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The Long Term-Failings of Internally Displaced Person Status: a Case Study of the Êzidi People

Sarah A. Johns
sjohns5@law.byu.edu

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The Long Term-Failings of Internally Displaced Person Status: a Case Study of the Êzidi People

Cover Page Footnote

J.D. Candidate, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School

THE LONG TERM-FAILINGS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSON STATUS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ÊZIDI PEOPLE¹

SARAH A. JOHNS*

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INTRODUCTION

Never has the term limbo been so appropriately used in modern history than as applied to the current situation of the Êzidi internally displaced persons (IDPs). As Dante's first circle of hell, limbo separates its residents from God, leaving them in a state of eternal suffering and sadness.² This in-between place is saved for just individuals who did not receive Christ as required in Catholic theology and are now doomed to reside forever in a place of separation from God's presence.³ Limbo is a state of punishment that seemingly freezes one's ability to progress or enjoy future happiness.⁴

Eight years after the desperate plight from their homes in Sinjar, the Êzidi people remain largely abandoned as the international community moves forward without them.⁵ Nearly 200,000 Êzidis are still trapped in the squalor

* J.D. Candidate, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School

¹ WhatsApp interview with Dr. Mamou Othman (Sep. 27, 2022) (Êzidi (or Yazidi as they are popularly known) is the preferred term for this people as discovered in a personal interview with Dr. Mamou Othman, a representative for the Êzidi people).

² *The Divine Comedy: Inferno*, CLIFFNOTES, <https://www.cliffsnotes.com/literature/d/the-divine-comedy-inferno/summary-and-analysis/canto-iv>.

³ *Id.*

⁴ *See id.*

⁵ Jane Arraf, *With No Options, Displaced Iraqi Yazidis Return To Homes Destroyed In Isis Fight*, NPR, (Dec. 3, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/2020/12/03/941976085/with-no-options-displaced-iraqi->

of IDP camps with little hope of change in the future.⁶ It is now the responsibility of the international community to recognize the shortcomings of using IDP camps as a long-term solution for displaced persons because the long-term conditions brought about by these camps violate the Êzidis' legally established human rights.⁷ In recognizing this shortcoming, the international community can better uphold the human rights sustained in the UN's universal declaration on the topic and made law in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.⁸

This paper argues that IDP status is not a viable long-term solution to internal displacement and that the international community should intervene to adopt the laws necessary to prevent the prolonging and occurrence of IDP status. In Part I, this paper will provide background on the Êzidi IDPs and on the evolution of IDP status in the international community. In Part II, this paper will discuss the myriad of challenges that currently separate the Êzidis from escaping their IDP limbo. These challenges include Iraq's sovereignty as a state and how this key concept of international law has thus far prevented meaningful international intervention, the barriers the Êzidis face in attempting to gain asylum, especially in the forms of cost and uncertainty, as well as barriers to the Êzidis' return to Sinjar. In Part III, this paper will discuss Iraq's legal obligations to ensure the human rights of the Êzidi people and how Iraq has failed to meet these obligations.⁹ Part IV will then discuss the possible legal interventions that can be made to hold Iraq accountable for its failings to meet its legal obligations to the Êzidis. These interventions include individual complaints by Êzidis to the Human Rights Committee and ICCPR member State complaints requesting Êzidis' rights be enforced.¹⁰ In Part V, this paper will discuss the impact of these findings on other internally displaced populations and grapple with the moral difficulties brought about by constraints on the resources of international intervention. Lastly, Part VI will discuss the future of internal displacement and how this future will require greater care from the international community to ensure that IDP status remains a temporary intervention. Here, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement will be suggested as a possible legal solution to address the increasing number of IDPs worldwide.

I. BACKGROUND

A. *THE EVOLUTION OF PROTECTIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT*

yazidis-return-to-homes-destroyed-in-isis-fight#:~:text=Thousands%20of%20women%20were%20taken,or%20too%20poor%20to%20return.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ See *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, OHCHR, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>.

⁸ See *id.*

⁹ See *id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

Though today internal displacement is well understood by the international community as an important issue, legal frameworks for dealing with internal displacement have yet to be adopted into widespread international law. Internal displacement became a global issue in the early 1990s and has since become better defined through a series of frameworks and protocols.¹¹ In 1998, one of the first milestones toward developing standards for protecting internally displaced people was adopted.¹² This milestone, known as the Guiding Principles, established thirty principles covering the following topics: protection against displacement, protection during displacement, frameworks for humanitarian assistance, protections during return, resettlement in other parts of the country, and assisting IDPs in becoming integrated in the locations where they have been displaced.¹³ The Guiding Principles affirm the need for national authorities to ensure IDPs have access to all rights, including a right to seek asylum in other countries.¹⁴ Additionally, the Guiding Principles make clear that national authorities should accept international intervention if they are unable to provide for the rights of their IDPs.¹⁵

In 2006, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) adopted the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, which was the first legally binding authority to incorporate the above mentioned General Principles into international law.¹⁶ The framework became binding in 2008 to the eleven member states of the ICGLR, all of which belong to the continent of Africa.¹⁷ Also in 2008, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre along with the International Refugee Rights Initiative published a guide for all civil societies to use the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons to further the rights of all IDPs.¹⁸ In 2012, the Kampala Convention was created, binding its African government parties to provide protections for IDPs.¹⁹

The year 2018 marked the 20th anniversary of the General Principles at which time UN representatives launched the GP20 Multi-stakeholder Plan of Action for Advancing Prevention, Protection and Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons.²⁰ This three-year plan focused on four issues: “the

¹¹ *An Institutional History of Internal Displacement*, IDMC, <https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement/history-of-internal-displacement>.

¹² *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, IDMC, <https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement/guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement>.

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *An Institutional History of Internal Displacement*, *supra* note 11.

¹⁷ *Id.* (ICGLR member states include: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia).

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.* (ICGLR member states include: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia).

²⁰ *Multi-stakeholder Plan of Action for Advancing Prevention, Protection and Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (GP20)*, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner,

participation of internally displaced persons in programmes and decision-making processes affecting them, national law and policy on internal displacement, data and analysis on internal displacement, and addressing protracted displacement and securing durable solutions.”²¹ The product of the three-year GP20 was the GP20 Compilation of National Practices to Prevent, Address and Find Durable Solutions to Internal Displacement which discussed twenty-two promising internal displacement practices but created no legally binding standards for dealing with internal displacement.²²

From the early 1990’s to today, it is clear that the international community has become increasingly aware of the difficult plight of IDPs but has simultaneously been unable to create enforceable international standards of protection. It is with this background in mind that we move forward to dissect the plight of the Êzidi IDPs and how their current IDP status violates their legally established human rights.

B. UNDERSTANDING THE ÊZIDI PLIGHT

In northern Iraq lies the city of Sinjar, a former haven for the peaceful followers of one of the Middle East’s minority religions, the Êzidis. Sinjar is home not only to the Êzidi people, but to many of their holy sites, including many temples.²³ For hundreds of years, the Êzidis have shirked assimilation to the dominant religions surrounding them,²⁴ and because of their resistance to Islamic conversion, Al-Qaeda declared the Êzidis to be infidels, making them targets for ISIL’s aggression.²⁵ In August of 2014, ISIL sought to stamp out this faith group in a brutal attack against the Êzidis, which acts have been officially declared a genocide by the UN Human Rights Panel.²⁶ By the end of the day, on August 3rd, 2014, ISIL brought the Êzidi home of Sinjar under their control.²⁷ The ISIL conspirators began by capturing Êzidi families and then separating the women from the men.²⁸ After the men and women were separated, the men were forced to either convert or face execution.²⁹ Those willing to convert to Islam were then taken to ISIL work camps and young boys, aged seven and up, were taken to ISIL conversion camps, where they

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-internally-displaced-persons/multi-stakeholder-plan-action-advancing-prevention-protection-and-solutions-internally-displaced>.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

²³ *List of Yazidi holy Places*, WIKIPEDIA (2022), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Yazidi_holy_places.

²⁴ *Why did Isis attack the Yazidi people?*, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2016, 6:35 PM), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-overtime-why-did-isis-attack-the-yezidi-people/>.

²⁵ *Who are the Yazidis and Why is Isis Hunting Them?*, THE GUARDIAN (2014), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/who-yazidi-isis-iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains>.

²⁶ *ISIL crimes against Yazidis constitute genocide, UN Investigation Team finds*, UNITED NATIONS: UN NEWS, (May 10, 2021), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091662>.

²⁷ *Iraq/Yazidi, Genocide Studies Program*, Yale University, <https://gsp.yale.edu/case-studies/iraq-yazidi>.

²⁸ *The gendering of genocide: Isis’s crimes against the Yazidis*, RELIEFWEB (2016), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/gendering-genocide-isis-s-crimes-against-yazidis>.

²⁹ *Id.*

faced forced conversion and were given new identities and names.³⁰ All captured women aged nine years old and older were taken to holding sites where they are abused and sold into sexual slavery; the sexual assaults waged against the Êzidi women are viewed by ISIL fighters as spiritually beneficial and virtuous acts.³¹

Since the August 3rd attack, an estimated 5,000 Êzidis have been murdered by ISIL while 3,000 remain slaves to their captives who have continually required that the Êzidis “convert (to Islam) or die.”³² Those Êzidis that are still living and free have either escaped to the mountains nearby Sinjar to live in IDP camps in that region, or have fled Iraq under the asylum protections of other nations.³³

The genocide against the Êzidis in Sinjar is especially significant because it could have extinguished the Êzidi faith completely, as Êzidism does not have a central text but is passed down orally.³⁴ These orally transmitted texts require that there be Êzidi survivors who are able to pass down the religion to budding Êzidis. Additionally, Êzidism is an ethno-religious faith as the faith requires its members not mix with non-Êzidis.³⁵ Therefore, if ISIL had been successful in wiping out the Êzidi believers, it would have erased both a religion and an ethnicity of people.

The Êzidi religion, Êzidism, is a monotheistic faith that centers on the belief that God interacts with mankind through seven angels. One of these seven angels, the peacock angel, Melek Taûs, is believed to have convinced Adam to leave the garden of Eden.³⁶ Due to other faiths attributing Adam's departure from the garden to the devil, Melek Taûs has been widely and erroneously confused with the devil, a concept that Êzidism fully rejects.³⁷ Much of the persecution that the Êzidis have faced has come from the erroneous view that they are devil worshippers, stemming largely from the peacock parade that the Êzidis hold as a way to show respect to the angel, Melek Taûs.³⁸ As a religion that fully rejects the concept of a devil, Êzidism teaches one to focus on the concepts of right and wrong through a greater focus on correct practice than on correct belief.³⁹ Part of this correct practice includes the use of sacred hymns to communicate messages of faith and devotion; these hymns also play a central role in the Êzidis' ability to pass down the religion orally.⁴⁰ Overall, Êzidism encourages only peaceful practice

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *Id.*

³² *Why did Isis attack the Yezidi people?*, *supra* note 24.

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ *Id.*

³⁵ WhatsApp interview with Dr. Mamou Othman (Sep. 29, 2022).

³⁶ ReligionForBreakfast, *Yazidi Religion Explained*, YouTube (Sept. 10, 2020), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRB9e9OI4Hs>.

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ ReligionForBreakfast, *supra* note 36.

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.*

from its believers and though largely misunderstood and persecuted, the Êzidis continue to forward their faith of peaceful devotion to God.⁴¹

Though the followers of Êzidism have persevered in the face of ISIL's relentless attacks against them, IDP living is hardly the prize the Êzidi survivors deserve. In tent homes the size of regular car parking spots with only a PVC floor separating them from the dirt below, the Êzidis new living conditions remain far less than ideal.⁴² Abandoning the Êzidis to remain indefinitely in IDP conditions, due to barriers the IDPs face in both attempting to return or obtain asylum, as discussed below, will require constant humanitarian intervention just to meet the Êzidis' basic survival needs. After eight years in this brutal environment, it is time that the international community recognize the human rights violations brought about by the Êzidis' long-term IDP status and create legal frameworks to ensure that these violations be ended and prevented.

II. CHALLENGES TO ESCAPING IDP STATUS

Widely recognized as a foundational principle of international law is the concept of state sovereignty and the necessity of protecting state's rights.⁴³ Because state sovereignty is a priority, the assistance and protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently remains the primary responsibility of the state in which the IDPs reside.⁴⁴ This unfortunate reality furthers the limbo conditions of the Êzidi people as it allows the international community to view their predicament with a "hands-off" attitude while their homeland continues to offer them no protection. Thus, the Êzidis are currently left to solve the issue of their continuing IDP status themselves. The two main solutions to self-led escape of IDP status are to seek asylum in another State, or to return to one's home.⁴⁵

A. Asylum

Though asylum offers incredible relief to many IDPs across the globe, this form of relief is not a viable option for the Êzidi IDPs because of cost constraints. International refugee law, via the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (of which two neighboring nations to Iraq, Turkey and Iran, have ratified)⁴⁶ provides protections to individuals who:

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² Kristina Schlick, *Yazidis still displaced in their own country*, DW (June 11, 2021), <https://www.dw.com/en/yazidis-still-displaced-in-their-own-country/a-59725928>.

⁴³ Chris McGrath, *Principles of sovereignty under international law*, Envlaw.com.au (Dec. 10, 2018), http://envlaw.com.au/wp-content/uploads/handout_sovereignty.pdf.

⁴⁴ *About internally displaced persons*, OHCHR, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-internally-displaced-persons/about-internally-displaced-persons#:~:text=Once%20persons%20have%20been%20displaced,freedom%20of%20movement%20and%20residence%2C>.

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol*, UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, <https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf>.

- “[Have] a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her: Race; Religion; Nationality; Membership of a particular social group; or Political opinion.
- [Are] outside his or her country of origin or habitual residence;
- [Are] unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, because of fear of persecution; and
- [Are] not explicitly excluded from refugee protection or whose refugee status has not ceased because of a change of circumstances.”⁴⁷

Internationally, asylum is generally noted as the status available to those who have not yet, but are in the process of, achieving refugee status.⁴⁸ ISIL is the perpetrator of the Êzidi genocide, and though Iraq declared ISIL defeated in November of 2017 after a long battle against them, “thousands of fighters, affiliates, and sympathizers of the decentralized [ISIL] organization remain[] at large.”⁴⁹ Thus, although Iraq is clearly willing to control ISIL, they have been unable to completely stamp out all ISIL threats against the Êzidis. Therefore, the Êzidis would qualify for refugee and thus asylum help because they meet all of the required elements. The Êzidis are in fear of persecution based on their ethnicity and religion, they have been unable to avail themselves of Iraq’s protections due to Iraq’s inability to snuff out all ISIL threats against them, and there is nothing specifically excluding them from obtaining refugee status.⁵⁰ With this understanding, many Êzidis have been able to obtain asylum abroad.

Why then are not all of the Êzidis’ fleeing their IDP camps for international asylum protections? In a personal interview with Dr. Mamou Othman, an Êzidi professional living in Germany and working to represent the needs of his people abroad, Dr. Othman stated that “most of [the Êzidi people] want to immigrate but it is [too] expensive. They [feel] hopeless and [] not secure.”⁵¹ The expense of asylum is too great for the Êzidis who have been without regular work for the last eight years and whose resources were greatly destroyed in the ISIL attacks against them. By way of example, the cost for a family of Syrian refugees to escape to the U.S. was about \$5,000 for travel expenses alone.⁵² If a similar cost is applied to the 200,000 Êzidi IDPs hoping to escape their current conditions, their travel expenses will cost

⁴⁷ FRANCES NICHOLSON & JUDITH KUMIN, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION AND UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, *REFUGEE PROTECTION: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS*, 18 (2017).

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 17.

⁴⁹ *ISIL outside of Iraq and Syria*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant/ISIL-outside-of-Iraq-and-Syria#ref335211>.

⁵⁰ *About internally displaced persons*, *supra* note 44.

⁵¹ Othman, *supra* note 35.

⁵² Hannan Adely, *For refugees, escape to U.S. comes with a cost*, NorthJersey.com), (Oct. 12, 2017, 12:00 PM), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2017/10/12/refugees-escape-u-s-comes-cost/695033001/>.

around \$167,000,000,⁵³ and of course, this does not include the costs of asylum applications, attorney fees, or the costs of settling in a new place. Clearly, the cost of obtaining asylum is an immense barrier for the Êzidi IDPs.

Additionally, it is a sad reality that many nations reject refugees. This rejection can be done on the grounds that states cannot admit these persons due to economic and political concerns.⁵⁴ The uncertainty of admission is therefore another large barrier to the Êzidis on their journey toward asylum as they must know not only that they will be able to afford to flee, but that spending this money will not be in vain due to the possibility of rejection or forced repatriation.

B. Return

The second road to self-led IDP status termination, return, also fails as a viable option for the Êzidi IDPs due to a lack of safety and infrastructure in Sinjar. Return to Sinjar is a preferred and important solution for the Êzidi IDPs as Sinjar is home to many of the Êzidis' religiously significant holy sites.⁵⁵ Dr. Othman shared that in 2020, 25% of the Êzidi IDPs attempted to return to their homes in Sinjar but soon after returned to the IDP camps because of the lack of infrastructure, employment, and safety in Sinjar.⁵⁶ Even though ISIL threats in Sinjar may no longer be as greatly pronounced, other militant groups have moved into the area, creating new security threats, which make Êzidi return largely impossible.⁵⁷ Sinjar remains a war zone with the following groups remaining in the area: the Kurdistan Workers Party backed People's Protection Units (YPG) which has been "recognized by the US and the EU as a terrorist organization,"⁵⁸ the Defense Units of Sinjar (YBS), the Iran-supported Popular Mobilization Forces; "the peshmerga, the Kurdish branch of the Iraqi forces; and numerous other representatives of the Iraqi army."⁵⁹ Additionally, Turkey bombs the Sinjar area regularly in an effort to fight against some of the Kurdish insurgent groups living there.⁶⁰ Observing the situation, Jan Jessen, a German development aid worker and journalist stated that, "[t]he people coming back [to Sinjar] do not have jobs. The infrastructure is broken, and the security situation is difficult."⁶¹ It is unclear whether Iraq has made efforts to clean up the security situation in Sinjar, but the eight year period in which the Êzidis have been unable to return home would hint that Iraq is, at the very least, unable to eliminate these threats to a level sufficient for the safe return of the Êzidis.

⁵³ Calculation based on the cost of moving a family of six persons at a rate of \$5,000.

⁵⁴ *Rejection of refugees*, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD PROBLEMS & HUMAN POTENTIAL, <http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/rejection-refugees>.

⁵⁵ See *List of Yazidi holy places*, *supra* note 23.

⁵⁶ Othman, *supra* note 35.

⁵⁷ Schlick, *supra* note 42.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ See *id.*

⁶¹ *Id.*

Though return and asylum are both options for IDP status termination, the barriers of cost, uncertainty, and unsafe return conditions have made these avenues impossible to travel. The Êzidis are thus left to remain in their IDP limbo until other interventions can be made. We now turn our focus to the human rights violations brought about by the inescapable IDP conditions of the Êzidis.

III: IRAQ'S LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE ÊZIDI IDPS

The nation of Iraq is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which obligates Iraq to ensure all individuals within its territory the rights laid out in the ICCPR.⁶² Discussed below are the numerous ways in which Iraq has failed to ensure the human rights that it is legally bound to provide to the Êzidi IDPs. These failed rights include: prosecuting ISIL for the crime of genocide, allowing the Êzidis to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, protecting Êzidi rights to choose their residence, allowing Êzidis to participate in elections, and allowing them to develop their culture and practice their religion. Iraq's failings largely display how long-term IDP living conditions inevitably lead to violations of IDP human rights because many of Iraq's violations stem from the fact that long-term IDP conditions are in and of themselves violative of human rights.

The first of Iraq's violations comes from its failing to try ISIL for the crime of genocide. Though this violation of the Êzidis' human rights does not speak directly to the human rights violations brought about by long-term IDP living, it speaks to one of the reasons that the Êzidis cannot yet safely escape their IDP lifestyle. The UN announced in May of 2021 that its investigations into ISIL's actions against the Êzidis displayed "clear and convincing evidence of genocide."⁶³ According to Article VI of the Genocide Convention, of which Iraq is a party, "[p]ersons charged with genocide . . . shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed."⁶⁴ Thus, Iraq is obligated to try ISIL for the crime of genocide committed against the Êzidi people. These obligations are further enforced in article 6.3 of the ICCPR which requires parties to the Convention to not to derogate from the obligations laid out in the Genocide Convention.⁶⁵ The ICCPR also requires, in Article 2.3(a), that an effective remedy be provided to any individual whose ICCPR rights have been violated, and the genocide against the Êzidis clearly marks such a violation.⁶⁶ Iraq has failed to meet these legal obligations to the Êzidis because "[a]s of July 2019 . . . [a]lthough ISIS has been officially defeated [in Iraq], not a single conspirator or perpetrator of the genocide has been brought to justice – and hardly any

⁶² Article 2, Section 2.

⁶³ IUN news, *supra* note 26.

⁶⁴ G.A. Res. 260 A (III), Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948).

⁶⁵ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

[have] even [been] tried.”⁶⁷ Without their destroyers brought to justice, the Êzidis cannot safely return to Sinjar, as the culprits of their genocide may still be at large, posing a great threat to Êzidi safety.

Additionally, Iraq’s inability to provide the necessary infrastructure to remove the Êzidi IDPs from their IDP camps leads to the violation of Article 1.1-2 of the ICCPR which guarantees the right of all people to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development as well as the right against deprivation of one’s own means of subsistence.⁶⁸ As stated in a May 2019 report on the situation of Êzidi IDPs, the socio-economic conditions of the IDPs are deteriorating, poverty is increasing among the IDPs, and the already limited humanitarian assistance they depend on is ever decreasing.⁶⁹ This harsh reality reveals that the foundation needed to support the Êzidis’ ability to realize their economic and social rights is quickly crumbling. The Êzidis will remain unable to obtain these rights until they are able to access infrastructure that can support them as they pull themselves out of poverty and seek to meaningfully contribute to and participate in greater society. The Êzidis’ inability to develop economically, socially, or culturally is largely attributable to their continued existence in IDP camps, as these camps cannot provide the long-term infrastructure needed for development.

The Êzidis’ economic development conditions are especially precarious as finding employment that can cover the basic costs of living in IDP camps has been, at best, unstable.⁷⁰ Most work available to the Êzidis comes in the form of casual daily labor that cannot provide regular income.⁷¹ Further, the Êzidis struggle to find employment because they widely lack the necessary documentation and skills needed to obtain jobs outside of construction or agriculture.⁷² Due to these difficulties, it has been reported that many Êzidis have been forced to “incur[] debts, [participate in] child marriage and forced marriage, send[] children to work and reduc[e] food intake.”⁷³ Clearly, the current conditions of Êzidi IDP living violate the Êzidis’ ICCPR right to economic, cultural, and social development, which Iraq is legally obligated to provide.⁷⁴ If Iraq removes the Êzidis from their IDP camps, these violations will be greatly resolved as it is the long-term conditions of IDP living that create these violations.

Next, Article 25(a-b) of the ICCPR establishes the right of individuals to “(a) take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; [and] (b) [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by

⁶⁷ *Iraq/Yazidi | Genocide Studies Program*, *supra* note 27.

⁶⁸ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

⁶⁹ *Coi Note on the Situation of Yazidi idps in the Kurdistan ...*, REFWORLD, (2019), <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5cd156657.pdf>.

⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² *Id.*

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”⁷⁵ Reports have shown that though Êzidis have been provided with representation in parliamentary elections and have been able to vote in their IDP camps, due to their inability to obtain new documentation, none of their votes were counted in a recent election.⁷⁶ The lack of access to the documentation required to participate in state elections is a clear violation of the Êzidis’ Article 25 right to vote and displays an obvious failing by the state of Iraq to guarantee such a right.⁷⁷ This failing also brings additional weight to the loss of the Êzidis’ Article 1.1 right to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, as robbing one of the capacity to vote in elections removes the ability to impact the result of those elections, and elected officials then make decisions that impact individuals economic, social, and cultural development.⁷⁸ Here, the separateness of IDP camps from the rest of society has proved to create conditions that lead to human rights violations.

Article 27 of the ICCPR guarantees additional rights to members of ethnic and religious minorities, of which the Êzidis certainly are.⁷⁹ The text of Article 27 reads that “persons belonging to such [ethnic, religious or linguistic] minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”⁸⁰ Due to the unique oral and ethnic nature of the Êzidi faith, it is important that the Êzidis be able to congregate and live together so that intermarriage and the oral sharing of the faith are possible.⁸¹ As discussed above, the Êzidis are forbidden from marrying outsiders to the faith, so it is essential that they be able to live together in mass so that marriage and family options are available to faithful Êzidis.⁸² With their homeland of Sinjar destroyed and without the state of Iraq removing the above mentioned barriers to return, the Êzidis must either separate to seek asylum or choose to forgo the comfort of their human rights by remaining in IDP camps. The Êzidis’ Article 27 rights would be best ensured if the state of Iraq would assist the now-impooverished Êzidis in rebuilding their homeland for a mass, triumphant return, which would protect the culture and religious practice of the Êzidis.

Iraq’s only defense for not providing these rights comes from the excuse laid out in Article 4.1 of the ICCPR which allows a party to the Covenant to derogate from their Covenant responsibilities in a state of emergency.⁸³ ISIL’s violent attacks throughout the state of Iraq certainly created a state of emergency, but this state of emergency necessarily ended when ISIL was

⁷⁵ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

⁷⁶ Dengê Êzdiya, *How Yazidi votes are lost in elections in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq*, Yazidis.az (2022), <https://yazidis.info/en/news/4044>.

⁷⁷ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ *Why did Isis Attack the Yezidi people?*, *supra* note 24.

⁸² Othman, *supra* note 35.

⁸³ *Id.*

defeated by Iraq in 2019.⁸⁴ Since that time, Iraq's obligations to ensure and protect the rights of the Êzidi people have resumed and cannot therefore be excused. Providing for the Êzidis' rights will require that the Êzidis be removed from their IDP camps as many of Iraq's violations stem directly from camp conditions themselves. It is with this need for enforcement in mind that we must now consider the possible avenues for legally enforcing the Êzidis rights against the state of Iraq.

IV: LEGAL INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE ÊZIDI IDPS

A. SUIT BY THE ÊZIDIS

Because their human rights were violated by the State of Iraq, the Êzidis may attempt to sue the State for the enforcement of these rights.⁸⁵ Individuals are permitted to file complaints under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, but must meet a certain number of standards before this remedy becomes available.⁸⁶ The first of these standards is that the Êzidi IDPs must exhaust all of the domestic remedies available to them before attempting to bring suit before the Human Rights Committee.⁸⁷ This means that the Êzidi IDPs would need to obtain legal representation in Iraq and then proceed to go through all domestic suit processes against the state.⁸⁸ The Êzidis only option to shirk the domestic remedy requirement would arise if those processes are "unreasonably prolonged."⁸⁹ If domestic remedies are exhausted or if they can be excused, the Êzidis may file a complaint with the Human Rights Committee.⁹⁰ Sadly, because of a large number of filings, the Committee has made clear that there may be a delay of several years before a final decision is made.⁹¹

Barriers to the Êzidis obtaining justice via a personal suit come mostly from the cost and time required to obtain justice. Having already been impoverished for many years, the Êzidis have limited resources with which they can obtain representation and undergo the long domestic process of filing suits and appealing them through all of the required domestic authorities. A possible solution to the issue of cost arises from the ability of NGOs to help fund the law suit or help the Êzidis obtain adequate representation.⁹² But, even if these cost barriers are removed, the Êzidis must still face the long process of seeking justice while remaining in the squalor of their IDP camps. As

⁸⁴ *Iraq/Yazidi | Genocide Studies Program*, *supra* note 27.

⁸⁵ *Individual Complaint Procedures under the United Nations Human Rights Treaties*, OHCHR, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/FactSheet7Rev.2.pdf>.

⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² *Human Rights Activism and the Role of NGOs, MANUAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION WITH YOUNG PEOPLE*, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/human-rights-activism-and-the-role-of-ngos>.

mentioned above, even if the Êzidis reach the Human Rights Committee, they may still be required to wait several years for a decision to be issued.⁹³

Though obtaining justice via the enforcement of human rights or compensation would greatly benefit the Êzidi IDPs, the barriers to reaching this outcome are great. It is likely that the Êzidi IDPs would need an NGO to intervene on their behalf in order to afford the costs of representation, but this representation cannot quickly pull the Êzidis out of their IDP limbo.⁹⁴ The scars of their genocide and IDP limbo will remain for years to come, but it is essential that the Êzidis be removed from their IDP conditions so that they can access their human rights and begin to heal from the PTSD and other traumas that they have suffered.⁹⁵

B. SUIT ON BEHALF OF THE ÊZIDI IDPS BY A MEMBER STATE

As discussed above, the conditions created by the Êzidis' long-term IDP lifestyle violate their human rights. The UDHR preamble states that "every individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive . . . by progressive measures, national and international, to secure [the] universal and effective recognition and observance [of these rights], both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction."⁹⁶ Iraq being a member state of the UN should encourage the greater United Nations to take necessary and even progressive measures to ensure that the rights of the Êzidi people are observed.

Because of Iraq's failings, Article 41 of the ICCPR allows for another member State to submit a communication to the Human Rights Committee regarding Iraq's failure to meet its ICCPR obligations.⁹⁷ With the limited resources available to the impoverished Êzidis, intervention on their behalf by an ICCPR member State is likely the most realistic solution to the Êzidis' loss of human rights.

In order to bring this matter to the Human Rights Committee, the intervening member State must first submit a written communication to the State of Iraq, bringing the matter to Iraq's attention.⁹⁸ At this point, Iraq would be given three months to respond to the member State with an explanation clarifying the remedies pursued and the relevant domestic procedures.⁹⁹ Then, if six months have passed from the initial communication to Iraq and the matter has not been resolved to both Iraq and the member State's satisfaction, the issue may then proceed to the Human Rights Committee.¹⁰⁰ When reviewed by the Committee, the issue will be pursued until the satisfaction of

⁹³ *Individual Complaint Procedures under the United Nations Hum...*, *supra* note 85.

⁹⁴ *Human Rights Activism and the Role of NGOs*, *supra* note 92.

⁹⁵ Othman, *supra* note 35.

⁹⁶ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, UNITED NATIONS, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

⁹⁷ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

both parties can be reached, even if this requires the issue be moved to an ad hoc Conciliation Commission.¹⁰¹ Whatever the mutually agreeable resolution may be, the Êzidis' rights will be better protected with international intervention in this form.

Though intervention on behalf of the Êzidi IDPs is not required of any State party to the ICCPR, the preamble of the ICCPR recognizes that "the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."¹⁰² The preamble then recognizes that "these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."¹⁰³ Therefore, member States should intervene on behalf of the Êzidi IDPs not only to protect their individual rights but to safeguard freedom, justice, and peace in the world.¹⁰⁴

V: THE IMPACT OF THESE FINDINGS ON OTHER DISPLACED POPULATIONS

With the understanding that long-term IDP conditions violate the legally established human rights of the Êzidi IDPs, it is essential to consider the other long-term IDPs living across the globe. Primarily, if groups like the Palestinian IDPs (who have been displaced since the 1940s)¹⁰⁵ exist, one must query how international intervention can be equitably distributed amongst all of these groups in need? Due to constraints on available resources, it is concluded that offering prioritization to certain groups is not only palatable but is essential for effective intervention.

International intervention on behalf of the Êzidis is justified due to member States' call to safeguard human rights for the protection of the international community. Similar to the Êzidis, the Palestinian IDPs, for example, lack many of their human rights, especially the ability to vote and the right to move freely and choose their residence.¹⁰⁶ Rather than flushing out all of the human rights violations brought about by the long-term IDP status of the Palestinian IDPs, it is sufficient to say that not all of their legally established human rights are available to them, and these missing rights have not been available for a very prolonged period of time.¹⁰⁷ Thus, intervention for the Êzidis creates a moral dilemma, as human rights violations do not exist for them alone.

In truth, the ICCPR recognizes the inherent dignity of every human being and would therefore support intervention until every person can access the full spectrum of the ICCPR rights supporting this dignity.¹⁰⁸ If then, all people are deserving of being granted access to their human rights, how can the

¹⁰¹ *Id.*

¹⁰² *Id.*

¹⁰³ *Id.*

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*

¹⁰⁵ *What you need to know about Palestinian Refugees and Internally*, BADIL Resources Center, 4 (2011), https://badil.org/phocadownloadpap/Badil_docs/publications/Q&A-en.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ *See generally id.*

¹⁰⁷ *See e.g. id.* at 29.

¹⁰⁸ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

international community intervene first on behalf of the Êzidis before assisting the Palestinians who have been IDPs since the 1940's? In a perfect world, the international community could and would provide this type of intervention, but with volatile international politics and limited resources, asking that action be taken for all people, all at once, is painfully unrealistic. As any action by the international community is not obligatory and would thus be voluntary, international actors retain discretion to determine where intervention is most appropriate. Therefore, although all people deserve to obtain protection of their human rights, prioritization of certain groups must be given if any action is to be taken.

In the case of the Êzidis, the ethno-religious aspect of Êzidi identity merits prioritized intervention to prevent the extinction of both an ethnicity and a religion.¹⁰⁹ If intervention is not taken to protect the human rights of the Êzidis, it is possible that the world may stand to see Êzidism fade from existence. As was stated previously, the Êzidis must be gathered together in order to pass down the Êzidi faith orally and to be able to intermarry within the faith.¹¹⁰ The continued presence of the Êzidi people in disease sponsoring IDP camps greatly threatens the remaining Êzidi population in Iraq. For these reasons, though international intervention should be made in all long-term IDP situations in order to protect human rights, the Êzidi IDPs should be given priority in receiving protection.

VI: THE FUTURE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

The future of internal displacement looks to see larger numbers of IDPs arising all across the globe.¹¹¹ The unstable nature of our global political climate looks to a future of likely conflict and therefore larger numbers of IDPs fleeing such conflicts.¹¹² Even if world peace is achieved in the near future, climate change will surely create numerous IDPs in years to come.¹¹³ With ocean levels rising and natural disasters hastening due to an ever-warmer climate, human beings are likely to lose their homes all across the world to these disasters, and when they do, they will need to seek internal and external protections.¹¹⁴ For these and other reasons, the international community should begin to brace for larger numbers of IDPs around the world and should do what is necessary to ensure that IDP status remains a temporary intervention. Without preparing for these future IDPs, the world will likely see the collapse of thousands of individuals' abilities to access their human rights.

¹⁰⁹ *Why did Isis attack the Yezidi people?*, *supra* note 24.

¹¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹¹ United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, *Shining a Light on Internal Displacement*, 5-6 (2021), https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/sites/www.un.org.internal-displacement-panel/files/idp_report_web.pdf.

¹¹² *See id.* at 2.

¹¹³ *See id.* at 5-6.

¹¹⁴ *See id.* at 51.

Article 2, Section 2 of the ICCPR states that “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”¹¹⁵ As the rights recognized in the ICCPR are greatly violated in long-term IDP conditions, adopting laws that can prevent and improve these conditions should be a priority and even an obligation of member States. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement represent such a law.¹¹⁶

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, if they would have been applied to the Êzidi IDPs, would have protected them from many of the human rights violations they have been experiencing. The guiding principles ensure that internal displacement takes place for a time that is no longer than what is absolutely necessary.¹¹⁷ The Guiding Principles, if incorporated into international law, would require that IDPs be provided with proper documentation, medical care, education, water, shelter, clothing, and sanitation.¹¹⁸ But, even more important than its protections against the symptoms of IDP status, the Guiding Principles require states to take necessary steps to reduce the possible causes of internal displacement.¹¹⁹ This important protection would require nations to be aware of volatile situations and be better prepared to prevent internal displacement, or better plan for internal displacement when it occurs.¹²⁰ Additionally, the Guiding Principles also establish standards for States to follow in terms of return to home and emphasize the importance of creating conditions that would make return possible.¹²¹ The Guiding Principles, if adopted into international law, would require that States create frameworks of protection that would boost IDP access to human rights and to return.

The Guiding Principles have been adopted into international law in specific regions of Africa via the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (hereafter the “Protocol”) which was adopted into law by the parties to the 2006 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.¹²² This Protocol, as an example for the rest of the international community to follow, reveals the benefits and challenges of adopting the Guiding Principles into international law.¹²³ Key benefits to the Protocol implementing the Guiding Principles are that the Protocol “provid[es] measures aimed at protecting the physical safety and material needs of the

¹¹⁵ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *supra* note 7.

¹¹⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, UNHCR (1998), <https://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2>.

¹¹⁷ *See id.* (Principle 7).

¹¹⁸ *See id.* (Principles 18, 20, and 23).

¹¹⁹ *See id.* (Principle 5).

¹²⁰ *See id.* (for example, Principle 7).

¹²¹ *Id.* (Principles 28-30).

¹²² *An Institutional History of Internal Displacement*, *supra* note 11.

¹²³ *See generally* Walter Kälin, *The Great Lakes Protocol on Internally Displaced Persons: Responses and challenges*, BROOKINGS (2016), <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-great-lakes-protocol-on-internally-displaced-persons-responses-and-challenges/>.

displaced, and creat[es] obligations to prevent and address the root causes of displacement.”¹²⁴ This holistic approach aims to solve the issues of displacement from all sides. The main challenges to implementing the Protocol are:

- Solving issues regarding competing property claims. Due to the unsteady nature of displacement, individuals may have legitimate competing claims over the same properties, making restitution during the return process difficult.¹²⁵
- Providing for both justice and reconciliation. As the causes of IDP status are often related to conflict, it is important that victims be provided with justice. This important need for justice may compete with the need for the formation of peace agreements, which can end the conflict and allow for the beginning of the process of return.¹²⁶
- Including IDPs in the process of discovering durable solutions. The Guiding Principles call for the participation of IDPs in the process of developing durable solutions.¹²⁷ Though this inclusion of IDP voices is incredibly important, organizing and defining the roles of contributors has proved difficult in the implementation of the Protocol.¹²⁸
- Finding funding for both humanitarian and development assistance. Gaps between the methods of funding humanitarian and development aid make it “extremely difficult to fund early recovery activities” as these activities “must go hand in hand in order to find durable solutions for internally displaced persons.”¹²⁹

With the challenges of implementing the Protocol in the Great Lakes Region better understood, it is clear that the benefits of implementing the Guiding Principles into international law still outweigh the possible costs and challenges of doing so. Though the few aforementioned issues are certainly challenging, creating an overall framework that can better prepare the world to prevent, care for, and assist in the return of IDPs is still a better option than choosing to leave the Guiding Principles outside of international law.

It is not enough for the international community to legally enforce the human rights of those already living in long-term IDP conditions. With the warming of the climate and the constant threat of conflict in our volatile world, the international community must begin to create frameworks for the prevention and protections of internally displaced persons before the situations requiring individuals to seek IDP status occur, as there will certainly be more to come. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are a well-researched collective of standards that would help to accomplish these aims

¹²⁴ *Id.*

¹²⁵ *See id.*

¹²⁶ *See id.*

¹²⁷ *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, *supra* note 12 (Principal 28, Section 2).

¹²⁸ *See* Kälén, *supra* note 123.

¹²⁹ *Id.*

and should therefore be adopted as a sweeping international effort to address internal displacement at both the source and the symptoms.

CONCLUSION

The peaceful followers of Êzidism have been the victims of a terrible genocide at the hands of ISIL fighters.¹³⁰ After fighting for their lives and escaping to the mountains nearby their homeland of Sinjar, the Êzidis have been left to face a new battle against the squalor of IDP camps. After eight years in the limbo of internal displacement, the legally protected human rights of the Êzidi IDPs have been greatly violated.¹³¹ Iraq has not met its legal obligations to protect the human rights of the Êzidis as laid out in the ICCPR and should thus be held accountable for its failings. Lack of access to justice against the perpetrators of their genocide have left the Êzidis in fear of returning to their homes in Sinjar.¹³² Additionally, the Êzidis rights to economic, social, and cultural development have been greatly violated as IDP camp conditions see a consistent deterioration of humanitarian aid and lack access to meaningful work.¹³³ Êzidis' ICCPR protected right to vote has also been stolen from them as their lack of proper identification cards has led to their votes not being counted in recent elections.¹³⁴ Additionally, the Êzidis' right as a minority religion to profess and practice their religion and to enjoy their culture cannot be fully realized until they are able to once again gather in mass in their homes in Sinjar for the sharing of their oral religion and the intermarrying of their people. Lastly, the Êzidis' right to life and choice of residence have also been lost as camp conditions threaten the lives of the IDPs and broken infrastructure has trapped the Êzidis in their disease filled camps.

Without the financial resources to seek asylum with other nations and without the infrastructure and safety necessary for the Êzidis to return to Sinjar, intervention will be required if the Êzidis are to have any hope of escaping their IDP status. Individuals can file claims with the Human Rights Committee, giving the Êzidis the option to sue Iraq for the enforcement of their human rights.¹³⁵ Though this option could allow for greater protections for the Êzidi IDPs, large barriers of cost and time constraints stand to limit the effectiveness of this remedy. The ICCPR additionally enables member States to intervene when other States fail to meet their obligations under the Covenant and this type of intervention is likely the Êzidis' best hope for legal recourse against the State of Iraq.¹³⁶

Looking to the situation of the Palestinian IDPs, it is clear that long-term IDP conditions violate established human rights, regardless of the identity of

¹³⁰ *Iraq/Yazidi | Genocide Studies Program, supra* note 27.

¹³¹ *Id.*

¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ *Coi Note on the Situation of Yazidi IDPs in the Kurdistan ...*, *supra* note 69.

¹³⁴ Êzdiya, *supra* note 76.

¹³⁵ *Individual Complaint Procedures Under the United Nations...*, *supra* note 85.

¹³⁶ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra* note 7.

the long-term IDPs.¹³⁷ With this understanding, equity would require that intervention be made on behalf of all long-term IDPs whose human rights have been violated. But, because of the limited resources available for such interventions, prioritization of certain groups is not inappropriate. The Êzidi IDPs deserve prioritized intervention because of their ethno-religious status and the need that status creates to prevent the ethnicity and religion from reaching extinction.

Lastly, it is important that the international community recognize the increasing numbers of IDPs across the globe due to conflict and climate change. With this recognition, the international community should adopt the laws necessary to protect future IDPs from facing long-term IDP status and the human rights violations that follow those conditions. Adopting such laws is an obligation of ICCPR member States.¹³⁸ It is recommended that member states to the ICCPR adopt the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in order to prevent internal displacement, protect IDPs who face internal displacement, and end internal displacement as quickly as possible. The protections laid out in the Guiding Principles would help to create a needed international legal standard for creating these important protection frameworks.

IDP status and accessing IDP camps is a helpful temporary solution for those who face internal displacement, but this study has shown that when these conditions are required in the long-term, they fail to provide for the human rights of the IDPs. All people are deserving of having their human rights ensured and safeguarded by their Nation and by the Nations of the world. Thus, IDP status should not be seen as a viable long-term solution to internal displacement and the international community should intervene and adopt such laws as are necessary to prevent the prolonging of IDP status.

Limbo, the first circle of hell, freezes one's ability to progress or enjoy future happiness.¹³⁹ The IDP conditions that the Êzidis have been battling for the last eight years have similarly frozen their progress by thrusting them into poverty and revoking many of their essential human rights. The ethno-religious status of this group makes the Êzidis especially vulnerable to extinction and so they must be offered quick protections. Therefore, the Êzidi IDPs should be prioritized as a group needing immediate intervention in order to remove them from the tragedy of their limbo.

¹³⁷ *What you need to know about Palestinian Refugees Internally...*, *supra* note 105.

¹³⁸ Article 2, Section 2.

¹³⁹ *The Divine Comedy: Inferno*, *supra* note 2.