progress" suspect as suppressors of their sacred "rights" all who dislike their boorish behavior. It is noted that the poetic "progressivists" and fanatics of justice do not even scruple at offering their spectacle [that is, their poems and tracts] as a kind of political program.¹⁴

On October 1, 1961, Komsomol'skaja pravda reported that two hundred idlers attended a public demonstration of poets:

Vjacheslav Gogin went for a stroll around town with his friends. Arriving at Zoja-Kosmodemjanskaga-Park, he invited some young people to participate in a poetry reading. The passers-by stopped. "Come again tomorrow at the same time," said Vjacheslav to his audience. The following day over two hundred persons arrived to hear him. He read from Majakovskij, Bloch, Whitman, Esenin, Evtushenko, and finally from his own poetry. . . . But then suddenly the vigilantes [druzhinniki] appeared, grabbed him by the coat, and said, "Come with us."¹⁵

The District Committee of the Komsomol in Tambov later investigated wherein Gogin had committed a crime. All that could be said was that his behavior was "unauthorized." In the final analysis all the members of the committee came to this conclusion. The gathering resulted "without previous permission"; it was "spontaneous"; it was "unallowed."

Why does poetry have to be read on the street? That is the purpose of clubs and cultural centers. There you can hear things in an organized way and you can hear what will not harm you. Do you mean that there is such a thing in Moscow, too? Well, that may be, that such things are

¹³. V. Ruzhina, "Bez skidki na talant. . . ." [There is No Discount for Talent], a letter from a reader in Molodoj kommunist no. 5, pp. 118-121, 120 (1960).
¹⁵. I. Arkhipova, "Dvesti 'shalopaev' slushajut stikhi" [Two Hundred Loafers Hear Poetry], Komsomol'skaja pravda, October 1, 1961. On the druzhinniki, see supra, pp. 28-29.
allowed to happen there, but here at Tambov, it will not even be discussed, and that's that.16

In December, 1959, Junost' published a story by another young author, Gladilin, “Smoke in Your Eyes.” The story provoked a letter of protest from a young reader from Irkutsk, which, in turn, provoked a counterattack by the editors. Their literary critic, V. Shitova, instructed “the young girl from Irkutsk and other inexperienced readers” on how the lessons of literature were to be understood. Shitova’s apology for the story engaged in some sharp name-calling. She is dealing with an open “revolt against literature,” an attack on the “right of literature to show the manifold phenomena of life” and an attempt to canonize “pedantic fables” as the only acceptable form of literature.17

Junost’s defense did not itself remain without contradiction. In Molodoj kommunist T. Polozova found fault with Shitova for declaring that the constructive heroes of literature were “boring, uninteresting and pedantic,” while she preferred the worm-eaten, spiritually crippled heroes with complicated, fragile natures.18 Polozova maintained that the chief character of “Smoke in Your Eyes,” Igor Serov, was a proud, selfish, and heartless man. On the contrary, Shitova now replied, Serov was a realistic example for Soviet youth to imitate. Shitova suggested that the story was almost the first fundamentally literary treatment of the character of the “new man,” the first attempt at a serious discussion of “the Moscow Broadway ‘cats.’” Shitova maintained that Igor is not an exceptional case. Gladilin had merely attempted to bring out for every student the characteristics of his fellow student “or just simply the characteristics of the man sitting by chance next to him in the grandstand.” At the same time Shitova noted that such young people have a difficult nature, which leads, indeed, to their essential destruction. Comparing Gladilin’s creation with the young hero of V. Banykin’s “Andrej Sniezhkov,” she criticized Banykin for sketching a young man who complies with the demands of Communist morality: this “type” is too simple, too transparent.19

One gets the impression that Junost’ is trying to justify to the public some of the stories it has recently published — for example, Michail Parkhomov’s “A Splendid Fellow” (January, 1959), Zeleranskij and Larin’s “Misha,

19. V. Shitova, ibid.
Serega, and I” (July, August, 1959), Moskovkin’s “A Little Dog Barking at the Moon” (May, 1960). In all of these, rather singular and difficult characters appear. There is not a single hero in the Communist sense in any of these creations. Nor is there one in Dmitrij Kholendro and Michail Makljar-skij’s “The Referee’s Watch,” nor in Inna Goff’s “You Cannot Be a Poet.” As Polozova observed, in none of them is there “a hero who would be capable of arousing a desire in the reader to resemble him, who would motivate him to become spiritually richer, better, lovelier, or stronger.”

II. A Parallel

If we compare the trend among the young Soviet authors with the sociopolitical situation of the sixties of the nineteenth century, we find strikingly similar motivations at play. A recent Soviet historian of philosophy, M. T. Iovchuk, has observed: “At the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties of the nineteenth century, a serious revolution occurred in the consciousness of the progressive members of Russian society, above all in the consciousness of the intelligentsia, of the raznochintsy.” One thinks, first of all, of Nicholas Gavrilovich Chernyshevskij’s novel, What is to be Done? The novel was begun in December, 1862, and completed in four months by the author while he was imprisoned in the Petropavlov Prison at St. Petersburg. He wrote it as an “action program for future generations of revolutionaries.” N. A. Nekrasov hastened to publish the manuscript in his journal, Sovremennik. The first chapters of the novel appeared in the March, 1863, issue, followed by further chapters in April and May. The censors had been neglectful. The publication of the full novel was soon prohibited. It was permitted to be published in its entirety only in the year of the 1905 revolution.

Before the sixties the most open support for freedom and political enlight-
enment had been the Decembrist revolt of 1825. There had also been the stand of "Westerners" against "Slavophiles" in the forties and fifties. But interest in enlightenment had been largely confined to the nobility. Chernyshchevskij became the classical representative of the raznochintsy. These were the sons of teachers, priests, office workers, and the like, who appeared in the fifties and sixties. Unlike the reformers of the older generation led by Alexander Herzen, they henceforth formed a cadre of revolutionary intelligentsia.

In a book published on Chernyshchevskij in Moscow in 1961, Boris Rjurikov observes:

Belinskij blamed Herzen for making Krutsiferskij, a member of the raznochintsy, appear to be insignificant, to be nothing in contrast to Bel'tov, who is a purely superficial fellow from the nobility. In the forties, when Herzen wrote *Who is Guilty?*, one could already notice people who suggested what the future role and significance of the raznochintsy would be. Herzen dealt primarily with other types. But it must be emphasized that such raznochintsy — shy, humiliated, impractical people — lived already in his time, that is, in the forties, not only in the sixties. It is, however, primarily Chernyshchevskij's merit to have discovered and made evident the conception and development of this new element in society. He brought out, in particular, the raznochintsy's delicate feeling for personal values, their democratic pride and their capacity for self-assertion. They need these characteristics in order to give a validity to their personality in life, in order to be a match for the aristocrats and the well-to-do. The independence, the self-assertiveness of the new men is not only a moral psychological trait. It is above all a political one. It marks the role that these people play in social life and will play in the future.  

*What is to be Done?* was, to a considerable degree, already a work of answers. It was a reply, in particular, to the recently published novel of Turgeniev, *Fathers and Sons*, whose hero, the nihilist Bazarov, was considered by Chernyshchevskij and his ideological comrades as a virtual caricature of the younger generation and its earthly hopes, its desire for freedom, its acknowledgment of human reason. To let the public know that this generation was now being defended by him against the charge of thoughtless simple nihilism Chernyshchevskij gave his novel the descriptive subtitle "Stories about the New People." The action took place in three areas. As Rjurikov notes, these areas correspond to three themes: (1) "the theme of free work on a socialistic basis; (2) the theme of emancipation of woman; (3) the theme of revolutionary

underground activity, of approaching revolution — a theme which is fundamental and determining, while, in this work subject to censorship, it is muted and only allusively intoned.”

The heroes of the novel are members of the raznochintsy, the students Lopukhov and Kirsanov. The author tells us that “they were both early accustomed to make their own way without any help from others.” One need not suppose that this statement refers to economic aid. The statement could, and in fact did, contain a political meaning. Lopukhov started his studies at the medical academy at St. Petersburg on a state scholarship, but “when he got into some kind of quarrel, he had to withdraw and look out for his own interests.” Such misfortunes, it might be observed parenthetically, are not uncommon to Soviet students at state schools in the present sixties.

Why did the raznochintsy of the 1860’s run into such difficulties? Why do their legitimate heirs, the “new people” of modern Russia, in spite of many differences, resemble them so much in their relationship to society? What is of decisive importance in answering both questions is a basic characteristic in both generations: a radical aversion to any kind of suppression and an urgent desire for independence and freedom.

“You call me a dreamer and ask me what I really want from life,” says Vera Pavlovna in What is to be Done? as she answers her friend Julie, who is carefully presenting to her the advantages of marrying Storeshnikov:

“I want neither to rule nor to be subject myself. I want neither to be deceived, nor to deceive. I don’t want to conform to the opinion of others, nor to seek to achieve what others advise me to seek when I do not feel the need of it. For what doesn’t seem necessary to me I will not sacrifice myself or even any little whim of mine. I want to be independent and to live according to my tastes. For what is necessary for me I shall give a great deal. What I do not need, I don’t want either. What I shall need someday, I do not yet know. . . . I do not know how I shall feel when I am captured by the love of a man. I know only this that I will not subject myself to anyone, that I want to be free and not to feel bound to anyone so that anyone could dare say to me ‘You are obliged to do something for me.’ I want to do only what pleases me. Let the others do the same. I don’t want to ask anything from anyone.

24. Id. at 137.
25. N. G. Chernyshevskij, Chto delat’? [What is to be Done?] 2/II. A 1961 version of this novel in English has been issued by Vintage Books as a paperback. It employs the 1883 translation by the famous anarchist, Benjamin R. Tucker. It has been revised by Ludmilla B. Turkevich, and abridged with one-eighth of the text being omitted. There is an introduction by E. H. Carr. The only other English translation appears to be one by Nathan Haskell Dole and S. S. Sidelsky (New York, 1886).
26. Id. at 2/II.
I don’t want to limit anyone’s freedom, and I want to be free myself.”27

At the birthday dance, Vera explains to the curious and surprised Lopukhov in their first conversation together:

“The main thing is independence to do as I please, to live as I please without having to ask anyone’s permission, not to ask anything from anybody, to need no one, no one at all — that’s the way I want to live.”28

Concerning the raznochintsy Rjurikov makes the following observation:

The raznochintsy know life, not in its dress uniform, but as it really is. They have its burden to carry on their shoulders, but this kills illusions and leads to a sober observation of reality. With them there is no profit to be made from useless dreaming, in an insincere “striving for the ideals” which the “prose of life” so haughtily ignores. They have their own progressive, democratic ideals, and these ideals point to reality.29

“Insincere ‘striving for the ideals’ which the ‘prose of life’ so haughtily ignores”? One can doubtless understand very different things from these words, not only in the West, but also in the Soviet Union. As Iovchuk wrote in 1952:

Chernyshevskij’s revolutionary democratic ideology was an attack against the ideology of an autocracy based on serfdom and on the liberal ideology of the large estate holder and bourgeoisie. Despite the attack the ruling classes came through the sharp revolutionary crisis of the fifties and kept the transformation of the revolutionary situation of 1859-1861 from turning into a political overthrow. The historical condition of Russia was so shaped that until about the eighties there were no available forces to organize the masses and to effect the political and social revolutions. Still, the ideological battle was fought by Russian revolutionary democracy. It was led by Belinskij, Herzen, and Chernyshevskij. It tried to unmask the reactionary ideas of the autocracy and of Pan-Slavism and the imported thinking of Schelling and Hegel which was used to justify the autocratic habits of a politically aggressive Czarism.30

In What is to be Done? are two kinds of characters: “the decent average men” of the new generation and the “rigorist” Rakhmetov. The author had

27. Id. at 1/VI.
28. Id. at 2/IV.
30. Iovchuk, op. cit. supra note 21, at 54f.
several reasons for emphasizing his concern with the first kind of character. One immediate motive was to give the impression of being interested in only harmless, everyday things, in an awkward attempt to fool suspicious readers without making the deciphering of his meaning impossible to potential followers. Secondly, these kinds of people were the bulk of the raznochintsy. "We are weak because we believe ourselves to be weak," says Vera Pavlovna. As Chernyshevskij comments on these "decent average people," "What do they do that is exceptionally noteworthy? They commit no really bad deeds; they are not frightened by decisions; they possess normal, honest convictions, and make an effort to behave with moderation and nothing more. One cannot really call this kind of behavior heroism."

Yet the reader of What is to be Done? would not have understood Chernyshevskij's purpose without the introduction of his second kind of character, Rakhmetov. As Rjurikov has emphasized:

The emerging political effect of the raznochintsy can be perceived only through the relationship between them [the average raznochintsy] and his towering hero, Rakhmetov. . . . Rakhmetov is the knot that ties together all the threads. He is an "extraordinary man." His essential activity, the direct preparation for the revolution, is withheld from the vision of the reader. As a man of indomitable courage, spiritual independence, and iron will, he offers his services without reservation to the cause of the revolution. The disciplined way of life, the renunciation of personal feelings and comfort, all these characteristics point to a purposeful behavior, dedicated to revolution, and of great rarity.

Some critics have taken Rakhmetov as a type in the line of the "penitent nobility." This interpretation, of course, only reveals that these critics could not grasp the fundamentally new kind of phenomenon marking the new type of the raznochintsy hero. Rakhmetov does not display the traditional traits of the penitent nobility, such as their endless deliberation and their consciousness of guilt seeking atonement . . . and Rakhmetov overshadows the "average man" of the new generation as a palace overshadows a house.

Chernyshevskij indicates that he knows more about Rakhmetov than he is prepared to say. There are very few people of his importance. "So far I have met only eight cases of this sort, among them two women," the author says mysteriously.

Thanks to them, everyone's life flowers; without them, it would pass without trace, disintegrate like sour milk. There are only a few of them,

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31. Chernyshevskij, op. cit. supra note 25, at 3/XXIX.
but they make it possible for all men to breathe; without them, people would suffocate. The mass of honest and good men is large. Of men such as Rakhmetov, there are only a few, but they are among the others as theine in tea, as the bouquet of a precious wine. From them the masses get force and spice. They are the flower of the best people. They are those who move the moving powers. They are salt from the salt of the earth. 33

It is not without interest that Rakhmetov was in a number of aspects the model for the young Lenin. "Before studying the works of Marx, Engels, and Plekhanov," Lenin once stated, "only Chernyshevskij exercised a decisive and overpowering influence on me, and that began with the reading of What is to be Done?" 34

It is also of interest that until recently the influence of Chernyshevskij on Lenin was either kept secret or debated polemically by the Soviet historians of ideas, who were interested in maintaining the Marxian authenticity of Lenin. 35 It was only in 1960 that the authorized biography of Lenin, after acknowledging the non-Marxist influence on him of his older brother, Alexander, continued as follows:

Lenin was fascinated by the novel What is to be Done?, a favorite book of his executed brother. In this novel, Chernyshevskij introduced, through the disguise of fiction his socialist views, which, for the first time in Russian literature, created the figure of the revolutionary as an unselfish fighter for the freedom and the happiness of the people. What is to be Done? impressed young Vladimir Ilyich so strongly that during the summer of 1888 he read it carefully five times, always discovering new and exciting thoughts. . . . Later he remembered that in the summer of 1888 he was "thoroughly transformed" by Chernyshevskij. 36

Does not one think of Lenin in reading Rakhmetov's key conversation with Vera Pavlovna after Lopukhov's suicide?

33. Chernyshevskij, op. cit. supra note 25, at 3/XXVII.
34. N. Valentino-Vol'skij, Vstrechi s Leninom [Meetings with Lenin] 108 (New York, 1953). In the same conversation Lenin was asked, "Does that mean that you did not give the title What is to be Done? to your pamphlet of 1902 by accident?" "Is it possible that one would not guess the connection immediately?" Lenin replied. Id. at 102. Lenin is here reported to have indignantly repudiated the suggestion that Chernyshevskij was "primitive" and maintained that Marx had called him "a great author."
36. V. I. Lenin — Biografiya 6 (ed. by Marxist-Leninist Institute, Moscow, 1960).
"I am really not made to be a dark monster, but circumstances are such that a man like me, possessed of this glowing love, cannot be anything else but a dark monster. Were things not this way, then perhaps I could joke and laugh, sing and dance all day long."

Was this not to present a model that Lenin could understand when Rakhmetov declared:

"We ask that people come to the full enjoyment of their lives. Then we must demonstrate with our entire behavior that we ask for this not for the satisfaction of our personal passions, not for ourselves, but for humanity in general, that we raise our voices purely for principle, not because we are following a certain preference — out of conviction, and not out of personal need."37

The new people, Lopukhov, Kirsanov, Vera Pavlovna, were the carriers of the new principles, while Rakhmetov was consecrated to making the new principles a reality in a new social order. Chernyshevskij's prophetic words on this subject, dangerously relevant for the present, are usually ignored by Soviet critics. He said of the new people:

This kind of human being has existed in our country for only a short time. There were a few isolated personalities before now who approached it. But they were exceptions, lonesome and weak in their exceptional posture, and as a result remained inactive or despaired or else indulged in romantic flights and cultivated phantasies, proving that they still lacked the hallmark of this kind of man, that is, a practical cold-bloodedness, ready for balanced, prudent, and efficient action. . . . This kind of being has appeared only recently, but he increases rapidly. He is a product of the time: he is characteristic of the time: and he will — shall I say it? — disappear with his time. His existence is not of long duration. Six years ago these people could not be seen; three years ago they were despised; and now. . . . In a few, a very few, years one will beg them, "Rescue us." Everyone will give them what they ask. Then some years will pass, perhaps only months, and they will be cursed, driven from the scene, hissed, marked. So what, if they are hissed and marked, driven away and cursed, you will have had your profit from them; that's enough for them. And amid the loud hissing and stream of cursing, they will exit from the stage as proud and noble, as strong and kind as they always were. — And won't they remain on the scene? — No. — Then how will it be without them? — Bad. But after them it will be better than it was before their appearance. The years will pass, and the people will say, After them it was better, yet it remained bad. When

37. Chernyshevskij, op. cit. supra note 25, at 3/XXVII.
they speak in this way, it will mean that the time has come again for this kind of human being to appear again, and they will awaken men—now better and more numerous—to a new life, because there will already be much more on hand of everything that is good, and all good things will be better. Then the cycle will begin in a new form. And so it will continue until the people finally say, Now, now it goes well with us. And then there will be no more of this special kind of human being, for all men will be such. And they will grasp only with great effort that once there was a time when this sort of man was believed to be something special, and was not recognized as the natural form of all men.

Chernyshevskij’s words, which echo so hauntingly in the Soviet Union of today, are not the only writings of the nineteenth century which seemed to have parallels now. Consider Turgenev’s novel, On the Eve, written about the situation just before the liberation of the serfs. In this story, Turgenev sought “a new hero in order to give form through him to the new tendencies of progress in Russian social development, as well as form to his own thoughts about the fate of Russia.” The modern Soviet critic, N. A. Dobroljubov, commented, “The earlier heroes had done their work, and with the majority of our society they no longer awakened sympathy.” So Turgenev “decided to drop them, as he perceived in certain fragmentary phenomena the signs of new challenges of life, and attempted to choose the road on which the

38. Id. at 3/VIII.
39. See, e.g., Oles’ Gonchar, Vospityvat’ pravdoj i geroikoj zhizni [Education for Truthfulness and Heroism in Life], DRUZHEBA NARODOV (Moscow), no. 3, pp. 204-16 (1962); N. Vladimirova & M. Sultanova, K edinym tseljam [For Equal Goals], DRUZHEBA NARODOV no. 6, pp. 264-271 (1962); Z. Finickaja, Chelovek protiv sobstvennika [Man Against Property] DRUZHEBA NARODOV no. 3, pp. 217-228 (1962) [Druzhba Narodov is a Moscow literary monthly which is particularly interested in young authors]; V. Ivanov, Zametki o nekotorykh literaturnykh sporakh [Notes on Some Literary Analysses], KOMMUNIST no. 4, pp. 58-68 (Moscow, 1962); A. Metchenko, Novoe u zhizni i v literature [What’s New in Life and Literature], KOMMUNIST no. 5, pp. 85-95 (1962) [Kommunist is the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it is devoted to theory]; (anon.), Mlddeč očima V. Aksjonoa [Youth in the Eyes of V. Aksenov], TVORB (Prague) no. 19, May 10, 1962, p. 451; V. Ozerov, “Zhivoe delo, tvorcheskaja mys’” [Creative Thought, a Vital Matter], Pravda (Moscow), May 13, 1962, p. 4; “The Fourth Generation [Russian poets under thirty]” — Report from the Budapest literary monthly NAGYVIJLAG, in EAST EUROPE (New York), June 11, 1962, pp. 30-32; D. Burg, Cholodnaja vojna na unutriliteraturnom fronte [The Cold War on the Literary Front], SOTSIALISTICHESKIJ VESTNIK (New York) no. 5-6, pp. 68-71 (May-June, 1962); V. Aleksandrova, Taruskie stranitsy [Pages from Tarusa], SOTSIALISTICHESKIJ VESTNIK no. 5-6, pp. 72-74 (May-June, 1962).


progressive movement of our time marches.”41 Turgenev’s friend, P. V. Annenkov, noted that in the critical reception of *On the Eve*

The public split into two camps. . . . Those who praised it were university students, the class of scientists and writers, and the enthusiasts for the freedom of the suppressed people. The liberal, rousing tone of the story was entirely to their taste. In contrast, the spiritual conception of the author, with his concern for terrible questions about the rights of the people and justice, terrified established society.42

Are there not people today in the Soviet Union to whom Turgenev’s confession, “I love Russia differently from those who are now its masters”43 means something?

III. Present Theories of Responsibility

1. Antecedents. — The present state of formal Soviet thought on ethics, human purpose, and human values cannot, of course, be understood apart from the roots of this thought in the ethical traditions of the West. Even Christianity, even St. Paul’s proclamation of a “new man,” even his message “We shall walk in a new life” because “the old man is crucified,” continue to have reverberations in the Communist doctrine of the “new man.” The notion of an orderly universe held by Greek cosmologists like Heraclitus, Plato’s idea of the good as a criterion of purpose, Aristotle’s category of virtues, St. Paul’s concept of the new man, the intellectualism of Aquinas—all these systems have had effect on the structure of values incorporated in Soviet thought.

The more immediate sources of Soviet thought, however, may be found in the “rational egotism” of the Enlightenment. In the shape given it by Ludwig Feuerbach, this theory informed the ethics of the Russian revolutionary democrats of the nineteenth century. As contemporary Soviet historians put it, this theory was what the revolutionists invoked “to provide the foundation of justice in the revolutionary alteration of society.”44 In the difference between Feuerbach’s formulations and Marx’s criticism of them may be found a paradigm of tensions which recur in present Soviet ethics.

Feuerbach’s ethics started with a concept of happiness as the object of

individual effort. But he attempted to enlarge this concept, so that it involved collective happiness. To do this, Feuerbach assumed that happiness consisted in reciprocal benefits. "Happiness," he wrote, "is not found in this person or that person, but it is shared among persons, encircling you and me together."45 This possibly empirical observation was then given further weight by being cast in terms of idealistic philosophy.

In Feuerbach's version of idealism, man is described as the self-conscious essence of "Nature." Man has significance then not as an individual, but as species (Gattung). Species is a "single reality," identical with the "being of one's own essence."46 The consciousness of the individual that he is nothing except as he is part of mankind, identified with the species, is what Feuerbach called "communism."47 It is in this consciousness that man rises from matter to pure Spirit, becoming one with the absolute species. Material, individual men find in this unity the true meaning of life: 48

Your belief in immortality is only true if you can believe in the immortality and truth of the Spirit, of consciousness, in the undying youth of man; if you believe that man has an existence which does not depend on the existence of existing individuals.49

In this system, morality has its sole root in the "absolute identity" of individual men and the community.50

What is my principle? Ego and alter ego; egoism and communism. They are as indivisible as head and heart. Without egoism you have no head, and without communism no heart.51 . . . That I, beyond myself, am morally you, is the origin of the transcendental consciousness in me.52

In summary:
1) Communism is understood by Feuerbach in the sense of an idealistic identification, determined by consciousness, of man with the species; the identification invokes the concept of the Spirit of absolute idealism, taken as the opposite of Nature.
2) The apparent reality of a united species exists in his system only through the Spirit, whose self-consciousness is assumed.
3) The double image of man of Feuerbach, equally rooted in Nature

45. Ludwig Feuerbach, 10 Sämtliche Werke 67 (Leipzig, 1846-1866).
47. Gerd Dicke, Der Identitätsgedanke bei Feuerbach und Marx 70 (Köln, 1960).
49. Feuerbach, 3 Sämtliche Werke 82.
50. Feuerbach, 2 Sämtliche Werke 413.
51. Feuerbach, op. cit. supra note 46, at 235.
52. Feuerbach, op. cit. supra note 45, at 73.
and in essential Spirit, gives the ego a preponderance in both knowledge and behavior, and a preponderance in its relationship both to the alter ego and to the datum of sense experience. Because Spirit and Nature, man and Nature are not related in the Hegelian way by an absolute identity, no ground is given for a materialistic inversion of this relationship.

4) An analogy exists between the principles of Feuerbach and the second great commandment of Christian morality to love your neighbor as yourself. The association of Feuerbach of the "transcendental consciousness of man" with "the ego outside myself" contains a component which is individualistic and personalist.

Marx criticized Feuerbach chiefly for the remnants of dualism in this system. The transfer of dialectic into matter had not been total. The double image of man had been the result. With Feuerbach, man is, indeed, finally independent of matter, and so Marx can scornfully characterize his philosophy as a "former materialism." The "communism" of Feuerbach was equally unacceptable to Marx. "It asserted a relationship which was only determined by consciousness and was therefore purely idealistic, not an action working toward unity." Finally, Feuerbach's system was essentially static: the Spirit was discovered at the moment it was actually described, and it was at this moment completed. With Marx, man, in a self-development which is both an alienation and a return, creates his objects; his essence is practical.

Marx's materialist critique of Feuerbach left little room in Marx's own work for the personalist strain which Feuerbach transmitted to the Russian revolutionary democrats. But a basic problem remained for Marx in the concept of social consciousness which was fundamental to his idea of Communism. According to his Critique of Political Economics, "It is not the consciousness of man which determines his being, but rather his social being which determines his consciousness." Yet how can Marx appeal to "social being," without appealing to "social consciousness"? Moreover, "social being" is a fatally ambiguous term. Is it "the sum of individual consciousnesses," or is it the "independent existence of the individual consciousnesses of the members of a class"? The problem of explaining "social being" or "social con-

53. DICKE, op. cit. supra note 47, at 63.
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 64.
sciousness" in a nonidealist way will be found to recur today in Soviet
ethics.

2. Tugarinov and Smirnov.—If we turn from the philosophical battles
of the infancy of Marxism to the work of the most vigorous contemporary
Soviet ethician, V. P. Tugarinov, we can note the existence of this problem,
together with the problem of dealing with the desire for individual happiness
and the desire for meaning in an individual life. In his recent book, signif-
icantly entitled *The Values of Life and Culture*, Tugarinov has attempted to
answer in formal philosophical terms some of the aspirations of the present
generation.

On the basis of its materialism, the kind of Soviet ethics advanced by
Tugarinov has to give some place to the elementary observation that it is
natural "for everyone to seek happiness and well-being." But by its demand
for "immanence," this materialism rejects any transcendental attempt to
satisfy these desires. Transcendental tendencies like Christianity, Tugarinov
finds, lead to putting "the meaning of human life in the fulfillment of a divine
will." In them "man becomes a mere tool, by whose help God realizes ends
which are inscrutable, unknown and unknowable by man."

There is a further objection to the "transcendental" approach, tellingly
put by Tugarinov as follows:

Suppose it is asserted that there is an empirical meaning for life, can
any metaphysical meaning be given it? In other words, how shall one
answer the question, what is the final meaning of life, to what object
is it directed? This question leads us again to a transcendental under-
standing of the meaning of life. We consider it further and it raises the
still more general question, why does the world in general exist? The
scientific philosophy of life is not able to answer this question; it, indeed,
holds the question itself a false one. No one can give a purpose for the
existence of the universe, including the life in it. Nature is equally its
own origin and its final "purpose." It may be recalled that religion has
not answered this question either but has thrown up the "inscrutableness"
of the decrees of God. Even if religion made the effort to unveil these
divine secrets, this could not be the final answer, for its information would
only lead us to a further question, For what purpose has God set this end?
Only man can set a purpose. Purpose is anthropomorphic. This means
that nature is treated as a conscious essence when man ascribes a purpose
to it. Man is a natural, finite, and social being. Because of this his pur-
poses, rightly understood, are real and finite even if they go beyond the

58. TUGARINOV, *op. cit.* supra note 57, at 113 f.
59. *Id.* at 37.
60. *Idem.*
reach of a particular person. In this approach there is no metaphysical meaning, and none can be given it.\textsuperscript{61}

Tugarinov concludes, "The Marxian conception of the meaning of life is materialistic in the sense that its approach is an immanent one: that is, it seeks the meaning of life not outside of life, not in some predetermination from beyond life, but in life itself."

At the same time, Tugarinov declares, "The Marxist understanding of the meaning of life is distinguished from all other theories, including materialistic theories, by its overthrowing of the individualistic thought which makes the meaning of life a purely personal problem."\textsuperscript{62} The answer to the drive for individual happiness is found collectively. Unexpectedly, as it were, this apparently individualistic drive is found to respond to the communal consciousness embraced in the concept of "social being." The seeking of happiness, then, becomes "work for the welfare of society, for its progress, for the creation of the best society."\textsuperscript{63} "Work for the building of Communism is the fundamental vital need, the chief interest, the meaning of life for a socialist man."\textsuperscript{64}

The idea of personal freedom is, accordingly, devalued in Tugarinov's postulation of the coincidence of personal and social goals, in his interpretation of "social" to mean the "building of Communism." According to his argument,

new community conditions . . . give new form to personal freedom. In capitalism the measure of personal freedom was determined through the degree of relative independence which men experienced from hostile and oppressive civil communities. In socialism and Communism the freedom of the person is measured by the degree in which a man joins his personal interest in his consciousness with the interests of the community and the degree in which he makes the communal his personal interest. In other words, the freedom of the person in socialism, like his development, is not found in his alienation from the community but through the unity and coincidence of the personal and the communal, through an ever-growing approach of the person to community corresponding to the progress of Communism. The approach of person and community is a new measure, appropriate to socialism, of the relation of these two to each other.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{61.} TUGARINOV, op. cit. supra note 57, at 40.
\textsuperscript{62.} Id. at 38.
\textsuperscript{63.} Id. at 39.
\textsuperscript{64.} Idem.
\textsuperscript{65.} TUGARINOV, op. cit. supra note 57, at 44.
In this context:

Freedom of speech, like other freedoms, cannot be taken as a metaphysical value which has no relation to the social conditions in which it is developed. This freedom, like other freedoms, is conceived of as a means of the achievement of the general goal which Marxism seeks, the building of the socialist and Communist society.\(^6\)

Again, in his examination of the essential constituents of personal freedom, Tugarinov cites an article in the Moscow periodical Literaturnaja Gazeta of April 18, 1959, making the following unambiguous remarks:

Everything which at a given period in time contradicts the fundamental objects and efforts of a socialist people should be legally forbidden and branded by the community as valueless.\(^6\)

This concept of freedom is what is set out by Tugarinov as the "overthrow of individualistic thought" and put forward by him as a fundamental category at the basis of the development of Communist morality.

Tugarinov, to be sure, defines "truth" as the "agreement of thought with reality."\(^6\) But this reality is identified with the model of society which is the foundation of his order of values. Similarly, Tugarinov says that the good is "a relationship which is developed with the conscious objective of bringing effective utility to society, that is, a utility which aids social progress."\(^6\) No repeated proof is needed to show that in this Marxist-Leninist ethic only the building of Communism has validity as the social progress of true history.

What can be said on this collectivist theory of value in its own terms?\(^7\)

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66. Id. at 70.
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id. at 103.
69. Id. at 125.
70. To go outside the system, one may consider the kind of commentary modern phenomenology would make on it. According to phenomenology, the individuality which is at the center of an act of being contradicts any collectivist explanation. Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik 407 (Halle, 1921\(^3\)), takes everything perceptible to be embraced by the word "consciousness," for he holds consciousness alone to have meaning. At the level of the phenomenological analysis it is clear, as Vladimir Soloviev had earlier observed, that an act "such as my thought, for example, in which or for which everything is conceivable cannot itself be conceived." (1 Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenij 72 [St. Petersburg, 1911-14]) Consequently, "the act involved in any form of perception or even of observation, whether the perception is external or internal, is never itself given as an existent. I, the perceiver, am given in the form of particular kinds of perceptions, and the form of the act of inner perception and the essentially corresponding form of diversity are given as existent." (Scheler 388 f.) The simplicity of the act thus posits an encompassing concept of consciousness corresponding to "each consciousness of" each intentionally directed being. It is rightly pointed out by Scheler that this understanding of consciousness is identical with the idea of person. The assertion is equally true that "the person is the unknown and scientifically ungraspable living substance of every act which completes an
First, is it not fair to note that it assumes what is to be proved, that “a personal meaning for life for individual men has in the concrete historical conditions been eliminated along with the role and status of individual men in this concrete society”?\textsuperscript{71} Secondly, has not recent Soviet philosophy itself recognized that there is a universal human element which does not depend on class interest and can never lose its validity?\textsuperscript{72} This recognition contradicts the class association or economic being which Tugarinov posits as necessarily governing the spiritual activity of man. Thirdly, has not there also been some recognition that freedom is a constituent of a human person?\textsuperscript{73} Fourthly, one Soviet writer, G. Smirnov, has attempted to distinguish “personal interests and the interests of a person”; the latter are related to interests beyond the individual, while the former are proper to the individual.\textsuperscript{74} Is this not to admit a dualism of interests?

Is there not, moreover, a ring of reality in the further concession Smirnov has made: There exist “special interests of social groups, semicollectives, and individuals”?\textsuperscript{75} Smirnov has noted that the interests of the whole are “not always and under all circumstances in harmony” with the interests of particular collectives and persons. He gives as examples “the well-known remaining class distinction between workers and kolkhoz farmers,” and the “activities of particular production collectives and organizations which occur in open contradiction to the interests of the society, and the system of proportionate payments which puts the position of a particular collective in opposition to the general interest.”\textsuperscript{76} From these observations he arrives at two conclusions: (1) The general character of the fundamental interest offers no

\textsuperscript{71} TUGARINOV, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 57, at 38.
\textsuperscript{72} OSNOVY MARKSISTSKOJ FILOSOFII 570 and 596. See also TUGARINOV, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{74} G. SMIRNOV, \textit{Bor’ba za nove — zakon dvizhenija k kommunistu} [The Fight for What is New — a Law of Movement for Communism], \textit{KOMMUNIST} no. 1, pp. 36-48, esp. p. 40 (Moscow, 1963).

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id.} at 41.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Idem.}
guarantee of an automatic solution to the problem of the interests of different groups of men carrying out particular concrete tasks. (2) It is clear that the masses must be made conscious of the desirability for cooperation between the general interest and particular interests, if the activity of the masses in the fight for the building of Communism is to be increased.77

In somewhat the same way Tugarinov attempts to join “the rebirth of the true character of man resulting from his social nature” and happiness, virtue, duty, to which Marxism finally gives “a concrete, historical, class-conditioned content.”78 He makes men individually responsible, without granting man individual freedom. He tries to make use of potentialities for effort which exist in man’s drive to happiness, but will not accept the individuality of man’s will. Does not, then, the ethical insistence of Marxism-Leninism become merely a tool, used to posit a foundation and an end, and in being so used become the instrument for the rule of the few over the many?

3. Pressing Problems of Legality and Responsibility.—On the basis of this ethic one can understand what is meant by the legal transformation of the collective morality of dialectical and historical materialism:

The session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on December 8, 1961, took up the “foundations for legislation in the Soviet Union and its federal republics.” These have taken effect May 1, 1962. The publication of these important acts of fundamental law is a remarkable step in the development of the new code of Soviet legislation. There is colossal significance in this because it brings the content of the civil law into accord with the socioeconomic characteristics of the present period of development of our society, the period of the unfolding of Communism.79

One would scarcely be surprised from this statement to find that in this work of legislation the concepts of law are made absolutely subject to the demands of ideological doctrine. Thus, it is stated in the preamble to the law that the purpose of Soviet legislation is to “actively cooperate in solving the tasks of the building of Communism.”80 Allowance, however, has to be made for the fact that

77. Cf. idem.
78. TUGARINOV, op. cit. supra note 57, at 131 and 38.
80. Quoted in id. at 94.
... in the present stage of development ... the residual evils of capitalism and the influence of imperialist ideology and morality, which infected individuals, have not been fully removed from our society. There are still plunderers of socialist property, the avaricious, swindlers, rowdies, parasites, and other elements hostile to society, who hinder our progress forward. To fight these elements, to the extent that they do not let themselves be influenced and re-educated by our society, the Soviet state has retained official means of compulsion.\textsuperscript{81}

The problem of responsibility for a socialist society is not only crime in the conventional Western sense, but failure to work for society. O. V. Smirnov notes that Article 12 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. provides that "Work is not only a moral, but a legal, obligation of every citizen capable of working."\textsuperscript{82} As to the discipline which is necessary to enforce this obligation, a report of \textit{Kommunist} of December, 1962, is informative:

A short time ago in the plant [the turbine works of Cheljabinsk] it was a widely tolerated practice for mill workers, welders, and steel-pourers to appear drunk on the job; many times people came into the plant and even into the work area with bottles. Alcoholism resulted in this kind of neglect of work: every day twenty to thirty persons were absent from work. People referred to "tradition" when discussing these facts. Today, however, such loafing and drinking during work hours has met with the severest condemnation by the collective. . . . The number of offenses against work discipline has diminished in recent times, but yet not so much that one can speak of a fundamental turn.\textsuperscript{83}

The area of conventional criminal justice is also marked by open questions and some contradictions. It is contended that criminality in the Soviet Union is declining. At the same time in books and newspapers there is a perceptible number of cases reported which show that the socialist state "is not yet free from elements hostile to society — parasites, hooligans, thieves, and other people of worthless moral behavior. These disgusting appearances can be

\textsuperscript{82} O. V. Smirnov, \textit{O ponjatii prava na trud} [On the Concept of Right to Labor] in \textit{VLU - SEFP}, no. 3 (1962), p. 118. At 123 he says, "As a result of binding law the legal obligation of work begins for the factory worker and the office worker and the member of the kolkhoz on the completion of their sixteenth year. In an exceptional case, one may be employed as a worker when he has completed his fifteenth year if there is agreement by the technical and regional committees of the factorium. This is in accordance with the decree of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of December 13, 1956."
\textsuperscript{83} F. Petrenko and G. Khrustov, \textit{Chelovek budushchego formiruet'sja segodna} [The Man of the Future is Formed Today], \textit{Kommunist} no. 17, pp. 46-58; here p. 49 (Moscow, 1962).
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observed in Soviet society in no small degree."\(^8^4\) The authors commenting on this situation do not neglect to note the disharmony of such realities with the idea of laying the foundations of Communism. In a review of representative legal publications of 1960-1961, K. Nikitin critically pointed out the present characteristics of Soviet criminal activity:

The general decline of crimes and criminality has occurred chiefly in the area of trifling offenses, while the number of major crimes has only gradually declined, and major crimes have even increased in particular districts and cities. It must be noted that in many places the principle of associating measures of social influence with just punishment has been lost. In not a few cases a liberal attitude has been taken toward evil and dangerous criminal elements, and public compulsion to prevent crime has been lessened. Individual representatives of the militia, the courts, and the administration have falsely thought that they could weaken the application of measures of legal punishment even towards crimes of great danger to the public, because the public at large was participating actively in the fight against lawbreakers. These people apparently have not paid any fundamental attention to the instructions of the Twenty-first and the Twenty-second Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These instructions did not envisage that the transfer of a number of functions of the organs of the state, including the function of protecting the legal order, to social organizations, should in the least lead to a weakening of these functions and to a lessening of the role of the socialist state in the elimination of criminal activities. The transfer to reliance on social influence is not an invitation to give everything away and to neglect severe measures of punishment for dangerous lawbreakers. . . . The difficult task of the fight against dangerous lawbreakers simply cannot be shifted to the voluntary troops of order (dobrovol'nye narodnye druzhiny) and to the comrades' courts (tovarishcheskie sudy). For these large and difficult matters the clear law must be strengthened for the protection of the socialist legal order by decisions of the competent organs of the state. . . . Unhappily in many recent works a one-sided treatment of this theme appears. These works do not give sufficient recognition to the function and significance of legal compulsion in the fight against criminality.\(^8^5\)

An essay of N. Mironov on *Pressing Questions for the Further Consolidation of Legality*, in the January, 1963, *Kommunist*, suggests how often axioms based on the collective welfare fail to furnish any beliefs for individuals. In the list of present-day crimes, the principal place, next to hooliganism, is

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85. *Id.* at 117f.
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held by economic offenses. The verified injuries to property reported by Mironov include a notable number of cases of embezzlement of socialist property and of speculation. These economic crimes, he observes, are, above all,

serious crimes against discipline and order in particular branches of the economic administration and in the lower levels of work and also in many organs of the state and social organizations whose function it is to prevent and suppress offenses of this kind. The dangerousness of this kind of crime is not limited to the material harm done the state. Rather, the circumstances suggest that those who participate in these crimes, working together in criminal bands, implicate a comparatively large circle of people in their intrigues. The epidemic of avarice leads to the corruption, by bribes and handouts, not only of individual members of public authority and institutions, but even of officers of the state administration.  

Add to these facts the rather ambiguous consequences of what current jargon calls “social influence” (voluntary militia, comrades’ courts, collective security) operating in the interests of an ideology. It seems that Soviet moral philosophy faces two alternatives: either to ask complete submission to the collective moral norms of Communism or to wage a battle against criminality in the socialist sense by an appeal directed to a sense of individual responsibility.  

The second alternative is made increasingly difficult by the ideological tendency to depersonalize individuals. The apparent distance between the is and the ought is even clearer in the suspicion that surface demonstrations of Communist morality and opinion by the public occur perhaps only for self-protection. The doubt occurs whether, in terms of proposing ends, either collectivist theory or individual practice may not be superfluous. This is the kind of doubt which could give support to an unstable situation ethics.

M. Koval’zon voices this anxiety in a note on the relationship between the weltanschauung and public morality:


87. Mironov also takes up, as did Nikitin, the mischievousness of the concept of “social influence” in this area. The sharing with the public of responsibility for protection of the socialist legal order, which seemed desirable ideologically, is, he says, “no reason to curtail the significance of the organs of the state and to hand over their direct functions prematurely to the public.” On the contrary, “The success of the state against crime depends at the present stage on the organs of the state for the protection of the social order — the administration and the courts — being active and expertly protecting the rights recognized by the state.” (Id. at 53)

Individual functionaries of the party and other organisms of the society have generally taken pains so that the people make their own a more or less large amount of knowledge within the domain of Marxism-Leninism. This is naturally very important. Knowledge increases power and provides tools for the understanding of the environment. At the same time, to know principles is not to make them part of one’s inner convictions. In not a few cases a man knows the principles of Marxism-Leninism very well, but he behaves like a principleless bourgeois, who snatches what he can pick up. Knowledge must be distinguished from conviction. The active builder of Communism organically relates to himself his knowledge of the principles of Communism with a conviction of their sublime justice. Every day he wages a stubborn and implacable fight for the building of Communism.

What does it mean to fight in one’s daily life for the ideals of Communism? Many have an incomplete understanding of this: no crimes against the rules of community life; learning, working, and contributing by your work to the good of the whole. Of course, this is necessary, but the world view and ethics of Communism is relentlessly driven by collectivism, by a passionate interest not only in the well-being of individual persons but also in the well-being of the entire collectivity, in which the individuals live and labor, in the well-being of the whole society. Communism teaches that the welfare of individuals must be achieved through the bettering of the life of everyone.89

4. Conclusion. -- Is not Koval’zon appealing to something curiously like a Christian conscience when he appeals to inner conviction? Are we not in the presence of a new tendency when G. Smirnov speaks of “individual interests”? The established texts of Soviet ethics, the Fundamentals of Communist Morality, the Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy, the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, know nothing of particular interests of social groups or individuals which could clash with the interest of the whole.90

Smirnov, although already under attack as deviating from Communist principle,91 is still attempting to explain the person in collectivist terms. For him the person is the complex consciousness of the moral demands of the code for the building of Communism. General interests are preferred to personal interests. The building of Communist society is taken as unshakeable datum.92 Tugarinov adheres to similar convictions in his polemic against

89. Id. at 44.
91. A. Schischkin, op. cit. supra note 90, at 102, German trans.; cf. all of ch. 2, pt. 4.
92. Smirnov, op. cit. supra note 74, at 41.
individualism. The kind of rational egotism which inspired Chernyshevskij's raznochintsy is still far from acceptance among representative Soviet philosophers.

Yet the wish remains to show that "natural personal needs do not work against the general interest, but harmonize with it." And if this coincidence of personal and social interest is not found, on what does Communist morality rest? Does it not already contain an assumption which is not explicable in terms of materialistic immanence? Is not the transcending of human contingency the essential condition of moral obligation?

(Translated by Maria K. Dittman and the Staff of the Forum)

94. See Chernyshevskij, op. cit. supra note 25, at 2/VIII and 2/XIX. Nor has Tugarinov done justice to that passionate respect for freedom which characterized the raznochintsy. Kirsanov declares, "I make it a rule to undertake nothing in anyone's behalf against his or her will; liberty is above everything, above life itself." Id. at 5/III.