The Duty to Defend Them: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War

William C. Bradford
"THE DUTY TO DEFEND THEM":

A NATURAL LAW
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BUSH
DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR

William C. Bradford*

INTRODUCTION

We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather.

President George W. Bush

The horrific events of September 11, 2001 heralded an Age of Terror in which wicked malcontents bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will abjure all legal restraint and deliber-

---

* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis; Articles Editor, Journal of National Security Law and Policy; U.S. Army, 1989–2001. I am indebted to colleagues who were gracious enough to review and comment upon earlier drafts, including Jeff Addicott, Lou Beres, Robert Chesney, Steve Dycus, Derek Jinks, Gerard Magliocca, Jordan Paust, Mike Ramsey, Lee Schinasi, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Jim Torke, Ruth Wedgwood, and George Wright. I have been fortunate to have the invaluable assistance of dedicated librarians Michelle Burdsall and Richard Humphrey; Nate Leach and Keith Donnelly provided loyal research assistance.

1 See Glenn Frankel & Dana Milbank, In Britain, Bush Answers Critics on Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at A1 ("The people have given us the duty to defend them, and that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men.") (quoting President George W. Bush)

2 President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1529 (Sept. 12, 2002).

3 Terrorism, defined as the "threat or use of violence in order to create extreme fear and anxiety in a target group so as to coerce them to meet the political objectives of the perpetrators," has descended into new depths of destructiveness and barbarism in recent years. Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (1989).

4 A "weapon of mass destruction" is defined as "any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of . . . toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; . . . a disease organism; or . . . radiation or radioactivity." 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (2000).

5 Terrorism, the "totalitarian form of war and politics," rejects any obligation to adhere to the dictates of law or morality and in so doing "shatters international humanitarian law." Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or
ately murder civilians to advance their anti-civilizational designs. The sobering prospect that successive attacks in which enormously destructive nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons might be brought to bear upon its civilian population⁶ by suicidal terrorists living within its midst greatly enhanced its perception of vulnerability and prompted the United States to undertake a dramatic revision of its national security strategy in response to this existential threat.⁷ The September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America,⁸ also known as the Bush Doctrine, warns transnational terrorists and rogue states that the United States has abandoned deterrence in favor of a robust and proactive strategic doctrine that sanctions the use of military force to eliminate threats posed by the intersection of WMD and an emerging breed of undeterrable adversaries,⁹ before they can materialize. Specifically, the Bush Doctrine unmistakably claims the legal

Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State's Duty to Protect Its Citizens, 15 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 195, 233 (2001). Among the more reprehensible tactics they employ is sheltering their number in areas populated by civilians in order to “exploit the rules of the game . . . which categorically state that the civilian population must not be involved in the armed conflict.” Id. at 234. This and other violations of international humanitarian law were committed by forces fighting for the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Preparing to Try Iraqis for Crimes Against Humanity and Mistreating Prisoners, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2003, at B14 (listing Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law, including mistreatment, perfidious surrender, fighting in civilian garb, using civilians as human shields, and employing hospitals for cover).

⁶ Fear that the terrorists responsible would attempt further attacks shaped the perceptions of the public and of government decisionmakers in the aftermath of September 11. Bob Woodward, Bush at War 349 (2002).

⁷ It may be impossible to overestimate the severity of the threat posed by the intersection of transnational terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. See Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many 6 (1991) (describing this intersection as the gravest threat ever posed to U.S. national security); Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 483, 483–84 (1999) (“The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . is one of the most significant and protracted threats to international security . . . ever faced by mankind.”).


⁹ The Bush Doctrine contends that deterrence, predicated upon the maintenance of the threat that attacks against the United States will be met with an overwhelming response and thus redound to the detriment of the attacker, is ineffective against terrorists and rogue states who have no values against which the threat of force in response might counsel restraint. See id. at 15 (contending the “terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death,” is not susceptible to deterrence).
right to unilaterally preempt and eliminate an incipient threat that, even if not yet operational, will, if permitted to mature, be reducible only at a much greater cost in lives and treasure. For the United States, the lesson of September 11 is unmistakably clear: "Take care of threats early."

Immediately upon its promulgation the Bush Doctrine sparked a legal debate over whether the use of military force to prevent megaterrorism on the order of September 11 constituted one of the permissible exceptions to a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations, and whether the substantive and procedural obligations concerning resolution of international disputes incumbent upon member states of the United Nations could countenance the resort to self-help under such circumstances. Although the U.S.-led intervention against and deposition of the Hussein regime in Iraq in March and April 2003 was predicated not upon an argument in favor of preventive war, but upon far less controversial legal justifications, the characterization of the grounds for intervention for do-

---

10 See id. (stating that the "immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit . . . let[ting] our enemies strike first"); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf ("Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures."); David E. Langer, Bush Renews Pledge to Strike First to Counter Terror Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2002, at A3 (reporting a message from President Bush to U.S. troops home from Afghanistan that the United States will preemptively strike against states developing WMD and that "America must act against these terrible threats before they're fully formed").

11 WOODWARD, supra note 6, at 350 (quoting President George W. Bush in a discussion with National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice).


13 The Bush Doctrine, rather than establishing an expanded doctrine of preemptive self-defense, transcends preemption in favor of the doctrine of preventive war. See infra note 203 (defining the doctrine of preventive war). Some use the terms preemption and prevention interchangeably. See, e.g., George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 536 (2003) (equating preemption and prevention). Others equate anticipatory self-defense, preemptive self-defense, and prevention. However, there are important distinctions between these terms that this Article will elaborate. See infra Part II.

14 Neither the Bush Administration nor the United Kingdom defined the March 2003 intervention against the Hussein regime as a preventive war, but, rather as a Chapter VII enforcement action with legal authority claimed under prior U.N. Security Council resolutions, specifically Resolutions 678 and 687 requiring, as a condition
mestic political consumption by the Bush Administration as a preventive war, along with a widespread perception that interven-


15 In his address to the nation on March 17, 2003, President Bush, although he referenced humanitarian considerations and self-defense arguments as well as Iraqi violations of the 1991 ceasefire, rested his justification for the intervention largely on the ground that “[i]n 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over,” and that failure to “meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities” would be an act of national “suicide.” President’s Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 338, 340 (Mar. 17, 2003).
tion could not be legally justified on any other basis, has thrust the contentious assertion of the right of states to engage in preventive war to the forefront of international legal discourse. In some quarters it is no longer understood merely as a doctrine around which to orient debates concerning the intervention in Iraq specifically, or the norms and institutions that should govern contemporary international relations more generally, but, rather, as an "international constitutional moment" that will prove decisive for the future of international law. Without conceding that intervention in Iraq was an act of preventive war, the United States and allied states claim the forcible ouster of the Hussein regime as a triumphal success, entirely consistent or at least reconcilable with international law, that liberated the people of Iraq and rescued the credibility of the United Nations after

16 A number of commentators reject the argument that existing Security Council resolutions standing alone provide adequate legal justification for the March 2003 intervention. See Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 607, 613 (2003) ("Neither the text nor the debates on the adoption of Resolution 687 reveal the slightest indication that the Council intended to empower any of its members, by themselves, to determine that Iraq was in material breach."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (opining that "[m]ost international lawyers will probably reject this claim [that Resolution 1441 authorized the use of force] and find the use of force illegal under the terms of the [U.N.] Charter"); Yoo, supra note 14, at 567 (conceding that many international legal scholars and a number of states, including France, Germany, and Russia, do not accept the prior Security Council authorization justification). Moreover, several commentators, after analyzing the evidence adduced by the United States, reject the United States’ claim to have acted in self-defense on the ground that no imminent threat existed. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 590, 598 (2003); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 599, 603 (2003). For a discussion of the element of “imminence” in respect to a claim of self-defense under international law, see infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.

17 See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 2 (2000) (writing in response to the debate over the Bush Doctrine of preventive war in the context of the then proposed Iraqi intervention: "Just as in 1945, the nations of the world today face an international constitutional moment.").

18 See Kofi Annan, In Annan and Chirac’s Words: ‘Fork in the Road’ and ‘Call a Summit,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2003, at A13 (stating that the assertion of the right to engage in preventive war stands as “a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded”). Many observers concur with the assessment that the advent of the Bush Doctrine is, “[w]ithout question, the most pressing issue in the international realm.” Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on Assassination, 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 751, 754 (2003); see also Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 17, at 2 (“Few events in global history can have galvanized the international system to action so completely in so short a time.”) (quoting British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw).
an ignominious decade marked by failures to prevent famine, end genocides, and enforce the disarmament of rogue states. However, a number of states and commentators excoriating the decision to intervene without Security Council imprimatur as a jurisprudential act posing a grave threat not only to a half-century long commitment to multilateralism, but to the international rule of law and, derivatively, to global order.

Even if it were possible to forge a consensus as to whether the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 can better be described as an illegal act of preventive war that bodes ill for international law and institutions, or as a benevolent police action in defense of human rights and law-governed international society, the resolution of this issue would not be dispositive of other questions at the core of the current international constitutional crisis: In a world with no central enforcement mechanism, must a state cower in terror until it absorbs a devastating first strike from WMD armed terrorists before acting in self-defense, or may it resort to self-help? Does the failure of the framers of the U.N. Charter to anticipate the virulence of contemporary ter-

19 See Annan, supra note 18 (insisting that U.S.-led intervention against the Hussein regime has posed a “fundamental challenge” to multilateralism and to the role of the United Nations in preserving peace and security); see also Steven R. Weisman, An Audience Unmoved, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2003, at A1 (reporting that French President Jacques Chirac has termed the legal division over the 2003 intervention as “one of the gravest threats to multilateral institutions in modern times”). Some go so far as to accuse the United States of seeking to “disable the United Nations”—the better to rid the United States of “an international regime that is insufficiently responsive to both America’s needs and the reality of [the United States’] disproportionate power” and establish an “American protectorate” in its stead. Franck, supra note 16, at 617; see also Stromseth, supra note 14, at 637 (suggesting the result of United States’ actions consistent with the Bush Doctrine will be the circumscription of the United Nations). Thus, for Franck and others, the Bush Doctrine represents a mortal threat to the international legal regime governing the use of force. Franck, supra note 16, at 610 (blaming the United States for the “death” of international law governing the use of force); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Review Essay: Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 446, 446 (2003) (reviewing Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (2000)) (noting the resurfacing of the suggestion that international law governing the resort to force is moribund as a result of the Iraq intervention).

20 See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 553, 553 (2003) (“[M]ilitary action against Iraq in spring 2003 is one of the few events of the UN Charter period holding the potential for . . . destruction, of the system of law governing the use of force that had evolved during the twentieth century.”). The effect of noncompliance upon the continued vitality of international law, an issue raised but by no means answered by the Iraqi intervention, is the “most profound epistemological question” in the international legal academy. Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 621, 621 (2003).
rorism and the lethality of modern weapons technology render the Charter framework an unsalvageable anachronism, or does the U.N. Charter provide a "viable legal framework if the rules are refined to take account of recent experience and emerging security threats"? Put slightly differently, does the lethal and barbarous marriage of WMD and international terrorism require a fundamental reinterpretation or reimagining of the international law governing the use of force in self-defense against terrorists and rogue states, to include the identification of profoundly different rules and norms better tailored to facilitate state survival? If so, is the Bush Doctrine a jurisgenerative approach to legal reform that elaborates a well reasoned basis for the extension of the War on Terror to terrorist groups and their state sponsors, even where such terrorists and states are not presently engaged in overt acts of aggression against the United States, or is it an abject negation of law altogether that threatens to rend the legal fabric of global order? In other words, in the Age of Terror may states, when their very survival is threatened, engage in preventive war to defend their own survival, and does the Bush Doctrine provide an adequate legal foundation for this claimed entitlement? Finally, are other states impressed with a corresponding obligation to support, or at least not interfere with, coercive diplomacy and the use of force, where necessary, in defense of this right?

Part I of this Article will analyze the primary customary and treaty-based sources constituting the international legal regime governing  


22 Stromseth, supra note 14, at 637.

23 See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 17, at 2 (arguing that an effective response the new threat environment of the post-September 11 era dictates the development of new rules); see also Addicott, supra note 18, at 775 (inquiring whether the "traditional international rules related to the use of force... actually work in the real world" of transnational terrorism). A number of commentators describe the threat environment of the twenty-first century as so radically at variance with the geopolitical, technological, and ideological conditions that obtained in the immediate aftermath of World War II that the U.N. Charter cannot any longer, without substantial modification or reinterpretation, serve the purpose of preventing armed conflict for which it was intended. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, Wkly. Standard, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26 (arguing that the U.N. Charter is fundamentally incompatible with the contemporary defensive requirements of states by virtue of the emergence of robust transnational terrorist groups and state sponsors, unforeseeable by the framers, who possess the capacity to deliver devastating attacks with essentially no warning and against whom the Charter does not expressly authorize states to undertake measures now revealed as necessary in self-defense).
self-defense, as well as relevant state practice in the post-Charter era, to evaluate the arguments of the legality of measures undertaken in anticipation of an armed attack, as well as the continued functionality of the U.N. Charter framework in the Age of Terror. Part II will examine the Bush Doctrine as an expression of a doctrine of preventive war that entirely transcends the debate over the use of armed force in anticipation of an imminent attack. Part III will present the claim that an examination of historical sources of international legal obligation predating the Charter and a less restrictivist, less positivist read of the Charter reveals a natural legal basis for the right, and, even more pointedly, the duty of states to engage in preventive war where necessary to defend their nationals and vital interests against existential threats. Part IV will examine the U.S. Constitution, and in particular its allocation of competence over defense matters, as a domestic expression of a Presidential legal duty, arising under natural law, to defend the United States against external threats. It will then make the assertion that the Bush Doctrine is an expression of the intent to faithfully discharge this natural legal duty and that the doctrine of preventive war it elaborates is not only theoretically consistent with obligations under international law, but even promotive of the ends law is intended to secure, even if the exercise of the right to preventive war is subject to some important qualifications. Part V will offer proposals to harmonize the Bush Doctrine with the U.N. Charter framework and guide formal international legal institutions, including the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, toward enhanced functionality in the simultaneous defense of the natural right of states and peoples to life and the promotion of law-governed order and justice in the international system; several criticisms will be anticipated and, to some degree addressed in concluding remarks.

I. SELF-DEFENSE IN THE CHARTER ERA

Self-defence is Nature’s eldest law.

John Dryden\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{A. Sovereignty Circumscribed: The U.N. Charter and the Prohibition on Aggressive War}

  For most of history the sovereign prerogative of states to resort to armed conflict was largely immune from regulation under interna-
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{24} John Dryden, \textit{Absalom and Achitopel} (London, J.T. & W. Davis 1682).
DUTY TO DEFEND THEM

Sovereignty was its own justification for war: although the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 was motivated in part by collective interests in preventing religious disputes from giving rise to interstate conflicts, states continued to claim, as a constituent aspect of their sovereignty, the right to engage in war in response to a host of perceived offenses, to collect debts, and to acquire territory well into the twentieth century. However, early twentieth century efforts to regulate the resort to war, most notably the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, advanced the crystallization of an as yet inchoate international customary prohibition on "aggressive" war, commonly defined as the use of armed force against...
the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. In turn, the emerging *jus ad bellum* proscribing aggressive war found positive expression in the Charter of the United Nations, which entered into force in 1945, as well as application at Nuremburg, and quickly acquired the status of a peremptory norm. Article 2(4) of

---

31 The precise definition of "aggression" has bedeviled international lawyers for nearly a century. See Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order 88–91 (1958) (suggested it may be impossible to overcome politics and achieve a universal definition); Jonathan A. Bush, "The Supreme Crime" and its Origins: The Last Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2324 passim (2002) (chronicling the history of attempts to define the term). Nevertheless, progress has been made in recent decades, and in 1974 a definition was adopted without vote by the United Nations General Assembly. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) (enjoining members from the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," and establishing a rebuttable presumption that the "first use of armed force by a state in contravention of the Charter" constitutes prima facie evidence of aggression but, by limiting aggression to force used "in contravention of the Charter," suggesting that some first uses of force may be permissible). In intervening years a general definition of aggression has emerged that includes the elements of a military attack, not otherwise justified by international law, directed against the territory of another state. See Louis René Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 Hous. J. Int’l L. 259, 263 n.5 (1991) (synthesizing various definitions of aggression).

32 The strand of international humanitarian law known as the *jus ad bellum* governs the right to resort to armed force, whereas the *jus in bello* governs the methods and means employed in war and specifies who and what are legitimate targets. See William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 767, 770 (1999) (differentiating the *jus ad bellum* from the *jus in bello*).

33 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state . . . .").

34 See 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 209, 218–22 (1947) [hereinafter Trial of the Major War Criminals] (convicting defendants of conspiracy to wage "aggressive war").

35 A peremptory norm, also known as a norm of "*jus cogens,*" is the most powerful genre of all the sources of international law. A norm of *jus cogens* "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344. The prohibition against aggression in international relations is widely regarded as having attained the status of a norm with the character of *jus cogens.* See 2 Arthur Watts, The International Law Commission 1949–1998, at 741 (1999) ("[T]he law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.") (quoting the International Law Commission 1966 Commentary to the Final Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties); Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 100 (holding that
the Charter categorically proscribes "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," and thus, fifty-eight years into the Charter era, it is "well settled in modern international law that no nation may engage in aggression."

B. Sovereignty Preserved: The Inherent Right of Self-Defense

Nevertheless, imposition of a sharp prohibition on aggression has not disabled the "inherent right" of states to self-defense, nor has it prevented state practice inconsistent with what former Justice Hersch Lauterpacht termed the "guiding norm" of the U.N. enterprise: "there shall be no violence." Although the U.N. Charter has had a transformative effect on the law governing the resort to force, states remain free under customary international law to use force "in conformity with the Charter." Accordingly, states continue to resort to armed self-help to defend their territory and political independence against aggression and to protect their nationals and property abroad from serious threats of death or injury, and they do so with-

36 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The text of the Charter only admits of two exceptions to Article 2(4), namely Article 106, which allowed the current permanent members of the Security Council to undertake collective action prior to the establishment of the Security Council, and Article 107, which allowed states to take action against the Axis Powers during World War II. See id. arts. 106, 107.

37 Addicott, supra note 18, at 769.

38 "Self-defense" under international law may be defined as "a lawful use of force . . . under conditions prescribed by international law, in response to a previous unlawful use (or, at least, a threat) of force." Dinstein, supra note 25, at 175.


40 Scholars debate not whether the U.N. Charter has transformed the jus ad bellum but the degree to which it has done so. See Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent, 3 Wyoming L. Rev. 663 passim (2003) (examining the intent of the Article 51 drafters in an attempt to answer this debate).

41Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8).

42 See Beck & Arend, supra note 21, at 199 ("No nation should be limited to using force to protect its citizens . . . to situations in which they are within its boundaries.") (quoting the U.S. State Department Legal Advisor); Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 Whittier L. Rev. 711, 729 (1986) (enumerating lawful bases for the use of force in self-defense); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 96 (1989) (noting that states "have traditionally defended their military personnel, citizens, commerce, and property from attacks"). The Israeli rescue of hostages held by terrorists at Entebbe Airport in Uganda in 1976 is perhaps the most familiar example of the use of force in defense of nationals. See Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions
out impinging either the territorial integrity or political independence of states that fail in their duty to protect aliens and alien property within their jurisdiction. Moreover, self-defense remains so intrinsic to the concept of sovereignty even in the Charter era that the right is "one that would be asserted by nations absent recognition in international law." \(^{44}\)

In fact, the Charter does not of its own force disable or impair the right to self-defense, nor is it at all likely that its framers intended that it do so.\(^{45}\) Article 2(4), although broadly drafted, prohibits only three

---


specific applications of force in international relations: (1) the threat or use of force prejudicial to the territorial integrity of states; (2) the threat or use of force contrary to the political independence of states; and (3) the threat or use of force "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." In other words, all those uses of force not excluded by operation of Article 2(4) are permitted, and provided that a particular use of force cannot legitimately be construed as challenging either the territorial integrity or political independence of a state or as inconsistent with the primary purpose of the United Nations—the "maintenance of international peace and security"—the use of force in question is arguably permissible.

The exercise of the right to self-defense, even where it involves armed force, is thus not inconsistent with the maintenance of international peace and security and not contrary to the Charter. Even more directly, Article 51 recognizes the "inherent right" of a state subjected to aggression to engage in self-defense, and to receive the assistance of other states to that end. In sum, the Charter is not limited in its ends to the promotion of international peace, nor is it most accurately construed when the exceptions to Article 2(4) are read narrowly: the


46 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
47 Id. art. 1(1).
48 See Bowett, supra note 43, at 185-86; Paust, supra note 12, at 536; Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 513, 521-22. But see Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 73, 90-92 (1985) (conducting detailed exegesis of the travaux préparatoires of the U.N. Charter and reaching the conclusion that "Article 2(4) was not intended to permit force to be used even when not inconsistent with a purpose of the U.N.").

49 It is important to note that Article 51 is not an affirmative grant but is rather the recognition of an inherent right of self-defense. See Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 241; see also Walker, supra note 45, at 351-52 (clarifying the status of the right to self-defense in the Charter as a recognized, and not a conferred right).

50 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . ").
framers recognized that justice, measured in terms of the right of states to resist and defeat aggression, is a concomitant of peace, particularly in a world in which there is no effective international monopoly on the right to use force and no sovereign to which states may turn for resolution of their disputes, vindication of their rights, and guarantee of their security.

C. Whither Customary International Law Governing the Resort to Force? The Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense

1. Restrictivists: Plain Language and Security Council Primacy

Abridge States' Rights under Customary International Law

Some commentators contest the argument that the customary international law of self-defense is little transformed by the Charter, suggesting instead that a further reading of Article 51, coupled with an examination of the drafting history of the entire document, supports the conclusion that a much more prohibitive regime in derogation of the customary international law of self-defense was created in San Francisco in 1945. For this restrictivist camp, Article 51 explicitly qualifies the right to individual or collective self-defense to those circumstances in which an “armed attack” has occurred and, in the absence of the satisfaction of this condition precedent, states that resort to armed force cannot avail themselves of the self-defense exception to the general prohibition of Article 2(4), which in any event is to be read very narrowly consistent with the primary purpose of the United Nations—maintaining peace.

Moreover, Article 51, which provides further that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of... self-defense, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” can be read to have structurally modified the inherent right to self-defense by subordinating it to the Security Council—the U.N. organ charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Although it is hotly debated to what extent and with what


52 See Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of U.S. Military Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 18 (1985) (summarizing the restrictivist argument regarding Article 51).

53 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).

54 Article 24 of the Charter confers upon the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Id. art. 24. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is specifically empowered to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
degree of success the Security Council must intervene in a given case to preclude a state from employing force in self-defense, and although the record of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security is abominable, the plain language of

sion." See id. art. 39. Should the Security Council make such a determination, it may at its discretion make recommendations as to measures to restore international peace and security, or it may call upon members to take a wide array of "measures not involving the use of armed force," to include, inter alia, the "complete or partial interruption of economic relations . . . and the severance of diplomatic relations." Id. arts. 40, 41. Should such nonforceful measures prove inadequate, or should the Security Council decide that such measures would not suffice, the Council may authorize member states to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id. art. 42. The Security Council may also authorize regional organizations to undertake enforcement measures consistent with the restoration of international peace and security. Id. arts. 52, 53.

55 Some scholars, interpreting Article 51 literally, contend that once the Security Council becomes seized of a matter the right of self-defense is automatically suspended. See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defense—Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT'L LAW. 1081, 1089 (2002) (positing this interpretation of Article 51); Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 131–34 (1999) (surveying proponents and critics of the "literalist" interpretation of Article 51). According to this literalist interpretation, it matters not whether the Security Council takes effective measures against the aggressor; the right of a state to self-defense is in abeyance. Critics of this literalist interpretation suggest that to prevent an injured state from taking measures in self-defense despite the ineffectiveness of the Security Council would be "an implausible—indeed absurd—interpretation" entirely inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the Charter to protect, rather than render illusory, the inherent right of self-defense. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 458 (1991) (criticizing the literalist interpretation, and noting that in the scenario where the Council calls an invader to withdraw, such a decision by the Council "could not be intended to deprive the victim state of its right to defend itself when the invader has not complied with the Council's order"); see also Schmitt, supra note 48, at 532 (insisting that "the mere fact that the Security Council . . . is considering the situation . . . does not deprive a State of its right to self-defense"); Roger K. Smith, The Legality of Coercive Arms Control, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 455, 497–98 (1994) (noting that language that would have explicitly terminated the right of continuing self-defense upon the Security Council becoming seized of a dispute was proposed and rejected at the San Francisco drafting conference). According to this pragmatic interpretation of Article 51, the right to self-defense cannot be suspended upon anything short of an affirmative Security Council finding that the state acting in self-defense has exceeded the scope of Article 51, to the point where its actions in response to aggression constitute an independent threat to international security. Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 51: Limits on Self-Defense?, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 336, 351–52 (1992) (stating that the right to self-defense terminates only upon an explicit Security Council determination that continued measures in self-defense would constitute aggression).

56 Only a quarter-century into the Charter era, commentators were eulogizing the Security Council on the ground that it had failed in its mission of preserving
Article 51 supports the restrictivist argument that the customary right of self-defense has been abridged by the investment of the primary responsibility for peace and security in the Security Council, even where the Security Council fails to respond or responds ineffectively.

The customary international law doctrine of anticipatory self-defense—a subset of the broader body of custom predating the Charter, which holds that when a state is faced with an imminent threat of armed attack it may lawfully resort to proportional acts of defensive international peace and security. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 810–11, 822 (1970) (noting the abuse of Charter provisions by states falsely claiming to act in self-defense, the spurious invocation of the authority of regional organizations, and the inability of the Security Council to enforce prohibitions on the use of force). Subsequent analyses of the performance of the Security Council offered four and nearly six decades, and several genocides, after its founding, supports the argument that it has failed abjectly. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of War: Self-Defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51 of United Nations Charter, 25 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL’Y 539, 540 (2002) (“Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations—126 states out of 189—fought 291 interstate conflicts in which 22 million people were killed. . . . The upshot is that the Charter’s use-of-force regime has all but collapsed.”); O’Connell, supra note 19, at 449 (describing the Security Council as “limp[ing] on under a cloud of questioned legitimacy” after its exclusion in favor of NATO during the Kosovo Crisis in 1998–1999); W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 279, 280 (1985) (suggesting that states have ignored the Charter provisions governing the use of force, and modified the role of the Security Council, by practice); Roberts, supra note 7, at 484 (describing contrary state practice as having rendered Charter provisions governing the use of force “moribund”); Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 581 (describing the Security Council as having “enormously weakened its own prestige by ineffectual responses to the disastrous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s”). Some commentators lay much blame at the foot of states and suggest that their failures to participate in Article 43 agreements and to otherwise contribute to collective security is at the root of Security Council ineffectiveness. See Anthony Clark Arend & Robert Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N. Charter Paradigm 56–58 (1993) (suggesting states “are simply not committed enough to the principle of collective security to be willing to use force in circumstances that seem to have little direct relevance to their own national security goals”); Annan, supra note 18 (reminding member states that the United Nations has not yet proven “that [the] concerns [of ‘uniquely vulnerable’ states] can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action”).

57 Anticipatory self-defense is sometimes referred to as “preemptive self-defense.” See, e.g., Kearley, supra note 40, at 665; Sapiro, supra note 16, at 600. Although it is possible to differentiate the two, this Article accepts the argument that anticipatory self-defense and preemptive self-defense are largely equivalent; nevertheless, there is a crucial distinction between these terms and the doctrine of preventive war, discussed infra Part II.
armed force to preempt the attack before it is inflicted—has of late become the wedge that has broadened the theoretical division between restrictivists and pragmatists on the subject of self-defense. That a customary right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense existed in the pre-Charter era is uncontroverted. European multilateral defense treaties codified express provisions for the collective exercise of self-defense in anticipation of aggression as late as the early twentieth century, and with the Monroe Doctrine the United States issued a clear expression of its intent to engage in anticipatory self-defense should any European power attempt to extend its sphere of influence into the Western Hemisphere. The classic recitation of the doctrine, enunciated in the Caroline case, established a more secure foundation in international law for the right of a state to anticipate a threat with force, provided that "the 'necessity of . . . self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.'" The Caroline formulation, which ac-

58 In the strict sense, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is inapplicable to ongoing conflicts, under which the formal state of belligerence has been created, military operations are not designed to anticipate enemy attacks, and the rights of belligerents to self-defense cannot be said to depend upon whether it is possible to demonstrate an imminent threat, as the threat exists from the moment of the first strike. See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 536 ("Once the first attack in an ongoing campaign has been launched, the issue of anticipatory self-defense becomes moot. Imminence is irrelevant because an armed attack is already underway.").


60 See Walker, supra note 45, at 327-35 (examining treaties from the eighteenth through twentieth centuries that established collective self-defense regimes and incorporating anticipatory self-defense provisions as support for the existence of a right at customary international law to invoke the doctrine); see also id. at 350 (interpreting the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other treaties as supportive of the customary international legal right to anticipatory self-defense).


62 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in National Jurisdiction: Its Legal Effects, 2 Moore Digest § 217, at 412. The facts of the Caroline case are as follows: during an uprising against British rule in Upper Canada in 1837, a British officer authorized an armed band of irregular forces to cross into the United States to destroy a vessel, the Caroline, then moored in port, by sending it over the Niagara Falls. From the availa-
quired near-universal acceptance over the course of the next century as the authoritative expression of the right of states to anticipatory self-defense, influenced the interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which cited it approvingly even in denying the defense proffered by Nazi defendants to charges of aggressive war. However, although the existence of the right to anticipatory self-defense under traditional customary international law is well established, the question remains whether the transformations wrought upon the international legal regime governing self-defense by the establishment of the U.N. Charter include impairment of the right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense even under the narrowly delimited circumstances of necessity resulting from an imminent threat of sufficient magnitude.

It appeared that the Caroline was to be used by Americans to provide arms and supplies to Canadian insurgents, and the British Government characterized the destruction of the Caroline—in the context of diplomatic correspondence concerning the criminal trial of a captured British national—as an act of anticipatory self-defense. Diplomatic correspondence between Britain and the United States resolved the dispute and provided authoritative expressions in support of the qualified right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense. See 1 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law 189-90 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) (offering contemporaneous support for the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense as articulated in the Caroline case). For a discussion of the Caroline case, see Thomas Graham, Jr., National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6-8 (2003).

See Walker, supra note 45, at 342-43 (noting that fourteen of the parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact signed a statement of authoritative interpretation of the Pact stating that the Pact did not affect their “inalienable” right of self-defense, to include the right to anticipatory self-defense).

Judgment, 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 34, at 448 (holding that the German invasions of Denmark and Norway did not meet these requirements: “[P]reventative action in foreign territory is justified only in case of ‘an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.’”).

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East restated the Caroline case in approving the exercise of anticipatory self-defense by the Netherlands in response to an impeding Japanese attack upon its possessions in the South Pacific. See United States v. Araki, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, THE TOKYO JUDGMENT 382 (B.V.A. Röling & C.F. Rüter eds., 1977) (“The fact that the Netherlands being fully apprised of the imminence of the attack in self-defense declared war against Japan . . . cannot change that war from a war of aggression on the part of Japan into something other than that.”).

To the requirement of imminence, some commentators add the requirement that the threat be of sufficient magnitude to justify the resort to anticipatory self-defense on the theory that lesser threats can be managed without the resort to force that carries with it the prospect of being in violation of the general proscription on the use of force. See Addicott, supra note 18, at 778. Moreover, the exercise of antici-
For restrictivists, anticipatory self-defense, despite its pedigree,
is "fertile ground for torturing the self-defense concept" and a dangerous warrant for manipulative, self-serving states to engage in prima facie illegal aggression while cloaking their actions under the guise of anticipatory self-defense and claiming legal legitimacy. Analysis of the legitimacy of an act of anticipatory self-defense requires replacing the objectively verifiable prerequisite of an "armed attack" under Article 51 with the subjective perception of a "threat" of such an attack as perceived by the state believing itself a target, and thus determination of whether a state has demonstrated imminence before engaging in anticipatory self-defense lends itself to post hoc judgments of an infinite number of potential scenarios, spanning a continuum from the most innocuous of putatively civilian acts, including building roads and performing scientific research, to the most threatening, including the overt marshaling of thousands of combat troops in offensive dispositions along a contested border. Establishing the necessity of anticipatory self-defense in response to a pattern of isolated incidents over a period of time is an equally subjective task susceptible to multiple determinations and without empirical standards to guide judgment. History is replete with examples of aggression masquerading as anticipatory self-defense, including the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in

68 Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 228.


70 See Paust, supra note 42, at 732 (questioning how one can judge the self-defense requirements of necessity and proportionality when responding to specific terrorist attacks in various parts of the world with lulls of time between each).

71 See Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 221–23 (chronicling the history of the “over-zealous” application of anticipatory self-defense, including in the War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714) and the Anglo-Franco-Danish Conflict (1807)); id. at 235 (characterizing Indo-Pakistani wars as instances where both sides claimed they were acting in self-defense); John-Alex Romano, Note, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a State of Necessity, 87 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048 n.163 (1999) (noting the rejection by the International Law Commission of the Ger-
1931 and the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and by simply recharacterizing their actions as anticipatory self-defense rather than aggression dedicated to territorial revanchism or fulfillment of religious obligations, self-interested states such as China, North Korea, Pakistan, or members of the Arab League, restrictivists warn, might claim the legal entitlement to attack, respectively, Taiwan, South Korea, India, and Israel. Moreover, taken to its logical extreme the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense might be interpreted as authorizing a state under the leadership of a paranoid decisionmaker to attack the entire world on the false suspicion of threats emanating from every corner.

In short, restrictivists champion the Charter as a rigidly positivist legal framework in which anticipatory self-defense is an unwelcome and even repugnant legal anachronism that blurs the distinction between claim that its invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium in 1914 was an act of anticipatory self-defense). See League of Nations, O.J. Spec. Supp. 177, V1, at 42 (1933) (rejecting the Japanese claim of anticipatory self-defense in view of facts which demonstrated the absence of a threat from China without prejudicing the general availability of a defense of anticipatory self-defense).

The Nuremburg Tribunal concluded that the German invasion of Poland was not predicated upon “an intention formed in good faith and honesty of conviction to protect one’s safety, that safety being immediately threatened,” in convicting German defendants of conspiracy to launch an aggressive war against Poland. For restrictivists, the essential purpose of Article 51 was to preclude “bogus claim[s] to be acting in self-defense” such as the German invasion of Poland. Franck, supra note 16, at 620.

See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreward: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1516 (2003) (presenting examples of disputes ripe for exploitation through false claims of anticipatory self-defense as the legal justification for aggression). In the words of French President Jacques Chirac:

As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other countries will naturally do the same. . . . What would you say in the entirely hypothetical event that China wanted to take pre-emptive action against Taiwan, saying that Taiwan was a threat to it? . . . Or what if India decided to take preventive action against Pakistan, or vice versa? Elaine Sciolino, French Leader Offers Formula to Tackle Iraq: Chirac Wants Support of U.N. Before Action, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A1.

The proper exercise of anticipatory self-defense requires far more than the judgment that another state might eventually harbor ill will toward another state, or that a state may be waxing in power; capacity, coupled with direct and specific intent to make immediate use of that capacity by aggressive action, are necessary elements which must be proven. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 14, at 557 (“One state may not strike another merely because the second might someday develop an ability and desire to attack it.”). Put somewhat differently, “pure capability is not a sufficient casus belli . . . . And pure capability with a smarmy attitude is not casus belli.” Six Degrees of Preemption, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2002, at B2.
between aggression and self-defense by substituting a highly subjective imminence standard in place of an objective requirement of an antecedent armed attack. All but a handful of restrictivists conclude that to read Article 51 as anything other than a clear and deliberate measure intended by the framers to override and extinguish the customary law as an independent source of an inherent right of self-defense and impose a restrictive obligation upon states-parties would jeopardize the legal project of restraining state discretion in regard to the resort to armed force. Accordingly, for restrictivists, Article 51 is unambiguous in its requirement that an armed attack occur prior to the lawful exercise of self-defense, and “unless troops, planes or ships cross an international border to commence an attack,” the right of anticipatory self-defense simply does not arise. Moreover, any application of military force undertaken absent an armed attack is ipso facto an aggressive act in violation of the plain terms of Article 2(4) unless authorized by the Security Council; in theory, a state engag-

76 See John Quigley, A Weak Defense of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 10 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 255, 257 (1996) (“In a world which is hard pressed to stop aggressive war, it makes little sense to open a loophole large enough to accommodate a tank division.”); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 15 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (“The UN Charter was adopted for the very purpose of creating a far wider prohibition on force than existed under treaty or custom in 1945 . . .”). A handful of restrictivists may be amenable to the conclusion that a vestigial right under customary international law entitling states to resort to anticipatory self-defense is available in those highly unusual circumstances in which a threat is “nearly certain to materialize,” the threat is of a very high order of magnitude, and nonforceful options are certain to fail. Schmitt, supra note 48, at 531.


77 Condron, supra note 55, at 131.

78 See Henkin, supra note 67, at 295 (“[T]he Charter intended to permit unilateral use of force only in a very narrow and clear circumstance, in self-defense if an armed attack occurs.”) (emphasis added).

79 The International Court of Justice, in a much-criticized—and cited—opinion, offered strong support for the restrictivist position, holding that the legitimacy of a claim to self-defense rests upon and is “subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack,” thus seeming to restrictivists to categorically reject the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense as incompatible with the U.N. Charter, and in particular Article 2(4). See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Ni).
ing in anticipatory self-defense without such authorization could itself become branded an outlaw and the target of Security Council action under Article 42.

2. Pragmatists: The Charter Accommodates Custom and Necessity

In stark contrast, pragmatists\(^\text{80}\) assert that, as an essential constituent of sovereignty, the traditional right of states to self-defense is to be

\(^{80}\) A number of commentators espouse views that can collectively be termed the "pragmatist" position, which asserts that the post-Charter viability of the customary international law doctrine of anticipatory self-defense was intended by the framers of the Charter and is necessary in a world lacking a central executive with the power to sanction aggressors. See, e.g., Bowett, supra note 43, at 191 ("It is not believed [that the Charter] restricts the traditional right of self-defense so as to exclude action taken against an imminent danger but before 'an armed attack occurs.'"); Brierly, supra note 76, at 418–21 (rejecting the restrictivist interpretation of Article 51); McCormack, supra note 45, at 253–84, 302 (setting forth a more pragmatic approach to analyzing self-defense); Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, The International Law of War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order 241 (1994) ("A rational appraisal of necessity demands much more than simple ascertainment of the modality of the initiating coercion."); McDougal & Reisman, supra note 43, at 988–91 (citing the view that customary international law allows for anticipatory self-defense); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 150–52 (1991) (finding it unnecessary to interpret Article 51 as "exclud[ing] absolutely legitimate self-defense in advance of an actual attack"); Stone, supra note 43, at 2–3 (rejecting the restrictivist view of the Charter); Ann van Wylen Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr., The Concept of Aggression in International Law 58 (1972) ("The limitations of aggression only to instances of armed attack and possible threats thereof is too narrow."); William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 667, 725 (2003) (discussing the use of anticipatory self-defense to kill Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein); Beres, supra note 31, at 266 (arguing that a literal interpretation of Article 51 "ignores the reality that international law cannot compel a state to wait until it absorbs a lethal first strike before acting to protect itself"); George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, Naval War C. Rev., May–June 1986, at 69, 73–74 (finding an "inherent right" to anticipatory self-defense); Franck, supra note 45, at 68 (arguing that the use of force is tolerated under the Charter system); Claude Humphrey & Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 496–99 (1952); David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1991 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 57, 65–84, 122 (stating that the "proper treaty interpretation" of the Charter includes a customary law of self-defense); Rein Mullerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, in Beyond Confrontation: International Law for the Post-Cold War Era 93, 109–10 (Lori Fisher Damrosch et al. eds., 1995) (finding that the Charter did not extinguish anticipatory self-defense but did put limits on it); John F. Murphy, Commentary on Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in Law and Force in the New International Order 241, 242 (Lori Fisher Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (considering the U.S. justification for its intervention in Panama as a pragmatist rationale); William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense
presumed to have survived the Charter in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, and that available evidence indicates the intent that the Charter coexist with, rather than trump, custom as an independent source of rights and duties under the international law pertinent to the use of force. Accordingly, anticipatory self-defense,

See Bowett, supra note 43, at 184-85 (arguing that member nations of the U.N. still have all of those rights accorded to them under international law which they have not surrendered, including the right of self-defense); McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 80, at 236 ("[Anticipatory self-defense] has long been honored in traditional authoritative myth as one of the fundamental 'rights of sovereign states' [and] limitations or derogations from sovereign competence are not lightly to be assumed.").

81 The travaux préparatoires of the Charter is silent with regard to anticipatory self-defense, and some scholars read into this silence an intent to "eliminate the preexisting right to act in anticipation." Henkin, supra note 43, at 141; see also Zeidelis, supra note 48, at 100 ("Had Article 51’s reference to self-defense ‘if an armed attack occurs’ not been intended to eliminate the preexisting right to act in anticipation, some effort to have the travaux capture that fundamental point would have seemed natural. The failure of the travaux to do so, therefore, is somewhat suggestive."). However, many scholars are doubtful that the travaux supports the restrictivist argument. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 80, at 1634 (noting that “it is not clear that article 51 was intended to eliminate the customary law right of self-defense”). Pragmatists interpret any indeterminacy in Article 51 to mean that the inclusion in Article 51 of the words “nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right” evinces a clear intent not to restrict the pre-Charter customary legal rights of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense. See Summary Report of Fourth Meeting of Committee, Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 387, 400 (1945) (stating that under the Charter “self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired”); Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 234 (“To the extent Article 51 . . . provide[s] that the inherent right of self-defense is not impaired, the anticipatory right should stand, as it was customary law before the Charter existed.”). Pragmatists differ further from restrictivists in regard to the language relevant to the
a subset of the inherent right of self-defense that antedates the Charter, coexists easily with the text of Article 51, a provision the plain and natural meaning of which neither compels, nor was it intended to compel, the cramped restrictivist conclusion that self-defense is permitted under international law if, and only if, an armed attack occurs.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, to restrictivist claims that the resort to anticipatory self-defense without the pre-authorization of the Security Council constitutes aggression, pragmatists counter with the assertion that because the inherent right to self-defense, to include anticipatory self-defense, is a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted,\textsuperscript{84} the all too frequent failure of the Security Council to take effective measures to thwart a would-be aggressor does not preclude or place outside the analysis, insisting that the French language version of Article 51, which uses the phrase "aggression armée"—armed aggression—instead of "armed attack," was intended to accord states a margin of appreciation to permit them to respond to armed aggression in the form of threats, even in the absence of an armed attack, and as such is a better interpretation of the framers' intent. See Mallison & Mallison, \textit{supra} note 45, at 420–21 (arguing that the French text, which is equally as authentic as the English version, more accurately reflects the negotiating history and the intent of the parties). For pragmatists, the \textit{travaux préparatoires} clearly reveals that anticipatory self-defense survives the Charter as an independent source of legal authority for self-defense in the face of threatened attack. See \textit{McCormack}, \textit{supra} note 45, at 184–85 (discerning a clear intent to preserve the customary doctrine of anticipatory self-defense); Graham, \textit{supra} note 62, at 3–4 (summarizing the restrictivist position on the survival of the customary law of self-defense in the Charter era); Beth M. Polebaum, \textit{Note, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age}, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 202 (1984) (summarizing this position as of 1984).

\textsuperscript{83} See \textit{Military and Paramilitary Activities}, 1986 I.C.J. at 347–48 (Schwebel, J., dissenting):

I wish, \textit{ex abundanti cautela}, to make clear that, for my part, I do not agree with a construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article 51 as if it were worded: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if, and only if, an armed attack occurs . . ." I do not agree that the terms or intent of Article 51 eliminate the right of self-defense under customary international law, or confine its entire scope to the express terms of Article 51.

\textsuperscript{84} Scholars diverge in their opinions as to precisely which norms can be considered to be peremptory norms in international law. See Mark Weisburd, \textit{The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1995) (arguing that the idea of peremptory norms in international law is indefensible). However, at least two commentators conclude that the right to self-defense has attained the status of norm of \textit{jus cogens}. See Louis René Beres, \textit{On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel}, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321, 322 n.3 (1991); Carin Kahgan, \textit{Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense}, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767, 827 (1997). If the right to self-defense is a norm of \textit{jus cogens}, it trumps treaty-based norms, including those created or reflected by the U.N. Charter, in the event of conflict. See \textit{Walker, supra} note 45, at 352 n.212.
law the prudent exercise of anticipatory self-defense, particularly when the survival of the threatened state is at risk.\textsuperscript{85} In other words, nothing in the language of Article 51, its drafting history, or its relation to the object and purpose of the U.N. Charter compels the absurd conclusion that the framers intended to abolish the customary right of states to anticipatory self-defense "when [their] survival is at stake."\textsuperscript{86}

Moreover, pragmatists argue, not only is anticipatory self-defense compatible with the Charter, but ongoing processes of technological development, proliferation of WMD, and radicalization of international relations have so enhanced the magnitude of the threats to civilian populations and the speed with which enemies can attack that the \textit{Caroline} standard for "imminence," developed in a pre-WMD era, is no longer sufficient to simultaneously restrain states while guaranteeing their survival.\textsuperscript{87} For pragmatists, the conceivable acts of aggres-

\textsuperscript{85} See Timothy Kearley, \textit{Raising the Caroline}, 1999 Wis. Intr'. L.J. 325, 345 (challenging the notion that Security Council inactivity with respect to threatened aggression renders an act of anticipatory self-defense in the face of that aggression an illegal act); see also Taft & Buchwald, supra note 14, at 557 ("An otherwise lawful use of force does not become unlawful because it can be characterized as preemption.").

\textsuperscript{86} See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263 (July 8) (opining that one should not lose sight of the inherent right of every state to survival).

\textsuperscript{87} In regard to the determination of imminence, pragmatists assert that fundamental changes in political and military circumstances that render a legal test inappropriate to a contemporary threat environment demand that the test be revised to reflect current realities. See Myres S. McDougal, \textit{The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense}, 57 Am. J. Intr'. L. 597, 598 (1963) (contending, in regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1960s and the application of the \textit{Caroline} test to that threat environment, "that a test formulated in the previous century for a controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary controversies, involving high expectations of violence, between nuclear-armed protagonists"). Professor McDougal noted further that

under the hard conditions of the contemporary technology of destruction, which makes possible the complete obliteration of states with still incredible speed from still incredible distances, the principle of effectiveness, requiring that agreements be interpreted in accordance with the major purposes and demands projected by the parties, could scarcely be served by requiring states confronted with necessity for defense to assume the posture of 'sitting ducks.' Any such interpretation could only make a mockery, both in its acceptability to states and in its potential application, of the Charter's major purpose of minimizing unauthorized coercion and violence across state lines.

\textit{Id.} at 600-01. More recent pragmatists observe that technological transformations not foreseeable at the time of the drafting of the U.N. Charter have enabled methods of intelligence collection, such as satellite intelligence and communications in-
sion against which states were historically entitled to defend included not merely transborder attacks but also military preparations undertaken as preludes to or as threats of an attack, and to read the Charter hypertechnically to require that a state assume the posture of a “sitting duck” and submit to a potentially decisive first strike, thereby risking its very survival, would “eliminate the customary law right of self-defense” and “protect the aggressor’s right to the first stroke.”

Such a principle would “be a denial of that essential reciprocity between intercepts, that yield proof of the hostile intent of adversaries long before an actual armed attack and should thus permit states to act in self-defense in anticipation of such attacks. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, Wkly. Standard, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26 (arguing that “modern methods of intelligence collection . . . now make it unnecessary to sit out an actual armed attack to await convincing proof of a state’s hostile intent”).

Pragmatists take a far more expansive view than do restrictivists on the question of precisely what constitutes aggression against which states are entitled to exercise their inherent right of self-defense. See Neil H. Alford, Jr., The Legality of American Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A Broader Perspective, 75 Yale L.J. 1109, 1113 (1966) (positing that the definition of “armed attack” should comprehend preparatory stages rather than a solitary event); Humphrey & Waldock, supra note 80, at 498 (“Where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack maybe said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the frontier.”); Richard G. Maxson, Nature’s Eldest Law: A Survey of a Nation’s Right to Act in Self-Defense, Parameters, Autumn 1995, at 55, 65–66 (requiring only “objective indicators,” such as troop buildups and increased alert levels, to satisfy the imminence requirement); McDougal, supra note 87, at 598 (stating that conditions giving rise to a finding of aggression are not limited to an “actual armed attack” but include “imminence of attack of such high degree as to preclude effective resport by the intended victim to non-violent modalities of response”); Polebaum, supra note 82, at 203 (“The Charter should not be read to require one nation to permit another the benefits of military armament, surprise attack, and offensive advantage, against which no defense may lie.”). As Colonel Roberts further explains,

[a]ggression does not usually begin, and injury is not usually incurred when the first weapons are fired. The uses of force are usually but one phase of a competition of interest and power. As Clausewitz observed, the aggressor is often peace-loving, and it is his resistant victim who causes war to erupt: “[a] conqueror is always a lover of peace (as Bonaparte always asserted of himself); he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed; in order to prevent this, we must choose war.”

Roberts, supra note 7, at 517 (footnote omitted).

Romano, supra note 71, at 1036 (quoting Schachter, supra note 80, at 1634).

Humphrey & Waldock, supra note 80, at 498; see also id. (“[I]t would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow.”); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 151, 183–85 (2002) (arguing that “in light of the availability of weapons of mass destruction” a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is available de-
tween States, without which the supposed rule of law and the principle of sovereign equality can be but the merest mockeries.”

91 The argument that the definition of imminence must be pegged to the

spite claims of state territorial inviolability, and “[e]ven failure to suppress terrorist activity may justify action in self-defense”).

91 STONE, supra note 31, at 101. Professor Stone asks the following rhetorical questions to underscore his point that a restrictivist interpretation of the Charter that abolishes the customary doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is inconsistent with the requirements of law, politics, and morality:

[S]uppose military intelligence at the Pentagon received indisputable evidence that a hostile State was poised to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead, against New York, Boston and Washington, would it be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to wait until those cities had received the missiles before it reacted by the use of force? . . . [I]s it bound by law to wait for its own destruction?

Id. at 99. Some restrictivists concede that a coherent theory of legal regulation of force in international relations must make room for anticipatory self-defense in some very limited circumstances. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 189–90 (arguing that the United States could legally have attacked the Japanese fleet en route to Pearl Harbor on the ground that the United States had “convincing” intelligence that the Japanese were committed to attack); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 81 (3d ed. 2000) (allowing the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense where the enemy demonstrates “a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk”); see also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE THREAT OF TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 259–60 (1964) (“[I]n the absence of effective international machinery the right of self-defence must . . . be extended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently contrary language of Article 51.”). However, not all restrictivists are as tolerant of even a slight exception under such circumstances, and thus even before the conclusion of the U.N. Charter, representatives to the San Francisco Conference questioned whether the argument that the Charter could be construed to abolish customary rights of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, was politically and legally defensible. See, e.g., Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 54, ¶¶ 392–93 (1952) (indicating questioning of the delegates by U.S. Representative Makatos and Belgian Representative van Glabbeke as to whether the United States, if it had received prior notice of an impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, would have been branded an aggressor had it engaged in anticipatory self-defense to destroy the Japanese forces detailed to bomb Pearl Harbor). A former jurist of the ICJ demonstrates the continued incongruity of the restrictivist position nearly sixty years later:

[C]ommon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right to self-defense . . . .

swiftness of delivery and destructiveness of weapons technology is not new; as President John F. Kennedy noted in 1962:

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.\footnote{The Soviet Threat to the Americas: Address by President Kennedy, 47 Dep't St. Bull. 715, 716 (1962). Sixteen years earlier the U.S. representative made an almost identical point in attaching a memorandum to the report of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, stating the U.S. position that "[i]t is . . . clear that an 'armed attack' is now something entirely different from what it was prior to the discovery of atomic weapons." The memorandum continued, noting that "it would therefore seem to be both important and appropriate . . . that the treaty define 'armed attack' is [sic] a manner appropriate to atomic weapons and include in the definition not simply the actual dropping of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in themselves preliminary to such action." The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., Special Supp., Annex 4, at 106, U.N. Doc. 5/Supplements (1946).}

However, revolutions in political and military affairs over the course of the last forty years have fundamentally transformed the nature of armed conflict at a pace beyond the demonstrated capacity of the law to adapt, and the introduction of WMD, ballistic missiles, and information warfare have contracted the battlespace, reduced the time necessary to deliver deadly payloads, and greatly multiplied the costs of miscalculation.\footnote{Pragmatists argue that determinations of imminence must evolve in parallel to transformations in military technology and the nature of the international system; standards appropriate in earlier historical eras when the marshaling and deployment of force took far more time under conditions of greater transparency and with far less threat to civilians are unsuited to the present. See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 228 ("When war machines operated at a slower and more deliberate tempo and could not threaten the very existence of humanity, a standard of justifiable self-defense, requiring a nation to wait for an armed attack on its soil, was a reasonable and stabilizing rule."); Yoo, supra note 14, at 572–73 (noting that the conjunction of weapons proliferation and the evolution of radical transnational terrorism has "dramatically increased the degree of potential harm, . . . vastly improved the capability for stealth, . . . and render[ed] threats more imminent because there is less time to prevent their launch"). The proliferation of weapons of far greater destructive capacity, coupled with the structural complexities in identifying, locating, and deterring suicidal enemies that take cover deep within the civilian infrastructure of sponsoring states and target states alike, has spawned the greatest threat to international peace and security}
elusive and deadly threats posed by the intersection of international terrorism and WMD has rendered restrictive standards for determining imminence irrational and even dangerous.\textsuperscript{94} Some pragmatists go so far as to suggest that technological transformations have drawn whole categories of threats to the verge of imminence,\textsuperscript{95} thereby authoritatively resolving in the affirmative the debate over whether anticipatory self-defense has a place in the Charter era;\textsuperscript{96} others simply demand that in an “age of instant deliverables”\textsuperscript{97} the interpretation of the Charter keep pace with technological developments and that far more relaxed standards for determining when anticipatory self-defense may be lawfully exercised be developed,\textsuperscript{98} particularly in regard to the intersection of terrorists and WMD.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{94} See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 56, at 552 (suggesting that critics of anticipatory self-defense are “fight[ing] a losing battle with common sense” and that “no rational decision-maker” can be expected to refrain from anticipatory self-defense when an attack is imminent).

\textsuperscript{95} See McDougal, supra note 87, at 601 (noting, while discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis, that in light of advances in modern weaponry and the speed of delivery, reaction time to a nuclear attack from Soviet missiles in Cuba would be so short as to make the distinction between “attack” and “imminent attack” meaningless). Pragmatists assert that by burrowing deeply into the civilian populations of the states they seek to target, only to quickly become operational and attack without warning, terrorists have transformed the practical definition of imminence beyond the capacity of antiquated legal definitions to stretch. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 572.

\textsuperscript{96} See Walker, supra note 13, at 521–23 (concluding that, save for “those who may not be familiar with new weapons technology and the WMD threat,” the “debate over whether [anticipatory self-defense] is or is not permitted under international law... has become largely moot”).

\textsuperscript{97} Wedgwood, supra note 59.


\textsuperscript{99} See Beres, supra note 84, at 323 (warning that in an era of terrorism, international law should not be regarded as “as suicide pact,” but should allow for anticipatory self-defense under certain conditions); Yassin El-Ayouty, International Terrorism Under the Law, 5 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 485, 492 (1999) (stating that “in the case of universal and catastrophic terrorism... striking at the terrorists does not wait until a definite nexus is established between the terrorists and their actions”); Graham, supra note 62, at 8 (warning that the proliferation of WMD “make[s] waiting for an actual armed attack exceedingly dangerous”); Roberts, supra note 7, at 485 (arguing that, when rogue states or terrorist groups possessed of WMD directly threaten the survival of another state, the threatened state has the right to engage in anticipatory self-
Accordingly, pragmatists have offered a range of proposals to channel the application of anticipatory self-defense to the contemporary threat environment consistent with their view of lawfulness. The most restrictive of these require that a state be prepared to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it exhausted diplomatic remedies and took action only during the “last possible window of opportunity in the face of an attack that was almost certainly going to occur” or that the resort to anticipatory self-defense was unlawful yet excusable on the grounds of extreme necessity or duress.

defense “to either deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs or destroy illicit WMD sites”).

100 Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement generally requires that states attempt direct negotiations with the alleged aggressor state and make appeals to the Security Council. See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 198-99.

101 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 535. The most restrictive of the proposals for evaluating the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defense deviate very little from the Caroline requirement of imminence. See, e.g., Beres, supra note 84, at 329 n.33 (maintaining “that the danger posed . . . [be] instant and overwhelming” and “involve the threat of immediate and catastrophic (e.g., nuclear/biological/chemical) attack”). To this standard some would add the requirement, imported perhaps from Christian just war doctrine, that the harm to be prevented be greater than that occasioned by the application of anticipatory self-defense, a requirement clearly met in cases involving the intersection of terrorism and WMD. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 14, at 574-76 (creating a “reformulated” standard incorporating this requirement). The most restrictive of the pragmatists would hold states to an evidentiary standard identical to that associated with the common law criminal justice system, and require states exercising rights under anticipatory self-defense to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the factual predicate underlying their claims by post hoc presentations of the intelligence information available at the time of the decision to engage in anticipatory self-defense. See Beres, supra note 84, at 321-22 (insisting that certain due process “rules,” including the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, be maintained to protect against abuse of anticipatory self-defense in the assassination context); Schmitt, supra note 48, at 531 (warning of the risk that a lesser standard will promote aggression). Some pragmatists would add still further preconditions, including the publication of the threat in such a manner as to enhance the prospects for diplomatic resolution. See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 210 (requiring publicization “so that the threatening nation’s intent can be debated in international fora and pressure exerted to defuse [the] crisis”).

102 The domestic criminal law systems of many common law states permit a “necessity” defense in which the violent self-help is immunized under narrow circumstances where there is no morally justifiable or reasonable alternative. See Martin E. Veinsreideris, The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 621-23 (2000) (discussing the basis for and widespread availability of the necessity defense). A “state of necessity” under international law is analogous, denoting circumstances in which the “only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril” is to adopt conduct “not in conformity with an international obligation of that State.” State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of Draft Articles Adopted by the Drafting Committee, U.N.存量
More permissive proposals dispense with imminence considerations to require instead that a state prove (by some objective evidence) the exhaustion of peaceful remedies and the existence of a "coherent" threat.\textsuperscript{104} The most permissive proposals would legitimate the resort

GAOR Int'l Law Comm'n, 51st Sess. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.574 (1999). The most restrictive pragmatists would allow states arguably faced with the choice between elimination or the prudent exercise of anticipatory self-defense to elect preemptive force out of "necessity," and the conduct of states electing anticipatory self-defense out of necessity, even if technically unlawful, would be effectively "pardoned" and fully immunized under international law. See Romano, supra note 71, at 1045–46 (proposing a necessity based standard that would "preclud[e] the wrongfulness" of anticipatory self-defense). Some pragmatists characterized the necessity standard as, in effect, not a guide for judging the lawfulness of an application of anticipatory self-defense, but rather a defense against what would otherwise be unlawful conduct. The defense carries with it the benefit of preserving what they claim is a general prohibition against anticipatory self-defense, giving way only under circumstances of genuine peril such as is created by possession of WMD by terrorists—actors whose conduct, in comparison to defending states, is demonstrably more culpable. See Franck, supra note 39, at 13 (allowing for the "flexible application of existing rules, in accordance with . . . contextual exigencies and with narrow exceptions for situations of extreme necessity").

Pragmatists offering a duress based argument do not contend that anticipatory self-defense is lawful, but instead would permit a defending state to engage in an otherwise prohibited use of force when there is a "clear and present danger" and moral choice—whether to engage in anticipatory self-defense or to accept destruction—is not in fact possible. See Dinstein, supra note 25, at 141–42 (describing the duress doctrine in international criminal law).

Intermediate pragmatists develop a series of categories of evidence that states must assemble to prove the objective and subjective merits of a resort to anticipatory self-defense. See Graham, supra note 62, at 9 (requiring a demonstration of threatening alterations in military posture, "past conduct or hostile declarations" that "reasonably lead to a conclusion that an attack is probable," the availability to the enemy of and capacity to use specific weapons systems, and exhaustion of diplomatic solutions); Maxson, supra note 88, at 66 (stressing that the "past conduct or hostile declarations" of the alleged aggressor are important to a determination of imminence and thus the lawfulness of an exercise of anticipatory self-defense). Some pragmatists would tie the lawfulness of an exercise of anticipatory self-defense to an evaluation of the capacity of a targeted state to defend against a particular threat by other means, while granting that terrorist threats, by virtue of the difficulty in locating and targeting loose bands of individuals in the civilians' midst, may not be susceptible to reduction by any means other than anticipatory self-defense. See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 534. Still others in the intermediate category would require satisfaction of additional steps as conditions precedent to the lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense, including a declaratory statement that a state in possession of WMD constitutes a concrete "threat to the vital national security interests of the state, regional security, and international peace and security" and a formal "finding that further delay in undertaking the preventive strike will . . . unreasonably increase the possibility of harm to its civilian population." Roberts, supra note 7, at 519, 522.
to anticipatory self-defense under a forgiving "reasonable state standard" that would inquire solely whether the defending state could be considered, on the basis of available information, to have had "no adequate alternative," viewing all the circumstances from the perspective of and in the light most favorable to the defending state. 105 This reasonable state standard does not establish an a priori probability threshold to define the imminence of enemy threats or impose specific criteria to guide post hoc lawfulness evaluations, but rather accords states a broad margin of appreciation 106 to determine and apply those measures that will best harmonize their rights to self-defend with the faithful performance of their legal obligations. Significantly, mistakes, so long as they can be construed as reasonable, do not render the resort to anticipatory self-defense unlawful under this most permissive standard, 107 which served as the basis for adjudicating

105 See, e.g., Louis J. Capezzuto, Preemptive Strikes Against Nuclear Terrorists and Their Sponsors: A Reasonable Solution, N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 375, 393–96 (1993) (advocating a substitution of the imminence requirement in cases of anticipatory self-defense with a reasonableness standard); W.T. Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335, 360 (1962) ("[A] target state is authorized to [undertake anticipatory self-defense] when it reasonably expects that it must use the military instrument of national policy to preserve its physical integrity and continued existence . . .") (emphasis added). Several commentators would admit prior bad acts and statements of the threatening state to substantiate, post hoc, the reasonableness of the exercise of anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Polebaum, supra note 82, at 210 (considering that "past acts may indicate whether the threatening nation has shown a sufficient disregard for the threatened nation’s integrity and civilian life to persuade it to take the . . . threats seriously").

106 The doctrine of "margin of appreciation," developed in the European Union (E.U.), directs courts to accord a measure of deference to member states in determining whether actions taken to harmonize domestic law with E.U. law are consistent with member state obligations under relevant treaties. See generally R. St. J. MacDonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in The European System for the Protection of Human Rights 83 (R. St. J. MacDonald et al. eds., 1993).

107 Under general principles of law common to the domestic systems of many states, the use of force in self-defense is justifiable even if the defender is mistaken about the necessity to act in self-defense, provided the mistake is "reasonable." See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (1985) (deeming acts of self-defense premised upon mistaken but sincere beliefs justifiable, unless the beliefs are negligently or recklessly acquired); 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 259, 358–59 (4th ed. 1936) (discussing the availability of pardons for killing "by misadventure or in self-defence" under English common law); McCORMACK, supra note 45, at 271 (stating that all major legal systems—"Western states with common law or civil law jurisdictions, Eastern European states, Asian states, Latin American states"—as well as religious systems, broadly recognize the individual right of self-defense); Dolores A. Donovan & Getachew Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights, Federalism, and Legal Pluralism, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 505, 507 (2003) (noting the availability of a mistake
the individual criminal liability of defendants at Nuremburg.\textsuperscript{108}

Notwithstanding the sharp theoretical bifurcation on the question of its lawfulness in the abstract, anticipatory self-defense is almost invariably appraised in light of, and following, specific applications of defense in cases of individual self-defense resulting in death in European and African legal systems). Building upon this tolerance for mistake in domestic legal systems, proponents of a permissive standard argue that the mistaken exercise of anticipatory self-defense, whether as the result of an overestimation of the magnitude or imminence of a threat or of the premature resort to force when diplomatic measures are later revealed to have had prospects for success, should not give rise to a finding of unlawfulness in violation of Article 2(4) under the reasonable state standard unless the defending state's actions are manifestly unreasonable. In evaluating whether the mistaken actions of the defending state are unreasonable, permissive pragmatists insist that the proper determinant is not what the facts are subsequently determined to have been, but rather what the defending state believed them to have been at the time it elected to engage in anticipatory self-defense. \textit{Dinstein, supra} note 25, at 191 ("Hindsight knowledge, suggesting that—notwithstanding the well-founded contemporaneous appraisal of events—the situation may have been less desperate than it appeared, is immaterial" as the "invocation of the right of self-defence must be weighed on the basis of the information available . . . at the moment of action, without the benefit of \textit{post facto}m wisdom."); Mallison, \textit{supra} note 105, at 359–60; Walker, \textit{supra} note 45, at 374 ("A national leader should be held accountable for what he or she . . . knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision is made to respond [with anticipatory self-defense.]’’); Polebaum, \textit{supra} note 82, at 220 ("Whether an action is justifiably taken in self-defense . . . should be judged from the perspective of the threatened nation.”).

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{See} \textit{1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra} note 34, at 208–22 (noting that the standard for determining individual criminal liability in regard to the decision to undertake anticipatory self-defense requires an evaluation of what the defendants knew or should have known in making the decision, and that mistakes occasioned by uncertainty or inaccurate information are to be judged by a reasonableness standard). Even the prosecution implicitly recognized that mistake was an available defense. \textit{See} 19 \textit{id.} at 461–62 (recording the statement of Hartley Shawcross, British Chief Prosecutor, that individuals are liable for acts claimed as exercises of anticipatory self-defense, where such acts were abuses of discretion or acts that "twist[ed] the natural right of self-defense into a weapon of predatory aggrandizement and lust," but not in cases of misapprehension of facts). Nevertheless, although it recognized that sovereign states were entitled to a broad margin of appreciation in their decisions with regard to the use of force in self-defense, the Nuremburg Tribunal did not accept the argument that measures of anticipatory self-defense were entirely self-judging, on the ground that the international law governing the use of force would otherwise be gutted of any force. 19 \textit{id.} Although the doctrine of margin of appreciation cannot be expanded to effectively render the resort to anticipatory self-defense self-judging, since the Nuremburg trials there has been no contrary, authoritative judicial statement in regard to individual criminal liability in connection with the decision to undertake anticipatory self-defense, and state decisions are arguably immunized upon subsequent review, provided that they are not manifestly unreasonable. Walker, \textit{supra} note 45, at 370–71.
the doctrine in practice; moreover, although a specific exercise of anticipatory self-defense is immediately opened to contestation, its legal legitimacy is often not ripe for review until long afterwards, when the defending state finally declassifies and submits the sensitive intelligence that established the factual predicate upon which its decision to act rested to public review.\footnote{Some commentators insist that states engaging in anticipatory self-defense submit to an international "jurying" process whereby the evidence adduced by the state seeking a variance is "tried" beforehand, with the onus on the requesting state to prove the purity of its motives, the proportionality of the proposed use of force, and the severity of the threat. See Franck, supra note 39, at 15–16; Graham, supra note 62, at 13–14 (insisting that if international relations is to become law-governed, "states must openly justify their actions," including decisions to engage in anticipatory self-defense, and present their decisions for the review of states and international organizations). However, considerations of bureaucratic inefficiency, opposing political interests, and the absence of effective transnational procedures for protecting shared intelligence sources and methods militate against submission to an international jury. To wit, the establishment of the factual predicate of an imminent threat is a time-consuming process made all the more so by the machinery of the U.N. system. See Michael A. Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An Analysis of the Disarmament of Iraq and the Legal Enforcement Options of the United Nations' Security Council in 1997–1998, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 101, 152–53 (2000) (describing determinations of material breaches of peace and security as "plodding" and subject to "the whim of whatever immediate political and economic factors are motivating the Council"); Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons, Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 477, 508–09 (1999) (discussing the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the U.N. system). Moreover, proof requires the sharing of intelligence, something states are loathe to do with all but their closest allies for fear that revelation of the evidence will permit deductions as to how the evidence was acquired (methods) and by whom (sources), as well as the possibility that reviewers sympathetic to the target might share the intelligence with the target. See Sara N. Scheideman, Note, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50 Syracuse L. Rev. 249, 255 (2000) (noting the dilemma inherent in balancing accountability with secrecy, but distinguishing operational information that might compromise future operations and evidence that might demonstrate culpability); see also Graham, supra note 62, at 10 (conceding that the release of classified information that an attack is coming is "one truly difficult issue"); Wedgwood, supra note 80, at 567 ("In the midst of a . . . war, a country defending its territory and nationals will rarely be able to disclose its intelligence sources in a public forum."). Moreover, even after reviewing the evidence, states unwilling on other grounds to approve a proposed exercise of anticipatory self-defense are far less likely to concede that the proffered evidence is probative of the existence of the requisite imminent threat. See Graham, supra note 62, at 7. Worse yet, the inaccessibility of the target state to the state engaging in anticipatory self-defense, coupled with the interest of target states in concealing relevant evidence of WMD or terrorist training centers that would otherwise supply the "smoking gun" justifying the act of anticipatory self-defense, creates difficulties in acquiring and assembling all the evidence necessary to establish the factual predicate beyond a reason-}
tice is necessary to assess the state of the governing law—customary and Charter-based—applicable to anticipatory self-defense.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{D. Anticipatory Self-Defense in Practice, 1945–Present}

Analysts of the post-1945 history of anticipatory self-defense have found state practice generally inconclusive in regard to the Charter era validity of anticipatory self-defense,\textsuperscript{111} in part because, although post-Charter international relations have been no less sanguinary than earlier historical epochs, there have been relatively few instances in which states resorting to force have explicitly justified their actions under the anticipatory self-defense doctrine rather than by passing reference to Article 51.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, no post-Nuremburg international tribunal has issued an authoritative pronouncement on the law-

\textsuperscript{110} The customary international law of treaties provides that, in interpreting a treaty, resort is to be had to, inter alia, state practice to resolve ambiguities in the text of the treaty. \textit{See} Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, \textit{supra} note 35, art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{See} \textsc{Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al.}, \textsc{International Law: Norms, Actors, Process} 842 (2002) (finding state practice inconclusive); \textsc{Zedalis}, \textit{supra} note 48, at 105–06 (finding the significance of state practice “questionable” given the failure of the U.N. General Assembly to offer direct support for the doctrine).

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{See} \textsc{Arend & Beck}, \textit{supra} note 56, at 74 (indicating, in 1993, that cases in which the resort to force was justified or could have been justified as an act of anticipatory self-defense included the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, and the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Osiropa reactor, whereas the 1985 U.S. invasion of Grenada and the 1986 airstrike on Libya were justified primarily on other grounds). Although the use of force has been little justified under the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, states have justified the resort to force largely under Article 51, claiming that in particular circumstances the requisite “armed attack” under that article has in fact occurred. \textit{See} id. Many of these claims have been summarily rejected as entirely without merit by the Security Council and General Assembly. \textit{See}, e.g., S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981) (rejecting Israeli destruction of Iraqi nuclear weapons facility); S.C. Res. 188, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1111th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/188 (1964) (rejecting Portuguese claim of self-defense under Article 51 in the shelling of Senegal); G.A. Res. 36/34, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17–18, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) (rejecting the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan). Although anticipatory self-defense has not been frequently claimed in justification, force has been so prevalent in the Charter era that Arend and Beck contend that a new legal regime, known as the “post-Charter self-help” para-
fulness of anticipatory self-defense. Still, although few states have openly embraced anticipatory self-defense as official policy, since the 1960s the doctrine has become much contested terrain. A handful of cases, all of which involved the United States and Israel as defending states, are generally regarded as instances in which an arguably legitimate claim to anticipatory self-defense was either asserted or would have been the most defensible basis for the resort to force had it been offered contemporaneously: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (United States), the 1967 Six-Day War (Israel), the 1981 destruction of the Tuwaitha reactor in Iraq (Israel), the 1986 air strikes against Libya (United States), and the 1998 attacks on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan (United States).

...
Although domestic ratification debates reveal that U.S. membership in the United Nations was predicated upon the explicit assertion in the text of the Charter of an inherent right to self-defense,\textsuperscript{116} and notwithstanding strong historical American support for anticipatory self-defense,\textsuperscript{117} U.S. statements of official policy initially rejected the doctrine as an “impossibility” in the nuclear age.\textsuperscript{118} In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis provided the first, and arguably most significant, post-Charter test of the continued viability of customary law as an independent source of support for, as well as official U.S. policy in regard to, anticipatory self-defense.

President Bush in 1993. However, most scholars consider each of these cases as having failed to meet even the most permissive standards for justification as an act of anticipatory self-defense, and would thus classify them as acts of reprisal, as interventions in defense of nationals, or as illegal interventions. See Maxson, \textit{supra} note 88, at 55 (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the claim that the attack on the Iraqi intelligence headquarters was an act of self-defense); Mark J. Yost, \textit{Note, Self-Defense or Presidential Pretext? The Constitutionality of Unilateral Preemptive Military Action}, 78 \textit{Geo. L.J.} 415, 438–39 (1989) (noting that the Reagan administration characterized the invasion of Grenada as a defense of U.S. nationals). Some scholars judge the March 2003 intervention in Iraq as an exercise of anticipatory self-defense, although perhaps not a justified use, despite the fact that the United States and its allies justified the intervention on other grounds. See, \textit{e.g.}, Franck, \textit{supra} note 16, at 619–20 (considering the intervention as anticipatory self-defense, and concluding that it was an unlawful attack on the rule of law); Graham, \textit{supra} note 62, at 13 (judging the intervention an unlawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense); Koh, \textit{supra} note 74, at 1523–24 (anticipating the March 2003 invasion, denying any possibility that it could be justified as anticipatory self-defense, and concluding that it could not be justified by Iraqi violations of Security Council resolutions); Sapiro, \textit{supra} note 16, at 604 (considering the intervention an extension of anticipatory self-defense beyond legitimate boundaries); Yoo, \textit{supra} note 14, at 574 (judging the intervention a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense). Nevertheless, taxonomy is inherently subjective, and only time will reveal the full truth; for purposes of this Article the justification offered by the Bush Administration for the March 2003 intervention in Iraq will be taken as true and the intervention will be treated as a Chapter VII enforcement action.

\textsuperscript{116} See \textit{supra} note 82 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{117} See, \textit{e.g.}, Elihu Root, \textit{The Real Monroe Doctrine}, Opening Address at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 22, 1914), \textit{in 8 Am. J. Int’l L.} 427, 432 (1914) (stating official U.S. policy as the principle that a state has the sovereign right to act in advance of an attack “to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself”).

\textsuperscript{118} See McGeorge Bundy, \textit{Danger and Survival} 252 (1988) (quoting from a 1954 press conference in which President Eisenhower argued that the destruction that would follow an act of anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear age was so great that he “wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing”).
1. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

On October 20, 1962, the United States, four days after acquiring credible intelligence that the Soviet Union was deploying medium-range nuclear armed missiles ninety miles from U.S. shores in Cuba, demanded their removal and instituted a pacific naval blockade to prevent further shipments. During a heated debate within the Kennedy Administration, senior officials of the Departments of Justice and State urged the United States to claim anticipatory self-defense as the legal justification for the blockade and subsequent air strikes, and others, led by State Department Legal Adviser Abram Chayes, counseled that to mount such an argument on the basis of the

---

119 ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN Missile Crisis 23, 107 (1969). The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, produced photographic and other documentary evidence establishing for the other members of the Security Council the "smoking gun" that proved the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and established the factual predicate for U.S. actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Id. at 75-76.


The concept of self-defense in international law of course justifies more than activity designed merely to resist an armed attack which is already in progress. Under international law every state has, in the words of Elihu Root, "the right . . . to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself."

Id. For many Administration officials, the presence of Soviet missiles a scant ninety miles from the United States transformed the relative capability of the Soviet Union so radically that this fact, standing alone, constituted a threat of such imminence that any proportional exercise of force would have been a permissible act of anticipatory self-defense under any legal standard. See BUNDY, supra note 118, at 399 (describing the views of Secretary of State Acheson and others that the "intolerable" change in "the level of nuclear threat" justified a military action to destroy the missiles as "an entirely legitimate act of self-defense"). Interestingly, even those Administration officials who favored the blockade and air strikes, and who would have defended these uses of force as legitimate acts of anticipatory self-defense, considered providing a limited advance warning to allies as well as the target states in the belief that failure to do so would cause the United States to be "marked as a reckless aggressor and this Administration cursed forever as the force which opened the door to a world of catch-as-catch-can violence." See Theodore Sorenson, Draft, Air Strike Scenario for October 19, 1962, reprinted in THE CUBAN Missile Crisis, 1962, at 138, 140 (Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh eds., 2d ed. 1998). In other words, proponents of anticipatory self-defense in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis recognized the obligation to justify
facts, which in their estimation could not support a claim that an “armed attack” had occurred or that a threat to the United States was imminent, would be to stretch the definition of anticipatory self-defense beyond reasonable bounds and “trivialize the whole effort at legal justification.” Although opponents of anticipatory self-defense could not convince President Kennedy that the presence of missiles in Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat to U.S. security as a matter of policy, they prevailed on the question of legal justification, and the United States characterized the blockade not as an act of anticipatory self-defense under Article 51 but rather as regional action

its application, lest failure to do so carry with it adverse legal and political consequences.

122 CHAYES, supra note 121, at 65–66. For Chayes and others, including a number of officials from the State Department, the Soviet deployment of missiles was not only not an imminent threat, it was not illegal, and interpreting their deployment as an armed attack to satisfy the requirements of Article 51 was simply unsustainable. See JAMES G. BLIGHT & DAVID A. WELCH, ON THE BRINK: AMERICANS AND SOVIETS REEXAMINE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 40 (“Our legal problem was that their [the Soviets’] action wasn’t illegal.”). Thus, despite the retained legal utility of anticipatory self-defense in the Charter era, to have asserted the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense—under circumstances where not only could no objective imminent threat be openly identified, but the action that would be claimed as having given rise to an imminent threat was considered legal—would have been to withdraw entirely the use of force in self-defense from the realm of international law and reinvest it in the realm of political discretion.

No doubt the phrase “armed attack” must be construed broadly enough to permit some anticipatory response. But it is a very different matter to expand it to include threatening deployments or demonstrations that do not have imminent attack as their purpose or probable outcome. To accept that reading is to make the occasion for forceful response essentially a question for unilateral national decision that would not only be formally unreviewable, but not subject to intelligent criticism, either . . . . Whenever a nation believed that interests, which in the heat and pressure of a crisis it is prepared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its use of force in response would become permissible. . . . In this sense, I believe an Article 51 defence would have signaled that the United States did not take the legal issues involved very seriously, that in its view the situation was to be governed by national discretion not international law.

123 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 573 (noting that during the Cuban Missile Crisis the near-consensus among senior U.S. officials was that the establishment of nuclear armed missile bases in Cuba by the Soviet Union constituted an imminent threat to U.S. security even in the absence of proof of an “imminent” threat under the Caroline standard).
authorized by the Organization of American States (O.A.S.)\(^\text{124}\) under Articles 52 and 53 of the U.N. Charter.\(^\text{125}\)

In subsequent days the Security Council staged a parallel debate—this one conducted along Cold War lines—over whether the blockade could be justified as an act of anticipatory self-defense.\(^\text{126}\) The expressed U.S. justification was largely ignored, reflecting the broad understanding that anticipatory self-defense provided the more legitimate, or even the sole defensible, position. A number of states expressed strong opposition, alleging that the United States had adduced insufficient proof that the missiles had been emplaced for offensive purposes to meet the imminence threshold necessary to permit the exercise of anticipatory self-defense\(^\text{127}\) and that, as a consequence, the blockade was an unlawful exercise of force in violation of Article 2(4). Others reached the opposite conclusion, judging the blockade a lawful act of anticipatory self-defense in response to an imminent threat posed by offensive missiles.\(^\text{128}\) Despite the intensity of the debate, however, the Security Council took no action,\(^\text{129}\) a fact U.S. officials interpreted as implied authorization for U.S. actions in


\(^{125}\) Sapiro, supra note 16, at 601. Article 52 recognizes the existence of regional organizations with mandates for the maintenance of regional peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 52. Article 53 contemplates that Article 52 regional organizations may take enforcement action with the authorization of the Security Council. Id. art. 53.

\(^{126}\) See Arend & Beck, supra note 56, at 75–76 (characterizing Security Council debate over the U.S. blockade of Cuba as having been couched, implicitly, in terms of anticipatory self-defense).

\(^{127}\) A bloc of states rejected the blockade as a violation of Article 2(4) not otherwise permissible under Article 51 on the ground that, unless the United States could prove an offensive purpose for the missiles, it could not demonstrate an imminent threat against which the lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense could be maintained. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1024th mtg. at 18–19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1024 (1962) (statement of Quaison-Sackey, delegate from Ghana, to the Security Council) (arguing that there was insufficient proof to conclude that the missiles had been emplaced for offensive purposes and that as a result the U.S. blockade was not in response to an imminent threat and therefore not lawful); see also Condron, supra note 55, at 134–36 (noting that the Soviet Union, Ghana, Romania, and the United Arab Republic opposed the U.S. blockade as an act of anticipatory self-defense).

\(^{128}\) Arend & Beck, supra note 56, at 75 (listing states in support of the blockade as Chile, France, Ireland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela).

\(^{129}\) See A. Mark Weisburd, Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II 217 (1997).
self-defense and for the resort to the O.A.S.\textsuperscript{130} On October 28, the Cuban Missile Crisis ended with a public concession by the Soviet Union promising to withdraw all missiles from Cuba.\textsuperscript{131}

Subsequent analysis has revealed a general agreement that the mere presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat to the United States sufficient to satisfy the standard elaborated in the \textit{Caroline} case,\textsuperscript{132} even though the U.S. response to the Cuban Missile Crisis is "widely accepted as legitimate."\textsuperscript{133} The reason for the apparent gap between law and legitimacy may stem from the fact that many scholars of the Cuban Missile Crisis read into the silence of the Security Council on the question of the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense a widespread implicit endorsement, not only of the U.S. naval blockade, but also of a more expansive legal basis for U.S. military action in self-defense than is provided by Article 53.\textsuperscript{134} Because much of the debate in the Security Council centered not upon law but upon whether the missiles were in fact offensive or defensive (and therefore whether the missiles genuinely posed a threat to the United States), and as the Security Council did not specifically reject the continuing validity of anticipatory self-defense in the Charter era, some suggest not only that anticipatory self-defense was the more defensible legal justification for the U.S. blockade but also that the real lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that anticipatory self-defense survived the advent of the Charter and even evolved to reflect

\begin{footnotes}
\item[130] See Abram Chayes, \textit{Law and the Quarantine of Cuba}, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556 (1963); see also Leonard C. Meeker, \textit{Defensive Quarantine and the Law}, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 522 (1963) (arguing that because the quarantine continued with the knowledge of the Security Council, "authorization may be said to have been granted by the course which the Council adopted").

\item[131] See \textit{The Cuban Missile Crisis}, 1962, supra note 121, at 391–92 (discussing the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis).

\item[132] See Roberts, supra note 7, at 528–29 (stating that, arguably, the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba "did not per se constitute a threat against the United States and the Western Hemisphere" although in conjunction with other examples of Soviet brinksmanship, support for terrorism, and other acts of aggression the missiles may have been adjudged a threat, whether imminent or not); Smith, supra note 55, at 488–90 (concluding that the "Soviets did not deploy missiles in Cuba in order to launch a war against the United States" but rather to achieve parity with the United States).

\item[133] Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 584.

\item[134] A number of commentators have criticized the resort to the O.A.S. specifically, and the doctrine of implicit Security Council authorization of regional organizations as enforcement mechanism, as inconsistent with the express terms of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 43, at 291–92.
\end{footnotes}
changed technological circumstances that transformed the functional definition of imminence.\footnote{See Arend & Beck, supra note 56, at 75 (analyzing the Security Council debate and concluding that most states implicitly approved anticipatory self-defense under the proper circumstances); Smith, supra note 55, at 495 (concluding that the U.N. debate on the Cuban Missile Crisis supports the proposition that even in the Charter era ‘‘certain steps’ well short of an armed attack could trigger Article 51’s right to self-defense’').}

2. Six-Day War, 1967

sistance to resolve the brewing crisis, supra note 142. Egypt incorporated the armed forces of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq under its unified command. supra note 143. Finally, on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a decisive air campaign against the air forces of the U.A.R. Unified Command, to which the Arab states, despite suffering complete tactical surprise and the destruction of their air support, responded by attacking with ground forces along and across their borders with Israel. In subsequent days Israel defeated combined Arab ground forces and captured the entire Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, and by June 10 all parties had accepted a ceasefire.

In the aftermath of the brief but decisive conflict, Israel justified its attack under Article 51 in part on the premise that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an “armed attack” justifying the Israeli use of force in self-defense, supra note 145 and in part on the basis that the presence of the troops of a hostile state on its southern border, coupled with the clearly expressed intent of that state to destroy Israel and convincing intelligence that an Egyptian attack was imminent, posed a serious and imminent threat to its national security justifying the exercise of anticipatory self-defense.
The ensuing debate within the Se-

142 SAERAN, supra note 136, at 269.
143 See id. at 269 (reporting that Algerian, Kuwaiti, Libyan, and Sudanese units were also sent to Egypt).
144 For a detailed discussion of the Six-Day War, see GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST (4th ed. 1995). For an examination of Israeli decisionmaking, see generally MICHAEL BRECHER, DECISIONS IN CRISIS (1980) (comparing Israeli decisionmaking before, during, and after the Six-Day War to Israeli decisionmaking before, during, and after the Yom Kippur War of 1973).
145 Some commentators have suggested that the Israeli justification for the use of force was that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an “armed attack” for purposes of self-defense under Article 51. See, e.g., Sapiro, supra note 16, at 601; see also Condron, supra note 55, at 136–37 (concluding that the Israeli use of force constituted an exercise of anticipatory self-defense).
146 From the Israeli perspective, the Six-Day War was one of *ein breaira* (“no alternative”), as the survival of the state was in jeopardy had Israel not chosen to engage in anticipatory self-defense. See AVRAHAM TAMIR, A SOLDIER IN SEARCH OF PEACE: AN IN-
curity Council largely rejected the former argument and centered upon the reasonableness of the Israeli attack, inquiring whether under the circumstances the threat could have been considered sufficiently imminent to dispatch with the requirement of an “armed attack” as a condition precedent to self-defense.\(^{147}\) As might have been expected during the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Arab clients steered the discussion away from the threat the U.A.R. had posed to Israel and focused formalistically on the text of Article 51, defining the Israeli action as illegal aggression in violation of Article 2(4) because Israel had been first to resort to the overt use of force.\(^{148}\) Predictably, the Russo-Arabic bloc categorically refused to engage on the question of the availability of anticipatory self-defense.\(^{149}\) In contrast, although little serious consideration was paid to the argument that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an “armed attack,” the United States and other Western states defended the Israeli position that the imminence and magnitude of the threat justified the exercise of measures in self-defense, and this bloc shielded Israel from adverse legal judgment. Although the Security Council did not make an official pronouncement upon the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense in context, none of the three Security Council resolutions that emerged from the aftermath of the Six-Day War condemned Israeli actions.\(^{150}\)

Although the question whether the threat to Israel was sufficiently imminent to justify anticipatory self-defense remains the subject of legal and political wrangling, most commentators now view the Israeli belief that the threat justified the response to be reasonable.\(^{151}\)


\(^{148}\) See Arend & Beck, supra note 56, at 77 (noting that the Russo-Arabic position was reducible to the argument that the first use of force was aggression regardless of the circumstances prompting that use of force).

\(^{149}\) Id.


\(^{151}\) See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 192 ("Most commentators concluded that Israel's belief that it was about to be attacked on all its borders was reasonable."). For a defense of the factual predicate giving rise to the Israeli claim of legal legitimacy, see Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, 6 Isr. L. Rev. 65, 73–76
More importantly, commentators generally read into Security Council silence on the legitimacy of the Israeli anticipatory self-defense argument implicit support for the proposition that the right to anticipatory self-defense continues in force under the customary international law of the Charter era, particularly where the survival of a state is arguably at issue.152

3. Osiraq, 1981

Despite what amounted to, arguably, tacit approval of Israeli acts in preemption of the Arab threat in 1967, residual doubts over whether anticipatory self-defense was a legally defensible doctrine may well have contributed to Israeli failures to employ anticipatory self-defense in 1973, when Israeli decisionmakers failed to correctly diagnose Syrian troop maneuvers and a host of other indicators as preparations for a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack on October 6, 1973.153 The lessons of the failure to correctly assess enemy intentions in 1973 may have influenced future Israeli responses to yet another threat.

By Spring 1981, Iraq, with French assistance, was nearing completion of its Osiraq nuclear reactor facility, a project which, although the Hussein government publicly claimed would be dedicated only to

---

(1971) (contending that Israel was faced with imminent attack). For a counterargument, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Middle East": The Misunderstood Conflict, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 327, 347–50 (John Norton Moore ed., abr. & rev. ed. 1977) (arguing that Israel committed aggression because it "started the shooting"). See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 191 ("In the circumstances, as perceived in June 1967, Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow . . ."); Franck, supra note 39, at 12 ("In some circumstances, the Charter system has condoned a state's recourse to force to preempt an imminent attack on it; . . . an example is the Israeli war against Egypt."); Smith, supra note 55, at 483–84 (concluding that Security Council and General Assembly refusal to condemn Israeli actions constitutes implicit affirmation of the right to anticipatory self-defense). Those most critical of the legality of the Israeli actions of June 5, 1967, generally contend either that the facts did not support anticipatory self-defense under the particular circumstances or that the failure of the Security Council to expressly condemn the actions cannot be interpreted as condoning anticipatory self-defense. See O'Connell, supra note 19, at 453 (challenging the legitimacy of Israeli actions as based on "less than convincing evidence" which did not indicate an imminent threat); see also Condron, supra note 55, at 136 (concluding that the failure of the United Nations to condemn Israel leaves the question of the legality of anticipatory self-defense under the Charter as an "unsettled question").

152 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 191 ("In the circumstances, as perceived in June 1967, Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow . . ."); Franck, supra note 39, at 12 ("In some circumstances, the Charter system has condoned a state's recourse to force to preempt an imminent attack on it; . . . an example is the Israeli war against Egypt."); Smith, supra note 55, at 483–84 (concluding that Security Council and General Assembly refusal to condemn Israeli actions constitutes implicit affirmation of the right to anticipatory self-defense). Those most critical of the legality of the Israeli actions of June 5, 1967, generally contend either that the facts did not support anticipatory self-defense under the particular circumstances or that the failure of the Security Council to expressly condemn the actions cannot be interpreted as condoning anticipatory self-defense. See O'Connell, supra note 19, at 453 (challenging the legitimacy of Israeli actions as based on "less than convincing evidence" which did not indicate an imminent threat); see also Condron, supra note 55, at 136 (concluding that the failure of the United Nations to condemn Israel leaves the question of the legality of anticipatory self-defense under the Charter as an "unsettled question").

153 See TAMIR, supra note 146, at 193–95 (describing Syrian and Egyptian troop movements, the withdrawal of the families of Soviet military advisers from Syria, and other ominous warning signals as evidence of an imminent attack that Israeli decisionmakers interpreted as nonthreatening, in large measure due to overconfidence and misperceptiveness).
peaceful research, Israeli intelligence deemed to be a nuclear weapons production facility.\footnote{154}{See Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A8 (indicating that Israel claimed to possess intelligence from "[s]ources of unquestioned reliability" that the Osiraq reactor would be in production of nuclear weapons within three months).} \footnote{155}{David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A1. Most analysts believe the Osiraq reactor was either operational or nearly so. For a discussion of the operational status of the Osiraq reactor, see Louis René Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 437, 437 (1995) (contending the reactor was very nearly operational); George Russell, Attack—and Fallout, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 24, 26 (reporting that Israeli intelligence indicated that the reactor would soon be operational). But see Anthony D’Amato, Israel’s Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 259, 261 (1996) (noting that the reactor was not operational at the moment of the attack).} \footnote{156}{See Russell, supra note 155, at 30 (reporting statement from Israeli Prime Minister Begin, claiming that after an Iranian aircraft had attempted unsuccessfully to bomb Osiraq, Iraq had issued a statement to the Baghdad press stating that “[t]he Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist enemy”). The Iraqi government had released numerous statements calling upon Arab states to develop nuclear weapons for the destruction of Israel. See, e.g., IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (Baghdad), Aug. 19, 1980, quoted in The Israeli Air Strike: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 225, 226 (1981):}

When several months of Israeli efforts to alert the international community to the brewing danger and to secure condemnation of the Iraqi attempt to acquire WMD were unsuccessful, Israel responded with military force. At sunset on June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16 aircraft accompanied by six F-15 escorts destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor with twelve two thousand pound bombs, shortly before it could become operational.\footnote{155} Israel defended the destruction of Osiraq as an act of anticipatory self-defense, justified on the grounds that if Iraq, a state committed to the destruction of Israel, were permitted to acquire a nuclear reactor capable of producing weapons it would do so; that such weapons would certainly be used against Israel at the earliest possible juncture;\footnote{156} and that therefore Israel, and in particular its civilian population, was subject to an immediate and direct threat by the existence of an operational,
or nearly operational, reactor.157 Israel claimed further that even if the reactor had not been fully operational, had Israel delayed until such time as it was fully operational before destroying it more Iraqi civilians would have been exposed to radiation leaking from the facility, a likelihood supporting the conclusion that the threat, even at the moment of the attack, was already sufficiently imminent for purposes of Israeli compliance with international law.158 In other words, the fact that the threat emanated from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to an enemy state determined to use them against Israel dictated a relaxed interpretation of imminence consistent with the magnitude and seriousness of the particular threat profile as perceived by the intended target of that threat.

Arab states swiftly and publicly condemned the attack,159 and the Security Council, with U.S. and British support,160 followed suit, unan-

157 See Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, supra note 154 (“We were therefore forced to defend ourselves against the construction of an atomic bomb in Iraq, which itself would not have hesitated to use it against Israel and its population centers.”); see also id. (“[The reactor was] intended . . . for the production of atomic bombs. The goal for these bombs was Israel. . . . After the Iranians slightly damaged the reactor, Saddam Hussein remarked that it was pointless for the Iranians to attack the reactor because it was being built against Israel alone.”).

158 See David K. Shipler, Begin Defends Raid, Pledges to Thwart a New “Holocaust,” N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1981, at Al. Israeli Prime Minister Begin argued that the threat posed by the reactor was imminent due to the increased civilian casualties that were certain to occur had Israel waited to strike, and stated that “[w]e faced a terrible dilemma. . . . Should we now be passive, and then lose the last opportunity, without those horrible casualties amongst the Baghdad population, to destroy the hotbed of death?” Id. See U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 57–60, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (1981) (statement of the Permanent Representative of Israel) (arguing that had Israel failed to strike immediately, the Iraqi civilian casualties would have been unacceptably high and that as a consequence, the threat was imminent as a matter of law); Excerpts from Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of June 15, 1981, in 20 I.L.M. 996 (1981) (“[I]n removing this terrible nuclear threat to its existence, Israel was only exercising its legitimate right of self-defence within the meaning of this term in international law and as preserved also under the United Nations Charter.”). In other words, further delay would have rendered an otherwise discriminate and proportional response to the Iraqi threat an indiscriminate, disproportional, and therefore unlawful, use of force. See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 532–33 (describing the Israeli strike on Osiraq as a “surgical[ ] exterminat[ion]” of the threat due to its limited scope and duration).

159 See Arabs Assail Raid as “Peak of International Terrorism,” N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at Al.

160 See Bruce Ackerman, But What’s the Legal Case for Preemption?, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at B2 (“Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach of international law.”) (noting the remarks of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in response to the Israeli attack on Osiraq); Judith Miller, U.S. Officials Say Iraq Had Ability To Make Nuclear Weapon in 1981, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981,
imously "condemn[ing] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct" and stating that Iraq was "entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered." For most states, the facts that Israel could not prove that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons that it intended to use against Israel in the very near future, and that the Iraqi threat was therefore not imminent enough to leave "no moment for deliberation" and to create an immediate and overwhelming necessity to attack the reactor—a determination subsequently reinforced by evidence that Israel had initiated preparations and planning for the destruction of the Osiraq reactor at least as early as March 1981—vitiated, consistent with the Caroline standard, the Israeli claim that they lawfully exercised anticipatory self-defense, and suggested to the contrary that the strike was a premeditated act in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Although the Security Council imposed no


162 See Smith, supra note 55, at 487 & n.181 (noting that Israeli Prime Minister Begin conceded that Israeli preparations for the attack had commenced in March 1981, and noting further that Israel began developing intelligence about the reactor as a potential target as early as 1979).


It has been argued that the Israeli attack was an act of self-defense. But it was not a response to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq. There was no instant or overwhelming necessity for self-defense. Nor can it be justified as a forcible measure of self-protection. The Israeli intervention amounted to a use of force which cannot find a place in international law or in the Charter and which violated the sovereignty of Iraq.

Id. (statement of Sir Anthony Parsons, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom).

164 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2283d mtg. at 145, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2283 (1981) (statement of Mr. Koroma, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone) (evaluating the Israeli strike as having failed to satisfy the absence of premeditation requirement of the Caroline rule of necessity). For many states, however, the unlawfulness of the Israeli strike was the exclusive consequence of a lack of imminence of the threat—had it been clear that Iraq would produce nuclear weapons and that those weapons would be imminently used against Israel, the Israeli claim to anticipatory self-defense might well have avoided condemnation. See Condron, supra note 55, at 137–39 (analyzing Security Council debates and concluding that had Israel been able to adduce evidence in support of its factual predicate, the Israeli argument would not have been perceived to be so attenuated and might well have avoided legal condemnation).
sanctions, it rejected the Israeli claim to anticipatory self-defense in these circumstances because the threat, viewed objectively rather than subjectively and in light of the traditional rule rather than in terms of the relaxed standard propounded by Israel, was deemed simply too prospective to justify the use of force.

In the main, the contemporaneous judgment of the legal academy affirmed the Security Council assessment that the Israeli attack could not be justified under the international law of self-defense on the grounds that Israel had neither satisfied the imminence requirement nor exhausted peaceful means of dispute resolution prior to engaging in self-help. At least one scholar drew the still broader conclusion that even if anticipatory self-defense had survived the entry into force of the Charter it could not be exercised except with the prior approval of "some community of states." In other words, the Israeli air strike in 1981 stood for the proposition that the unilateral resort to force, however otherwise justified, was now incompatible with the framework of the Charter.

However, with the benefit of two decades' hindsight some now question whether the facts upon which the Security Council relied in reaching its judgment were incomplete and whether, in light of the revelation of new information regarding the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program developed during the period from the Gulf War to the present, the Israeli claim that the threat posed by Iraq was imminent might have justified the Israeli attack on Osiraq as an act of anticipatory self-defense despite the absence of an "armed attack."
The most restrictivist scholars may not concede, as do a growing number of commentators, that "it was unquestionable that Israel was the target of Iraqi nuclear weapons." However, whether in light of evidence unavailable or not credited as accurate at the time of the attack, or out of a pragmatist commitment to anticipatory self-defense in principle, a number of commentators now grant that the formalistic evaluation of imminence is unsuited to an era replete with rogue states armed with WMD that seek the destruction of their otherwise helpless neighbors, and that the Israeli attack on Osiraq must therefore be reconceived not as an unlawful act of aggression but rather as a "heroic and indispensable act of law enforcement."


On April 5, 1986, one day after U.S. intelligence intercepted a cable indicating Libyan terrorists would attack a target in Berlin the next day, a bomb detonated in a West Berlin nightclub known to be frequented by American military personnel, killing two U.S. nationals and wounding fifty to sixty others. Nine days later, on April 14, U.S. F-111 fighter-bombers departed from bases in England and attacked five military and regime targets in Libya. President Reagan indicated that the United States possessed "clear evidence that Libya is planning future attacks" and stated that the preemptive action was intended to "preempt and discourage Libyan attacks on innocent civilians in the future." Although in subsequent statements Reagan

sensitive technology to make one nuclear weapon by the end of [1981] and several bombs by the mid 1980's").

169 Magenis, supra note 45, at 430; see also Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 155, at 437 ("Looking back at this event almost a decade and a half later, Israel's defensive action looks very different. As is now well-known Saddam Hussein's plans to build a French-supplied reactor... were designed to produce militarily significant amounts of weapons...").

170 See Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 80, at 49 ("[I]f anticipatory self-defense cannot cover the Iraqi reactor case... how are we going to deal with a Saddam Hussein who may be preparing to use weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors?").

171 Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 155, at 440.


174 Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, 1 PUB. PAPERS 468 (Apr. 14, 1986). In his address to the nation, President Reagan spoke in terms of "preemptive action" concerning the at-
Administration officials made reference to other claims to legal justification for the attack on Libya, including in reprisal for the terrorist bombing of April 5 and as an exercise of self-defense against ongoing attacks on U.S. nationals and embassies abroad, the official legal justification for the use of force against Libya posited that Libya was actively planning future attacks against the United States; that no diplomatic resolution of the dispute was possible; that the U.S. action constituted an exercise of the inherent right of anticipatory self-defense to preempt these future attacks; and that the U.S. action was taken consistent with Article 51 of the Charter.

Although the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Denmark joined the United States in preventing Security Council condemnation of the U.S. attack on Libya, many states judged the response to have been an unlawful reprisal, as did the General Assembly. Furthermore, a great many states and commentators found the alleged facts concerning the imminence of attack insufficient to support the claim of self-defense, and still others concluded that the magnitude of the response was disproportionate to the alleged threat. Despite British support for the notion that the exercise of

tack on Libya. Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, 1 PUB. PAPERS 468, 469 (Apr. 15, 1986).


176 See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901, 921 (1986) (stating that the United States attacked Libya to prevent “some 30 possible impending Libyan attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel throughout the world”).

177 See President’s Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, United States Air Strike Against Libya, on April 14, 1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 499–500 (Apr. 16, 1986) (contending that the attack on Libya, justified under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as an act of anticipatory self-defense, was narrowly tailored to preempt future Libyan attacks on U.S. interests).


179 McCormack, supra note 45, at 230–33.


181 See Romano, supra note 71, at 1041–44 (surveying international commentary on the U.S. attack on Libya and concluding that “the international community, in significant part, repudiated” the U.S. strike).

182 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 42, at 730–31 (arguing first, that the United States introduced insufficient factual support for its assertion that future armed attacks on the United States were imminent, and second, that even if such attacks were certain it was not clear that U.S. action against Libyan military targets, rather than defensive measures to protect the intended U.S. targets, was the more proportionate and direct
the inherent right to self-defense "plainly includes the right to destroy or weaken the capacity of one's assailant, reduce his resources, and weaken his will so as to discourage and prevent future violence," the general conclusion within the international community was that the U.S. attack on Libya was difficult to characterize as anything but a reprisal and that, as such, the question of anticipatory self-defense had not arisen.

5. U.S. Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 1998

On August 20, 1998, twelve days after the Qaeda terrorist group attacked and destroyed the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the United States fired cruise missiles at several al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and at the Shifa factory in Sudan, alleged to be a production facility for chemical weapons intended for al Qaeda. Although various Clinton Administration officials hinted that the action had been undertaken in retaliation for the embassy bombings, the United States invoked anticipatory self-defense as the predominant legal justification for its attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, contending that the application of military force had been necessary to prevent specific imminent terrorist attacks about which it possessed clear and credible intelligence.

---

185 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, *Bin Laden Was at Camp Just Before U.S. Attack*, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1998, at A1 (quoting official statements that U.S. plans for strikes were conceived as possible retaliatory measures to terrorist attacks before the embassy bombings occurred); Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Remarks During Appearance on *This Week* (Aug. 23, 1998), available at 1998 WL 6392416 (stating that the embassy "bombings had a huge part" in prompting the attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan).
186 See Sean D. Murphy, *Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law*, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 161, 162–63 (1999) (reporting that the United States claimed the right to defend against imminent attacks by al Qaeda); Bennett, supra note 184 (reporting that the Clinton Administration justified the strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan as anticipatory self-defense on the grounds that al Qaeda was responsible for these and other acts of terrorism, al Qaeda had declared its intention to conduct additional attacks, and "key terrorist leaders" were gathered at the headquarters, establishing the imminence of a continuing threat to U.S. nationals); *Clinton's Words: "There Will Be No Sanctuary for Terrorists,"* N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1998, at A12 (claiming an inherent right to self-defense against future attacks under Article 51 of
Some restrictivist scholars argued that the United States failed to establish that the threat posed by al Qaeda was sufficiently imminent for analysis under the Caroline standard, and that the action must consequently be examined not as an exercise of anticipatory self-defense but rather as an act of reprisal for the embassy bombings.\textsuperscript{187} To some degree, criticisms of the U.S. anticipatory self-defense justification hinged on the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of the claim. Some commentators, otherwise supportive of the inherent right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense, questioned its applicability given the absence of sufficient proof of imminence,\textsuperscript{188} while others, although generally hostile to anticipatory self-defense, evaluated the U.S. claim on its merits, concluding that the "questionable nature of some of [the U.S.] factual assertions, and the circumstances surrounding the strikes render the success of its legal justification very unique."\textsuperscript{189} Reports indicated that the factory and camp had been developed by U.S. intelligence and military officials as potential targets many months before their destruction.\textsuperscript{190} Although

\textsuperscript{187} See Paust, supra note 12, at 536 (suggesting that, although the strikes may well have been directed towards future unspecified but anticipated al Qaeda attacks against the United States, the threats posed by such potentialities were not sufficient to constitute imminence for purposes of evaluation as an act of anticipatory self-defense); Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT' L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2002) (contending that on the evidence offered it is almost impossible for the United States to argue that the destruction of the U.S. embassies required an "instant, overwhelming" response against the particular targets selected and that it had "no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation") (quoting the Caroline standard).

\textsuperscript{188} On the basis of the evidence made available for review it was difficult for many commentators to comprehend precisely how the destruction of the Sudanese factory in particular was necessary to prevent imminent terrorist attacks, for if the attacks were in fact imminent it was unlikely that terrorists would receive weapons produced by the factory in the near-term and that any imminent attacks would be conducted with weapons already in their possession. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7, at 535 (accepting anticipatory self-defense in principle but rejecting its application to Afghanistan and Sudan on the ground that the United States had failed to "convincingly explain that acquisition [of chemical weapons] and use . . . was imminent"); Romano, supra note 71, at 1041–44 (same).

\textsuperscript{189} Romano, supra note 71, at 1041.

the United States countered such reports by releasing some of the intelligence upon which it had relied in reaching its decision to destroy the sites, as restrictivists seized upon these reports and other indications that the factory may not have in fact been a chemical weapons production facility, as proof that the strikes were indefensible inasmuch as any threats that had existed for months without necessitating a U.S. attack were not suddenly invested with imminence by the destruction of the U.S. embassies.

Nevertheless, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the evidentiary support for the U.S. strikes, "[t]he Security Council took no formal action in response," and neither the attacks nor their justification confronted substantial opposition internationally. Some commentators consider the muted international response to a questionable American self-defense argument a reflection of the distaste for al Qaeda and grudging tolerance of incomplete disclosure of intelligence sources and means in the particular case at issue, rather than an affirmation of a right to anticipatory self-defense. More pragmatist commentators suggest, however, that the U.S. strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan demonstrate that the right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense is, if not already a norm of customary int-


192 See David L. Marcus, Frank Criticizes Bombing of Plant in Sudan, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1998, at A9 (stating that newly released evidence suggested that the Sudanese factory was in fact either a pharmaceutical plant or an animal feed plant as claimed by Sudan).

193 Yoo, supra note 14, at 573. In a letter to the President of the Security Council justifying the U.S. attacks, the United States claimed to have acted only after repeated warnings to Afghanistan and Sudan to "shut down terrorist activities and cease cooperation with the Bin Ladin Organization." U.N. DAILY HIGHLIGHTS, Aug. 21, 1998.

194 See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A6 (discussing international reactions to 1998 strikes and reporting that most of the hostility to the U.S. action was confined to Islamic states); Romano, supra note 71, at 1041 (noting that the justification of anticipatory self-defense was received "with scant objection from the international community").

195 Romano, supra note 71, at 1041; see also id. at 1043 ("Perhaps the relatively passive international response is best explained by the wealth of intelligence information the United States had amassed linking Osama bin Laden's terrorist network to the embassy bombings and other past terrorist plots."). (footnotes omitted).
ternational law that predates and survives the Charter, emerging as *lex ferenda.*

6. Lessons from State Practice

Several conclusions may be drawn from the preceding analysis of the five cases of anticipatory self-defense in the Charter era. First, as the state-preserving benefits that might accrue from an act of anticipatory self-defense are apt to degrade with the passage of time, states are likely to engage in self-defense first, and legal legitimization second, when they perceive their survival to be at stake by the acts of another state or terrorist group. Second, where states cannot credibly claim to have been the victim of an armed attack, they will claim the right to anticipatory self-defense. Third, the division of the academy into restrictivist and pragmatist camps maps neatly onto scholarly analyses of states' claims to justification for the use of force: the most restrictivist commentators reject out of hand that a right to anticipatory self-defense exists in the Charter era, whereas others focus on the evidence for proof that the threat was sufficiently imminent, and pragmatists tend to be much less critical of state claims in this regard. Although debates persist, it is likely “impossible to prove the existence of an authoritative and controlling norm prohibiting the use of force for anticipatory self-defense.”

Fourth, reasonable minds can differ as to whether, in a particular instance, an act of anticipatory self-defense was justified, and in all likelihood the quested-after objective standard that would permit quick and precise evaluation of the legitimacy of a particular act of preemption is but a chimera. Fifth, other states tend to adopt positions with respect to claims of anticipatory self-defense that mirror their ideological commitments to much broader issues in international relations. Sixth, international organi-

196 See, e.g., id. at 1040 (suggesting that the largely absent criticism of the U.S. strikes may indicate the “growing acceptance” of anticipatory self-defense). The most pragmatist scholars insist that, because anticipatory self-defense survives the Charter, and the threat posed by terrorists seeking WMD requires a transformed standard of imminence, the strikes were perfectly legitimate as an exercise of anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Addicott, *supra* note 18, at 772.


izations, and in particular the Security Council, have steadfastly refused to impose sanctions upon states asserting claimed rights to anticipatory self-defense, and the extent of Security Council disapprobation is to some extent a function of the degree to which the acting state has sought multilateral support (and is therefore a political determination). Seventh, evaluations of the legal legitimacy of state decisions to engage in anticipatory self-defense are often subject to revision as the passage of time permits revelation of the intelligence upon which acting states relied in reaching the decision to engage in anticipatory self-defense. Eighth, the resort to anticipatory self-defense remains rare: it has occurred fewer than once every decade. Ninth, the legal significance of the debate over the right of states to resort to anticipatory self-defense is increasing in a hyper-ideological and hyper-weaponized era, in which the meaning of the term “imminence” has assumed, or should assume, new understandings. Finally, in every instance where states have resorted to anticipatory self-defense in the Charter era, acting states made efforts at proving the factual predicate necessary to satisfy other states, at least formally, that the threat presented was sufficiently imminent to justify the response. In other words, while state evaluations of the concept of “imminence” as applied to practice have varied and evolved in light of technological transformations, the Caroline standard has remained the generally accepted restatement of the inherent right of states under customary international law to engage in anticipatory self-defense.\textsuperscript{199}

Still, after September 11 it is not enough simply to draw lessons from state practice and scholarly analysis to ascertain the international law governing the resort to preemptive force. Indeed, a number of commentators have approached the Bush Doctrine as essentially a formal distillation and restatement of the emerging practice of states facing grave threats to their vital national interests in a world in which terrorism and WMD are allied. However, rather than simply extending the pattern of Charter era practice with regard to anticipatory self-defense into the War on Terror, the Bush Doctrine, as the next Part will demonstrate, proposes a paradigmatic shift toward a fundamentally new legal regime that radically alters the definition of imminence and would permit, in effect, measures to prevent, rather than merely to anticipate, attack.

II. Beyond Anticipation: The Bush Doctrine as an Assertion of the Right to Engage in Preventive War

The principal foundations that all states have, new ones as well as old or mixed, are good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws . . . .

Niccolò Machiavelli

Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just; And four times he who gets his fist in fust.

Josh Billings

Whereas the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense justifies the resort to force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack out of necessity, where the threat is so great that no moment for deliberation is possible, the use of force—in the absence of an imminent threat—that is intended to destroy the potential that an enemy may pose a future threat is termed “preventive war.” The Bush Doctrine, ar-


200 Very few scholars maintain that the Bush Doctrine is more than simply a robust restatement of the right to anticipatory self-defense and that it represents something much more contentious, i.e., the “public[ ] embrac[e]” of the right to engage in preventive war. Sapiro, supra note 16, at 599 n.4.


ticated in the National Security Strategy, prominent presidential addresses, and the statements of senior officials, is effectively a unilateral U.S. assertion of the right to engage in preventive war. Although “[i]t has taken almost a decade for [the United States] to comprehend the true nature of the new threat” posed by the proliferation of WMD to irrational enemies endowed with the “capability to blackmail us,” and the “catastrophic power” to emerge from concealment to inflict “wanton destruction” without warning, the Bush Doctrine contends that the United States is compelled, in light of the capabilities and intentions of their adversaries—a threat matrix even more hazardous than that posed by the Soviet Union—to abandon their traditional “reactive posture” and replace outmoded standards for evaluating the lawfulness of self-defense with a contemporary doctrine adapted to the “capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” Therefore, the Bush Doctrine warns that the United States will no longer “wait for threats to fully materialize,” but will take “preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives” and “deter and defend against the threat before it is...

use of force, which is intended to “stop another state . . . from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter,” from anticipatory self-defense (otherwise termed “preemption”), which refers to the use of force “against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or warning indicating imminent military action by an adversary”). For an official definition of “preventive war,” see U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 419 (2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict (defining “preventive war” as a “war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk”).

204 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

205 See Addicott, supra note 18, at 780 (“Our approach has been to aim at prevention and not merely punishment. We are at war. Self-defense requires prevention . . . .”) (quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz).

206 National Security Strategy, supra note 8, at 15.


208 National Security Strategy, supra note 8, at 13, 15.

209 See id. at 13 (stating that the possession of WMD by terrorists, coupled with the “greater likelihood that they will use [WMD] against us [as compared to the likelihood that the Soviet Union would have done so], make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous”).

210 Id. at 15.

211 West Point Address, supra note 207; see also National Security Strategy, supra note 8, at 15 (warning that the United States will “act preemptively” to deter and defeat terrorists).
unleashed." Although the United States "will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats," and although the United States does not intend that the Bush Doctrine be employed by other states as a "pretext for aggression," the Bush Doctrine proclaims that the United States will "not hesitate to . . . exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively," even if "uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."

Thus, although the United States references traditional support at customary international law for anticipatory self-defense to justify the Bush Doctrine as simply an adaptation of longstanding U.S. support for the doctrine, and although the United States employs the language of "anticipatory action" and "preemptive options," in purporting to dispense with any obligation to support the exercise of

---

212 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 6.
213 Id. at 16.
214 Id. at 6.
215 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
216 See id. ("For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack."). Senior Bush Administration officials suggest further that the Bush Doctrine is nothing more than a restatement of the U.S. position on anticipatory self-defense that is largely consistent with the policies of prior administrations, including those of President Clinton. See, e.g., Office of the White House Press Secretary, Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President's National Security Strategy (Oct. 1, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html (suggesting that the Bush Doctrine states a policy with regard to anticipatory self-defense that is identical to the policy adopted by the Clinton Administration, affirming the right of the U.S. to resort to anticipatory self-defense in the 1994 crisis with North Korea). Analysis of the statements of Clinton Administration officials lends credence to the claim that the United States subscribed to the doctrine of preventive war long before the advent of the Bush Doctrine. See The Administration's Missile Defense Program and the ABM Treaty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 88 (2001) (statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry) (proposing that, in conjunction with a ballistic missile defense system, the United States establish the policy "that we will attack the launch sites of any nation that threatens to attack the U.S. with nuclear or biological weapons"). In fact, the earliest embrace of the doctrine of preventive war as a pillar of U.S. defense policy may well reach back nearly two decades to the Reagan Administration, when Secretary of State Shultz advocated the "use [of] force to prevent or preempt future attacks," to "retaliate" against prior attacks, and to defeat "those states that support, train or harbor terrorists . . . ." George Schultz, Address to the National Defense University, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity (Jan. 15, 1986), in 25 I.L.M. 204, 206 (1986).
217 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 15 ("The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . .").
218 Id. at 16.
force in self-defense with evidence demonstrating the imminence of an armed attack, the Bush Doctrine invites application to circumstances where threats are neither operational, nor at all certain to ripen into attacks on the United States, nor otherwise amenable to proof by objective evidence in a manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of even a relaxed Caroline standard. As such it would be disingenuous to cast the Bush Doctrine as a variant of anticipatory self-defense; rather, it must be understood as an assertion of the right to engage in preventive war predicated upon the policy judgment that war with terrorists and rogue states is inevitable or at least probable, that delay redounds to the benefit of terrorists and to the detriment of innocent civilians, and that failure to act preventively may mean the loss of the last best chance to prevent tremendous destruction on a scale not heretofore witnessed. Although the Bush Administration has not yet been forced to defend the specific question whether the Bush Doctrine and its exposition of the doctrine of preventive war are consistent with international legal obligations under the Charter, the March 2003 intervention in Iraq sparked academic debate as to whether preventive war, rather than the proclaimed enforcement of Security Council resolutions, was the legal basis upon which the United States had undertaken military operations. Even if it is unclear that the future application of the Bush Doctrine will “stand the Charter on its head,” the public pronouncement that U.S. strategy is constructed upon a theoretical foundation that trumpets the doctrine of preventive war is indeed a “militant and highly transformative assertion” that dramatically transcends the parameters of anticipatory self-defense, and therefore demands legal justification independent of this latter doctrine. Natural law, as the next Part demonstrates, supports the proposition that under limited circumstances preventive war, and thus the Bush Doctrine, is consistent with international legal obligations even in the Charter era, inasmuch as the Bush Doctrine restates a general principle of law immune from derogation even by the Charter.

219  See Franck, supra note 16, at 619 (describing the Bush Doctrine as having substituted an imminence requirement for a “balancing of reasonable probabilities”).
220  See supra note 16.
221  Franck, supra note 16, at 619.
222  Id.; see also Patrick McLain, Note, Settling the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 233, 278 (2003) (condemning the Bush Doctrine as a “dramatic departure[ ] from the existing international law that governs the use of force”).
III. NATURAL LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR

For if a man finds his enemy, will he let him go well away?

1 Samuel 24:19

A. Introduction

For millennia, philosophers have propounded and defended the notion that there exists a set of absolute and universal rules or precepts that, although ascertainable or discoverable by the deductive exercise of human reason, binds mankind and the political communities instituted to govern the affairs of men on earth, trumping any inconsistent rules by virtue of its intrinsic moral merit. Natural law, an immediate and eternal expression of the principles of rights and justice that, though gleaned from observation of the natural universe and referenced as the "ultimate origin of law" and the "beginning of moral life proper," long antedates the origin of man, and is effectively "super-law." By the contrivance of man-made institutions, natural law is forced into conflict with positive sources of regulation that are out of harmony with natural reason or that represent the "arbitrary construction of opinion" or base assertions of power. Natu-

223 1 Samuel 24:19.
224 See Beres, supra note 84, at 328 n.31 (tracing the development of natural law from ancient Hebraic philosophers through the Greeks and Romans to the present).
225 The term lex aeterna is sometimes used to refer to natural law, although the latter is better understood as a subset of the former inasmuch as the lex aeterna includes universal principles of "cosmic reason" that human reason has yet to discover. See Louis René Beres, The Oslo Agreements in International Law, Natural Law, and World Politics, 14 Ariz. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 715, 728 (1997). Despite its ancient lineage, natural law, for reasons discussed below, is "almost as foreign to American legal consciousness of the twenty-first century as honor," and thus the term requires some elaboration. See Detlev F. Vагts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 326 (2001).
227 See Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law 5 (1955) (“[Natural law] principles were made by no human hands” and either “antedate deity itself” or else “so express its nature as to bind and control it.”); Louis René Beres, International Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide, 11 Loyola L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 25, 34 (1989) (“[Natural justice’s] applicability is therefore timeless. ‘Not of today or yesterday its force . . . It springs eternal; No man knows its birth.’”) (quoting Sophocles’s Antigone). Although natural legal philosophy has a branch positing that the origin of natural law stems from the expressed will of a divine creator, another branch contends that, even in the absence of a divinity, the authority of natural law is rooted in the objective analysis of the natural order of the universe, from which generalizations can be drawn, and that the origin of this natural order is not relevant for purposes of establishing the authority of natural law.
228 Beres, supra note 227, at 35.
ral law not only prevails over the “will of human governors” but rejects utterly the notion that such contrary statements of obligation have the force of law. Put very simply, natural legal philosophy, the supreme source of normative guidance for and judgment of human conduct, demarcates the legal universe, affirmatively prescribes rights and duties, and defines the limits of our legal reach in insisting that “[o]nly good laws are laws. And for a law to be good, it must be based, in one way or another, upon natural law. ‘If a human law is at variance with natural law it is no longer legal.’”

B. Intellectual History

The natural law tradition found its earliest expression among the ancient Israelites, for whom the Torah, as the literal word of God, stood as the sole and unambiguous basis of legal obligations. To the extent religious scholars imputed to the Torah obligations not evident from the words themselves, Jewish law treated these scholarly analyses not as new sources of law but as revelations of law “already given to Moses on Mount Sinai.” For the ancient Greeks natural law was the universal font of all human laws, and human laws contrary to natural law were of no legal force. In ancient Rome natural law prescribed universal rules of right and wrong, and positive laws, known as lex scripta, at variance with the “true” law were not to be regarded as law. To preserve the conformity of Roman law to natural reason, the Roman lex scripta incorporated saving clauses to the effect that statutory enactments were not intended to abrogate jus

229 See Corwin, supra note 227, at 5 (insisting that only those “human laws” created through the faithful “discovery and declaration” of natural law and codified as a “record or transcript” of the same deserve recognition as law).

230 Natural law creates both negative and positive rights and duties. See Christian Thomasius, *Fundamenta Iuris Naturae et Gentium, in The Philosophy of Law* (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (distinguishing natural law as a source of affirmative and negative obligations and rights). For a discussion of affirmative natural legal duties in the context of self-defense under international law, see infra Part IV.

231 D’Entreves, supra note 226, at 81-82 (citation omitted).


233 Beres, supra note 225, at 727 n.52 (citing Talmud Megillah 74d).

234 See id. at 727 (“For all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine.”) (citing Hermann Diels & Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Weidmann ed., 1966).

235 See 3 The Dialogues of Plato 11 (B. Jowett trans., 4th ed. 1953) (arguing that, from the perspective of Plato, laws contrary to natural law were not worthy of being obeyed)

236 Cicero, *De Re Publica, De Legibus* 385 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., 1948).
natural legal system, and Roman lawyers drew upon such clauses to defend *jus naturale* against legislative assaults upon its supremacy.

Christian scholars elaborated a strong association between natural law and universal moral principles: positive laws or customs that did not mirror the substantive justice and morality of the eternal or divine law were not true law and were denied any legal effect. The first principle of natural law was very simply "to do good and to avoid evil." For Christian natural legal theorists, the duty of obedience to secular authority extended only insofar as the "order of justice require[d]," and Christians were obliged to abandon allegiance to rulers who "command[ed] things to be done which are unjust." In turn, Enlightenment scholars developed a theory of natural law premised upon the argument that the exercise of natural reason led ineluctably to the conclusion that Creation had invested each individual with an equal body of inalienable rights and liberties and

---

237 Corwin, *supra* note 227, at 12.

238 The Roman Senator and lawyer Marcus Tullius Cicero offered the quintessential assertion of the imperviousness of *jus naturale* to positive law and of the duty of legislators not to attempt to derogate from this supreme source of law: "It is a sin to try to alter [natural] law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people . . . ." Cicero, *supra* note 236, at 211.

239 Christian natural legal theorists posited that certain universal moral principles were superior to and not abrogable by the parochial customs and laws of princes and secular rules. See John Dickinson, *The Stateman's Book of John of Salisbury* 33 (1927) ("[T]here are certain precepts of law which have perpetual necessity, having the force of law among all nations and which absolutely cannot be broken with impunity.") (quoting John of Salisbury); see generally Jean Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonweale* (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1577) (conceding that natural law imposes moral limits on the expression of state sovereignty).

240 St. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* 8–12 (Thomas Williams trans., 1993) (setting forth the concept that people are only obliged to follow that law which is derived from the eternal law).

241 d'Entreves, *supra* note 226, at 34 ("Natural law absolutely prevails in dignity over customs and constitutions. Whatever has been recognized by usage, or laid down in writing, if it contradicts natural law, must be considered null and void.").


244 Natural legal philosophers of the eighteenth century developed a somewhat secularized theory of natural law that allowed agnostics to substitute Nature in the stead of a divinity as the source of order, justice, and human obligation without disturbing the central precepts of the theory. See Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, *supra* note 155, at 498 n.30 (discussing the parallel development of a secular theory of natural law).
obligated every other person in the "state of nature," and by extension each state, to accord reciprocal respect to these rights and liberties. Those who trespassed against this fundamental law of nature declared themselves beyond "that measure God has set to the actions of men," and the inevitable attempts to abrogate these divinely ordained rights and liberties by legislative or executive action, whether at the level of the state or by agreement between states, inevitably foundered upon the immutable shoals of natural legal command.

The natural legal concepts that positive law is subject to and limited by a superior source of law, and that individuals are not obligated to obey commands of sovereigns that transgress rules and principles revealed by reasoned study of a divine or natural purpose, exerted potent influence upon the subsequent development of the positive legal frameworks of a number of leading states, as well as of the emerging positive international legal order, beginning in the late seventeenth century. To underscore the depth of natural legal hostil-

245 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 93 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) ("And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes to have abandoned, or transferred."); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.").

246 LOCKE, supra note 245, at 272.

247 In the words of eighteenth century Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel:

Since, therefore, the necessary Law of Nations consists in applying the natural law to States, and since the natural law is not subject to change, being founded on the nature of things and particularly upon the nature of man, it follows that the necessary Law of Nations is not subject to change.

Since this law is not subject to change and the obligations which it imposes are necessary and indispensable, Nations cannot alter it by agreement, nor individually or mutually release themselves from it.


248 The work of eighteenth century British jurists and social scientists suggests that the English common law regarded international law as a species of natural law—and therefore a part of the domestic law—that bound all individuals and states consistent with the principle that natural law resided at the apex of the hierarchy of sources of law both domestic and international. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66, 73 (stating that international law was "deducible by natural reason," and that each state is expected "to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common law; by inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that universal law"); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 340–41 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. MacFie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) ("Every system of positive law may be regarded as a more or less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural jurisprudence . . . .").
ity to pure positivism, one need only reference the Nazi Nuremburg laws and the concentration camps, monstrosities which were "legal" in the positivist, but not even remotely so in the naturalist, sense of the word.

C. Self-Defense Under Natural Law

The question of the right to undertake preventive measures in self-defense has garnered much analysis within the natural law canon. The Torah exonerates the potential victim of a robbery who responds by killing the would-be attacker prior to the commission of the planned crime. The Roman jurist Cicero, although addressing the question in the context of the individual right to self-defense, insisted that under natural law "every means of securing our safety is honourable" if "our life be in danger from plots, or of open violence, or from the weapons of robbers or enemies," including preventive measures. For English philosopher Thomas Hobbes it was inconceivable that it could be "against the dictates of true reason for a man

the United States, the Declaration of Independence reflected a commitment to the natural legal principle, also recognized as a principle of international law known as self-determination, that a people possess the right of revolution whenever a sovereign becomes destructive of inalienable rights invested in them by the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God . . . .” The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Moreover, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution reflects commitment to the Lockean notion that a transcendent body of international law forms part of the nation’s law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). For a discussion of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution as having established a natural legal framework for the United States, see generally CORWIN, supra note 227. For an exposition of the relationship of natural law to international law as well as domestic law, see infra Part V.

249 See Exodus 22:2 ("If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him."). Rabbinical commentaries on this passage state further that "if a man comes to slay you, forestall by slaying him!" Beres, supra note 31, at 264 (quoting Talmud Sanhedrin 72a). 250 Contemporary scholars suggest that Cicero’s argument in favor of preventive self-defense applies by extension to states on the theory that if “individuals have such great latitude in protecting their personal lives, how much greater is the latitude of a state in preserving its collective ‘life?’” Louis René Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 31 n.60 (1994).

251 In The Speech of M.T. Cicero In Defence of Titus Annius Milo, in 3 ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 394 (C. D. Yonge trans., 1911), Cicero offered the following words in defense of his client against the charge of murder:

But if there be any occasion on which it is proper to slay a man,—and there are many such,—surely that occasion is not only a just one, but even a
to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his Body, and the Members thereof from death," as men did not have the freedom to voluntarily surrender their divinely granted natural rights to life and liberty. Thus, although the first “Fundamentall Law of Nature” required men to “seek Peace, and follow it,” the “Second, the summe of the Right of Nature,” permitted men “[b]y all means we can, to defend our selves.” Where presented with a choice between evils—death or the use of force to prevent death—“man by nature chooseth the lesser evil.” John Locke further elaborated the Hobbesian recognition of a “State of War” triggering the natural right to use preventive force against a “settled Design, upon another Mans Life.”

Moreover, for Locke the natural right to self-defense, including the right to engage in preventive force in self-preservation, extended beyond the intended victim to all others who would join in the defense of the innocent: “a criminal, who having renounced Reason . . . hath . . . declared War against all Mankind . . . .” By their very designs that ran counter to the restraints imposed by natural law, aggressors

What is the meaning of our retinues, what of our swords? Surely it would never be permitted to us to have them if we might never use them. This, therefore, is a law, O judges, not written, but born with us,—which we have not learnt, or received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken and sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we were not taught, but to which we were made,—which we were not trained in, but which is ingrained in us,—namely, that if our life be in danger from plots, or from open violence, or from the weapons of robbers or enemies, every means of securing our safety is honourable. For laws are silent when arms are raised, and do not expect themselves to be waited for, when he who waits will have to suffer an undeserved penalty before he can exact a merited punishment.

Id.

252 THOMAS HOBBES, De Cive 47 (Howard Warrender ed., 1983) (1651)
253 HOBBES, supra note 245, at 91–92.
254 Id. at 98.
255 LOCKE, supra note 245, at 278.
256 Id. at 274. In other words, the right to exercise preventive force against a planned attack is both an individual and a group right.

[When a party declares] by Word or Action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled Design, upon another Mans Life, [he] puts him[self] in a State of War with him against whom he has declared such an Intention, and so has exposed his Life to the others Power to be taken away by him, or any one that joyns with him in his Defence, and espouses his Quarrel: it being reasonable and just I should have a Right to destroy that which threatens me with Destruction. For by the Fundamental Law of Nature, Man being to be
forfeited their right to life and liberty and merited destruction just as did other "Beasts of Prey."\textsuperscript{257} The current domestic laws of many states regarding the right of individual self-defense continue to reflect the influence of natural law in their tolerance for the exercise of measures of preventive force against potential aggressors even in the absence of an objective, imminent threat.\textsuperscript{258}

---

preserved, as much as possible, when all cannot be preserv'd, the safety of the Innocent is to be preferred . . . .

\textit{Id.} at 278–79.

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Id.} at 279:

[O]ne may destroy a Man who makes War upon him, or has discovered an Enmity to his being, for the same Reason, that he may kill a Wolf or a Lyon; because such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason, have no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be treated as Beasts of Prey . . . .

\textsuperscript{258} The principle that an individual may defend himself against an unlawful attack so long as the force is necessary, in response to an imminent attack, and proportional to the threatened force, has traditionally been a feature of the domestic jurisprudence of almost all states. \textit{See supra} note 107; \textit{see also} Martin E. Veinsreideris, Note, \textit{The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women}, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 613 (2000) (analyzing the elements of an individual self-defense claim under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions). The question of whether individuals may exercise preventive force to defend against the possibility, or probability, of future violence from a known aggressor has been much debated, often on natural legal grounds, in recent decades. \textit{See, e.g.}, Larry Alexander, \textit{A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection}, 74 \textit{NOTRE DAME L. REV.} 1475, 1477 (1999) (analogizing the individual right of preventive self-defense to the right of states to anticipatory self-defense). Battered women and children have found some success in defending against homicide charges by asserting that "battered woman syndrome," a psychological condition diminishing capacity caused by the chronic abuse meted out by the batterer, constitutes a defense to an otherwise unlawful exercise of preventive force. \textit{See Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and the Appropriate Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuse}, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185, 188–89 (1994) (surveying this trend). Nevertheless, the right of individual preventive self-defense, particularly as applied to the question of the domestic abuse of women or culturally based defenses to homicide, along with the canons of interpretation of elements such as imminence and proportionality, remains much contested in the U.S. legal academy and in U.S. courts. \textit{See generally} ROBERT F. SCHOPP, \textit{JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS} (1998); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, \textit{Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma}, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (discussing cultural defenses to homicide); Loraine Patricia Eber, \textit{The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to Be Killed}, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981) (surveying sociological studies of battered women). Some commentators reject the lawfulness of the preventive use of force by individuals in terms similar to restrictivists on the subject of anticipatory self-defense, holding that in the absence of a "visible manifestation of aggression" preventive strikes are "grounded in a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to behave in the future," a standard rife with possibilities for abuse. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, \textit{A CRIME OF SELF-}
The founders of the modern international legal regime paid homage to natural law generally, and specifically with regard to their analyses regarding the right of states to self-defense. Hugo Grotius made direct reference to the self-defense arguments developed by Cicero and ancient Greek authors when articulating a natural law exception to the general proposition that a declaration must precede the initiation of war:

[As] Cicero explains, this [justification for extra-legal warfare] exists whenever he who chooses to wait [for legal authorization] will be obliged to pay an unjust penalty before he can exact a just penalty; and in a general sense, it exists whenever matters do not admit of delay. . . . For—as Aelian says, citing Plato as his authority—any war undertaken for the necessary repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not by a crier nor by a herald but by the voice of Nature herself.

In so doing, Grotius implied the fundamental right of state self-defense at natural law to undertake not only what might be understood presently as measures of anticipatory self-defense but also preventive measures designed "to kill him who is making ready to kill." Leading lights of international law such as Alberico Gentili, Emerich de Vattel, and Samuel von Pufendorf recognized that states were not obligated to "receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at [them]" but were rather entitled, at natural law, to

---

259 See Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres 39 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625):

The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.

260 See supra note 238.


262 Grotius, supra note 259, at 176.

263 See Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, reprinted in 16 The Classics of International Law, supra note 261, at 58 (1612) (commenting that natural law permitted a defensive attack by a threatened state).

264 According to eighteenth century Swiss scholar Vattel,

[t]he safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force . . . against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor.

Vattel, supra note 247, at 130.
engage in preventive war "even though [an enemy] has not yet fully revealed his intentions . . . ." The sole limitations these commentators recognized upon the natural right of states to engage in preventive war in self-defense provided that peaceful remedies be either exhausted, fruitless, or likely to compromise effective defense by apprising the aggressor of preventive efforts underway.

Subsequent scholars carried forward and incorporated the natural law doctrine of preventive war into the domestic jurisprudence of their respective states. Thomas Jefferson, one of the principal legal architects of the United States, held that the natural law of self-defense "control[led] the written laws," and thus irrespective of any domestic or international laws governing the resort to force and whatever treaty obligations the United States had incurred, the United States bore not merely the right but the "[m]oral dut[y]" and

---

265 2 Samuel von Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem Libri Duo [On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law] 32 (Frank Gardner trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682). According to Pufendorf, where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief . . . . [T]he excuse of self-defense will be his, who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant. Id.

266 See, e.g., id. (requiring exhaustion of peaceful remedies prior to exercise of the right to anticipatory self-defense unless "there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, [the enemy] may put off his hostile temper; or if such admonition be likely to injure our cause").


268 Although "[c]ompacts . . . between nation & nation are obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe their compacts," and although treaties created the same "[m]oral duties" between states that existed between individuals under natural law, for Jefferson there were "circumstances . . . which sometimes excuse[d] the non-performance of contracts . . . between nation & nation." Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the French Treaties, in The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113–14 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1993). Where performance was rendered impossible or "self-destructive to [a] party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation to others." Id. at 114. It would thus appear self-evident that for Jefferson the obligation to defend the United States would prevail in a conflict with a treaty or other domestic law. In his own words, "a treaty pernicious to the state is null, & not at all obligatory; no governor of a nation having power to engage things capable of destroying the state, for the safety of which the empire is trusted to him." Id. at 115.
“indispensable obligation” to engage in preventive war where necessary to ensure “its preservation and safety.”269

D. Erosion of Natural Law by Legal Positivism

1. Generally

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the legal philosophy of positivism began to emerge as the regnant paradigm in international law, incrementally banishing the natural legal principle that manmade laws inconsistent with the dictates of reason deduced from observation of the divinely orchestrated natural world were of no legal force. Positivism substituted the manifested will of sovereign states as the exclusive source and form of international legal norms.270 For the positivist, law is not a rough attempt to codify reason or justice, but is rather the “command of the sovereign” backed by the threat of sanctions in the absence of compliance:271 positivism supplants reason as the source of legal obligation with “fear; fear of violence, fear of lost liberty, advantage or amenity, or fear of social disapproval.”272 With the origins of positivism and the displacement of natural law from atop the hierarchy of sources of norms, the invocation of higher principles of reason and justice as authoritative sources no longer reliably restrained the political preferences of states in their international relations, and by the turn of the twentieth century the maturation of positivism had “bled the law white” by rendering state consent the sole criterion for adjudging the validity of norms in international relations.273 In its mildest forms, positivism is merely agnostic to the notion that specific enactments are intended as vehicles for the expression of moral content;274 in its more extreme versions, positiv-

269 JEFFERSON, supra note 268, at 114–15 (“The nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever it's preservation & safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to it's indispensable obligations.”).
271 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 27 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (elaborating the command theory of positivism, which holds that law is but the command of the sovereign rather than a statement of morality or a pathway to justice).
272 Hall, supra note 270, at 279.
273 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (P.E. Corbett trans., 1968).
274 Some commentators suggest that so great is positivism’s adherence to the principle of state sovereignty and its neglect of other bases for normative judgment that for positivists the very act of asserting state sovereignty through domestic legislative
ism eschews entirely the proposition that law and morality ought to be drawn into any relationship whatsoever, and proceeds to assert as lawful the pursuit of state objectives with utter indifference to the natural justice, or absence thereof, appurtenant to state practice. For the most committed positivists, the self-defense of states is at best a limited right, rather than a duty, and as such it is susceptible to qualification and regulation.

2. The Positivist Attack on Natural Law in International Relations, and the Natural Law Response

The philosophical changing of the guard from the justice-centered approach of natural law to sovereignty-centered positivism in the discipline of international law and the practice of states over the course of the last two centuries has not passed without remark. Critics of positivism more generally have assailed the "undue respect for law" it demands, particularly where positive laws have been susceptible to challenge on justice grounds; others have registered pointed objections to the renunciation of natural legal formulations enactment or by treaty, without regard to the substantive content of the law or international agreement itself, is by definition intrinsically just. See, e.g., Beres, supra note 225, at 727-29 (describing the extreme sovereigntist bias of positivism).

275 See D'ENTRESVES, supra note 226, at 111 (stating that, in its pure form, positivism is a "pernicious doctrine that there is no law but positive law, or that might equals right, since for all practical purposes the two propositions are perfectly equivalent").

276 "[H]umankind has not only been indifferent to Higher Law, but has often coupled this indifference with adherence to undiscovered 'laws' that reject justice." Louis René Beres, Pollard and Arafat: An Ironic Inversion of Justice, MACCABEAN-ONLINE, Mar. 1997, at http://www.freeman.org/m-online/beres.htm.

277 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 162-63 ("Although the statement [that self-defense is a duty] may reflect morality or theology, it does not comport with international law."); M. Jaroslav Zouerek, La Notion de Legitime Defense en Droit International, 56 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 51 (1975) (describing self-defense as optional under international law).

278 The seventeenth century French philosopher Blaise Pascal may have presaged the rise of positivism by more than a century in commenting that "[i]t is a singular thing to consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have made laws for themselves which they strictly obey . . . ."

Blaise Pascal, THOUGHTS § 393, at 131 (Charles W. Eliot ed., W.F. Trotter trans., Collier Press 1910) (1660). However, positivism did not displace natural law from its theoretical dominance in international law until the nineteenth century. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW 63 (1922) (noting that "all authorities down to the end of the eighteenth century . . . have treated [international law] as a body of doctrine derived from and justified by the Law of Nature").

and the unquestioning devotion adherents of positivism grant to "un-
discovered ‘laws’ that reject justice." Critics of the erosion of natu-
ral law as the philosophical basis for international legal theory have
excoriated the turn, wrought by positivism, away from the exercise of
human reason and the participation of individuals possessed of ina-
lienable rights in the (re)discovery of principles of eternal and immu-
table justice.

Natural law jurisprudence has enjoyed a revival of sorts towards
the end of the twentieth century as a number of scholars, particularly
in the fields of human rights and international relations theory, have
demanded that international law be reintroduced to justice and mo-
rality and reconfigured to provide a more secure legal foundation for
the expression and protection of inalienable rights—known alterna-
tively as “natural rights” or “human rights.” For “new natural law”
thorists, there are limits to lawmaking: states, although sovereign and
the authors of domestic law, are no more free to “transform a moral
wrong into a human right” than they are to criminalize the exercise of
human rights, and considerations of justice, along with the applica-
tion of practical reason to collective social problems by “free, rational
and moral . . . beings,” will require the restructuring of legal relation-
ships between individuals, between individuals and states, and be-
tween states. Nevertheless, although the pendulum of international legal theory may be once again swinging in the direction
of natural legal philosophy, positivism is ascendant, and international
law is arid terrain for the assertion and defense of norms, principles,
and rules derived from the exercise of human reason and informed by
considerations of universal justice and morality.

E. General Principles of International Law: Repository for Natural Legal
Principles in the Contemporary International Legal Regime

Although the Charter, acting as a collective sovereign, elaborates
on behalf of the international community a series of textual proscrip-

280 Beres, supra note 276.
281 See, e.g., Sherston Baker, First Steps in International Law 16 (Boston, Lit-
282 For an excellent analysis of scholarship in what has come to be known as “new
natural law” theory, see, for example, Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law
(1999); and John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980).
283 For a discussion of the invigoration of natural legal philosophy in the field of
human rights, see Hall, supra note 270, at 301–07 (explaining that the “new natural
law” school challenges the theoretical foundations of the power of states to “hinder[ ]
or prevent[ ] the enjoyment of . . . natural rights”).
284 See generally id.
tions and prescriptions often seemingly devoid of natural legal content, it is not at all evident that Articles 2(4) and 51 either create or recognize an absolute and authoritative prohibition on the resort of states to preventive measures of force, including preventive war. There is, at the very least, a fluid and vigorous debate whether the right of states at customary international law to engage in measures of force in anticipation of an imminent threat survives into the Charter era. Although the doctrine of preventive war, which is predicated not upon an imminent threat but rather authorizes the use of force to end an incipient threat that has not yet matured into an imminent attack, requires a basis of legal legitimization broader than that supporting the narrower doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, natural law, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, justifies force in self-defense even absent perfect information as to an enemy's intention, and authorizes the destruction of those who are merely preparing for a future attack at a date and time uncertain and with whom negotiation would be pointless. While the Charter framework is on its face a positivist instrument, the Statute of the International Court of Justice elaborates a more pluralist theoretical foundation: Article 38 recognizes, in addition to treaties and customary international law, that "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are cognizable as sources of international law applicable to the resolution of international disputes.285

1. Introduction

General principles of law provide "a reservoir from which apparent gaps in the corpus of international law may be filled," and "reinforce the view that international law should properly be regarded as a 'complete system,' i.e., that every international situation is capable of being determined as a matter of law."286 Their purpose is not limited to gap-filling, however. The argument that these "general principles," which number among them, inter alia, the denial of legal liability in the absence of fault, the defense of estoppel, the "clean hands" doctrine, the freedom to contract, a concept of due process that includes the right to be heard, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the principle that no party ought to be a judge in his own case,287 are derived from, and reflect the influence of, natural legal theory has

286 Hall, supra note 270, at 296–97.
287 Finnis, supra note 282, at 288–89 (listing general principles of international law); see also Advisory Comm. of Jurists, Permanent Court of International Jus-
gained adherents in recent years. At least one scholar contends that the "very existence of general principles as a source of law indicates that treaty and custom do not provide an exhaustive source of legal norms in international law," suggesting further that the general principles of international law referenced in the Statute of the ICJ are in fact principles and norms of natural law. No less authoritative a forum than the International Court of Justice has offered validation to the notion that these general principles are indeed norms and rules of natural law for which positivism must make room; as Justice Kotaro Tanaka stated in the Southwest Africa Cases:

[I]t is undeniable that in Article 38, paragraph 1(c), some natural law elements are inherent. It extends the concept of the source of international law beyond the limit of legal positivism according to which, the States being bound only by their own will, international law is nothing but the law of the consent and auto-limitation of the State. But this viewpoint, we believe, was clearly overruled by Article 38, paragraph 1(c) ....

2. Preventive War as a General Principle of International Law

The U.N. Charter does not explicitly prohibit the resort to preventive war. Articles 2(4) and 51 are susceptible to restrictivist and pragmatist interpretations, just as they are in respect to the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. Similarly, the question whether the lawfulness of preventive war under traditional customary international law has survived into the Charter era has been left open by divergent state practice and by diverging scholarly opinion. The orthodox methodology of international legal analysis permits the resolution of a legal question by resort to general principles of international law where analysis of relevant treaties and customary sources is not dispos-
itive of the issue. The preceding discussion suggests that it is at the very least arguable that the right of states under natural law to take all such measures as they should deem necessary to reduce incipient threats posed by avowed enemies to their existence, even where no such threats are objectively imminent, continues as a general principle of international law that functions to fill the gap in the Charter era international law governing the use of force in self-defense, and justifies preventive war under some circumstances. If the Bush Doctrine is thus merely the assertion of the natural legal right of the United States to engage in preventive war, it ought to be received as nothing more than a restatement of a general principle of international law rather than as a unilateral gambit to subvert the international legal order to American purpose.293

The next Part will build upon the argument that the Bush Doctrine is a lawful assertion of the natural legal right of states to engage in preventive force by positing that, under the U.S. Constitution and the domestic common law, the President of the United States is impressed with a duty, independent of any international legal considerations, to engage in preventive war where and when he deems it necessary to defend the nation and its people from existential threats.

IV. THE PRESIDENTIAL DUTY TO ENGAGE IN PREVENTIVE WAR: A NATURAL LAW DEFENSE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE

When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt294

A. Presidential War Powers Under the U.S. Constitution

1. The Constitutional Text

Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."295 The President is also vested with "the executive Power"296 and charged with the duty to "take Care that the Laws

293 See supra note 216 (describing the Bush Doctrine in these terms).
295 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
296 Id. art. II, § 1.
be faithfully executed," and upon assuming office is required to "solemnly swear (or affirm) that [he] will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Despite these several textual commitments, the precise contours of the powers and duties of the President in regard to the use of military force have been contested since the origin of the United States as an independent nation.

Advocates of legislative supremacy, fixing upon the textual commitment of the power to "Declare War" to Congress under Article I, have accused Presidents, particularly in the twentieth century, of waging undeclared and thus "unconstitutional wars," and have sought to restrain presidential independence and initiative in warmaking through legislation; proponents of a strong and independent exec-

---

297 Id. art. II, § 3.
298 Id. art. II, § 1.
299 For a discussion of this history, see generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996).
301 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath 3 (1993) (contending that "all wars, big or small, 'declared' in so many words or not . . . ha[ve] to be legislatively authorized" to be constitutional); Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 26 (1990) ("The President's designation as Commander in Chief . . . appears to have implied no substantive authority to use the armed forces, whether for war (unless the United States were suddenly attacked) or for peacetime purposes, except as Congress directed."); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1369-75 (1994) (listing sources).
302 In passing the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973), Congress declared its intent to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

Id. Congress declared further that the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Id. § 2(c).
utive have defended "energy in the executive" as "essential to the protection of the [nation] against foreign attacks."\(^{303}\) Although the interbranch battle over the distribution of the war powers continues to be waged within the legal academy, two centuries of practice, marked by the presidential employment of U.S. military forces more than 125 times,\(^ {304} \) suggests that the President and the Congress have approximated the sort of system for the shared exercise of the power to employ the armed forces of the United States that analyses of the original understandings of the constitutional design indicate the Framers intended: the President is encouraged to exercise initiative in the use of force but Congress is granted the ultimate power to check executive action through its powers of appropriation, statutory authorization, and impeachment.\(^ {305} \) Moreover, the judicial branch has largely abstained from the interbranch war power fray on political question grounds,\(^ {306} \) recognizing that the President is entitled to the widest margin of discretion in the exercise of his constitutionally committed and functionally essential power as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations"\(^ {307} \) and as "Commander in Chief."\(^ {308} \)

\(^{303}\) The Federalist No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

\(^{304}\) See Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law 143–49 (1986) (listing instances of what the authors term "presidential acts of war").

\(^{305}\) See W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 777, 783 (1989) (describing as an “operational code of competence” the system in which the President assumes the primary role in the initial decision to exercise the war powers, Congress accepts a subordinate role in authorizing and appropriating funds for military operations, and the judiciary abstains from interbranch conflicts); Yoo, supra note 299, at 295 (advancing a similar theory of the Framers’ original intent regarding the practical exercise of the constitutional allocation of war powers). Not all scholars describe the practical exercise of the war powers approvingly. See id. at 188–89 (noting that some constitutional scholars fault the established system as overly prone to congressional “acquiescence” in presidential faits d’accompli).

\(^{306}\) For a discussion and analysis of the political question doctrine, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that judicial abstention from the resolution of a dispute is obligatory where a case presents a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of an issue to a “coordinate political department,” a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards” to resolve the issue, an “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination” reserved for nonjudicial decisions, an impossibility of deciding “without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” or the “potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments”).

\(^{307}\) The seminal judicial pronouncement upon executive power, primacy, and discretion in international relations provides as follows:
2. The Relationship with Congress: A Model of Presidential Primacy

That the President is endowed with initiative in the employment of the U.S. armed forces and discretion in the conduct of international relations does not deny Congress a role in the war powers. The War Powers Resolution signifies the congressional intent that the "collective judgment of both the Congress and the President" will be brought to bear on the question of the exercise of the war powers,\textsuperscript{309} and the Supreme Court has superimposed a conceptual framework upon the political branches that, without intruding into the arena reserved to political questions, recognizes that presidential prerogatives are subject to the "express or implied will of Congress," and that the President, although the Commander in Chief, is not absolutely autonomous in this realm.\textsuperscript{310} Nevertheless, although the power to repel im-

\begin{flushright}
Not only... is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation... 

... It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing... [with] the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. . .
\end{flushright}


\textsuperscript{308} See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (holding that Congress may not direct the conduct of campaigns, a function constitutionally committed to the President under the Commander in Chief grant of power); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863) (holding that the question of whether and how the President employs military force as Commander in Chief "is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted"); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644–45 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the President has the exclusive role in commanding the military "at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our society"). For a discussion of the scope of presidential powers under the Commander in Chief Clause, and an argument that the executive was granted monopoly power over the tactical and operational command of the U.S. armed forces, see George K. Walker, United States National Security Law and United Nations Peacekeeping or Peacemaking Operations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 435, 472–78 (1994); for a discussion of the intellectual history surrounding the question of the commitment of the power of tactical command over the armed forces, see Yoo, supra note 299, at 198–204.


\textsuperscript{310} See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (analyzing presidential war powers not textually conferred by the Constitution and determining that
minent attacks or to otherwise act in defense of the United States is not explicitly mentioned in Article II, analysis of the Framers' original intent, a sustained pattern of executive practice and congressional acquiescence, and judicial interpretation of the textual allocation of powers conjoin in support of the argument that the President possesses a significant and exclusive measure of power to employ military force, even absent any congressional declaration of war or statutory authorization, where necessary to protect and defend the United States against foreign enemies.\footnote{311}

Read in isolation, the Commander in Chief and Executive Power Clauses might be read narrowly to authorize the President to employ the armed forces in defense of the United States, even during emergencies, only subsequent to congressional authorization.\footnote{312} However, when read in conjunction with the Take Care Clause,\footnote{313} with Article IV, Section 4, guaranteeing the states protection against invasion,\footnote{314} and Article I, Section 10, Clause 3, providing that states may engage in war if “in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay,”\footnote{315} the

\begin{itemize}
\item (1) when the President acts consistent with the will of Congress his power is at a zenith;
\item (2) when the President acts in the face of congressional silence, the constitutionality of his actions is in an uncertain “zone of twilight”; and
\item (3) when the President acts in opposition “to the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter”); \footnote{see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (“As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.”).}
\end{itemize}

\footnote{311} The roots of executive powers to act in case of emergency “according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it,” extend even further back in time through state constitutions, English common law, and eventually to the writings of John Locke. \footnote{See Yoo, supra note 299, at 199–200 (conducting an extensive intellectual historical analysis and exposition of common law executive prerogative in the areas of war powers and in particular the defense of the polity during emergencies).}

\footnote{312} \textit{See} \textsc{The Federalist} No. 69, \textit{supra} note 303, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (reassuring critics of the proposed Constitution that even subsequent to congressional authorization the President would have “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces” and not, as did the English King, the power of declaring of war); \textsc{Henry P. Monaghan}, \textit{The Protective Power of the Presidency}, 93 \textsc{Colum. L. Rev.} 1, 38 (1993) (suggesting that congressional notification and authorization is a condition subsequent to the exercise of presidential emergency powers).

\footnote{313} \textsc{U.S. Const.} art. II, § 3.

\footnote{314} \textit{See} \textsc{U.S. Const.} art. IV, § 4 (providing in part that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion”).

\footnote{315} \textsc{U.S. Const.} art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
Commander in Chief and Executive Power Clauses lead many to conclude that the Framers intended, in part out of efficiency considerations and in part out of a desire to continue to accord to the executive common law powers that had traditionally been within the province of the branch responsible for the conduct of martial operations, that the President rather than Congress initiate military action to fulfill this obligation. Moreover, a close textual exegesis of the language in Article I conferring upon Congress the power to “declare” rather than to “make” war represents for generations of scholars a conscious and deliberate election to allocate to the President residual emergency power to respond to foreign threats without obligating him to wait, perhaps disastrously, for legislative recognition of the de facto state of hostility. In short, it is exceedingly difficult to conceive of the Constitution as having created a model of legislative

316 See The Federalist No. 70, supra note 303, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”); id. at 424 (“Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number . . . .”).

317 See Yoo, supra note 299, at 202–03 (suggesting that the Framers were influenced by the views developed by Blackstone and Locke to the effect that the executive should be endowed with a “broad catalogue of executive power and duties” regarding the use of force, to include the “discretionary power of acting for the public good”) (quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 248, at *244).

318 See, e.g., W. Taylor Reveley III, War Powers of the President and Congress 39 (1981) (arguing that, after significant debate at the Constitutional Convention, the Framers intended that the Constitution preserve in the President the power to “respon[d] to sudden foreign attack”); Walker, supra note 308, at 478 n.288 (arguing that the Framers intended the president to have the power to repel sudden attacks or act in situations of imminent danger); see also Jordan J. Paust, U.N. Peace and Security Powers and Related Presidential Powers, 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 15, 19–21 (1996) (suggesting that the Take Care Clause would require the President, if necessary, to employ military force to execute treaties and customary international law, which are laws of the United States, where Congress was unwilling to act in enforcement).

319 See, e.g., AbrahaM D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 31–32 (1976) (arguing that the choice of “declare” rather than “make” reflects the decision to preserve presidential initiative in defending the nation from attack); Wormuth & Firmage, supra note 304, at 18 (summarizing the linguistic debate over the choice of the word “declare” rather than “make” in connection with the war power under Article I); Charles A. Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale L.J. 672, 675–77 (1972) (contending that many of the delegates in Philadelphia were of the view that the final draft of the Constitution retained on behalf of the President the power to repel attacks); Yoo, supra note 299, at 246–48 (examining constitutional debates and contemporaneous scholarly commentary and suggesting that the use of the word “declare” connoted the largely ceremonial act of recognition, rather than the authorization, of a state of war to the mind
supremacy that grants the President only that warmaking power necessary to execute legislative declarations of war and withholds the means and power to respond to attack or the threat thereof without reading the precise language chosen by the Framers out of the document.\footnote{In arguing that Congress must be granted the power to maintain a standing army in order that the President have available troops to command, Hamilton foresaw that future threats would obligate the President to swiftly and preemptively employ the means "by which nations anticipate distant danger and meet the gathering storm" in order to preserve the new nation. \textit{The Federalist} No. 25, \textit{supra} note 303, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton). Madison, in support of the Federalist position, asserted that the President would require the instruments necessary to make war to protect the United States and warned the Framers against erecting "constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation." \textit{The Federalist} No. 41, \textit{supra} note 303, at 257 (James Madison).}

3. War Powers in Practice: Congressional Acquiescence in and Judicial Recognition of a Presidential Power to Engage in Anticipatory Self-Defense

Moreover, presidential practice, congressional acquiescence in that practice, and judicial review of the concord established by the political branches has lent additional force to the argument that the Constitution drapes the President with the power to respond unilaterally, at least where Congress has not acted, to defend the United States against the threat of attack. During the Civil War, President Lincoln ordered the blockade of Southern ports as a measure designed to prevent and otherwise hinder attack on the United States and its interests by the Confederate States of America. In the \textit{Prize Cases}, the Supreme Court upheld the seizure and condemnation of vessels in pursuit of the blockade order against a challenge alleging that the President did not have the inherent power to defend the United States in the absence of express congressional authorization. The Court held that the President was not only inherently authorized but duty-bound to defend the United States against attack: "If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He . . . is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority."\footnote{The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).} The Court went on to note that the President, in fulfilling his duty as Commander in Chief, was the sole entity competent to determine the degree of force necessary to suppress an insurrection or repel a foreign invasion.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 670.}
In a second Civil War era case, *Durand v. Hollins*, a similarly broad construction was given to the Executive Power Clause, in response to the question whether following lawful orders to attack a government threatening U.S. nationals and interests, issued by the President to a naval officer, gives the defendant naval officer a defense to a civil action for damages in connection with injuries arising from the execution of the orders. In upholding the proffered defense, the court not only upheld executive power to engage in unauthorized self-defense but recognized a presidential duty to afford U.S. nationals protection for their persons and property by the prudential exercise of measures in self-defense:

As the executive head of the nation, the president is made the only legitimate organ of the general government . . . . It is to him [that] the citizens abroad must look for protection of person and of property, and for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended for their protection . . . .

. . . . Acts of lawless violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his property, cannot be anticipated and provided for; and the protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently [sic], require the most prompt and decided action. Under our system of government, the citizen abroad is as much entitled to protection as the citizen at home. The great object and duty of government is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the people composing it, whether abroad or at home; and any government failing in the accomplishment of the object, or the performance of the duty, is not worth preserving.

Subsequent practice throughout the twentieth century, stretching from the Korean War to the Gulf, adds additional layers of gloss upon the constitutionality of the presidential power to act with alacrity and firmness to protect vital U.S. interests overseas, in order to preserve U.S. national security and afford Congress the opportunity for meaningful participation. Although the Supreme Court has never directly decided the question of whether anticipatory self-defense is constitutional, most

---

323 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
324 Id. at 111–12
325 Id.
326 See Yoo, supra note 299, at 296–98 (examining presidential practice in cases of national emergency).
327 See Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 80, at 748 (noting that, although the question of the constitutionality of anticipatory self-defense is "just starting to receive the attention it deserves," the Supreme Court has never decided the issue). Legislative proposals to ground anticipatory self-defense on sound constitutional footing, either by amendment to the War Powers Resolution or in other forms, have been the
scholars concur that the *Prize Cases*, congressional acquiescence in subsequent executive practice, and the practical exigencies of the contemporary threat environment\(^{328}\) clearly support the constitutional interpretation that, in the event of an invasion or other imminent harm against U.S. citizens or property, inherent presidential powers of self-defense—for the exercise of which the President need neither seek nor receive congressional authorization—are triggered,\(^ {329}\) even if the President remains obligated to make a subsequent request for congressional authorization of his course of action.\(^ {330}\) In other words, the President has the unambiguous authority, substantially equivalent to an executive "necessary and proper" power,\(^ {331}\) to employ military force to defend the United States against attack or the threat thereof, and relevant case law suggests that resort to the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is within the scope of lawful presidential authority under such circumstances.\(^ {332}\) Moreover, a determination by the Presi-

---

\(^{328}\) See Bobbitt, *supra* note 301, at 1382 ("In a world in which many foreign states have the power to attack U.S. forces—and some even the U.S. mainland—almost instantly, it is impractical to require the President to seek advance authorization to use force.").

\(^{329}\) See Yost, *supra* note 115, at 429 & nn.74–76 (surveying relevant literature). A minority of scholars read the *Prize Cases* more narrowly for the proposition that unilateral presidential warmaking authority is limited to invasions of the United States or an attack on U.S. interests, thereby rejecting entirely the argument that the Constitution grants the President the power to engage in anticipatory self-defense absent congressional authorization. See, e.g., Wormuth & Firmage, *supra* note 304, at 34 (making this argument); *see also* Paust, *supra* note 12, at 533, 556–57 (suggesting that presidential authority to engage in anticipatory self-defense under the Constitution is limited by international law, which prohibits anticipatory self-defense).

\(^{330}\) See Bobbitt, *supra* note 301, at 1369 (indicating that even a great number of scholars chary of presidential authority in respect of the war powers accept that, in the event of an imminent invasion of the United States, the President, provided he sought post hoc congressional ratification of his actions, could defend the United States without waiting for congressional authorization).

\(^{331}\) See Monaghan, *supra* note 312, at 42 (describing presidential emergency powers as having evolved through practice to the point where they are now akin to congressional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).

\(^{332}\) See *supra* note 329 and accompanying text (discussing the *Prize Cases*).
dent that the resort to anticipatory self-defense is imperative is within his sole discretion, and any challenges to the lawfulness of acts ordered by the President pursuant to the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense present nonjusticiable political questions.\(^{333}\)

**B. A Presidential Duty to Defend**

However, *Durand* not only accords judicial legitimacy to the exercise of the executive power to “make” war in instances requiring the protection of U.S. nationals and interests against invasion or threat of harm; rather, it identifies a presidential *duty* to do so. A “duty” is distinct from a power: whereas the latter can be described as a state enforced *capacity* to act in a given fashion, the former is better understood as the *obligation* to act in a given fashion that runs to the benefit of bearer(s) of a legal right.\(^{334}\) In other words, by explicitly recognizing that threats to the United States “cannot be anticipated and provided for” and that responses in self-defense “require the most prompt and decided action,” the *Durand* opinion arguably establishes judicial recognition of a presidential duty to, where necessary, employ military force to prevent “[a]cts of violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his property . . . .”\(^{335}\) Although the opinion did not elaborate a reasoned basis for its recognition of a presidential duty to prevent injury to the United States, its nationals, and its interests, the roots of such an obligation reach back in time, antedating the concept

\(^{333}\) See infra notes 377–83 and accompanying text (discussing why presidential decisions to engage in anticipatory self-defense are nonjusticiable and protected by the political question doctrine).

\(^{334}\) See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, *Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning*, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913) (constructing an early theory of the distinctions between rights and duties under the law). Duties and rights exist in a correlative relationship: to possess a right implies that others bear duties toward the right-holder to act or refrain from action by virtue of the existence of the right, and to this extent duties arise whenever rights are recognized. See Albert Kocourek, *Various Definitions of Jural Relation*, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 395 n.7, 412 (1920) (building upon the Hohfeldian dichotomies). Moreover, the existence of a duty implies that in the event of a breach of that duty, a transgression against the bearer of the correlative right occurs which exposes the incumbent to liability and entitles the right-holder to a remedy. See Julius Stone, *The Province and Function of Law* 98–99 (1950) (linking breaches of duties with liability to the bearers of correlative rights). Although a discussion of “rights” is more generally accessible to the modern reader than is a discussion of “duties,” the latter analytical concept has a “more strategic explanatory role than the concept of rights” in a broader discussion of natural law and the notion of moral obligation upon which it rests. Finnis, supra note 282, at 210. Accordingly, it is to duties that this Article turns in developing and testing its natural law defense of the Bush Doctrine.

\(^{335}\) Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
of sovereignty and drawing nourishment from principles of natural law that, woven together, nurture the theory of social contract.\textsuperscript{336}

1. Protection as the First Duty of the State: Origins in Natural Law

a. Allegiance Based Theories

The argument that the state is brought into existence solely to protect its nationals against harm and to preserve the tranqulitas ordinis (public peace), and that the state has a moral and legal duty to use force where necessary to accord this protection, dates at least to ancient Greece.\textsuperscript{337} In exchange for service from its citizens, the state was obligated not merely to refrain from causing its citizens injury but to affirmatively discover and defeat any threat to the polis.\textsuperscript{338} Although by the Middle Ages the democratic basis for the organization of the state had given way to more hierarchical forms that restricted political participation, the symbiotic relationship between state and nationals, in which protection was exchanged for service, had so conditioned understandings of the meaning of sovereignty that the king was judged to be entitled to obedience and loyalty only insofar as he afforded justice and a reasonable assurance of protection to his subjects.\textsuperscript{339} Doing justice and protecting his subjects was, in effect, con-

\textsuperscript{336} In this Article, the description of a presidential duty to defend against threatened harm is limited to threats emanating from abroad and does not take up the potentially more complex question of a presidential duty to defend against domestic threats. For a thorough analysis of this latter issue, see Monaghan, \textit{supra} note 312.

\textsuperscript{337} See Lacey, \textit{supra} note 187, at 310 (locating the ancient Greek origins of the theory of protection of nationals as the raison d'état). Some commentators might locate the earliest example of an affirmative state duty of protection in ancient Israel. See Addicott, \textit{supra} note 18, at 761-62 (describing Mosaic law as “centering on the duty of the state to protect its citizens” both internally against criminal behavior and externally against enemies).

\textsuperscript{338} See Robert H. Murray, \textit{The History of Political Science from Plato to the Present} 1–2 (1926) (presenting the Platonic theory of the perfect state and noting its incorporation of affirmative state duties); see also \textit{id.} at 12 (“The action of the state may be positive or preventive. It may stimulate the good life or it may remove hindrances to it.”).

\textsuperscript{339} By the traditional English doctrine of allegiance, every loyal subject was entitled to the protection of the king. Anthony Fitz-Herbert, \textit{The New Natura Brevium} 29 (London, W. Rawlins 1534). However, allegiance was conditional upon the provision of that protection. See Corwin, \textit{supra} note 227, at 27–29 (summarizing the writings of the thirteenth century English jurist Bracton on the theoretical basis for the relationship between medieval sovereigns and their subjects).
consideration granted by the sovereign in exchange for the obedience of his subjects.\textsuperscript{340}

b. Contractarian Theories

In the Age of Enlightenment, sovereignty came to be understood as derivative of the duty of protection owed to subjects by their sovereign; individuals contracted out of a state of nature to enhance their security, relinquishing their natural liberty for the safety bestowed by the sovereign, who, by virtue of this bargain, was impressed by a duty to defeat any threats to his subjects.\textsuperscript{341} The supreme duty of the state was the protection of rights to life, liberty, and property owed under natural law to its nationals, who gave up their natural capacity to act in their own self-preservation to the state.\textsuperscript{342} To discharge this duty, the state was therefore obliged to “punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as it may hinder its violation.”\textsuperscript{343} Failure to engage or conquer threats to those within his protection stripped the sovereign of his entitlement to obedience and fidelity and invalidated this social contract, and thus for Locke “[t]he obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.”\textsuperscript{344} Moreover, should the state neglect its first duty to provide the requisite degree of protection, its government is dissolved and the people regain the natural legal entitlement to establish a new government that will more faithfully discharge its obligation.\textsuperscript{345} In short, protection implied subjection, yet subjection implied protection.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{340} See Bodin, supra note 239, at 500.
\textsuperscript{341} Hobbes, supra note 245, at 227.
\textsuperscript{342} Locke, supra note 245, at 353.
\textsuperscript{343} Id. at 271.
\textsuperscript{344} Id. at 355 (theorizing that because the state is established to protect the community, it is “obliged” to secure the life, liberty, and property of every individual).
\textsuperscript{345} Id. at 367 (“[T]he Community perpetually retains a Supream Power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any Body, even of their Legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the Liberties and Properties of the Subject.”); see also 2 Blackstone, supra note 248, at *233–36 (approving as part of the English common legal heritage the Lockean doctrine that the failure of a sovereign to afford protection terminated the duty of obedience and justified the replacement of the sovereign).
c. Common Law Theories

The "common right and reason" at the core of the natural law, conditionally exchanging protection for allegiance, was conveyed forward through the efforts of prominent Whigs and the rhetoric of colonial politicians, ultimately finding expression in the constituent documents of the several American states as well as of the United States. The generation that affixed their hands to the Declaration of Independence justified violent separation from the United Kingdom by the "opinions of mankind," on the ground that their king had "abdicated Government . . . by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us." The failure of King George III to protect the "unalienable Rights" with which his American subjects had been "endowed by their Creator" violated the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," and not only "entitle[d]" them to "alter or abolish" British rule in North America but imposed upon them a "duty to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security." The Constitution of this new government launched the nation on a natural law course, reflecting its Framers' deep-seated conviction that [it] is an expression of the Higher Law, that it is in fact imperfect man's most perfect rendering of . . . "the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions."

In the judgment of the Framers, that positive law should ever be invoked to interfere with the provision of the protection owed to the people was a proposition utterly inimical to reason and to the

348 See C.H. Van Tyne, Influence of the Clergy, and of Religious and Sectarian Forces, on the American Revolution, 19 Am. Hist. Rev. 44, 49 (1913) ("[G]overnment is a conditional compact between king and people . . . [and] a violation of the covenant by either party discharges the other from obligation.") (quoting Patrick Henry).
349 See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. I, art. X (1780), reprinted in 5 Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions 94 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975) ("[E]ach individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws."); Pa. Const. art. VIII (1776), reprinted in 8 id. at 278 ("[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property . . . ").
350 The Declaration of Independence para. 25 (U.S. 1776).
351 Id. para. 1–2.
352 Corwin, supra note 227, at vi (citation omitted). For a thorough defense of the position that the Constitution is a natural law document, see Randy Barnett, The Imperative of Natural Rights in Today's World 1–8 (forthcoming 2004).
survivability of the fledgling United States. In the words of Thomas Jefferson:

A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.\(^\text{353}\)

That the nascent U.S. government was charged with the moral and legal obligation to defend its citizens and its interests was a largely uncontested proposition throughout the first century of national independence, despite the waxing influence of legal positivism.\(^\text{354}\) Reconstruction era legislative debates sparked declarations to the effect that “the first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens,”\(^\text{355}\) and that “American citizenship would be little worth if it did not carry protection with it.”\(^\text{356}\) At least one contemporary scholar posits that, should the United States cease to afford its nationals protection, this failure would “void the very foundations for its existence.”\(^\text{357}\)

2. The Duty to Defend: Incumbent Upon the Executive Under Natural Law

a. Constitutional Analysis

Investment of primary responsibility for the protective function of government in the executive branch was an uncontroversial incorporation of the English common law doctrine of “conservation of the peace,” which ensured to all law abiding subjects not merely the arrest and prosecution of offenders, but affirmative state action oriented toward the prevention of violence.\(^\text{358}\) At common law, executive branch

\(^{353}\) Letter from Thomas Jefferson, *supra* note 268, at 162.

\(^{354}\) Positivist commentators regarded the state, rather than a divinity or a process of natural reason, as the source of legal entitlements and corresponding state duties of protection. See, e.g., J.K. Bluntschi, *The Theory of the State* 2 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1885) (“[T]he individual requires the state to give him a legal existence: apart from the state he has neither safety or freedom.”).


\(^{356}\) CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).

\(^{357}\) Lacey, *supra* note 187, at 313.

\(^{358}\) See 2 *Blackstone*, *supra* note 248, at *265–70, 349–54 (discussing the “conservation of the peace” doctrine and expressly characterizing its enforcement by executive branch officials as a “duty”); 2 *id.* at *353–54 (observing that, at common law, the
officers who breached or neglected their duty to protect the polity against violence were subject to civil and even criminal sanctions, and in *South v. Maryland*, the Supreme Court held that this "public duty doctrine," although it immunized public officials against civil liability, permitted their criminal prosecution in the event of neglect or breach of their duty to protect the public. More than three decades later in the case of *In re Neagle*, the Court, in determining whether the President was empowered to afford protection to a Supreme Court justice, read the Take Care Clause as having not merely vested a power in the President but rather as having imposed upon him a duty to enforce not merely the "express terms" of acts of Congress and the Constitution, but all the "rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution." Without directly referencing the public duty doctrine or identifying any available sanctions for a breach of presidential duties, and without extending its holding to impose a corresponding duty upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the *Neagle* Court implied that the origin of the presidential duty to protect is to be found in extra-constitutional and decidedly nonpositivist sources.

Power and duty of conservators of the peace included "suppressing riots and affrays, . . . taking securities for the peace, and . . . apprehending and committing felons and other criminals"); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *15 ("[E]very person is also entitled to the preventive arm of the magistrate, as a further protection from threatened or impending danger.").

See 5 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *140 (indicating generally that negligence of public officials was a misdemeanor at common law, and more specifically that conservators of the peace who failed to discharge their duties were subject to criminal prosecution).

59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1856).

Id. at 402–03 (holding, in the case of a conservator of the peace who failed to provide requested protection to a plaintiff against persons who had threatened his life, that criminal, but not civil, liability resulted from breach of a discretionary duty).

In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).

See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment "cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State" to protect life, liberty, or property "against invasion by private actors"). The specific question whether States are duty-bound to protect citizens against "invasion" by foreign "public actors" has never been presented to the Supreme Court, although the Court has held, in dictum, that "[a]s a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). Arguably, because the President is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations," it is to the President alone that citizens must look for the performance of the protective function against external threats. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
of obligation—i.e., the common law, and therefore, ultimately, natural law.\textsuperscript{364}

b. Extra-Constitutional Sources of Obligation

Although the public duty doctrine and additional positive sources expressly impose upon officers in the U.S. armed forces a legally-enforceable duty to exhibit courage and initiative in the defense of the United States against foreign and domestic threats,\textsuperscript{365} no constitutional provision or statutory enactment expressly imposes upon the President a general duty to defend against foreign threats.\textsuperscript{366} Absent

\textsuperscript{364} Subsequent opinions of inferior courts reinforced \textit{Neagle} in holding that the duty of the state to protect arises from extra-constitutional sources, on the ground that the Constitution is "a charter of negative rather than positive liberties." See \textit{Jackson v. City of Joliet}, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).

\textsuperscript{365} The oath of office administered to personnel upon enlistment or commissioning into the U.S. armed forces obligates the enlistee or officer to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." See U.S. Dep't of the Army, Oath of Office—Military Personnel (1999), \textit{available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/eforms/pdf/A71.pdf}. For failure to faithfully and courageously discharge this duty, domestic law imposes penalties as serious as death. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 99, 10 U.S.C. § 899 (2000), provides that:

Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the enemy—(1) runs away; (2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any command, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to defend; (3) through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers the safety of any such command, unit, place, or military property; . . . (5) is guilty of cowardly conduct; . . . (8) willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy; or (9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces belonging to the United States or their allies when engaged in battle; shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

\textit{Id.} Individual commanders are also obligated to undertake necessary measures to protect the forces under their commands as well as "U.S. citizens, their property, [and] U.S. commercial assets." See U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01A: Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces A-5 (2000) ("A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent."); \textit{id.} (defining "hostile act" and "hostile intent" as an attack or threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit "against the United States, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US nationals, their property, [and] US commercial assets").

\textsuperscript{366} Some commentators argue that the Oath of Office implies a constitutional duty to defend. \textit{See, e.g.}, Bobbitt, \textit{supra} note 301, at 1396–97 (arguing that the Oath of Office imposes upon the President the obligation to act in the face of "imminent danger" to protect the United States, its nationals, and its interests, and that the Presi-
any authoritative statutory command obligating presidential action in response to a specific threat, if the President is duty-bound to defend the United States, the source of such a duty must necessarily arise as the logical corollary to the natural rights, and in particular the rights to life and liberty, possessed by U.S. citizens. Accordingly, in charging presidents with the "solemn responsibility" to safeguard the nation and its population against the threat or use of force, scholars, presidents, and sitting heads of state have drawn heavily upon the language and ethos of natural legal theory.

Contractarian theorists hold the state to its bargain, demanding protection of life and liberty from officials specifically entrusted with the duty to defend; just war and Catholic theorists insist not only
that human beings are collectively obligated to protect and defend life "even if it means occasionally using arms," but that state leaders and other "key actors" bear moral obligations to protect and defend the innocent from grave evil. President Truman, in justifying his seizure of steel mills needed to produce war materiel during the Korean War, emphasized that "the President, under the Constitution, must use his powers to safeguard the nation." During the height of the Cold War, President Eisenhower feared that the Soviet threat was so great, the United States "would be forced to consider whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment that we could designate." In ordering the blockade of Cuba in 1962—arguably an act of war—President Kennedy expressed his understanding that had he failed to undertake an act tantamount to preventive war, he would have been impeached for breach of a fundamental duty. Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres considered it his moral duty to his state and its people to "meet [war] under the least dangerous conditions" and therefore, if necessary, to act preventively; current Australian Prime Minister John Howard describes the refusal of any leader to engage in preventive war where necessary to defend his state and its people as the failure of "the most basic test of office." Perhaps the boldest assertion of a presidential duty to defend the United States against external threats issued from President Theodore Roosevelt in his theory of presidential stewardship:

[The President is] bound actively and affirmatively to do all he [can] for the people . . . . [I]t is not only his right but his duty to do

---


371 BUNDY, supra note 118, at 251 (quoting a memorandum to John Foster Dulles, Sept. 1953).

372 See supra note 122.

373 BUNDY, supra note 118, at 394.


anything that the needs of the Nation demanded, unless such ac-
tion [is] forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.  

Again, however, notwithstanding the cogency of the various argu-
ments on behalf of a natural legal obligation requiring the President
to engage in preventive war where necessary to defend the United
States, its nationals, and its interests against threats to life and liberty,
neither the Constitution nor any provision of statutory or common
law imposes any legal sanction for dereliction of this duty. Whether
exigent circumstances have arisen in the realm of international rela-
tions necessitating presidential action is, although a factual question,
entirely left to presidential discretion. Moreover, even if the politi-
cal question doctrine did not render any presidential decision to re-
frain from engaging in preventive war nonjusticiable and thus
immune from judicial review, the President arguably enjoys immu-
nity from criminal prosecution as well as from civil liability for his
official acts and omissions while in office. In sum, the only sanction
to which the President may theoretically expose himself through neg-
lect or breach of his duty to defend is impeachment and removal

377 See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) (holding that "the au-
thority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the Presi-
dent, and . . . his decision is conclusive upon all other persons").
378 As Chief Justice Marshall noted more than two centuries ago in establishing
the constitutional basis for the political question doctrine,
[b]y the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with cer-
tain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character,
and to his own conscience. . . . The subjects are political . . . and being
infrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . .
Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.

379 See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 4-14, at 269 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that "[t]he question must be regarded as an open one"); see also Eric.
M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal
but ultimately rejecting, the view that the President is necessarily immune from crimi-
nal prosecution prior to impeachment).
the President is liable for his "purely private acts," he is cloaked in civil immunity with
respect to acts taken in his "public character").
381 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (providing that the President "shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
from office,382 a remedy inherently political rather than legal in nature.

C. Positivist Critiques of a Presidential Duty to Defend, and Responses to Positivists

For positivists, rights and duties are the "creation of Law, or arise[ ] from the Command of the Sovereign in a given independent society."383 It is axiomatic for positivists that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, . . . whenever that right is invaded."384 In the absence of a positive law creating a right and providing a sanction for the violation of that right, positivism therefore denies the existence of the right.385 Where there is no legally enforceable right, there can be no duty, and thus whatever else can be said of the President in terms of his powers and obligations the notion that he has a duty to defend the United States, its nationals, or its interests is limited to the province of judicial dictum. For positivists, natural law is nothing more than "a brooding omnipresence in the sky"386 and the attempt to identify and enforce such a duty by grafting indeterminate sources of obligation on to a positive legal framework is an exercise anathema to constitutional government.

However, it is not entirely clear that the absence of a legal remedy is to be read into the constitutional silence on the matter in connection with rights recognized therein. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,387 the Supreme Court rejected this argument and held to the contrary that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."388 In other words, the absence of an explicit remedy for the breach of a constitutionally protected right neither negates the existence of that right nor the duty to protect that right. Put slightly differently, the failure of the Framers to expressly provide a positive remedy for the breach of a right inferable from the text and historical subtext of the Constitution is not fatal to a theory of rights and duties that maintains its relative independence from positive law.

382 Id. art. I, § 3 (providing for removal from office upon impeachment).
383 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 61 (Burt Franklin 1970) (1861).
384 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *23.
386 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
388 Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
and claims in its stead a natural law genealogy. Because the presidential obligation to protect the United States, its nationals, and its interests does not arise from the command of a sovereign, the failure of the positive legal order to provide a remedy to parties injured by breach or neglect of this duty is not determinative of whether U.S. citizens bear the right to preventive defense against foreign threats or whether it is nevertheless incumbent upon the President, as the embodiment of the state whose reason for being is the preservation of the life and liberty of its nationals, to engage in preventive war where necessary. Just as the judicial interpretation of the Constitution admits of extra-constitutional sources of presidential power, our understandings of presidential duties must be similarly informed and tolerant of the notion that, although our Constitution is a positive law document the President, as the embodiment of U.S. sovereignty in its international relations, possesses powers and bears duties not entirely tethered to or limited by its provisions. In short, under the constitutional framework establishing a republican form of government, neither presidential powers nor presidential duties can be adequately described or understood in purely formal terms.

D. Conclusions

There should be scant surprise that in practice Presidents have acknowledged and embraced the "great object and duty" with which natural law charged them to defend U.S. "lives, liberty, and property" through "prompt and decided action." Viewed in this light, the Bush Doctrine, notwithstanding its proclamation of the unilateral right to engage in preventive war, is revealed as nothing more than a renewed commitment to the natural law duty to defend, which is at once wholly consistent with the letter and spirit of international law as well as with the object and purpose of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. That a President should interpret his aggregated powers against the backdrop of natural legal history, and with an eye toward the practical exigencies of the struggle against international terrorists armed with WMD, to reach the conclusion that he has not merely the capacity but the solemn obligation to defend the United States, its

389 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (analyzing the locus of sovereignty in a chain from Great Britain to the states to the United States and concluding that "[i]t results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution")
390 Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
391 See supra notes 316–17, 350.
nationals, and its interests would, standing alone, present no question of international law. That a President should assert that the faithful discharge of this duty may require him to engage in preventive war is another matter entirely if one does not accept the argument that preventive war is, under delineated circumstances, consistent with obligations under the U.N. Charter, particularly Article 51, as a permissible exercise of the natural legal right of self-defense. The potential looms large that the United States might engage in a use of force justified by the Bush Doctrine—which unabashedly asserts that the duty to defend encompasses preventive war—that might be challenged as a violation of a conflicting legal duty to refrain from acts of aggression under customary international law as well as under Article 2(4) of the Charter. With the advent of the International Criminal Court, it becomes imperative to develop a mechanism for adjudicating between contending claims derivative of these conflicting duties, lest good-faith measures of self-defense be criminalized to the detriment of global peace and order. The next Part proposes that it is possible and desirable to harmonize the domestic duty to defend as articulated in the Bush Doctrine with the international duty to refrain from acts of aggression.

V. Harmonizing the Bush Doctrine with International Law: A New Categorical Imperative

All that is required for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.

Edmund Burke

The law will never make men free; it is men who have got to make the law free.

Henry David Thoreau

A. Toward International Legal Recognition of a Domestic Duty to Defend

That the Bush Doctrine and the categorical prohibition of aggression under international law must be drawn ineluctably into con-

392 "Harmonization" is a term that refers to the iterative process whereby a common view of law emerges through the ongoing comparison and gradual revision of divergent laws and legal systems until convergence is achieved.

393 This often repeated quotation is popularly attributed to Edmund Burke, however, as discussed in Paul F. Boller, They Never Said It 10–11 (1989), the phrase is of unknown origin.

394 4 Henry David Thoreau, Slavery in Massachusetts, in The Writings of Henry David Thoreau 396 (1968).

395 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
Conflict is by no means preordained. The recent Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Report), which recognizes that sovereignty "implies responsibility . . . for the protection of [the] people [within] the state," offers strong support for the arguments that it is incumbent upon states to protect their nationals not only against domestic threats but from foreign threats as well, and that the Bush Doctrine is simply an expression of the acceptance of this international legal duty. If the Report reflects a reconceptualization of the meaning of sovereignty under international law that takes seriously not merely the powers and rights of states but also their duties, then in future instances where a President perceives a potential existential threat to the United States it need not be inevitable that the Security Council authorize the United States and other member states to intervene forcibly to check rogue states or terrorists, nor need the Security Council, having failed to authorize intervention, characterize the U.S. resort to arms as unlawful.


397 As Posteraro notes in evaluating the Report, international law has, for too long, regarded self-defense as a right of sovereigns rather than a responsibility. But, sovereignty carries with it a responsibility to protect citizens from preventable harm from both within and without state borders. . . . The responsibility of states to prevent mass murder of their citizens is just as imperative against foreign enemies as from homegrown threats. . . . The relationship between individuals and governments that this reconceptualization of sovereignty produces demands that states act decisively to uphold their responsibility to protect their people.

Posteraro, supra note 90, at 201–02. Others scholars have referenced the Report as an excellent distillation of the supreme duty of states to intervene in defense of the right to life, not only of their own citizens, but also of other peoples whose states of nationality have failed, through incapacity or unwillingness, to defend them. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations 12, 17–18 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).

398 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan concedes that the Security Council may need to move far more swiftly to authorize member states to use force against developing threats to their security:

The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual states may use force preemptively against perceived threats. Its members may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats, for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Annan, supra note 18. Where the Security Council authorizes preventive war, any controversy as to its lawfulness is, at the very least, greatly mitigated. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 14, at 563 (arguing that consistency with the resolutions of the Secur-
Although the United Nations has proven a rather unreliable collective security system, its failures are generally attributed not to the structural insufficiencies that bedeviled the League of Nations, but rather to the political nature of the enterprise. It is thus not impossible that the United Nations might in the future shuffle off its dysfunction and engage in the sort of credible and aggressive policing necessary to support multilateral deterrence and the preservation of individual and collective security. In recent years, the United Nations has exhibited greatly reduced deference to the territorial sovereignty of states engaged in genocide and systematic violations of human rights, and whether this incipient tendency towards interventionism might translate into political support for U.S.-led efforts to internalize the costs imposed upon the international system by rogue states and terrorists groups remains to be determined.

B. A Duty to Defend, and a Corresponding Duty Not to Obstruct Self-Defense: General Principles of International Law

In the alternative, the exercise of preventive war under the Bush Doctrine to defend the United States against brewing threats may come to be viewed by relevant actors as a general principle of international law and therefore, by definition, consistent with international legal obligations and deservedly immune from obstruction in the Security Council.

See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of preventive war in self-defense as a general principle of international law).
state practice consistent with a belief that it is lawful to engage in preventive war to defend the state, its nationals, and its interests, the United States might credibly claim that the gates of customary international law must open to admit preventive war into its domain—where intrepid states go in pursuit of policy objectives, international law must follow. In other words, ongoing social processes coexist with and animate the meaning of the U.N. Charter, an instrument which is, just as is the U.S. Constitution, a living, breathing document intentionally designed by its framers with sufficient malleability to adapt to and resolve previously unforeseen threats to peace and secu-

the characterization offered by the Commission of “illegal, yet legitimate.” Id. at 186. Closure of the “legality/legitimacy gap” by securing a commitment to this principle would potentially prevent the erosion of U.N. credibility in cases of future threats to peace and security, including those that might otherwise give rise to unilateral U.S. interventions that some commentators, focusing on the absence of U.N. authorization rather than upon the nature of the threat, might characterize as illegal. See Falk, supra note 16, at 591 (proposing adoption of the recommendation of the Kosovo Commission as a strategic move to buttress the authority of the United Nations and the legitimacy of future U.S. actions).

402 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 28 (Feb. 20) (restating the elements of customary international law as practice coupled with opinio juris, and indicating that no specific minimum time period is required to establish the requisite degree of practice); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 cmt. c (1987) (indicating that international law can be constituted solely by state practice followed as a matter of legal obligation).

403 See Romano, supra note 71, at 1056 (making the narrower claim that, even if anticipatory self-defense is not presently lawful under international law, contemporary state declarations in favor of the doctrine as customary law may “possibly lay the foundation for its proper invocation in the future”); see also Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force 38–39 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) (noting that the question whether the customary international law of self-defense survived the adoption of the Charter remains a source of debate). The same process would arguably be available to states asserting a right to preventive war or to other aspects of state practice inconsistent with the Charter. See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 45–46 (1990) (contending that the Charter cannot be interpreted as an authoritative statement of the international law on the use of force because state practice reveals a contrary understanding); W. Michael Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in 78 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 74, 75 (1984) (same). That state interests should be “an integral part of that decision making process which we call international law” is unobjectionable to the extent that one accepts that in the absence of a sovereign, lawmaking and enforcement are essentially political endeavors. Roberts, supra note 7, at 516 (citing Rosalyn Higgins, Integration of Authority and Control: Trends in the Literature of International Law and Relations, in Towards World Order and Human Dignity (Burns Weston & Michael Reisman eds., 1976)). For a discussion whether the customary international law regarding the use of force survived adoption of the Charter, see supra Part I.A.
ity. If, as the Report intimates, the authority of the Charter is a function of the degree to which it does not impede collective action even where there is normative controversy over a bedrock legal principle, then, in the face of what generally law abiding states in good faith deem threats to their security, it behooves unaffected member states to abstain from actions that might hamper an interpretation of the Charter that would harmonize that document with the complementary sources of law invoked by states seeking authorization for the use of force. There is support in the travaux préparatoires for the

404 A state's determination that it was obligated to resort to anticipatory self-defense or other measures of prevention is generally "accord[ed] great and perhaps conclusive weight, even if later events proved that judgment mistaken." 19 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 34, at 422 (statement of Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson). Although the international law governing the resort to force is manipulable by states bent on sheltering their actions from charges of unlawful aggression, the duty of good faith is a general principle of international law incumbent upon all states at all times. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (enumerating general principles of international law and describing their application as sources of international law). Although heads of state may not be repositories of perfect political wisdom and judgment, there is an important distinction between legitimate differences in opinion as to the nature and severity of a particular threat on the one hand, and deliberate attempts to exploit ambiguity to serve interests other than self-defense on the other, which international law can and must preserve and accommodate. One of the primary challenges for international law and institutions in the coming years will be the development of more consistent and well reasoned rules and procedures to differentiate between good-faith judgments and malicious claims when evaluating rights and responsibilities regarding the use of force in international relations. The most difficult aspect of this task will likely be constructing mechanisms for the sharing of sensitive intelligence between states, a function necessary for the establishment of the factual predicate underlying lawful exercises of force in anticipation of threats. Several scholars suggest that this function can presently be performed by the Security Council, the ICJ, or "various international bodies and public opinion." Roberts, supra note 7, at 516; see also Franck, supra note 39, at 14-19 (describing the evaluation of the factual predicate underlying a request for authorization of anticipatory self-defense or prevention as an international "jurying function"). There is reason to doubt whether these fora are sufficiently protective of information so as to allay the concern of intelligence-rich states.

405 See Kosovo Report, supra note 401, at 186 (pointing out that "recourse to force [by NATO or concerned states] without proper UN authorization tends to weaken the authority of, and respect for, the United Nations, especially the UNSC, in the domain of international peace and security," and that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibility to protect in humanitarian crises may lead individual states to such resort to "illegal, yet legitimate" force). For over two decades, scholars have pegged the legitimacy of the United Nations to its willingness and capacity to intervene to restore peace and security in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights and serious threats to state survival. See, e.g., Polebaum, supra note 82, at 228 (concluding that when it fails to authorize state actions vital to the prevention of grave harm to state survival and to its nationals, international law is
assertion that the framers conceived the Charter in precisely this flexible and functionalist spirit:

[...] instead of trying to govern the actions of the members and the organs of the United Nations by precise and intricate codes of procedure, we have preferred to lay down purposes and principles under which they are to act. And by that means, we hope to insure that they act in conformity with the express desires of the nations assembled here, while, at the same time, we give them freedom to accommodate their actions to circumstances which today no man can foresee.

We all want our Organization to have life. . . . We want it to be free to deal with all the situations that may arise in international relations. We do not want to lay down rules which may, in the future, be the signpost for the guilty and a trap for the innocent.  

C. The Moral Obligation to Authorize Preventive War in the Age of Terror

Although he has withheld his blessing from what some are calling a "post-Charter self-help paradigm," U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in registering his preference that the rules of international law be made more responsive to contemporary problems in international relations without compromising the textual and normative constraints imposed by the Charter on the use of force, seems to have invested, however tacitly, his considerable social capital in each of these proposals. The notion that the black letter of the Charter should be the subject of evolutionary processes that conform law to practice as well as practice to law, and that law serves a functional role in the mainte-

revealed as an impotent and counterproductive instrument); W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 6 (1973) (warning that “insistence on non-violence and deference to all established institutions in a global system with many injustices can be tantamount to confirmation and reinforcement of those injustices,” and that for international law to refuse to recognize that the use of force is permissible in defense of state survival would have delegitimizing effects); Zedalis, supra note 48, at 98 (doubting whether laws governing the use of force that compel certain behavior in the face of longstanding contrary practice can be described as legitimate). For a more general discussion of the relationship between law and legitimacy in the context of collective action problems, see W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004).


407 Arend & Beck, supra note 56, at 178.

nance of systemic order, is for pragmatists a matter of "moral necessity"\(^409\) and one to which even restrictivists subscribe.\(^410\) Functionalist jurisprudences maintain that the relevance of law requires that it be construed in the context in which it is to be applied, and much ink has been spilled in recent years urging that, in light of the dramatic transformations in threats and capabilities wrought by terrorist groups and rogue states, international law must be adapted if it is to remain suitable to its teleological purpose: the maintenance of international peace.\(^411\)

For several eminent scholars, the international legal justifications for the use of force captured by the U.N. Charter bear the stamp of a historical era marked by "fascist dictators, dueling superpowers, and . . . warring bands of militiamen on a colonial frontier," and because these anachronistic doctrines are simply an inadequate defense against lawless predators such as WMD armed terrorists, existing international law must be revisited and reengineered.\(^412\) In short, the Charter need not and should not be an "obstacle to doing what needs to be done."\(^413\) and a half-century of experience teaches that it is sufficiently flexible to withstand reinterpretation where necessary to suit fundamentally changed circumstances. Responsibility thus falls squarely upon the present generation to draw legitimacy and legality—concepts inherently related but gradually drifting apart—into a closer relationship.\(^414\)

\(^409\) Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 578; see also id. at 584 ("The United Nations Charter is appropriately read, even now, as an attempt to overcome the failures of Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations and its covenant of inaction. . . . This should inform the reading of [the Charter].").

\(^410\) See Franck, supra note 39, at 11 (describing the text of the Charter as having "become more tensile, evolving in accordance with functional criteria and procedures in response to new and unforeseen circumstances").

\(^411\) See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 67, at 1 ("Inevitably, international law responds to, and is shaped by, the political and economic forces that dominate the system."); Franck, supra note 39, at 8 ("[T]he meaning of the Charter does evolve as it is applied to practical situations."); Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 577 (explaining that "[p]rocedural dynamism is an underlying feature of the Charter—a willingness, sometimes after lamentation and sometimes quietly, to allow alternative methods of decision making")

\(^412\) Posteraro, supra note 90, at 200; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Fork in the Road, ASIL Newsletter, Sept./Oct. 2003, at 4 (calling on U.N. member states to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the rules of international law and to undertake a "collective compromise" that results in their revision in light of lessons learned with the recent intervention in Iraq).

\(^413\) Franck, supra note 39, at 18.

\(^414\) See Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 581 (suggesting that the reconnection of international law and legitimacy may require consideration, on a case-by-case basis, of
If one accepts the assertion that the Charter itself presents no impediment to the defeat of WMD armed international terrorists, one must conclude, by the same process of logic, that preventive war, if justifiable on nonpositivist legal grounds as essential to victory over these malignant foes, need not threaten the Charter. Proceeding further down this neofunctionalist and utilitarian path, some scholars champion preventive war as a "law-enforcing" doctrine in a world without an executive able and willing to enforce law and order and in which threats abound. Although some scholars might criticize the foregoing as an unduly consequentialist approach that trivializes the rule of law, when a terrorist group or rogue state armed with WMD threatens to wreak death and destruction upon millions of innocents, a preventive war precisely tailored toward the elimination of terrorist infrastructures and their weapons, although it may cause the unintended deaths of innocent civilians in the proximity of legitimate targets, may be likely, and even virtually certain, to produce outcomes significantly more preservative of human life and thus manifestly preferable to all other alternatives.

In other words, although preventive war may always catalyze political controversy, in no small measure by virtue of the fact that judgments concerning the immediacy of anticipated aggression require speculation and are prone to distortions by motivated biases, its legitimacy should not be determined solely or even primarily by way of a crabbed reading of the text of the U.N. Charter, but rather by evaluating whether the use of force tends toward the reinforcement of "the basic and enduring values of contemporary world public order and

---

415 Utilitarianism is the philosophical school that judges the moral virtues of human action almost exclusively in light of its consequences. See Bentham, supra note 385, at 11 (describing utilitarianism as a consequentialist moral and legal theory).


417 See Sapiro, supra note 16, at 603–04 (querying whether Iraq was “a case where the ends justify the means, irrespective of legality”).

human dignity."419 As with all treaty-based undertakings, the U.N. enterprise, although infused with politics, rests upon a legal quid pro quo: if states are bound to a solemn duty of prudence restraining them from injudicious or malicious exercises of the sovereign prerogative to use force contrary to law and to justice, the Security Council must, in the face of threats to peace or other fundamental and universal values, accept and adhere to a corresponding duty to either carry out its contractual responsibilities and authorize collective intervention or, failing that, absolve states of legal and moral opprobrium when they resort to self-help.420


The question of state responsibilities in the event that the Security Council fails to grant the requested authorization, while doing little to quell the impression that subsequent acts of self-defense against the alleged threat would lack the requisite quantum of legal legitimacy, is precisely the issue presented in the case of Iraq in March 2003. Although states generally tailor their conduct to conform to

419 Reisman, supra note 56, at 285. Reisman elaborates this test, explaining that for consequentialists

[t]he critical question, in a decentralized international security system such as ours, is not whether coercion has been applied but whether it has been applied in support of or against community order and basic policies, and whether it has been applied in ways whose net consequences include increased congruence with community goals and minimum order.

Id. at 234.

420 At least one scholar argues that the Security Council is bound, just as are member states, by a duty of good faith and is therefore obliged to grant authorization for the use of force to requesting member states save where no credible argument can be made in support of the request. See Elias Davidsson, The U.N. Security Council’s Obligations of Good Faith, 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 541 (2003). That the Security Council might one day fail to discharge its responsibilities in good faith or to otherwise fail in its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security was very much within the contemplation of its framers, who “proposed ‘an independent body of eminent men . . . known for their integrity . . . who should be available to pronounce [on] a decision of the Security Council . . . solely from the point of view of whether [it] is in keeping with . . . moral principles.’” Franck, supra note 39, at 9 (quoting Suggestions Presented by the Netherlands Government Concerning the Proposals for the Maintenance of Peace and Security Agreed on at the Four Power Conference of Dumbarton Oaks as Published on Oct. 9, 1945, at 313). However, no such supervisory organ was created, and thus formal oversight of the Security Council is unavailable. Id. Thus, where states take exception to an act or omission of the Security Council, their most effective recourse may well be to resort to self-help.
principles of international law, where they perceive, rightly or wrongly, an emergent threat to their survival or their vital interests their propensity is to react without regard to legal ramifications or the potential for condemnation by the international community. Scrupulous adherence to the restraints indirectly imposed by a sclerotic Security Council might well be tantamount to national suicide, a pact into which states are understandably loathe venture. A commitment to self-preservation trumps all other obligations; in the words of former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "[t]he survival of states is not a matter of law." Should the Security Council—a quintessentially political organism despite its legal mandate—passively default upon its responsibilities for collective security in the face of danger, states may conclude that they are released from their obligations under the Charter and are free to act beyond the purview of a U.N. system slouching towards irrelevance. If so, the resulting standard of review for acts of preemption and prevention may devolve still further from the objective and impartial ideal laid down at Nuremberg. In the place of the current pluralistic political process

421 The famous aphorism penned by Louis Henkin reminds us that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." Henkin, supra note 43, at 47.

422 See supra Part I.D.6 (analyzing state practice); see also Maxson, supra note 88, at 61 ("As a practical matter, each party—the Security Council and the defending state—must make its own determination of the effectiveness of the UN measures. Should the individual state reach a conclusion different from the Security Council, it will continue its military response as it deems appropriate."); Zedalis, supra note 48, at 114–15 (stating that in circumstances of grave danger "the only significant restraint on the use of preemptive force is the possibility that it might not succeed . . . no matter how the international community views anticipatory force").

423 Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson (Apr. 25, 1963), in 57 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 13, 14 (1963) (discussing the Cuban Quarantine). Others have analogized to the example of living organisms to conclude that the instinct of states to self-preservation is far more powerful than the compliance pull of the laws governing the resort to force. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 43, at 143–44 (recognizing that preventive uses of force against an attack that threatens to extinguish the state or devastate its population is in all likelihood beyond the realm of law); 1 O’Connell, supra note 25, at 339 (stating that the instinct of self-preservation is so strong that “if the law is ineffective the primordial right of self-defence must reassert itself”).

424 See Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments on the “Quarantine” of Cuba, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 592, 597 (1963) (reminding critics of anticipatory self-defense that states denied authorization to use force in self-defense will be forced to act “either outside or above the law”).

425 The Nuremburg Tribunal, while recognizing the entitlement to anticipatory self-defense, reserved for the international community of states, sitting ostensibly as an impartial jury and applying objective standards, the right to determine the legal legitimacy of a particular exercise of the doctrine; as a general principle of interna-
ripe for abuse—yet nonetheless garbed, however loosely, in the language and trappings of law—states will substitute a baldly auto-interpreting regime where each resort to force is judged in the first and last instance by none other than its author.426

Worse still is the sobering prospect that the Security Council will revert to a paralytic condition akin to that which prevailed during the Cold War, wherein permanent members actively veto requests for authorization despite objective evidence that rogue states or terrorists are scheming to inflict grievous harm on member states.427 Based upon highly credible yet very sensitive intelligence from well placed human agents, the United States may determine that the gathering

---

19 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 34, at 461-62.

426 The power of states to self-determine their compliance with the international law governing the use of force—an unattractive facet of sovereignty, particularly when abused—is a persistent feature of the international system. See Franck, supra note 56, at 818 (“Unfortunately, there is nothing in the U.N. Charter or in the machinery of the international system which limits the nation’s right to determine for itself when an act of aggression has occurred . . .”). Although it is generally held in reserve and used sparingly, the self-determination of compliance is likely to rush into the adjudicatory vacuum left by a disengaged or unresponsive Security Council.

427 Some commentators have argued that the Security Council never succeeded in transporting states out of the relative state of nature in which they had existed prior to the formation of the U.N. framework. See, e.g., Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defense in U.N. Practice, in The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 32 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) (“But whatever the official pretence, and perhaps the legal situation, the international community is in fact back where it was before 1945: in the state of nature . . .”). Others simply opine that a narrow window of opportunity in which to engineer a more law-governed and peaceful pattern of international relations that opened with the fall of the Berlin Wall has been closed by the failure of the Council to impose sanctions upon lawbreakers and that as a consequence the Charter is nearly defunct. See Ramsey, supra note 399, at 1556-61; Michael J. Glennon, Editorial, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37.
threat posed by the government of North Korea, a criminally irresponsible regime that deliberately and unabashedly violates its international obligations by actively pursuing acquisition of WMD\textsuperscript{428} and openly supporting terrorist groups in their quest for nuclear weapons,\textsuperscript{429} has surpassed a tolerable threshold and can no longer be abided.\textsuperscript{430} Should a vote in the Security Council be defeated by a Chinese veto and the United States be expressly denied authorization under Article 42 to forcibly reduce the North Korean threat, the United States would face the stark choice between potentially fatal inaction or intervention sure to be condemned by a host of states as criminal aggression in violation of Article 2(4). Under this set of circumstances two ostensibly conflicting duties would seem to bracket the range of options available to U.S. decisionmakers: while the U.N. Charter, a treaty of the United States, imposes a duty under international and domestic law to refrain from the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence”\textsuperscript{431} of North Korea, nat-

\textsuperscript{428} In 1994, North Korea entered into a treaty with the United States pledging not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with the development of peaceful nuclear power. See Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula, Oct. 21, 1994, U.S.-N. Korea, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 603 (1995).

\textsuperscript{429} In early 2003, North Korea admitted that it had deliberately breached its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its 1994 treaty with the United States and shortly thereafter announced that it possessed two nuclear devices for sale to any bidder. See Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2003, at A1.

\textsuperscript{430} Iran, another member of the so-called Axis of Evil, represents another potential near-term application of the Bush Doctrine in justification of preventive war. See Karl Vick, Iranian Hard-Liners Wary of Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at A28 (chronicling the steadily growing Iranian threat and reporting Bush Administration claims of a connection between Iran and proliferation of WMD to terrorists).

\textsuperscript{431} See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Because of the dualist nature of the U.S. legal system, the analysis of U.S. legal obligations under domestic law arising from membership in the U.N. Charter is more complex than is a similar analysis of international legal obligations. See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropriation Disputes in the Face of Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. REV. 35, 116 (2003) (contrasting monist and dualist approaches to incorporation of international law in domestic legal systems). The U.N. Charter is a treaty of the United States, and thus part of domestic law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (providing that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”). However, under U.S. domestic law the Charter, as a treaty, is subject to principles of construction in U.S. jurisprudence. Thus, as between the Charter or a Security Council resolution passed thereunder on the one hand, and a later congressional enactment or a controlling statement of the legislative or executive branches as to
ural law directs the President and his delegates to defend the United States, its nationals, and its interests by whatever means necessary.432

Viewed from the natural legal perspective, there need be no antinomy between a natural legal duty to defend and an obligation, however absolute, under the positive law of the U.N. Charter. The central tenet of natural legal jurisprudence is the commitment to the principle that all law is subordinate to divine inspiration and human reason, and therefore positive law can only be considered legally binding to the extent that it reinforces natural law—the superior expression of rationality in relation to which all other sources of law are subordinate.433 As any interpretation of the Charter that would obstruct or prevent the discharge of a natural legal duty carries no legal force, either such an interpretation is to be avoided if at all possible434 or the Charter must be reconceived as a limited expression of the rights and duties of states, confined in its application to those circumstances that do not implicate state survival or the defense of vital inter-

customary international law on the other, the “last in time” rule provides that the federal statute or interpretation will prevail if there is a clear conflict. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708-14 (1900) (noting that a controlling statement of the executive or legislative branches overrides customary international law or treaty obligation); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing conflict with a Security Council resolution). Although there is a presumption against invalidation of treaty obligations by later federal legislation or executive practice, Congress and the President are empowered under the dualist U.S. legal system to abrogate treaties and interpret or violate customary international law. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708-14. If the President should interpret his natural legal duty to require violation of the Charter or a Security Council resolution passed under the authority of the Charter, or if Congress should direct him to execute a law under his powers granted in the Take Care Clause, the President would, as a matter of U.S. law, have the clear authority to act in a manner inconsistent with the Charter or the resolution even if to do so would arguably violate international law. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115(1) (1987).

432 See supra Part IV.
433 See supra Part III.A.
434 Although under the dualist system of U.S. law a combination of limiting doctrines (e.g., the “last in time” rule and the presumption against the self-execution of treaties) suggest that international law does not automatically trump domestic obligations, international law is part of the law of the United States, and an important canon of statutory interpretation provides that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate [international law] if any other possible construction remains . . . .” Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). An analogous principle of international law would require adjudicative bodies to resist the impulse to find a conflict between a domestic law or duty and an international legal obligation and to attempt to harmonize the two.
ests against existential threats, and overridden by the transcendent duties imposed by natural law.

Much of the international legal academy may deem it a heretical capitulation to power, violative of law’s majesty, to suggest that the latter canon of construction be applied to legitimize preventive war.\textsuperscript{435} Moreover, that an individual state in a conundrum created by the clash of conflicting duties should be permitted to self-judge whether the Charter applies to its intended use of force as a means to relieve legal pressure will strike many commentators as an abject abandonment of law altogether. Under orthodox positivist precepts, conflicts between international and domestic obligations are to be resolved in favor of the international legal duty,\textsuperscript{436} and many moral philosophers contend that where duties conflict prioritization is to be accorded to negative duties over positive duties\textsuperscript{437}—i.e., the duty to refrain from the use of force in contravention of the Charter framework, a negative duty, trumps the duty to use force to defend the state, a positive duty.

Nevertheless, if the Security Council, by a negative authorization vote, returns a state to the state of nature—forcing it to select either pious resignation to its own devastation as an affirmative duty, or unilateral measures consistent with a positive duty under natural law, however much at odds with a restrictivist interpretation of the Charter—the inevitable election of self-help cannot seriously be labeled a

\textsuperscript{435} See Beres, \textit{supra} note 227, at 37 (cautioning that “it is probably unreasonable to claim that we have returned to the classical/medieval idea of natural law’s preeminence over all human institutions”).

\textsuperscript{436} See United States v. von Leeb, 11 \textbf{TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10}, at 462, 508 (1950) [hereinafter \textit{TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10}] (“International common law must be superior to and, where it conflicts with, take precedence over national law or directives issued by any national governmental authority.”). Conflicts between the domestic laws of states are generally resolved in favor of the territorial principle of jurisdiction. \textit{See Council of Eur., Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction} (1990), \textit{reprinted in 3 Crim. L.F.} 441, 463–68 (1992) (advocating the principle of territorial primacy in conflicts between domestic laws of multiple jurisdictions). However, in conflicts between a domestic law and international law, positivism privileges the international obligation. \textit{See von Leeb, 11 \textit{TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10}, supra, at 508}.

\textsuperscript{437} For Kant, the preferred means whereby to determine which of two conflicting duties deserved priority was the preference of the negative to the positive. \textit{See Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory} 73–74 (1989) (“Negative and strict duties as a rule thus carry more weight than positive duties . . . .”). Many modern scholars accord Kant’s solution considerable deference in their own work. \textit{See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments}, 72 \textit{Fordham L. Rev.} 93, 159–60 (2003) (describing contemporary formulations of the problem of conflicting duties).
DUTY TO DEFEND THEM

voluntary act. Furthermore, under natural law each state is not merely authorized to independently deduce those principles of right reason that govern behavior and to position duties in a relative hierarchy; rather, it is obliged to do so, and the duty to defend is the ultimate responsibility of the state. Although under Articles 24 and 25 U.N. member states accept the primacy of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security, any interpretation of the bare fact of their membership as a standing writ to suspend their natural rights to self-defense and strip their nationals of their entitlement to protection in the event of Security Council refusal to ratify a particular use of force is inconsistent with the natural legal principle that no individual or state may undertake to renounce self-defense or to perform any other act destructive or pernicious to survival. States' accession to membership was not purchased at the price of the renunciation of the right to self-defense or the entitlement of individuals to protection, by preventive war if necessary, and no state would have struck such a bargain if offered. In sum, positive duties follow upon the "monopolization of a particular path of relief" as a matter

438 Cicero, supra note 236, at 23 (describing natural law as self-interpreting).
439 In contrast to positivism's subordination of individuals and states to the binding force of written law, natural law considers that individuals and states are "mechanisms programmed to resist the immediate evils of death and bodily debilitation." Hobbes, supra note 245, at xiv. Thus "[a] covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void." Id. Accordingly, a treaty that requires a state to subordinate its security and survival is, if no other interpretation is possible, "null, and not at all obligatory, as no conductor of a nation has the power to enter into engagements to do such things as are capable of destroying the state." Vattel, supra note 247, at 195; see also id. at 198:
If the assistance and offices that are due by virtue of such a treaty should on any occasion prove incompatible with the duties a nation owes to herself ... the case is tacitly and necessarily excepted in the treaty. Neither the nation nor the sovereign could enter into an engagement to neglect the care of their own safety ... .
440 Contractarians analyzing the individual right to self-defense under domestic law reach the conclusion that, unless the protection enjoyed by individuals under the social contract is greater than that in the state of nature, the social contract cannot abate the individual right to self-defense. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 109, 122-23 (1987).
441 Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Theories of positive rights duties have not acquired much purchase upon Western legal systems, due to the influence of positivism. Yet the proposition that in exchange for the grant of authority a sovereign incurs positive duties to its subjects to provide for basic necessities, including protection, has clear foundations in natural law and has been cited favorably in the supreme courts of several states as well as in a number of international instruments. See, e.g., International Covenant on Eco-
of international law, and if the Security Council—the organ primarily responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security—fails in its duty to defend against threatened violence, even the most restrictive positivists cannot in good conscience strenuously object to the proposition that in such cases "the law of nature" makes the individual state its "own protector." 442

E. Heightening the Stakes: The International Criminal Court and the Prospect for Criminalization of Political Differences over Preventive War

Whatever one makes of the foregoing analysis, if it were not for the possibility that the recently created International Criminal Court (ICC) 443 might enter the fray and criminalize a future exercise of preventive war as an unlawful act of aggression, the controversy over the lawfulness of the use of force in the absence of Security Council authorization would become little more than the stuff of contentious

442 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *30. The principle that the absence of an effective international sovereign precludes derogation from the natural right of states to self-determine their legal obligations with regard to the use of force, just as individuals are wont to do in the state of nature, is central to the argument dating at least to the Enlightenment that the failure of international institutions to approximate effective enforcement releases states from any contractual obligations they assume to refrain from the use of force in self-defense.

The independent societies of men, called States, acknowledge no common arbiter or judge, except such as are constituted by special compact. The law by which they are governed, or profess to be governed, is deficient in those positive sanctions which are annexed to the municipal code of each distinct society. Every State has therefore a right to resort to force, as the only means of redress for injuries inflicted upon it by others, in the same manner as individuals would be entitled to that remedy were they not subject to the laws of civil society. Each State is also entitled to judge for itself, what are the nature and extent of the injuries which will justify such a means of redress. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 290 (George Grafton Wilson ed., Hein 1995) (1866).

political debates in international institutional contexts and eventual fodder for the engine of academe. However, it is not inconceivable that the eventual exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of "aggression" as it comes to be defined could result in an attempt to hale U.S. personnel—civilian and military—who execute the Bush Doctrine to the Hague to answer criminal charges, on the theory that preventive war is a per se violation of an international legal prohibition on aggressive war. Where one duty commands conduct prohibited on pain of criminal sanction by a second duty with which it is inextricably in conflict, the domestic courts of the United States are instructed to "proceed with greater precision" lest they subject to the rigor of criminal punishment an individual lacking any viable legal alternative but to violate one of two duties. In United States v. Kirby, the Supreme Court reviewed the claim of a state official who halted a steamboat to detain a federal mail carrier on a murder war-

444 See Sapiro, supra note 16, at 606 (reminding that state practice over the past half-century teaches that "as a practical matter, a state always has the option of using forceful measures to protect what it deems to be vital interests, and then face the consequences if world opinion disagrees").

445 A long quasi-legislative history precedes attempts to define the crime of "aggression" at international law. See Jonathan A. Bush, "The Supreme . . . Crime" and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2324 (2002) (chronicling this history); see also Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286 (defining "crimes against peace" as including "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements, or assurances"). Although the crime of aggression was included within ICC jurisdiction, the negotiating parties could not agree upon a definition. See Christopher M. van de Kieft, Note, Uncertain Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 2325, 2362 (2002) (describing various proposed definitions of aggression giving rise to individual criminal liability as including an option that would require, as a condition precedent, a determination of state responsibility for an unlawful war; a second option limiting individual liability to those ordering the aggressive acts; and a third identical to the first with the exception that peacekeeping operations were exempted). As a result, the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over aggression until the States Parties agree, by a seven-eighths majority, to a definition and to any conditions precedent; and in no event will this occur prior to seven years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 443, art. 5(1)(d), 37 I.L.M. at 1004 (granting the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression); id. art. 5(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1004 (providing that the ICC "shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the [ICC] shall exercise jurisdiction"); id. arts. 121, 123, 37 I.L.M. at 1067, 1068 (providing rules and procedures for voting amendments to the ICC).

447 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869).
rant but was subsequently convicted for violation of a federal statute prohibiting "obstructing or retarding the passage of the [U.S.] mail." Kirby provides guidance to courts reviewing the acts of individuals caught in the vise between conflicting duties:

All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.449

Whether the ICC would labor to provide the "sensible construction" to the definition of aggression that would be necessary to preclude the attachment of criminal liability to the acts of U.S. civilian and military personnel who plan and execute a preventive war against WMD armed terrorists or their rogue state sponsors is unclear. Even if the unauthorized resort to preventive war is preceded by gross malfeasance in the Security Council and justified by the President of the United States as the discharge of his natural legal duty, the ICC may well adhere to the principle established at Nuremburg that "[a] directive to violate international criminal . . . law is . . . void and can afford no protection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a directive"450 in reaching the decision to charge and prosecute the entire chain of command, stretching from the most junior enlisted personnel through the ranks and ultimately to the President of the United States.451

Putting aside the practical questions whether the United

448 Id. at 482.
449 Id. at 486-87.
450 United States v. von Leeb, 11 TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, supra note 436, at 508.
451 It is also possible that, rather than criminalize the Bush Doctrine, the ICC might adhere to the position that where failure to act—even if commanded by a legal duty—would result in the forfeiture of life "for no benefit to anyone and no effect whatsoever apart from setting a heroic example for mankind," the law cannot force an individual into inactivity. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case IT-96-22-T, Trial Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber 1996) (Cassese, J., dissenting). Law cannot command suicide, as the criminalization of the Bush Doctrine might be construed to require of the U.S. President and, derivatively, of the U.S. population. As Judge Antonio Cassese noted further in his dissent, "[l]aw is based on what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal behaviour falling below those standards." Id. ¶ 47 (Cassese, J., dissenting). However, despite the inherent logic of the Cassese dissent, the majority opinion suggests that national suicide is precisely what would be expected of the United States under circumstances where failure to act could threaten national existence. Whether the ICC would follow this line of "reasoning" is unknown.
States would ever cooperate with the ICC, and how the ICC would ever acquire custody of U.S. personnel in the absence of such cooperation, the prospect that the ICC might one day sit in judgment on the legality of the Bush Doctrine dramatically heightens the salience of theoretical partitions that pit restrictivists against pragmatists and leave positivists and naturalists quarreling over the most fundamental issue within the field of international law: May a state scorned by the machinery of the U.N. framework lawfully resort to unilateral forcible measures to defend against a threat that it believes, in good faith, poses or will eventually pose an existential threat to its survival or to the lives and well being of its nationals? Even if the ICC is never tasked to adjudicate the criminal liability of the President of the United States or of senior civilian officials within the politico-military chain of command, the omnipresent possibility that the Bush Doctrine might one day intersect with the agenda of the ICC introduces additional uncertainty into the decisional calculus of the United States and other states, for whom the question of the lawfulness of preventive war registers as perhaps the most critical foreign policy issue. Without a formal paradigmatic transformation of international law, the lawfulness of preventive war under the U.N. Charter will remain an open and hotly contested question. Accordingly, proponents of the Bush Doctrine—predicated upon the theory that principles of natural law predating the modern international system impose upon the state and its officials a nonderogable duty to prevent grievous harm to its people and their interests and that, where in conflict, international law must be harmonized to support that duty—would be well advised to develop a strategy, in advance of a future crisis, to "make the world safe" for preventive war, as well as for U.S. personnel.

452 The so-called "Hague Invasion Clause" of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act commands the President to use "all means necessary," including military force, to rescue any U.S. national who falls into the custody of the ICC. American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), Pub. L. No. 107-206, tit. II, 116 Stat. 899 (2002). ASPA was designed to protect U.S. military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the United States "from the risk of prosecution by the [ICC]." To that end, ASPA prohibits all agencies and entities of the United States, or of any state or local government, from cooperating with the ICC. Id. § 7423(e). The notion that the ICC or any other institution, organization, or state might successfully defeat an effort by the U.S. military to prevent the capture or liberation of U.S. personnel, and in particular the President, from its custody, is, at best, fanciful.

453 President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the Great War in 1917 on the slogan that the purpose of U.S. intervention was to defeat the imperial powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and to "make the world safe for democracy." See Joseph S. Nye, Scenarios for Making the World Safe: Middle East Futures, CHRISTIAN SCI.
F. Resolving the Tensions between Positivism and Naturalism: Proposals for Amendment of the U.N. Charter

The first plank of a proactive U.S. legal strategy in defense of preventive war might well be a proposal for an amendment to the U.N. Charter. Some scholars counsel that the Charter is presently amenable to the resort to preemptive measures under circumstances of an imminent threat, and that if further flexibility is necessary to shelter the authors of preventive war it will evolve “through the persistent and principled practice of its principle organs.” Yet most commentators who caution against amendment reposit great faith in the formal institutions of the Charter framework, though recent practice, particularly in the Security Council, casts doubt upon whether such trust is well placed. Article 51 has become the focus of proposals suggesting amendments that would add explicit language recognizing that the nebulous yet deadly threat posed by terrorists, and in particular those armed with WMD, is sufficiently imminent to confer, without the requirement for any action by the Security Council, preauthora-


F. Resolving the Tensions between Positivism and Naturalism: Proposals for Amendment of the U.N. Charter

The first plank of a proactive U.S. legal strategy in defense of preventive war might well be a proposal for an amendment to the U.N. Charter. Some scholars counsel that the Charter is presently amenable to the resort to preemptive measures under circumstances of an imminent threat, and that if further flexibility is necessary to shelter the authors of preventive war it will evolve “through the persistent and principled practice of its principle organs.” Yet most commentators who caution against amendment reposit great faith in the formal institutions of the Charter framework, though recent practice, particularly in the Security Council, casts doubt upon whether such trust is well placed. Article 51 has become the focus of proposals suggesting amendments that would add explicit language recognizing that the nebulous yet deadly threat posed by terrorists, and in particular those armed with WMD, is sufficiently imminent to confer, without the requirement for any action by the Security Council, preauthora-


456 Anne-Marie Slaughter proposes a U.N. Security Council that recognizes that the following set of conditions would constitute a threat to the peace sufficient to justify the use of force: 1) possession of weapons of mass destruction or clear and convincing evidence of attempts to gain such weapons; 2) grave and systematic human rights abuses sufficient to demonstrate the absence of any internal constraints on government behavior; and 3) evidence of aggressive intent with regard to other nations.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Chance to Reshape the U.N., WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at B7. However, while such a resolution might make other states feel “stronger and safer,” a lack of confidence—that the Security Council could be relied upon to act in good faith and not obstruct preemptive and preventive applications of force—calls into question whether a mere resolution would yield the transformative effects necessary to harmonize the Bush Doctrine with international law.

457 See Koh, supra note 74, at 1519 (criticizing the member states of the Security Council for their “obstinacy” and “fecklessness” in the months before the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003, and stating that “all deserve a good share of the blame” for the failure to authorize intervention and for the “future weakening” of the Council).
tion for the use of force. With a proposal that would far more narrowly circumscribe the competence of the Security Council in regard to the resort to force, at least one scholar suggests the replacement of the language of Article 2(4) with text that would simply reinforce the customary prohibition on the deliberate targeting of noncombatants while permitting all other applications of force in international relations, including preventive war.

G. If All Else Fails: Denouncing the U.N. Charter

However, for many states, the War on Terror is of secondary or even tertiary importance, and "soft threats" such as extreme poverty, malnourishment, disease, and environmental degradation are far more appropriate and timely subjects for international legal reform. Should international or domestic opposition to amendment prove impossible to overcome, the alternative may be to withdraw from the U.N. Charter. If sovereignty has not been drained of all significance, states are only bound by those rules of law to which they consent, and when treaties, just as any other form of contract, become injurious to fundamental state interests such as survival they are made to be broken or, better still, denounced. In the words of

458 See Neil Frankland, Australian P.M. Ready to Act Against Terror, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 1, 2002 (reporting proposal to this effect offered by Australian Prime Minister John Howard); see also Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes," 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 585, 590 (2003) (proposing a "modest reinterpretation" of Article 51 to permit the use of force absent Security Council authorization to "destroy terrorist groups" and prevent transfer of WMD to terrorists); Polebaum, supra note 82, at 216 (calling for the relaxation of the imminency standard, read into Article 51 by all but the most restrictivist scholars, to permit preemption of nuclear threats).

459 See Slaughter, supra note 16 (arguing that the U.N. "cannot be a straitjacket, preventing nations from defending themselves or pursuing what they perceive to be their vital national security interests"). Guy Roberts would eliminate Article 2(4) altogether on the basis that, in light of the numerous unsanctioned violations of its provisions, it has become "clearly inconsistent with the overwhelming realities of state practice" and thus is no longer "good law." Roberts, supra note 7, at 511.

460 See Annan, supra note 18 (stating that, for many states, the threat of WMD armed terrorists is not "self-evidently the main challenge to world peace and security").

461 Amendment of the U.N. Charter requires the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of the member states in the General Assembly as well as the domestic ratification of two-thirds of the member states. U.N. CHARTER art. 108.

462 Franck, supra note 16, at 618 (describing the "consent" theory of international law).

463 The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (so long as conditions remain the same) is an implied term in every treaty that permits a state to terminate when a change occurs in the circumstances that formed the intent to be bound and served as consideration
Hobbes, "[t]o be tied to impossibilities . . . is contrary to the very nature of compacts." 465 If the benefit of the bargain sought through U.N. membership—a collective guarantee of security—can for whatever reason no longer be secured in the post-September 11 milieu of the Security Council, the United States is entitled to denounce the U.N. Charter, reclaim from a defunct and discredited institution all the authority it delegated in 1945, and assume the exclusive competence to provide for its own self-defense, whether individually or in ad hoc coalitions of allied states whose views on crucial issue-areas are closely aligned. 466 While it should not be insensitive to international public opinion in reaching the decision to withdraw from the U.N., neither should the United States allow considerations other than how to most effectively discharge the duty to defend its nationals and interests to set its legal and political course.


464 Article 56 of the Vienna Convention provides that a party to a treaty that does not contain a provision regarding its termination, and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal, is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless the parties intended the treaty to be so subject, or a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, art. 56, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345. Although the U.N. Charter is silent as to denunciation or withdrawal, the right to denounce or withdraw from the Charter was arguably within the contemplation of the states-parties, suggesting that the United States is free to withdraw from the Charter upon provision of no less than twelve months' notice. Id. (providing for a minimum twelve months' notice as a condition precedent for withdrawal from a treaty). State practice reinforces this interpretation: in 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations. However, a counter-argument suggests that the Charter was intended to create not merely a treaty relationship but rather to serve as the constitution of a "community" with perpetual life from which, like the U.S. Constitution, secession is, in practice, forbidden. For an argument that the Charter does not permit withdrawal or denunciation, see Thomas Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, in NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE 95 (Max Planck Inst. Comp. Pub. L. & Int'l L. ed., 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/fs/2003/95_franck.pdf.

465 HOBBES, supra note 252, at 59. For Jefferson, when performance of a treaty became "impossible, non-performance [was] not immoral"—and the United States was excused from "engagements contrary to it's indispensable obligations." JEFFERSON, supra note 268, at 114–15.

CONCLUSION

It's better to be judged by twelve than carried by six.

Anonymous

The defense of the Bush Doctrine as merely an assertive acknowledgement by a U.S. President of a duty to defend nationals and vital interests is wholly consistent with, or at the very least readily harmonized with, an international legal regime in which natural law still holds pride of place. Nevertheless, it comes freighted with caveats. Foremost among them is that the Bush Doctrine must never be appropriated as a pretext for aggression. A formal legal defense need not necessarily follow immediately upon the heels of an exercise of rights under the Bush Doctrine, but unless the United States is prepared to demonstrate eventually that a particular act of preventive war was a reasonable and necessary measure directed toward the reduction of a threat of the highest magnitude—such as the elimination of terrorist groups or rogue state regimes in pursuit or possession of WMD and bent on using them against U.S. targets—the risk that the military action may be characterized as a "U.S.-initiated 'Pearl Harbor' on a small nation which history could neither understand nor forget"467 militates in favor of other policy options.

Second, the Bush Doctrine should be categorically inapplicable to lesser-order threats or military problems amenable to resolution by other means. The Bush Doctrine is not a Panglossian palliative for all that ails international relations or a cure-all for all the intractable problems of the international system. To permit it to burst through these conceptual boundaries would be a legal, political, and even moral failure that would soon become the father to others.468 Unless the United States is prepared to explain and justify its preventive wars to other states on the grounds of necessity and domestic duty—and explanations and justifications will ultimately, albeit not immediately, require the sharing of some of the intelligence establishing the existence of the relevant threats with some responsible states469—the cu-

468 See Chayes, supra note 121, at 65 (warning that expansion of the use of measures of preemption or prevention against lesser-order threats would estop the United States from challenging similar measures by other states).
469 The question of precisely how much intelligence must be shared with which states must be resolved if states are to be checked from "exercis[ing] broad defensive action based on thin evidence" and, in the process, calling into question whether their actions are better characterized as aggressive. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 55, at 1088. However, a dearth of discussion has prevented the development of principles
mulative costs associated with defending a doctrine stripped in application from all connections to its theoretical roots in natural law may outweigh the benefits. Even in a decidedly unipolar era of international relations, the efficient assertion of American power depends, in important part, upon the general sense that it is benignly exercised.

Finally, it may be important to recognize that the traumatic events of September 11 may have compromised the ability of all Americans, including U.S. decisionmakers, to exercise disciplined and informed moral restraint in the aftermath. Accordingly, preventive war is a medicine to be used sparingly and in full cognizance of its potential side-effects. The decision to apply the Bush Doctrine must to guide post hoc analysis of the legitimacy of preventive actions, and this issue-area must be invested with a significant deal of thought and negotiation if future applications of the Bush Doctrine are to benefit—without compromising U.S. sources and methods—from the broad perception of legitimacy that accompanies the objective proof of the nature and degree of threats giving rise to the use of military force. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing potential dangers of an overbroad sharing of intelligence).

See Franck, supra note 39, at 17 (positing that the maintenance of U.S. hegemony depends in important measure upon its willingness to justify and explain its military actions to other states).

Some scholars who would otherwise support preventive war would refrain from approving unilateral measures and would instead insist that the five permanent members of the Security Council grant pre-approval. See, e.g., David Sloss, Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, 4 Chi. J. Int'l L. 39, 55-57 (2003).

Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a complex of characteristic symptoms that follow exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate.

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV § 309.81 (1994). A diagnosis of PTSD generally requires that the subject experience intense fear, helplessness, or horror, and requires symptomatology that includes persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and a numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent hyperarousal in response to a perceived ongoing threat that causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. Id. Traumatic events often include, inter alia, military combat, violent personal assault, kidnapping, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war, and manmade disasters. Id. That U.S. decisionmakers should be suffering from PTSD after September 11 is not an impossibility, nor is the notion that their judgment—particularly regarding the appropriate response to the actions of the perpetrators—might be influenced by trauma.
be made only after consultation with legal advisers steeped in an appreciation of the relevant moral philosophical issues attendant to the doctrine of preventive war, and after sober and deliberate contemplation of a range of alternatives.

These proposed limitations upon the Bush Doctrine will not satisfy a bevy of critics. For committed positivists, resort to natural law in justification of preventive war is an epistemologically suspect venture, inasmuch as the identification of a universally valid moral canon is beyond the capacity of a human community divided along the fault lines of religion and social ideology to discern, and wholly inadequate to the project of informing rational international institutions in the orderly administration of human affairs. The positivist optic instructs that, however well intentioned, the "contamination of legality with morality" is "wholly outside the province of the lawyer." Further, if preventive war does, in fact, merit admission to the pantheon of legal doctrines—a determination that can only follow the running of the Bush Doctrine, just as any other contested principle, through the multilateral institutional gamut wherein other sovereign states may assert their coequal lawmaking authority—it must be invited through the front door of positive legislation. The very most ideological of positivists may go so far as to insist that, even if extant international legal regime governing the resort to force is morally bankrupt, the United States is obligated to scrupulously adhere to its

473 In other words, some critics may consider the resort to preventive war as a normative claim of right to be culturally-bound. See Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Moral Relativism, Truth, and Justification,' in The MacIntyre Reader 202 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998) (questioning whether and how normative claims generated within one culture can be universalized).

474 D'Entremont, supra note 226, at 83–84.

475 A number of restrictivists hew to the positivist dogma that law and morality are conceptually distinct and that it is solely through the formal, positive procedures of the sovereign, or institutions invested with attributes of quasi-sovereignty such as the ICJ, the Security Council, and the General Assembly, that law is to be made, (re)interpreted, and applied. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 19, at 455–56 (castigating nonpositivists defined as "those inclined to pursue policy goals through a reinterpretation of the international law on the use of force, rather than explication of the current rules"). O'Connell is critical of "scholars who, in the pursuit of their own agendas, ignore or mischaracterize state practice, dismiss decisions of the ICJ, read their own meaning into the actual terms of Security Council resolutions, or never look at votes in the General Assembly." Id. Others, less absolutist in their positivist commitment, concede that it may be possible to resist challenges to the positive law of the U.N. Charter and the role of the Security Council, while at the same time insulating those challenges, provided that they reinforce communitarian standards of law and governance, from legal sanctions. See Carsten Stahn, The Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 804 (2003).
terms "because the law stands in for a social decision about what ought to be done, collectively speaking, in the face of disagreement."476 The authoritative resolution of disputes, which depends upon not reawakening conflict over the applicable rules or otherwise "recapitulating . . . normative disagreement" that might "undercut" the rule of law, is thus, for the most prescriptive legal positivists, more important than striving toward substantive justice, even if the positive law "commands a catastrophic moral evil."477

For very different reasons, realists may take umbrage at the assertion that morality bears any relationship to law and may therefore defend the Bush Doctrine on the unrelated and less defensible ground, at least in a world aspiring to law, that preventive war makes efficient use of power.478 Realists and liberals alike may express concern that the Bush Doctrine is an invitation to imitation and that other states, most of which will treat far less seriously the responsibilities that attend to military and political leadership than the United States,479 will

476 Wendel, supra note 405 (manuscript at 7–8) (on file with author). For extreme positivists, the written law is a "substantial social achievement" inasmuch as it secures some objective normative standards against which to judge conduct, and even in the face of "deep and persistent disagreement about the underlying moral principles at stake" this codification, because it transports use beyond moral disagreement, is the authoritative guide to practice. Id. (manuscript at 9–10).

477 Id. (manuscript at 92).

478 See Marshall Cohen, Moral Skepticism and International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 6 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985) (expressing the realists’ doubt that foreign policy should ever be justified on grounds other than power and security).

479 To their credit, many of the vociferous critics of the present Administration, even while challenging what they deem is an increasing reluctance to "play by the world’s rules," recognize that the United States is an exceptional nation far more likely to contribute positively to the development of international law, human rights, and democracy than any other nation. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Law Under Stress After September 11, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 317, 321 ("The United States remains the only superpower capable, and at times willing, to commit real resources and to make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and drive an international system committed to international law, democracy, and the promotion of human rights."); see also Koh, supra note 74, at 1487 (cheering the United States for having been a "genuinely exceptional" nation in regard to the promotion and defense of international law, human rights, and democracy, and noting that U.S. leadership in the defense of international human rights is a necessary condition to success). The inference follows that other nations are not so committed in practice to rights or to law, even if they do not openly call the international legal regime into question. For a proposal recommending that the Israeli government adopt the "newly-stated defense policy of The United States," see PROJECT DANIEL, ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC FUTURE: PROJECT DANIEL FINAL REPORT (2003), available at http://www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/03-issue/daniel-3.htm.
promulgate preventive war doctrines that will one day "justify" strikes against the United States and its allies. Fears that the Bush Doctrine will open a Pandora's Box from which international law itself may escape leads some commentators, who might be favorably disposed to a more narrowly tailored expansion of the right to anticipatory self-defense under international law, to reject preventive war as a "drastic formulation" that will have the unanticipated consequence of undermining global security. Still others caution against the possi-

---

480 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Law and Force in the New International Order 21 (1991) (warning that by defending preemptive measures as lawful "the United States is opening the international door for abuse by other nations"); Schmitt, supra note 48, at 548 (noting the "enormous risks associated with preemptive strategies"). "[E]ach preemptive act builds a body of State practice that can be relied upon by those who would 'claim' the right malevolently." Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 458, at 588 (condemning the Bush Doctrine as an "ominous" statement that would "legitimize preemptive attacks by Arab countries against Israel, by China against Taiwan, by India against Pakistan, and by North Korea against South Korea").

481 Gardner, supra note 458, at 588 ("By expanding the right of preemption against an imminent attack into a right of preventive war against potentially dangerous adversaries, the Bush administration has created a 'loaded weapon' that can be used against the United States and against the general interest in a stable world order."). Whether the laws of war need only include doctrines of general applicability binding equally upon all states or whether certain states might be deemed to enjoy powers commensurate with their capabilities and interests, and with the threats posed to those interests, is a question beyond the scope of this Article; it suffices to note that the right under international law to engage in preventive war need not necessarily be admitted in the case of rogue states or other states whose purposes in so doing are other than purely defensive. For a discussion of and argument in favor of a "double standard" that acknowledges overwhelming American power and moral near-hegemony and would accord to the United States rights not available to lesser powers, see Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1 Green Bag 2d 365, 371 (1998) (arguing that to permit U.S. paramountcy in economic and military power to translate into immunity from international rules has beneficial effects for mankind generally in terms of democracy, human rights, and trade).

482 Gardner, supra note 458, at 589; see also Stromseth, supra note 14, at 638–39 (arguing that "[i]t would be far better for the United States to articulate a more tailored right of anticipatory self-defense focused especially on the unique attributes and threats posed by terrorist networks"). Consistent with their commitment to a belief that the Charter is a flexible, living document, these critics contend that the United Nations is not a "legal prison" out of which the United States must break, destroying fundamental norms in the process, if it is to be free to defend itself, and that the Charter is instead an instrument within which adaptation to contemporary conditions is possible. Falk, supra note 16, at 598 (insisting that it is unnecessary to jettison the Charter in favor of the doctrine of preventive war because, under the Charter, "[t]he law can be stretched as new necessities arise").
bility of mistakes. Finally, with regard to the moral question, some restrictivists worry that the resort to preventive war is little more than a self-indulgent exemption from all legal accountability that will strip the United States of its relative moral purity and render it “guilty of the very act that it anticipates and judges on the part of its enemy.”

For the most strident moral auditors of the Bush Administration, the Bush Doctrine is but Nazism repackaged, and some commentators, in thrall to a vision of the United States as a fallen nation, question whether the American embrace of preventive war signals that it is no longer the sort of state one need never suspect of harboring designs of conquest or imperialist domination.

While the comparison of the Bush Doctrine to Nazism or the passive submission to the despotism of positive law may strike observers as outlandish, the Bush Doctrine can only benefit from reasoned discussion and critical analysis in the halls of government and in the legal academy. Although the translation of the Bush Doctrine from a statement of national policy into operational plans with rules of engagement for warfighters cannot be predicted with certainty in advance of future crises, critical examination of the law and policy underlying preventive war is best performed well in advance when judgment is less likely to be clouded by the emotional and physical crush of events. Mistakes are possible, even if it is preferable that “the price of those mistakes be paid by states that so posture themselves than by innocent states asked patiently to await slaughter.”

Nonetheless, that the Bush Doctrine should be a residual policy limited in its application to the most dangerous and compelling of threats, or that policymakers who order preventive war should be prepared to offer some objective evidence in support lest other states seize upon it as precedent for more malicious acts far more destructive of international law, does not compromise the potential utility of preventive war in the Age of Terror. Notwithstanding the rants of

483 See Glennon, supra note 56, at 552-53 (“Mistakes may be made. It is better, however, that the price of those mistakes be paid by states that so posture themselves than by innocent states asked patiently to await slaughter.”).


485 See Francis A. Boyle, The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence 28-29 (2002) (equating the Bush Doctrine with the Nazi self-defense argument offered at Nuremburg and suggesting that the Bush Administration is as evasive of its legal obligations as was the Nazi regime).

486 Glennon, supra note 56, at 553.
French intellectuals envious of American cultural and material hegemony, the Bush Administration is not, metaphorically speaking, tilting at windmills. The Bush Doctrine is no ideological fever. Threats abound, and others are gathering. Any President who failed to respond aggressively to the scourge of WMD armed terrorism with all the instruments of policy at his disposal would have failed in his most basic obligation to the American people. If “mostly minor and sometimes venal governments are able to project a degree of power entirely incommensurate with reality” and clog the multilateral institutional machinery of the United Nations, then when they do the bets are off, and collective security must yield to the individual right to self-defense. Similarly, the law governing the resort to force, if it is to continue to serve human values in the post-September 11 international system, must remain concordant with the moral imperative that states are entitled, and even obligated, to use all necessary means to defend their existence, their nationals, and their interests. Shaping the law to fulfill this function—without compromising its Grotian aspirations toward a peaceful, rule-governed international system—is a venture in which many parties have a stake, and it will require dialogue and even compromise.

Even if the Bush Doctrine is in tension with the positive international legal regime governing the resort to force as codified in the U.N. Charter, it is a creative tension, and natural law stands on guard, prepared to release us from the captivity of a hypertechical reading of Articles 2(4) and 51. That positivists and restrictivists would counsel reflexive obeisance to laws all but certain to deliver us up to evil should stiffen our moral resolve and propel us to search the intellectual history of the international legal enterprise for a way out of this theoretical slough of despond. Having done so, we need but muster the courage to plead that, in the Age of Terror, only preventive war—the natural right and duty of states beset by existential threats—preserves the highest communal values law is intended to serve: order, justice, and ultimately peace.

Preventive war should never excite the same sort of enthusiasm reserved for more peaceful forms of international intercourse. Still, in this, the best of all possible worlds, even the most utopic of observ-

487 A passel of French intellectual elites excoriate U.S. foreign policy generally, and the Bush Doctrine specifically, as a “domestic delusion,” that is leading to “brainwash[ing of] the world” and is geared toward establishment of an American Empire. See, e.g., Régis Debray, Américains, si vous saviez [Americans, If You Only Knew], FIGARO, Sept. 5, 2003, at 1.

ers will be inclined to concede that the Bush Doctrine will likely be, in residual instances, the least of many evils. See generally Thomas More, Utopia passim (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1516) (advocating a pragmatic form of morality that prefers policies that, analyzed in the abstract, are distasteful but in comparison to alternatives are the lesser evil).

September 11 continues to reverberate throughout the international system and in the consciousness of many Americans. It is regrettable that the conclusions drawn in the aftermath of that dreadful day by many members of the international legal academy reveal little sympathy for the notion that a reconception of the regime governing the resort to force, to grant states a greater margin of appreciation in their struggle against terrorists and rogue states, is essential to the preservation of civilization against barbarity. The erosion of the formal sovereign equality of states and its replacement with a double standard that would permit the United States to engage in preventive war while denying the same prerogative to other states—particularly those classified as "rogues" or otherwise irresponsible members of the international community—requires a defense beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of whether such a double standard is morally defensible, see David Luban, Preventive War 28–34 (Geo. Univ. L. Center, Working Paper Series, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=469862 (arguing that it is under limited circumstances in which the threatened state alone acts to prevent a direct attack from a WMD armed rogue state or a terrorist group). But see Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 873 (2003) (arguing that it is not).

Ruth Wedgwood made a similar point in 1998 on the eve of U.S. enforcement action against Iraq, noting that "as sometimes happens in international politics, the question of the lawfulness of the putative U.S. enforcement action was allowed to overshadow the grave violation of international law by Iraq that was its predicate." Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 724, 725 (1998).
juries or enshrined in constitutive documents. Nor does the decision to engage in preventive war require the blessing of other states. Under natural law, the President of the United States is inef-fably bound to defend America, its nationals, and its vital interests, against wicked malcreants whose predations are infinitely more threatening to the civilizational values of order and justice than is the Bush Doctrine. In an ideal world, international lawyers and international institutions, recognizing that the Bush Doctrine is its best hope for the continued viability of international law in the Age of Terror, would rush forward to stamp it with their imprimaturs. In the world that is, international law will have to be coaxed, and sometimes even dragged, along. Where law fears to tread, there are moments when the President must nevertheless be ready and willing to rush in, ever hopeful that his leadership will hearten the law and induce it to follow. There may be places where law simply will not go. But in the Age of Terror, duty must be intrepid, and forged of much sterner steel.

That this is so is testament to a gap between law and legitimacy that has been widening for the better part of a decade. It is disquieting that, in an age of great moral contrast and conflict between terrorists and their intended targets, some scholars and statesmen should give positivism free rein to scrub international law clean of its natural legal origins and to banish the relevance of justice from international relations. However, from the ashes of September 11 a new impetus—toward converging the conceptual and moral universes partitioning positivists from naturalists, and restrictivists from pragmatists—has arisen. There may well be a solution to the dilemma of choosing between positivism and substantive justice within the extant international legal order, and it may well be that procedural safeguards can be devised to protect intelligence sources and methods and encourage states to share the information that justifies their uses of force and, derivatively, shores up the conceptual boundary between self-defense and aggression. Even its authors would not claim that the Bush Doctrine is the ultimate repository of all the wisdom and good judgment that can be accumulated on the question of preventive war. Nearly six decades after the founding of the United Nations, a thorough reexamination of the doctrinal, philosophical, and moral bases of the international law governing the resort to force is even more

492 See George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 109, 114 (Jan. 28, 2003) ("[T]he course of this nation does not depend on the decision of others. Whatever action is required, whatever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.")
overdue than is a legal restatement on preventive war that can claim both natural and positive provenance and thus command more universal acceptance than does the Bush Doctrine. Interestingly, and perhaps unwittingly, the Bush Doctrine, in the final analysis, has offered up not merely a fundamentally reordered national security strategy predestined to provoke controversy, but an entreaty, even an exhortation, to responsible members of the international community. The Bush Doctrine calls them to collectively diagnose the reasons for the untimely divorce of law and legitimacy in the most vital issue-area in international law and to negotiate toward a reconciliation. The exigencies of our times behoove scholars and policymakers, whatever their disciplinary, theoretical, or ideological commitments and whatever their views on preventive war, to join this conversation.