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Religion, Division, and the First Amendment

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ARTICLES

Religion, Division, and the First Amendment

RICHARD W. GARNETT*

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The Priest and me, we lived by the same principles.
It was only faith [that] divided us.

William "Bill the Butcher" Cutting1

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1. GANGS OF NEW YORK (Miramax Film Corp. 2002).
INTRODUCTION

Nearly thirty-five years ago in *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, Chief Justice Warren Burger declared that state programs or policies could excessively—and, therefore, unconstitutionally—entangle government and religion, not only by requiring or allowing intrusive public monitoring of religious institutions and activities, but also through what he called their “divisive political potential.” Government actions burdened with such “potential,” he reasoned, pose a “threat to the normal political process” and “divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government.” Chief Justice Burger asserted also, and more fundamentally, that “political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” And from this Hobbesian premise about the intent animating the First Amendment, he proceeded on the assumption that the Constitution authorizes courts to protect our “normal political process” from a particular kind of strife and to purge a particular kind of disagreement from politics and public conversations about how best to achieve the common good.

This Article provides a close and critical examination of the argument that observations or predictions of “political division along religious lines” should shape or supply the enforceable content of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The examination is timely, not only because of the sharp polarization that is said to characterize contemporary politics, but also because of the increasing prominence of this “political division” argument. Justice Breyer, for example, in his crucial concurring opinion in one of the recent Ten Commandments cases, identified “avoid[ing] that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict” as one of the “basic purposes of [the Religion] Clauses.” He then voted to reject the First Amendment challenge to the public display at issue in part because, in his view, to sustain it “might well encourage disputes” and “thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.” Justice Stevens went even further, referring to “Government’s obligation to avoid divisiveness and exclusion in the religious sphere.” In another arena, a prominent young scholar has offered both a diagnosis of and a cure for our “church-state problem”—namely, that we are “Divided by God.” This problem, he warns, poses a “fundamental

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3. *Id.* at 622, 623.
4. *Id.* at 622.
7. *Id.* at 2871.
8. *Id.* at 2875 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
challenge to the project of self-government." In a similar vein, the religion-related cover story of a recent issue of one of our leading newsmagazines reported, "Divided, We Stand." It appears that the political-divisiveness argument is and will for some time remain at the heart of our discussions about religious freedom and the First Amendment.

The inquiry and analysis that follow have empirical, doctrinal, and normative components: What, exactly, is "religiously based social conflict"—or, as the Court put it in Lemon, "political ... divisiveness on religious lines"? What, exactly, is the relevance of such conflict to the wisdom, morality, or constitutionality of state action? How plausible, and how normatively attractive, are the political-divisiveness argument and the "principle" it is thought to vindicate? How well do this argument and this principle cohere with the relevant text, history, traditions, and values? And what does the recent resurfacing of this argument in the Establishment Clause context reveal and portend about the state and trajectory of First Amendment theory and doctrine more generally?

Working through these questions, I am mindful of John Courtney Murray's warning that we should "cherish only modest expectations with regard to the solution of the problem of religious pluralism and civic unity." Accordingly, while I hope this Article will contribute to our conversations about the role of religious expression, belief, believers, and institutions in public life, my more specific goal is to identify and analyze—critically, carefully, and contextually—a specific and salient line of constitutional argument.

This Article proceeds as follows: Part One sets the stage with an overview of the relevant social and political context and also of the political-divisiveness argument's current revival. Part Two provides a comprehensive history of this argument, tracing its development and cataloging its deployments, with particular emphasis on its use by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon. This review suggests, among other things, that the "political division along religious lines" argument

10. Id. at 251. Feldman suggests, intriguingly, that “[p]erhaps ... it might be said that God has divided us, by virtue of the profound religious diversity that we have long had and that is daily expanding. Since Madison, this diversity has often been called a blessing and a source of strength or balance, yet it also remains, as it always has been, a fundamental challenge to the project of self-government.”


14. See Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. Rev. 1233, 1239 n.19 (noting the “underlying unity among constitutional commitments to free expression, free exercise, and non-establishment” and that “[t]hough often treated as independent or even conflicting, these commitments have a common textual source and a common early history, so it would be helpful to have an account that captures their common themes”) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944) (“[T]he great liberties insured by the First Article ... are interwoven .... [T]hey have unity in the charter's prime place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings.”)).

("the Argument") has rarely been outcome-determinative or done much real juridical work.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, it seems to have served primarily as a rhetorical device or as a concluding flourish to the application of one or another doctrinal "test." This account highlights, among other things, the Argument's amorphousness—or, perhaps, its adaptability. Put differently, the analytical narrative provided in Part Two reveals that not only is it unclear precisely what work the Argument \textit{does}, it is also not obvious what the Argument \textit{is}. Accordingly, in Part Three, I unpack and reassemble the Argument, considering a number of versions and casting it in a variety of ways. I conclude, though, that none of these variations is convincing. That concerns about "political division along religious lines" are real and reasonable does not mean that they can or should supply the enforceable content of the First Amendment's prohibition on establishments of religion.

At the end of the day, this Article offers a reminder that—again, in Murray's words—"pluralism [is] the native condition of American society"\textsuperscript{17} and that the unity toward which Americans have aspired—\textit{e pluribus unum}—is a "unity of a limited order."\textsuperscript{18} Those who crafted our Constitution believed that both authentic freedom and effective government could and should be secured through checks and balances, rather than standardization, and by harnessing, rather than homogenizing, the messiness of democracy.\textsuperscript{19} It is both misguided and quixotic, then, to employ the First Amendment to smooth out the bumps and divisions that are an unavoidable part of the political life of a diverse and free people and, perhaps, best regarded as an indication that society is functioning well.\textsuperscript{20} It is,

\textsuperscript{16} However, Justice Breyer's recent concurring—and controlling—opinion in \textit{Van Orden} might suggest that this is changing. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{17} Murray, supra note 15, at 43.
\textsuperscript{18} Id. at 59.
\textsuperscript{19} See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., \textit{Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment} 46–48 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the role of "religious pluralism" in the thinking of the Founding generation); McConnell, supra note 5, at 1254 ("The structure of American democracy was based on pluralism and diversity—the balance of power among sects and factions—rather than on a contrived homogeneity.") (citing \textit{The Federalist} No. 10 (James Madison)).
\textsuperscript{20} See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Why Societies Need Dissent} 213 (2003) (contending that "[w]ell-functioning societies [should] take steps to discourage conformity and to promote dissent"); Christopher Hitchens, \textit{Bring on the Mud}, Wilson Q., Autumn 2004, at 44, 46 ("By definition, politics is, or ought to be, division. It expresses, or at least reflects, or at the very least emulates, the inevitable difference of worldview that originates, for modern purposes, with Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine."); Jonathan Rauch, \textit{Bipolar Disorder}, \textit{Atlantic Monthly}, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 110 ("Politically speaking, our fifty-fifty America is a divisive, rancorous place. The rest of the world should be so lucky."); Andrew Sullivan, \textit{Federal Express}, \textit{New Republic}, Dec. 13, 2004, at 6 ("[C]ultural polarization is emphatically not a problem. It's a sign of political health, a bellwether of a society that has not given up on debating first-principle issues of human morality."). Professor Smith put the matter well:

\begin{quote}
It is arguable... that pluralism... has been the usual condition of Western peoples and that the normal and natural response to pluralism is not to shun contested foundational truths but to strive with even greater care and energy to figure out what those truths are.
\end{quote}

after all, not a failure, but—as Justice Brennan observed—a “function of free speech under our system of government to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”

I. SETTING THE STAGE

The word “religion” comes from ligare, which means to tie or bind together.22 Today, however, many regard religion’s purported tendency to “divide”—its capacity to cause, in Chief Justice Burger’s words, “political . . . divisiveness on religious lines”—as its necessary, near-defining feature.23 Because religious commitments and religion’s influence are viewed by many as particularly and perniciously divisive, they are often framed as pressing challenges for political communities, democratic theory, and constitutional law. In the culture and in the academy, pluralism, difference, and diversity are celebrated; dissent, nonconformity, boundary-testing, and competition are, most of us agree, well and good; but the division—or worse, the “divisiveness”—allegedly fomented by religious beliefs, claims, and expression is widely seen as cause for alarm.24 Justice Souter, for example, asserted recently in one of the


24. See, e.g., FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1995) (describing the “secular individualist” view in which religion is regarded as “an irrational and regressive antisocial force that must be strictly confined to private life in order to avoid social division, violence, and anomaly”); Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1011, 1013 (2004) (“Religion is by its very nature exclusionary, which means that religion is incapable of producing . . . unity . . . [P]olitical unity . . . is actually antithetical to religion’s entire reason for existing.” (emphasis added)); William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 854 (1993) (referring to the “‘dark side’ of religion and religious belief—the side of religion that is inherently intolerant and persecutory”); Stanley Fish, Why We Can’t All Just Get Along, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 18 (“[A] person of religious conviction should not want to enter the marketplace of ideas but to shut it down . . . .”); see also Luke 12:51 (Douay-Rheims) (“Think ye, that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, no; but separation.”); cf., e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 539 (2003) (“Religion is exclusionary. It doesn’t have to be, but it often is.”); John C. Danforth, Leaders Can Find Unity in What Divides Us, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 2002, at B3 (“The root meaning of the word suggests that religion is supposed to bind us together. If this is so, then those ‘religions’ that are divisive should be called by another name. To call a belief that is designed to be a wedge a religion is deceptive to the point of being fraudulent.”). More recently, commenting on the Court’s two Ten Commandments cases, Danforth asserted that “efforts to haul references of God into the public square, into schools and courthouses, are far more apt to divide Americans than to advance faith.” John C. Danforth, Onward, Moderate Christian Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at A27, quoted in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2874 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).

25. See Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717, 720–21 (2003) (“I have always found it strange that we might entertain a profound national commitment to the proposition that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, but
Ten Commandments cases that "the divisiveness of religion in current life is inescapable." Indeed, according to Richard Dawkins, "Only the wilfully blind could fail to implicate the divisive force of religion in most, if not all, of the violent enmities in the world today." 27

The argument that "political division along religious lines" is constitutionally significant—as well as politically, culturally, or aesthetically troubling—appears to be enjoying something of a comeback after a time on the doctrinal back burner. 29 A few years ago, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment permits Ohio to include religious schools in that state's school-choice program. Writing for a narrow majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Ohio had not constitutionally established or endorsed religion by permitting the program's low-income beneficiaries to direct their scholarship funds to otherwise-eligible religious schools. Justice Breyer dissented, writing separately "to emphasize the risk that publicly financed voucher programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict" and to note his belief that, whatever the policy merits of

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29. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The dissent resurrects the concern for political divisiveness that once occupied the Court but that post-Aguilar cases have rightly disregarded."). But see id. at 872 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court may well have moved away from considering the political divisiveness threatened by particular instances of aid as a practical criterion for applying the Establishment Clause case by case, but we have never questioned its importance as a motivating concern behind the Establishment Clause, nor could we change history to find that sectarian conflict did not influence the Framers who wrote it.").
such programs,\textsuperscript{32} the need to “protect[] the Nation’s social fabric from religious conflict pose[d] an overriding obstacle” to the Ohio experiment.\textsuperscript{33}

For Justice Breyer, in other words, avoiding “religiously based social conflict” and “social dissension” is not merely a policy desideratum, or the irenic aspiration of prudent leaders and civic-minded citizens, or an injunction of political morality.\textsuperscript{34} It is also a fundamental constitutional “principle.”\textsuperscript{35} And while he did not endorse a strict, no-aid form of separationism,\textsuperscript{36} Justice Breyer nonetheless warned that:

In a society composed of many different religious creeds, I fear that this present departure [upholding Ohio’s voucher program] from the Court’s earlier understanding risks creating a form of religiously based social conflict potentially harmful to the Nation’s social fabric. . . . I believe the Establishment Clause was written in part to avoid this kind of conflict . . . .\textsuperscript{37}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Ohio’s voucher program was “well-intentioned”).
\item \textsuperscript{33} Id. Justice Breyer also repeatedly voiced concerns about “divisiveness” during the oral arguments in the Ten Commandments cases, Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (No. 03-1500) (“There is no way to [determine whether the government has gone too far in allowing a religious display] other than to look at the divisive quality of the individual display case by case. And when I do that, I don’t find much divisiveness here.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No. 03-1693) (“[T]he government is not absolutely forbidden by the establishment clause to recognize the religious nature of the people nor the religious origins of much of our law . . . but it’s easy to go too far and . . . you are [treading] on eggs to become far more divisive than you hoped and really end up with something worse than if you stayed out in the first place. In other words, it’s a very delicate matter and it’s very easy to offend people.”).
\item \textsuperscript{34} See Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 217, 229 (2001) (distinguishing, for purposes of the debate over the role of religiously grounded arguments in public discourse, between the demands of constitutional law and those of a liberal democracy’s political morality).
\item \textsuperscript{35} See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 723, 724 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{37} Zelman, 536 U.S. at 728–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also stated that, in a “society as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to protect against religious strife.” Id. at 725; see also id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I have been influenced by my understanding of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our forebears to migrate to this continent, and on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to mistrust one another. Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.”); id. at 716–17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If the divisiveness permitted by today’s majority is to be avoided in the short term, it will be avoided only by action of the political branches at the State and national levels.”).
\end{itemize}

Professor Feldman, in Divided By God, endorses Justice Breyer’s view, insisting that “state financial aid for religious institutions does not encourage common values; it creates conflict and division.”
Justice Breyer’s point, then, is not simply that the absence of such strife is a happy result of scrupulous judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause or a motivating hope of those who drafted and ratified it.\(^3\) Instead, his claim is that the identification, prevention, and elimination of “religious strife” are integral parts of the Court’s interpretive, expositive, and enforcement tasks. That is, the construction of a “social fabric” free of “religiously based social conflict” is more than a desirable result of obeying and enforcing our Constitution’s no-establishment command—it is the command itself.\(^3\)

Now, in *Zelman*, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded only briefly to Justice Breyer’s invocation of the “invisible specters of ‘divisiveness’ and ‘religious strife.’”\(^4\) With respect to the proposed constitutional “principle” of “avoiding religiously based social conflict,” the Chief Justice thought it was “unclear exactly what sort of principle Justice Breyer [had] in mind, considering that the program has ignited no ‘divisiveness’ or ‘strife’ other than this litigation.”\(^4\) He also wondered “where Justice Breyer would locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they have chosen but that we subjectively find ‘divisive.’”\(^4\) Here, the Chief Justice might just as well have quoted Chief Justice Burger’s concession in *Lemon*: “Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy

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38. *Cf.*, e.g., *Marsh v. Chambers*, 463 U.S. 783, 805 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “principles of separation and neutrality help assure that essentially religious issues, precisely because of their importance and sensitivity, not become the occasion for battle in the political arena”).


40. 536 U.S. at 662 n.7. Chief Justice Rehnquist had previously expressed skepticism about the constitutional relevance in Establishment Clause cases of “political divisiveness.” *See*, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) (“We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the AFLA is invalid because it is likely to create political division along religious lines. It may well be that because of the importance of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there may be a division of opinion along religious lines as well as other lines. But the same may be said of a great number of other public issues of our day.” (citation omitted)); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983) (stating that the question of “political divisiveness” should be “regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools”).


42. *Zelman*, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7.
manifestations of our democratic system of government . . . " Judicial squeamishness toward contentious and messy politics, Chief Justice Rehnquist might have suggested, is not a particularly sound doctrinal tool, let alone a reliable constitutional benchmark.

Still, Justice Breyer’s arguments and concerns seem to fit the times. Hardly a day goes by without bold-print, full-volume reminders from pollsters and pundits that American society is fractured, split, polarized— even at “war”— and that it is, about many things and in many ways, “divided.” We are, according to Gertrude Himmelfarb, “One Nation, Two Cultures.” We are, political guru Michael Barone tells us, “Hard America” and “Soft America.” We are, as commentator David Brooks and many others have colorfully described, Bobos and Patio Men, Latte and Sprinkler Towns. We are Retro and Metro, Fahrenheit 9/11 and The Passion, Wal-Mart and Whole Foods,

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44. See Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1337, 1359 (1990) (criticizing as “idolatry” the “kind of aversion and squeamishness towards open political conflict displayed by [supporters of a flag-burning amendment]”); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 695, 717 (2001) (noting that “in the political realm, we cling . . . tenaciously to the fear that too much politics, or too competitive a political system, will bring instability, fragmentation, and disorder”); cf., e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (“The proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”).


"values evangelicals" and "legal secularists," even Roundheads and Cavaliers. United we stand, perhaps; seated at the table, though, we seem intractably divided by Brooks's "meatloaf line." Even our book-buying habits, *The New York Times* reported not long ago, reveal a sharply and starkly "polarized nation"; in line at Borders and Barnes & Noble, we are still two Americas, "Red" and "Blue." These alleged two Americas have different radio networks, live in increasingly segregated counties, use different online dating services, inhabit and move through different parts of the "blogosphere," and it has even been suggested that they ought to fly different airlines. The cultural cleavage is so deep, some say, that meaningful disagreement and argument are no longer possible.

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52. See William Powers, *The Great Shopping Divide*, 36 Nat'l J. 3700 ("Are you a Wal-Mart person, or a Whole Foods person?").


55. Brooks, *One Nation*, *supra* note 49, at 54 ("I've crossed the Meatloaf Line; from here on there will be a lot fewer sun-dried-tomato concoctions on restaurant menus and a lot more meatloaf platters.").

56. Readers Split, Left, Right (And Center), *N.Y. Times*, Mar. 13, 2004, at B7 ("A study of purchase patterns of political books reveals that buyers of liberal books... tend to buy only other liberal books, while buyers of conservative books... usually buy only other conservative books.").


58. See Bill Bishop, *The Growing Cost of Political Uniformity*, Austin Am.-Statesman, Apr. 8, 2004, at A-1 (noting that "[m]ost Americans live in counties that haven't changed their party preference in presidential elections in more than a generation" and, in recent decades, "[p]lace aligned with ideology, which aligned with party. Like-minded people came to live in the same place, which made it more likely that the group would polarize"); Brooks, *People*, *supra* note 49, at 29 ("[E]very place becomes more like itself. ... Once [people] find a town in which people share their values, they flock there, and reinforce whatever was distinctive about the town in the first place.").

It is worth noting, though, that American counties—and particularly suburban ones—are increasingly less segregated on the basis of race. According to data compiled by John Logan of the Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, segregation between blacks and whites at the county level declined by 3.7% during the same time that segregation by major-party affiliation increased by 47%. See Timothy Noah, *Mister Landslide's Neighborhood*, Slate, Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2098387/ (discussing Logan study).


Disagreement about issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the place of religion in public life is sufficiently profound and systematic as to suggest that Americans are split by two fundamentally different worldviews. The danger is that this division is too wide for discourse or compromise, indeed, too wide for any peaceful resolution.
To be sure, these "two cultures" and "Red State, Blue State" arguments are controversial and contestable. The political-polarization thesis should not be pushed too far, and our divisions should not be exaggerated. Still, there is no avoiding the fact that, as Justice Breyer feared, our social and political faultlines often trace, even if they are not reducible or even attributable to, religious convictions and denominational differences. "We are," Professor Feldman has recently observed, "increasingly, a nation divided by God." In Barone's words, "Americans increasingly vote as they pray, or don't pray." Accordingly, two social scientists have proposed that one of our two major political parties is most usefully and accurately characterized as "secularist." And, as if to return the favor, members of that party are sometimes heard to charge that the other, presumably non-"secularist" party is in the grip of the "Taliban wing of American politics."
Justice Breyer’s solicitude for our “social fabric” and his concern about “social dissension” resonate not only with the hand-wringing of cultural critics and with internet-salon chatter; they are timely in other ways, too. For example, an exchange between Chief Justice Rehnquist and pro se litigant Michael Newdow regarding the assertedly “divisive” character of the terms “Under God” was among the highlights of the oral arguments in the Pledge of Allegiance case a few years ago. In that same case, Justice O’Connor noted, in a concurring opinion outlining her view that the Pledge is constitutionally permissible, that “the practice has been employed pervasively without engendering significant controversy.” And, the deciding fifth vote to allow a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol hinged on Justice Breyer’s conclusions that, on balance and all things considered, the “display [was] unlikely to prove divisive” and that, in fact, a ruling against the display could “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”

It is worth noting that the theme sounded in these and other Establishment Clause cases is consonant with a number of important debates and developments in First Amendment law: In recent court decisions and scholarship addressing campaigns, advertising, political parties, and elections, the argument is often pressed that the First Amendment not only permits, but perhaps even requires, governments to manage benevolently the content and tone of political

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68. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44–45, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624). Mr. Newdow observed that “the country went [berserk] because people were so upset that God was going to be taken out of the Pledge of Allegiance,” and suggested that this fact tended to show that the inclusion by Congress of the term “Under God” in the Pledge was “divisive.” Id. at 44. Chief Justice Rehnquist then asked “what the vote was in Congress apropos of divisiveness to adopt the Under God phrase?” Id. When told by Mr. Newdow that the vote was “apparently unanimous,” the Chief Justice observed wryly, “Well, that doesn’t sound divisive.” Id. Mr. Newdow’s retort—“that’s only because no atheist can get elected to public office”—was apparently greeted with boisterous applause, causing the Chief Justice to threaten to clear the gallery. Id. at 44–45.

69. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 38 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Indeed, she continued, “[g]iven the vigor and creativity of [Establishment Clause challenges over the years], I find it telling that so little ire has been directed at the Pledge.” Id. at 39.

70. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); cf id. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I doubt that a slow walk to the courthouse, even one that took 40 years, is much evidentiary help in applying the Establishment Clause.”).
discourse. On this view, excessive divisiveness is a form of what Professor Meiklejohn called "mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment of the Constitution is directed." With respect to the Court's government-speech and public-forum doctrines, a similar claim seems to be at the heart of the tension between what Professors Volokh and BeVier have called an "enhancement" or "elite management" model, on the one hand, and a "distortion" model, on the other. The increasing uneasiness in some quarters with relying solely on counter-speech and thick skins to remedy the pain, offense, and strife caused by racist and hateful speech seems also of a piece with Justice Breyer's divisiveness argument. Even the controversy surrounding the Boy Scouts' asserted expressive-association right to exclude openly gay leaders and spokesmen might fairly be cast as a debate about how far into civil society and into the realm of voluntary associations the government's discourse-shaping authority and anti-"division" efforts may reach.

These and other developments provide support for Roberto Unger's observation a decade ago that one of the "dirty little secrets of contemporary jurisprudence" is its "discomfort with democracy." But one need not question the "comfort" with democracy of scholars like Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein to note the consonance between the political-divisiveness argument and their

71. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, 252–53 (2002) ("[T]he First Amendment's constitutional role is not simply one of protecting the individual's 'negative' freedom from governmental restraint. The Amendment in context also forms a necessary part of a constitutional system designed to sustain that democratic self-government. The Amendment helps to sustain the democratic process both by encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound electoral decisions and by encouraging an exchange of views among ordinary citizens necessary to their informed participation in the electoral process.").

72. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) (emphasis omitted).


77. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996). Unger notes that this "discomfort with democracy shows up in every area of contemporary legal culture," including "in an ideal of deliberative democracy as most acceptable when closest in style to a polite conversation among gentlemen in an eighteenth-century drawing room . . . ." Id. at 72–73.

78. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 75, at 19 ("The phrase 'freedom of speech' implies an organized and structured understanding of freedom, one that recognizes certain limits as to what should be included and excluded. This is the theory upon which speech regulation that aims to protect national security or public order is sometimes allowed; it should be equally available when the state is trying to preserve the
positions regarding the extent to which the First Amendment authorizes, and even demands, efforts by government to "promot[e] a well-functioning system of free speech." In a similar vein, the recent publication—to glowing reviews—of Justice Breyer’s Tanner Lectures confirms that we can expect continued and vigorous defenses of the role of courts in promoting, through constitutional interpretation and judicial review, conditions in society and capacities of citizens thought conducive to better politics. At the same time, Richard Pildes, Mark Tushnet, and others have expressed and developed their concern that "in the political realm, judges and others cling . . . tenaciously to the fear that too much politics, or too competitive a political system, will bring instability, fragmentation, and disorder."

Returning to Zelman: The Chief Justice was correct to observe that the Court in recent years has “disregarded”—or, at least, carefully cabined—the “concern for political divisiveness that once occupied the Court . . . .” At the same time, though, Justice Breyer was able to marshal a number of precedents and a plausible historical narrative to support his proffered no-strife principle. His observation in Van Orden that a “basic purpose[]” of the Establishment Clause was to “avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike” would seem to enjoy similar support.

And so, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s questions need to be

fullness of debate. Indeed, the First Amendment should be more embracing of such regulation, since that regulation seeks to further the democratic values that underlie the First Amendment itself.”

79. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 200 (2001) (“For citizens in a republic, freedom requires exposure to a diverse set of topics and opinions. This is not a suggestion that people should be forced to read and view materials that they abhor. But it is a claim that a democratic polity, acting through democratic organs, tries to promote freedom, not simply by respecting consumer sovereignty, but by creating a system of communication that promotes exposure to a wide range of issues and views.”); see also id. at 142 (“My basic argument . . . is that the free speech principle, properly understood . . . does not bar government from taking steps to ensure that communications markets serve democratic self-government and other important social values.”).

80. SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 109.


82. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); see also Breyer, supra note 71.

83. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 130 (2004) (“In my view, constitutional law should be oriented more toward the dangers of legislative and partisan self-entrenchment and less toward a perceived judicial need to ensure a democratic stability adequately secured already by the underlying institutional structures of American democracy.”); see also, e.g., MARK TUShNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).


85. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). I should emphasize here that it is not necessary for purposes of this Article to dispute that many of those who called for, drafted, debated, and ratified the First Amendment hoped that the provision would, among other things, forestall or reduce strength-sapping, religion-based social conflict. Cf. e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife.”). Professor Feldman supplies a nice quotation, from an “anonymous Virginia Federalist” who brushed off concerns that Congress
answered: “What sort of principle” did Justice Breyer have in mind, and where would he locate the Court’s “authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they have chosen but that [the Justices] subjectively find ‘divisive’”?86 This Article seeks to answer these and other questions.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL-DIVISIVENESS ARGUMENT

The prominence of concerns about religion and division in Justice Breyer’s opinions in Zelman and Van Orden, and in popular and political discourse more generally, suggests a renewal of interest in the Argument. Before turning to the Argument’s content and the implications of its revival, I sketch in this Part its genealogy, canvassing its pre-Lemon roots as well as its post-Lemon development.

A. THE ORIGINS OF THE ARGUMENT

Warnings about division and calls for unity are nothing new. They have long been a staple of American politics and even of the American creed. The same is true of concerns about the alleged balkanizing effects of religion and its tendency to unsettle political life by spilling over into it.87 Madison famously observed, in his Memorial and Remonstrance, that “intermedd[ling] with Religion” by government can only “destroy... moderation and harmony” and is an “enemy to the public quiet.”88 The separationism of Thomas Jefferson and his turn-of-the-century political allies reflected, at least in part, their irritation at the
political aims and effects of Federalist clergy's preaching. After the Civil War, the tumult surrounding the threats to American nationhood thought to be posed by Catholic immigration and religion included prominent and passionate invocations of unity and denunciations of division and sectarianism. James Blaine, for instance, highlighting the need for the proposed constitutional amendment that bears his name, insisted that the Grant-era debates over the school question “inevitably arouse[] sectarian feelings, and lead[] to the bitterest and most deplorable of all strifes, the strifes between religious denominations.” Later, during another time of national reflection about unity and cohesion, public intellectuals like Paul Blanshard lamented the persistence and influence of Catholic schools, “the most important divisive instrument[s] in the life of American children.” This complaint was consonant with Justice Frankfurter’s claim, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, that, in the interest of “promoting our common destiny” through the public schools, these schools must be purged of and protected from all “divisive forces.” Indeed, as Professor Feldman has described, a concern for the construction and maintenance of “national unity” runs through a number of Justice Frankfurter’s mid-century opinions. He wrote, for example, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, that “[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment,” emphasizing that “the flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution.”

It still remained, though, for these and the many other antidivision, civic-
unity arguments to be captured and operationalized in Establishment Clause doctrine. Concluding his short essay in 1969 on the Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Allen, in which the Justices rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a New York law authorizing public schools to loan textbooks in secular subjects to students attending parochial schools, Professor Paul Freund commented:

Ordinarily I am disposed, in grey-area cases of constitutional law, to let the political process function. Even in dealing with basic guarantees I would eschew a single form of compliance and leave room for different methods of implementation. . . . The religious guarantees, however, are of a different order. While political debate and division is normally a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall. It was healthy when President Kennedy, as a candidate, was able to turn off some of the questions addressed to him on church-state relations by pointing to binding Supreme Court decisions. Although great issues of constitutional law are never settled until they are settled right, still as between open-ended, ongoing political warfare and such binding quality as judicial decisions possess, I would choose the latter in the field of God and Caesar and the public treasury.

These reflections were constitutionalized—that is, they were incorporated into one step of a three-part constitutional “test”—not many months later by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon. In that case, the Court ruled that the First Amendment does not permit state actions that “foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion,’” and also announced—relying explicitly on not much more than Freund’s comment—that a policy’s “divisive political potential” not only indicates, but also constitutes, such impermissible entanglement.

96. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
97. Paul Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1691–92 (1969) (emphasis added); cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (joint opinion) (“Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”).
99. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
100. Id. at 622 (“A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented by the divisive political potential of these state programs. In a community where such a large number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be assumed that state assistance will entail considerable political activity.”); see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 St. Louis U. L.J.
B. THE LEMON "TEST" AND POLITICAL DIVISIVENESS ON RELIGIOUS LINES

Lemon’s “test” is so familiar to lawyers and law students that few remember the particulars of the laws considered or the details of the doctrine gathered and applied. In Lemon, the Court invalidated two state statutes—one involving “salary supplements” paid by Rhode Island to teachers at nonpublic schools and the other authorizing the purchase by Pennsylvania of “secular educational services” from such schools101—on the ground that “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.”102 Although this “relationship” was carefully structured “to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former,”103 the Court determined that the supervision, oversight, monitoring, and evaluation necessary to make good on that guarantee violated the Constitution no less than the harm the legislatures were trying to avoid.

Chief Justice Burger began his analysis with what today seems a striking understatement: “Candor compels acknowledgment . . . that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.”104 In his view, the Lemon cases—and Establishment Clause cases generally—were made even more difficult by the fact that the First Amendment “[d]oes not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state religion”; it “command[s] that there should be ‘no law respecting an establishment of religion.’”105 The Amendment imposes, in other words, a broader prohibition than a mere ban on establishments: “A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.”106 Accordingly, the challenge for the Court, as Burger saw it, was to devise an analytical method appropriate to its sweeping mandate to identify and forestall both the end of “establishment” and all possible steps

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205, 214 (1980) (noting that, concerning the First Amendment’s purpose, “Burger did not cite any primary sources for his opinion.”).
101. 403 U.S. at 602, 606–08 (“Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects. Rhode Island has adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary.”).
102. Id. at 614.
103. Id. at 613–14.
104. Id. at 612. Even in the course of setting the stage with what Chief Justice Burger no doubt believed was an uncontroversial observation, he invites the question, “what, exactly, is so extraordinarily sensitive about this area of law?” See also, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the “importance and sensitivity” of “essentially religious issues”). Does the political-divisiveness argument, which this characterization foreshadows, rest in the end on anything more than the Chief Justice’s ipse dixit concerning the “sensitive” nature of this area of law?
105. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
Chief Justice Burger was probably mistaken about the import of the Framers' use of the word "respecting." In any event, having elected to assume that the Establishment Clause bans more than establishments, he was left with the task of distinguishing those not-quite-establishments that portend establishment from those that do not. And, again, the fruit of Burger's efforts is the often-maligned, but still breathing, three-part Lemon test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" The Justices satisfied themselves quickly that the laws in question had the requisite secular purpose, and elected not to decide whether the arrangements created by these laws had the prohibited primary effect of advancing religion. Instead, the Court determined that the third part of its newly consolidated test—the "exces-

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107. That is, the term "respecting" probably did not indicate a desire to forbid government actions that were steps toward, or that might tend to result in, establishments of religion. Regarding the significance of the word "respecting," Judge Noonan supplies the following imaginary dialogue between a new judge and his law clerk:

[New Judge:] 'I would have thought 'respecting an establishment' meant 'taking into account an establishment'—in other words, the phrase in the Bill of Rights assumed that religious establishments existed and instructed Congress not to take any establishment into account, either by endowing a state-established church or by penalizing one. Am I being too simple?'

[Clerk:] 'You're being pretty perceptive, . . . but you're a bit out of date. Everyone's agreed that 'respecting an establishment' now means 'establishing.' They call it 'the Establishment Clause.' It'd be sheer pedantry to stick to the original language.'


108. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 888 (1993) (arguing that, although the Lemon test may not be applied mechanically by the Court in future cases, the test and its themes will continue to shape Establishment Clause doctrine and to control in lower-court decisions); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993) (contending that the Court in Weisman replaced the Lemon test with a new "coercion" test). Or, as Justice Scalia once put it, "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again. . . ." Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).


110. The Court stated that "the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Id. at 613. For background on the secular purpose requirement, see generally Koppelman, supra note 39.

111. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613–14 (avoiding the question whether "legislative precautions," employed to "guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former," "restrict the principal or primary effect of the programs to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses"). In Justice Brennan's view, however, the salary-supplement programs in question were unconstitutional wholly and apart from the "too close a proximity" or "entanglement" issue. Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., concurring). For Justice Brennan, the direct subsidy by government, standing alone, to religious schools violated the Constitution. See id.; see also id. at 640 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We have announced over and over again that the use of taxpayers' money to support parochial schools violates the First Amendment . . .").
sive entanglement" element—was sufficient to invalidate the statutes.\footnote{112} The "objective" of the Court’s entanglement review, Chief Justice Burger stated, “is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other.”\footnote{113} That said:

[T]otal separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. . . . Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a “wall,” is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.\footnote{114}

The Court then turned to the “circumstances” and, after reviewing the “character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority,” concluded that “both statutes foster an impermissible degree of entanglement.”\footnote{115}

At this point, one might have thought that more than enough had been said for the Court to strike down the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island laws: The laws required monitoring and oversight of religious teachers, schools, and instruction.

\footnote{112} See id. at 614 (“[T]he cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.”). Strangely, though, Chief Justice Burger provided little by way of historical or theoretical explanation of why, exactly, “entanglement” is to be avoided or is prohibited by the Constitution. Justice Brennan, however, elaborated in his concurring opinion on the “real dangers of ‘the secularization of a creed.’” \textit{Id.} at 649 (Brennan, J., concurring).

\footnote{113} \textit{Id.} at 614 (majority opinion).

\footnote{114} \textit{Id.} (citations omitted).

\footnote{115} \textit{Id.} at 615. The Court observed that Rhode Island had “carefully conditioned its aid with pervasive restrictions,” the administration of which, the Court was confident, would “inevitably” require “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance” and would “involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.” \textit{Id.} at 619. And, the same was true, the Chief Justice noted, with respect to the Pennsylvania program, which provided aid for teachers’ salaries directly to schools “controlled by religious organizations” and that “have the purpose of propagating and promoting a particular religious faith.” \textit{Id.} at 620; \textit{see also id.} at 628 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he \textit{raison d’etre} of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious faith. They also teach secular subjects; but they came into existence in this country because Protestant groups were perverting the public schools by using them to propagate their faith. The Catholics naturally rebelled.”); \textit{id.} at 635 (“No matter what the curriculum offers, the question is, what is \textit{taught}? We deal not with evil teachers but with zealous ones who may use any opportunity to indoctrinate a class.” (citing \textit{LORaine BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM} 360 (1962) (emphasis added))); \textit{id.} (“It is well known that everything taught in most parochial schools is taught with the ultimate goal of religious education in mind.”); \textit{id.} at 635–36 (“One can imagine what a religious zealot, as contrasted to a civil libertarian, can do with the Reformation or with the Inquisition.”); \textit{id.} at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]eaching [of secular subjects] cannot be separated from the environment in which it occurs, for its integration with the religious mission is both the theory and the strength of the religious school.”). \textit{But see id.} at 663 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our prior cases have recognized the dual role of parochial schools in American society: they perform both religious and secular functions.”). As these quotations illustrate, the \textit{Lemon} Court’s premises and conclusions with respect to the monitoring and supervision of teachers and other activities in religious schools reflect a striking suspicion toward Catholic schools and their mission.
and these required entanglements invalidated the law. However, Chief Justice Burger went on to identify what he called "[a] broader base of entanglement of yet a different character," namely, that "presented by the divisive political potential of these state programs." After all,

In a community where such a large number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be assumed that state assistance will entail considerable political activity. Partisans of parochial schools... will inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual political campaign techniques to prevail.

In such a struggle, the Court asserted—without citing evidence—"[i]t would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people confronted with issues of this

116. In other words, the monitoring required by the Establishment Clause rendered the programs unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. Cf. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 627 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The surveillance or supervision of the States needed to police the grants involved in these three cases, if performed, puts a public investigator into every classroom and entails a pervasive monitoring of these church agencies by the secular authorities. Yet if that surveillance or supervision does not occur the zeal of religious proselytizers promises to carry the day and make a shambles of the Establishment Clause."); id. at 634 (noting that either "school prayers, the daily routine of parochial schools, must go" or "the state has established a religious sect"); id. at 668 (White, J., concurring) ("The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and the parochial schools.").

In Tilton v. Richardson—which was decided the same day as Lemon—the Court concluded that a federal program providing construction grants for buildings at church-related institutions of higher education did not violate the Constitution. 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971). For Chief Justice Burger, the chief distinction seemed to be that the colleges in question in Tilton— unlike the Roman Catholic elementary schools at issue in Lemon—"were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination." Id. at 681. With respect to the entanglement question that was outcome-determinative in Lemon, the Court concluded that the Constitution does not require monitoring of the grants because "college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination," the colleges themselves are "characterized by a high degree of academic freedom," the government aid is of a "nonideological character," and the appropriations are not part of an annual budget process. Id. at 685–88. In other words, the Constitution did not require monitoring that was itself unconstitutional. The Court's entanglement-based conclusions were "merely reinforced" by the observation that "there was political division over the primary school aid programs, but not the college grant programs." John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 17.4, at 1193 (4th ed. 1991).

117. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622; see also, e.g., Brief for Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amici Curiae, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970) (No. 89), 1970 WL 116836, at 12 ("It does not take any great cerebration to realize what a pandora's box of religious strife will be opened if this new erosion of the principle of the separation of church and state is permitted to undermine the foundation of the First Amendment.").

118. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. It is interesting to note that, to Chief Justice Burger, those who support public assistance to parochial schools and their students are "partisans," while those who oppose school aid are assumed to do so for "constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons." Cf. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970) (No. 89), 1970 WL 116843, at 22 ("The divisiveness claim] is necessarily conjectural and is not subject to empiric demonstration. It poses difficult political problems that are more appropriate for legislative than for judicial resolution.").

kind will find their votes aligned with their faith."

The Chief Justice anticipated the obvious objection to this line of argument: "Yes, people will fight about this. So what?" He conceded, as had Professor Freund, that "ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." And, to this historical claim about the intent underlying the First Amendment, Burger added an argument that sounds more in political theory, or politics, period: Even putting aside the aims of the Framers and ratifiers, "the potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political process" because division on these issues "would tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency." We have, in other words, more important business to attend to:

We have an expanding array of vexing issues, local and national, domestic and international, to debate and divide on. It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government.

True, "(a)dherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues"; indeed, "[w]e could not expect otherwise." Still, the Chief Justice insisted, the programs at issue in Lemon raised the specter of "successive and very likely permanent annual appropriations that"—unlike the tax exemption that the Court had upheld in Walz—"benefit relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified."

Chief Justice Burger's opinion closed, finally, with a nod to the slippery-slope...
argument. True, the Court in Walz had rejected, in light of the “more than 200 years of virtually universal practice imbedded in our colonial experience and continuing into the present,” the argument that the tax exemption upheld in that case would “prove to be the first step in an inevitable progression leading to the establishment of state churches and state religion.” In Lemon, however, this “progression” argument was found “more persuasive.” The programs at issue were, the Court asserted, “something of an innovation” and were likely to be “self-perpetuating” and “self-expanding.” Chief Justice Burger reminded his readers that “in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to approach ‘the verge,’ have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a ‘downhill thrust’ easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop.” Thus, entanglement between government and religion is not only an “independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect,” it serves also as a “warning signal” that further evils are menacing.

In sum, Chief Justice Burger proposed in Lemon that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits not only “establishments” of religion, but also “step[s] that could lead to [them];” that unlawfully excessive entanglement between government and religion exists not only when the former’s laws purport to require or authorize intrusive oversight and monitoring of the internal workings of the latter, but also when the state action in question has “divisive political potential”; that, with respect to certain issues—particularly those involving education funding—“many people . . . will find their votes aligned with their faith”; that the divisiveness fomented by this alignment is—unlike, apparently, other alignments and divisions—“a threat to the normal political process” because it “tend[s] to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency”; and that political division along religious lines is an evil against which the Establishment Clause was designed to protect and against which the Court is therefore authorized to fight. Animating all this, it appears, was dissension between church and state.”); id. at 640 (noting that the “surveillance needed” to avoid violating the Establishment Clause “would breed only rancor and dissension”).

127. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 624–25.
132. Id. at 612.
133. Id. at 622.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 622–23; see also id. at 623 (“It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government.”).
136. See id. at 622.
Chief Justice Burger’s fundamental but unexamined premise that our “Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice.” Religion is “divisive,” because it is private. Constitutional doctrine that forestalls religion-caused division is warranted, and justifiable, in part because such doctrine is not seen as burdening religion, but rather as confirming its nature and keeping it in its appropriate sphere.

Again, Chief Justice Burger provided no evidence to support his observations and predictions about the division associated with certain issues or for his political judgment that certain issues are less important, and more distracting, than others. Perhaps more curious, though, is the fact that he offered so little authority for his central constitutional claim—i.e., that the political division associated with, or predicted to attend, certain government programs is relevant to the question whether those programs violate the Establishment Clause. Instead, to support his “broader base of entanglement” argument, Chief Justice Burger relied entirely on the few already-quoted sentences from Professor Freund’s 1969 comment and on concurring opinions by Justices Harlan and Goldberg in Walz, Board of Education v. Allen, and School District v. Schempp.

In Walz, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a tax exemption for religious properties used for religious worship. While endorsing without reservation the result reached by the Court, Justice Harlan emphasized the importance of “preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.” For Justice Harlan, “neutrality” and “voluntarism”—the two touchstones in Establishment Clause cases—stand in most cases as “barriers against the most egregious and hence divisive kinds of state involvement in religious matters.” But not always: Also invoking Professor Freund, Harlan noted that “governmental involvement, while neutral, may be so direct or in such degree as to engender a risk of politicizing religion.” Observing that “religious groups inevitably represent certain points of view and not infrequently assert them in the political arena,” Harlan insisted

137. Id. at 625.
138. See supra text accompanying note 97.
140. Walz, 397 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 695.
142. Id.
143. Id. By considering whether state action “politicizes” religion, Justice Harlan appears to miss the significance of his own observation that religious believers and groups have views, and—not surprisingly—often express these views. It is not entirely clear, then, what the difference is between politicization by the state of religion and sanctification of politics by religion. Is religious activism an indication that religion has been politicized by the state or simply that religion is doing what it does?
that "history cautions that political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against."

Even under a neutral program that "entangle[s] the state in details of administration and planning," the state's participation "may escalate to the point of inviting undue fragmentation." Justice Harlan was satisfied, however, that the tax exemption at issue in Walz "neither encourages nor discourages participation in religious life"—and so complied with the "voluntarism" requirement—and also that the law was appropriately "neutral."

Justice Harlan had also highlighted his concern about political divisiveness a few years earlier in Allen. In that case, the Court upheld a New York law requiring local public-school authorities to loan secular textbooks to students at private and religious schools. Justice Harlan agreed with the result but wrote separately to "emphasize certain of the principles which I believe to be central to the determination of this case." His central points were that "the attitude of government toward religion must . . . be one of neutrality" and that "[n]eutrality is, however, a coat of many colors." In the end, he concluded, the Establishment Clause permits activities that do not "significantly and directly" involve the State "in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to . . . divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom . . . ." Similarly, in Schempp, Harlan joined Justice Goldberg's opinion concurring in the Court's invalidation of state laws requiring readings from the Bible in public schools, an opinion that warned against "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious." These Justices agreed, however, that such state-mandated uses of Scripture in government schools so crossed into "the realm of the sectarian, as to give rise to those very divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion clauses of the First Amendment preclude."

144. Id. at 695. Professor Gaffney suggests that Justice Harlan's worries here should be put in the context of the "intense political involvement" of certain religious leaders and ministers at the time, particularly with respect to the war in Vietnam. Gaffney, supra note 100, at 210 n.29; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 670 ("Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right.").

145. Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (citing also Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Allen and Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Schempp).

146. Id. at 696.


148. Id.

149. Id.

150. Id. (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).

151. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also id. ("Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive historically from religious teachings.")

152. Id. at 307; see also Feldman, supra note 9, at 180 (observing that the "question of divisiveness" was "squaredly in view" in Schempp). Note Justice Goldberg's juxtaposition here—as if they were the same or of similar constitutional import—of "divisive influences" and "inhibitions of freedom." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 307.
C. THE ARGUMENT’S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT IN FUNDING CASES

The majority in *Lemon* constitutionalized Chief Justice Burger’s short-form understanding of an unexamined law-office history of the Establishment Clause and the cautionary reservations and amorphous unease of Professor Freund and Justices Harlan and Goldberg. And if, in *Lemon*, the Argument was presented as *lagniappe*, as a “broader base of entanglement of yet a different character,” it would take on “a life of its own” just a few years later, in *Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist*. The program at issue in that case authorized direct money grants to designated nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair of school buildings and also involved tuition grants and a tax-benefit package for the low-income parents of nonpublic-school children. Here, it was not the reality of administrative entanglement but the perceived prospects for political conflict that did the work.

The precise role of judicial observations and predictions about division in what Justice Powell called the Court’s “weighing process” remained vague. Still, Powell’s elaboration for the Court of the Argument added to, or expanded upon, Chief Justice Burger’s in several interesting respects. Justice Powell took pains to establish, for example, that it was the bare fact of political strife—and not the unattractiveness, on the merits, of the end results of that strife—that was constitutionally significant. Like Burger, Powell conceded that “the prospect of . . . divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of

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154. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, *supra* note 116, at 1193. In *Nyquist*, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), “a form of completely neutral aid—a tuition voucher plan—was stricken in part because of the belief that any significant aid to students in sectarian schools caused political division.” NOWAK & ROTUNDA, *supra* note 116, at 1193. In *Zelman v. Simmons-Harris*, 536 U.S. 659 (2002), of course, the Justices upheld a school-voucher plan, but were able to distinguish *Nyquist* by noting that the program at issue in that case provided aid only to private schools and private-school students, while many of the benefits of the program at issue in *Zelman* were available to students attending public schools as well. The Court in *Zelman* stated that “we now hold that *Nyquist* does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the program here, offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to religion.” *Zelman*, 536 U.S. at 662.
156. The Court acknowledged the valid, secular purpose behind the measures at issue, see *id.* at 773, but concluded that they had the impermissible primary effect of “advancing religion,” see *id.* at 789.
157. “One factor of recurring significance in this weighing process is the potentially divisive political effect of an aid program.” *Id.* at 795. In other words, the *potentially divisive effects of a program are significant in a weighing process* that evaluates the States’ “substantial reasons” against “the relevant provisions and purposes of the First Amendment.” *See id.* This does not suggest a precise or predictable approach to the task of determining the constitutional validity of challenged programs.
158. Because of “the importance of the competing societal interests implicated here,” Justice Powell added and expanded upon the observation that “apart from any specific entanglement of the State in particular religious programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion.” *Id.* at 794.
159. *See id.* at 795 & n.53 (noting, *inter alia*, that “[f]ew would question most of the legislative findings supporting this statute” and that the “underlying reasons” for the laws were “substantial reasons”; and quoting the lower court’s statement that “[t]his litigation is, in essence, a conflict between two groups of extraordinary good will and civic responsibility”).
state laws,” while insisting that “it is certainly a ‘warning signal’ not to be ignored.”160 A “warning signal,” though, of what? In Nyquist, the conflict that appeared to occupy Powell’s mind was not merely the predictable and tedious squabbling about annual appropriations.161 More dramatic and ominous, it was the specter of “competition among religious sects for political and religious supremacy”162 that threatened to disrupt the political order.163

During the decade or so following Nyquist, the Court, time and again, confronted efforts by governments to provide educational aid, in various forms, to children attending religious schools. In the published decisions that resulted, the Justices’ efforts to apply the Lemon test to programs involving slide projectors, atlases, maps, standardized testing, and field trips were—as the Justices could not help admitting164—not always edifying. In these cases, observations about and predictions of sectarian strife or political division along religious lines were frequently offered as relevant to, if not outcome-determinative of, a school-aid program’s constitutional validity.

Thus, in Meek v. Pittenger,165 the Court employed the “clearly stated, if not easily applied” Lemon test to invalidate a series of Pennsylvania laws that authorized state-funded auxiliary services for children at private schools.166 Along the way, the majority noted that, because the programs would require continued annual appropriations, “the prospect of repeated confrontation between proponents and opponents of the auxiliary services” created potential divisiveness along religious lines.167 Chief Justice Burger, now in dissent,

160. Id. at 797–98.
161. Cf. id. at 797 & n.56 (observing that the political realities of expenditures, particularly annual ones in times of scarcity and the “self-perpetuating tendencies of any form of government aid to religion,” when combined with the fact that “the underlying issue is the deeply emotional one of Church-State relationships,” are such that “the potential for seriously divisive political consequences needs no elaboration”).
162. Id. at 796 (noting that such competition has “occasioned considerable civil strife, ‘generated in large part’ by competing efforts to gain or maintain the support of government” (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1947))).
163. See id. (“[W]hat is at stake as a matter of policy . . . is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.” (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. at 694 (1970))). This concern with the efficient operation and integrity of the political system is a consistent theme in Justice Powell’s Establishment Clause opinions.
164. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must seem arbitrary.”).
166. See id. at 358. These “auxiliary services” included remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling, testing, and speech and hearing services, psychological counseling, “and such other secular, neutral, nonideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided for public school children of the Commonwealth.” Id. at 352–53. Pennsylvania had also authorized the loaning of state-owned textbooks to children in private schools, see id. at 354, and this policy was—in light of Allen—easily upheld, see id. at 359–62.
167. Id. at 372. Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion, expanded on this observation, and insisted that the majority had erred in too quickly equating the textbook provision at issue with the program upheld in Allen. See id. at 379–81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The latter
responded by predicting that there was "at least as much potential for divisive political debate in opposition to the crabbled attitude the Court shows in this case." Of course, this criticism could have been applied with equal force to his own opinion in *Lemon*. In his view, though, the provision of auxiliary services that were equally available to public school children would not create the same political divisiveness along religious lines as did the subsidized teacher provisions in *Lemon*.

A few years later, in *Wolman v. Walter*, the Court considered a challenge to an Ohio program that used public funds to pay for a wide range of educational assistance, from standardized tests and test-scoring to maps, film projectors, and bus service. While some portions of the program were upheld and others were struck down, the Argument appeared only at the margins and was employed much as it had been in *Meek*. Justice Brennan, for example, recoiled from the "divisive political potential of unusual magnitude [that] inhere[d] in the Ohio program." Justice Marshall also emphasized that the aid to be provided to religious schools "[w]as certain to be substantial" and concluded that it should not be provided "because of the dangers of 'political divisiveness on religious lines.'" However, Justice Marshall's primary divisiveness-related concern was not the costs associated with the aid—after all, he conceded that even costly "general welfare programs that serve children in sectarian schools" could be permissible—but was instead the "sectarian func-

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168. Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 385–86.
171. See id. at 233–34.
172. Ohio's efforts to loan to students or their parents certain nonreligious "instructional materials"—projectors, tape recorders, maps, etc.—were invalidated on the ground that "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function of [religious] schools . . . necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole." Id. at 250 (quoting *Meek v. Pittenger*, 421 U.S. at 366). The use of public funds for "field trip transportation and services" for students in private schools was also invalidated. See id. at 254 ("[T]he public school authorities will be unable adequately to insure secular use of the field trip funds without close supervision of the nonpublic teachers. This would create excessive entanglement . . . ."). On the other hand, as in *Meek*, the Court permitted the lending of "secular" textbooks to students attending private (and, in practice, overwhelmingly Catholic) schools. See id. at 237–38.
173. In several of the parties' briefs and briefs of amici, however, the argument was prominently invoked. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants at 21–22, *Wolman*, 433 U.S. 229 (No. 76-496), 1977 WL 189137 ("Nor has there been a lack of political divisiveness. In Ohio, as elsewhere, groups have formed on both sides of these issues . . . who have sought, often bitterly, to impress their points of view upon the legislature . . . ."); Brief of The State Convention of Baptists in Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae at 26–27, *Wolman*, 433 U.S. 229 (No. 76-496), 1977 WL 189147 ("The Ohio legislature, bowing to intensive lobbying, has attempted time and again to thread the needle between *Allen* and the various other standards established by the Courts. . . . Rather than ending religious divisiveness, the adoption of each new test and each attempt to distinguish *Allen* has brought new litigation and increased religious-political strife.").
175. Id. at 259 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
tions of denominational schools." On the other hand, Justice Powell contended that the Court’s constitutional analysis should take appropriate account of the fact that “[t]he risk of significant religious or denominational control over our democratic processes or even of deep political division along religious lines is remote . . .”

In the following years, there was a move away from the political-divisiveness inquiry and a general slackening of enthusiasm for finding excessive entanglement in cases involving aid to religious schools and their activities. That said, assumptions and assertions about religion and divisiveness set the tone, if not determined the outcomes, in two of the Court’s more ill-starred Establishment Clause cases, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton. In Ball, the Court struck down a school district’s “community education” and “shared time” programs on the ground that they “advanced” religion. The Justices did not, in any depth, consider administrative-entanglement or political-divisiveness arguments. Still, animating the Court’s review was Justice Bren-

176. Id. at 259–60 (“[B]ecause general welfare programs do not assist the sectarian functions of denominational schools, there is no reason to expect that political disputes over the merits of those programs will divide the public along religious lines.”).

Justice Marshall also stated that an appropriate appreciation for the “divisive political potential” of “programs of aid to sectarian schools” required that Allen be overruled. See id. at 259 (“Allen did not consider the significance of the potential for political divisiveness inherent in programs of aid to sectarian schools.”).

177. Id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As in Meek, Justice Powell’s concern went beyond the division that might naturally attend the appropriations process. He sounded a broader alarm, about “denominational control.”

178. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) (“We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the [Act] is invalid because it is likely to create political division along religious lines. It may well be that because of the importance of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there may be a division of opinion along religious lines as well as other lines. But the same may be said of a great number of other public issues of our day.” (citation omitted)); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 n.8 (1980) (“We find no merit whatever in appellants’ argument . . . that the extent of entanglement here is sufficient to raise the danger of future political divisiveness along religious lines.”); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765–66 (1976) (endorsing, as “entirely sound,” the conclusion that the aid program in question was constitutional—and not excessively divisive—because, inter alia, of the “substantial autonomy of the colleges” receiving the aid). See generally, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1195–97 (describing these developments).

181. 473 U.S. at 398. The Court also describes the program and the “sectarian” character of many of the schools at which the programs operated. See id. at 375–79.
182. See id. at 397 n.14. The trial court had concluded, though, that the programs in question “entailed an unacceptable level of entanglement, both political and administrative, between the public school systems and the sectarian schools.” Id. at 380–81. In several of the briefs filed in the case, though, the Argument was invoked or engaged. See, e.g., Brief of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990), 1984 WL 565398 (warning that judicial approval of “schemes” like the one at issue in Ball “would create divisiveness along religious lines the likes of which this country has not seen. The current anti-clericalism would be multiplied many fold”); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990), 1984 WL 565395
nan’s cautionary observation that “just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve powerfully to divide societies,” and also his defense of the Lemon test in school-aid cases on the ground that “[t]he government’s activities in this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for divisive rifts along religious lines in the body politic.”

In Ball’s companion case, Aguilar v. Felton, the Justices similarly invalidated a New York City program that used federal funds to pay the salaries of public-school employees who taught nonreligious, remedial subjects on-site in parochial schools. As in Lemon, the Court concluded that government supervision designed to make sure that the content of publicly funded education remained entirely non-religious “inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and state.” In other words, New York’s effort to prevent its policy from having the effect of advancing religion brought it into conflict with the no-entanglement rule. Justice Brennan also observed, without dwelling on the matter, that the required monitoring of religious schools’ activities could increase “the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines.” However, the primary dangers associated with this monitoring were not so much the risks of political discord associated with efforts to implement Title I, but the interference and “secularization” that it posed to religion. The Argument played a more prominent role in the concurring—and crucial—opinion of Justice Powell. Acknowledging that the programs in both Ball and Aguilar had

183. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382. The way through this tension—a solution which Justice Brennan attributes to the Founders—is the privatization of religion. See id. at 382 (“The solution to this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience while requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreligion.”).

184. Id. at 383.

185. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404. The Court also noted that the funds were used to pay for the teaching of “remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, [and] English as a second language” to Title I’s low-income beneficiaries. Id. at 406.

186. See id. at 409. As in Lemon, this conclusion depended crucially on the Court’s characterization of the parochial schools at issue as “pervasively sectarian,” and therefore in need of careful monitoring to prevent the funding of religious activities. Id. at 411–13.


188. Id. at 414 (majority opinion).

189. See id. at 413 (noting the Establishment Clause’s objective of “prevent[ing] intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971))); id. at 414 (“[T]he picture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools . . . surely raises more than an imagined specter of governmental “secularization of a creed.”” (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 650 (opinion of Brennan, J.))).
"'done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm,'" he nonetheless emphasized the "considerable risk of continuing political strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation of limited governmental resources." Justice Powell's separate opinion is noteworthy for being more specific about what, exactly, the harm is that triggers the Argument: The fear is not, he confessed, that the government funding could result in the "establishment of a state religion"; nor is it even that local efforts to implement the program could "result in significant religious or denominational control over our democratic processes." Instead, the point is that the enactment and implementation of the program take place in a political context and will certainly "spark political disagreement." The "proper allocation of limited government resources" is, necessarily, a contentious subject, and so programs like these pose a "considerable risk of continuing political strife." What's more, he reasoned, even a healthy political community—one that is generally able to weather the storms of division and disagreement—is endangered by the kind of "strife" that is associated with public assistance to parochial-school students. The "potential for such divisiveness" provided, for Justice Powell, "a strong additional reason" for invalidating the programs at issue.

Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, remained unhappy with the uses to which his opinion in Lemon—in particular, his discussion of "political divisiveness along religious lines"—was being put by his colleagues. It was Justice O'Connor, though, who responded most directly to Justice Powell's invocation of the potential for division. In her view, neither in Meek nor in Aguilar had the parties presented convincing evidence that publicly funded instruction in parochial

190. Id. at 415 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Felton v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984)).
191. Id. at 416.
192. Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973) ("[W]hat is at stake... is preventing that kind and degree of governmental involvement in religious life that... frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.").
194. Id. at 416 (stating that there will, unavoidably, be "competition and strife," and that it will, unavoidably, be the case that "politics will enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools").
195. See id. at 417 ("[A]id to parochial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."" (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))). Justice Powell's opinion here raises the question whether the "involvement" at issue here—the involvement that triggers the objectionable strife—is the monitoring or the funding itself.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing "concern that the Court's obsession with the criteria identified in [Lemon] has led to results that are 'contrary to the long-range interests of the country'"); see also id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court had "traveled far afield from the concerns which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we rely on gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets an entirely secular need").
schools "would produce political divisiveness." The weakness in the division-based argument was not simply a matter of the weight of the evidence. Justice O'Connor also questioned the very idea of according constitutional significance to predictions of political disagreement, highlighting the "hecker's veto" character of the Argument.

D. VARIATIONS ON THE ARGUMENT IN OTHER CONTEXTS

The possibility of "political divisiveness along religious lines" was invoked and treated as having doctrinal significance not only in school-funding cases. That said, by the mid-1980s, a majority of the Justices agreed with Justice O'Connor that "the 'elusive inquiry' into political divisiveness should be confined to the narrow category of parochial-aid cases." As if to confirm its

198. Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 429 ("The Court's reliance on the potential for political divisiveness as evidence of undue entanglement is also unpersuasive. There is little record support for the proposition that [the program] has ignited any controversy other than this litigation.").

199. Id. at 429. Justice O'Connor also noted that in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the "concurring opinion . . . suggest[ed] that Establishment Clause analysis should focus solely on the character of the government activity that might cause political divisiveness" and that "the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687).

200. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429 ("It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of the Constitution on speculation as to the likelihood of a phenomenon which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a lawsuit.").

201. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts zoning statute that prohibited the granting of a liquor license to an establishment located within 500 feet of a church if the church objected, noting that, by vesting an effective "veto" with religious institutions, the statute "enmeshes churches in the processes of government," and created the danger of political divisiveness along religious lines and therefore failed the Lemon test); cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that Tennessee law prohibiting ministers from serving at a constitutional convention was unconstitutional, and emphasizing that it was impermissible to assume that ministers elected to public office "will necessarily exercise their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality").

202. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding federal law authorizing loan of educational equipment to schools, including private and religious schools, and rejecting any "resurrect[ion]" of the political-divisiveness inquiry, which was "rightly disregarded" after Aguilar); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) (upholding Adolescent Family Life Act, which provided grants to religious and other institutions providing counseling on teenage sexuality, and stating that "the question of 'political divisiveness' should be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools." (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983))); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987) ("[T]his Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct. And we decline to so hold today. This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into political divisiveness is even called for . . ."); quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684)); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n.11 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota provision that permitted taxpayers to deduct educational expenses from their state income-tax returns, whether those expenses were associated with public or private schooling, and stating that Lemon's "political divisiveness" language should be "confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools."). In neither Bowen nor Mueller was it explained what it was about the political-divisiveness argument, or the arguments
"elusive" nature, though, the Argument resisted confinement. Although the Court has put aside Chief Justice Burger's formulation—that is, the potential for "political divisiveness along religious lines" is a kind of "excessive entanglement" within the meaning of the Lemon test's third part—that the Argument has nonetheless continued to be employed in a wide variety of cases and in many different ways. It has proved versatile and protean; its premises and the concerns to which it speaks are hardy and easily transplantable.

For example, one encounters these same premises and concerns throughout the Court's flirtation with, and embracing of, Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test." In *Lynch v. Donnelly*, the Justices considered a challenge to Pawtucket, Rhode Island's annual Christmas display, which included a creche. Chief Justice Burger downplayed the significance of the Lemon test, and of the political-divisiveness inquiry, focusing instead on the history of religious displays and expression in American public life. In a concurring opinion, though, Justice O'Connor set out her views concerning the importance in Establishment Clause cases of preventing government "endorsement" of religion. In so doing, she stated that the presence or absence of political pressed in *Lemon*, that justified such a limitation. See, e.g., *Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'r's of Davidson County*, 407 F.3d 266, 273 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that "the Court's 'political divisiveness' rubric is . . . inapplicable" to cases outside the parochial-school-funding context).

To be sure, the cabining or confining of the argument from division has not been without exceptions. See, e.g., *Marsh v. Chambers*, 463 U.S. 783, 800-01, 805 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (insisting that "any group of law students" would, employing Lemon, invalidate Nebraska's practice of allowing a paid chaplain to open legislative sessions with a prayer and arguing that the Establishment Clause seeks, "with regard to matters that are essentially religious . . . that there should be no political battles").

Claims about division have also been pressed in cases that turned on another of Lemon's prongs. In *Edwards v. Aguilard*, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987), for example, the Court invalidated—as lacking the required "secular purpose"—Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act." Dissenting from this disposition, Justice Scalia offered the reminder that "political activism by the religiously motivated is a part of our heritage" and that "[t]oday's religious activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act, but yesterday's resulted in the abolition of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine victims." *Id.* at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

204. *Lupu & Tuttle*, *supra* note 31, at 953-54 (concluding that the Argument has "kept a small toehold" in the area of Establishment Clause challenges to government speech on religious issues).


206. *Id.* at 679 ("We have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test in this sensitive area.").

207. *Id.* at 684 ("[T]his Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.").

208. *Id.* at 675 ("Our history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders."); *Id.* at 680 (noting City's display need not be considered an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, but instead a depiction of a "significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World").

209. *See id.* at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
divisiveness "should not be an independent test of constitutionality." In fact, though, the exposition and application of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test" has in practice invariably involved something like the search for political divisiveness along religious lines. That is, asking whether a reasonable observer would regard herself as having been cast by state action as an outsider in the political community seems consonant with, if not equivalent to, asking whether that same state action does or could cause political divisiveness. For example, in *County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union*, Justice O'Connor evaluated the holiday displays at issue in terms of the messages of exclusion or favoritism that were or were not communicated by government. As Justice Stevens reminded her, though, the question whether religious minorities or outsiders perceive such exclusion or favoritism is not easily separable from observations and predictions about religion-based divisions in the political community. More recently, in *Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow*, a majority of the Justices concluded that principles of standing counseled against resolving definitively constitutional questions surrounding the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public-school classrooms. Justice O'Connor, though, would have reached the merits and approved the Pledge. She found it both telling and constitutionally relevant, in her concurring opinion, that "so little ire has been directed at the Pledge."

Justice Kennedy's focus on coercion in Establishment Clause cases is also hospitable to a revised or translated form of the Argument. This method's

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210. Id. at 689 ("[W]e have never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for holding a governmental practice unconstitutional."); cf. id. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he quiescence of those opposed to the crèche may have reflected nothing more than their sense of futility in opposing the majority.").

211. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (framing inquiry in terms of whether government makes religion relevant to one's "standing in the political community").

212. See 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than showing either favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based on their personal religious choices, government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full members of the political community.").

213. See id. at 651 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("These cases illustrate the danger that governmental displays of religious symbols may give rise to unintended divisiveness, for the net result of the Court's disposition is to disallow the display of the crèche but to allow the display of the menorah.").

Judge McConnell has criticized the endorsement test for precisely these reasons. In his view, the problem with the endorsement approach "is that it exacerbates religious division and discord by heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic injuries." Michael W. McConnell, *Religious Freedom at a Crossroads*, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 193 (1992).


215. Id. at 39 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also cited the observation, made in *Lynch*, that the display in question there had "caused no political divisiveness." See id. at 38 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984)). The question of the Pledge's "divisiveness" was also, as has already been noted, a topic on which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Newdow exchanged views during oral argument. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

216. This notwithstanding the fact that the "coercion" test is framed and regarded as departing in significant and important ways from the concerns animating the "endorsement" test. *Compare Alle-
most prominent deployment was in *Lee v. Weisman*, in which the Court invalidated a nonsectarian prayer offered by an invited rabbi at a middle-school graduation.\(^{217}\) Writing for a narrow majority, Justice Kennedy purported to reject an invitation to reconsider *Lemon*;\(^{218}\) still, his analysis owed little to that case’s three-part test. Instead, it was enough to establish—or, in any event, to conclude—that the relevant state actors had “creat[ed] a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school.”\(^{219}\) Certainly, Justice Kennedy’s core claim was that “[n]o holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise”; indeed, he insisted, such compulsion is forbidden by the Establishment Clause.\(^{220}\) Nonetheless, the decision owes as much as any post-*Lemon* opinion to claims and predictions about politics, division, and religion. At times, the Argument is explicit;\(^{221}\) in other places, its work is more subtle.\(^{222}\) Although Justice Kennedy took pains to disavow any sweeping “no division” mandate\(^{223}\) and to locate his argument in a particular context—one that, in his view, presents special dangers of coercion—premises about “political divisiveness” run through Justice Kennedy’s typically high-flying rhetoric about the nature and purpose of schooling in a “pluralistic society.”\(^{224}\)
Eventually, Justice Kennedy pulled back to more modest claims about the perceptions of the "nonbeliever or the dissenter" in the setting of a public-school graduation.225 And, in the end, the case probably turned more on "peer pressure" than on political fissures.226 It remained for Justice Blackmun to pick up and run with the argument from division. To underscore his insistence that "it is not enough that the government restrain from compelling religious practices,"227 Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]he mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no one is forced to participate" because "[o]nly 'anguish, hardship and bitter strife' result 'when zealous religious groups strugg[e] with one another to obtain the government's stamp of approval.'"228 Echoing the worry that Justice Powell often expressed in the parochial-school-aid cases, Justice Blackmun warned that "[s]uch a struggle can 'strain a political system to the breaking point.'"229 He supplemented these claims about strife with a quotation from the Memorial and Remonstrance, by invoking the specter of the Inquisition, and with an anecdote supplied by a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union concerning the volatility of the school-prayer issue.230 Not far below the surface was the charge that religion,

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225. See id. at 592. This reliance on "perceptions" might come as a surprise, given that the "coercion" test is offered as, among other things, an alternative to the "endorsement" test.

226. See id. at 593-96; cf. id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's test of "psychological coercion" as "its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering... a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion").

227. Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

228. Id. at 606-07 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962)).

229. Id. at 607 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)). In his separate opinion, Justice Souter hinted at a similar theme. See id. at 617-18 (Souter, J., concurring) ("We have not changed much since the days of Madison, and the judiciary should not willingly enter the political arena to battle the centripetal force leading from religious pluralism to official preference for the faith with the most votes.").

230. See id. at 607 & n.10 ("Religion has not lost its power to engender divisiveness.").
because it is divisive, is dangerous to democracy.\textsuperscript{231}

Perhaps the most difficult of the Court's recent Establishment Clause cases to categorize, or to assimilate to the current doctrinal structure, is \textit{Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet}.\textsuperscript{232} New York had created a school district by special statute specifically for the Village of Kiryas Joel, "a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim."\textsuperscript{233} Justice Souter, writing for the Court, saw the statute as "tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious criterion" and, therefore, as a violation of the Establishment Clause.\textsuperscript{234} If only out of habit, Justice Souter added that, in \textit{Lemon}'s terms, this unlawful "allocation of power" had the impermissible effect of advancing religion.\textsuperscript{235} But

that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship and seek." \textit{Id.} at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{231} See \textit{id.} at 607 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Democracy requires the nourishment of dialog and dissent, while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority above all human deliberation. When the government appropriates religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate into theological decree.' Those who no longer are questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of a higher authority who is beyond reproach."); \textit{Id.} at 608 ("Democratic government will not last long when proclamation replaces persuasion as the medium of political exchange."). In other words, the influence of "religion" is divisive because religion is unreasoning. Democracy must be policed so as to remain the realm of "persuasion." \textit{See, e.g.,} Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Clarence Darrow's claim that "[t]he realm of religion . . . is where knowledge leaves off, and where faith begins").

In his separate opinion, Justice Souter hinted at a similar theme. \textit{See Lee}, 505 U.S. at 617–18 ("We have not changed much since the days of Madison, and the judiciary should not willingly enter the political arena to battle the centripetal force leading from religious pluralism to official preference for the faith with the most votes.").

\textsuperscript{232} 512 U.S. 687 (1994).

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Id.} at 690. Governor Cuomo remarked, when he signed the bill creating the district, that it was "a good faith effort to solve the unique problem' associated with providing special education services to handicapped children in the village." \textit{Id.} at 693.

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{See id.} at 690; \textit{see also id.} at 696 (stating that the law creating the school district "departs from [the First Amendment's 'neutrality' command] by delegating the State's discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally."); \textit{Id.} at 696–708 (analyzing the district in light of \textit{Larkin}). \textit{But see id.} at 746 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Souter's reading of \textit{Larkin}).

It was only the school district, and not the Village itself—even though the district followed the Village's lines—that was invalidated. And, the "boundaries of the village of Kiryas Joel were drawn to include just the 320 acres owned and inhabited entirely by Satmars." \textit{Id.} at 691. Note also that the imputed for the creation of the school district was the Court's decisions in \textit{Aguilar} and \textit{Ball}, which cast doubt on the validity of earlier efforts to provide special-education services to Satmar children attending religious schools. \textit{See id.} at 692; \textit{id.} at 730–31 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Id.} at 697. Justice Blackmun wrote separately to "note my disagreement with any suggestion that today's decision signals a departure from the principles described in \textit{Lemon}.", \textit{Id.} at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He also insisted that the Court's analysis was functionally similar to an application of \textit{Lemon}'s "effect" and "entanglement" prongs. \textit{See id.} at 710. Justice O'Connor, however, welcomed the Court's lack of emphasis on \textit{Lemon}. \textit{See id.} at 718 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[S]etting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than good."); \textit{Id.} at 721 ("[T]he case law will better be able to evolve towards [a unified test] if it is freed from the \textit{Lemon} test's rigid influence."); \textit{see also id.} at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's "snub of \textit{Lemon}").
even if *Lemon* and its three-part test were cast in a background role, the Argument was on display. Even in setting the stage and reciting the facts, Justice Souter reported that “[n]eighbors who did not wish to secede with the Satmars objected strenuously” to the Village’s creation. At the heart of his analysis was unease about “legislative favoritism along religious lines” and the concern, if not the conviction, that the “next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own [would not] receive one.”

The dangers of political division and social segregation were also flagged in several of the Justices’ separate opinions. Justice Stevens, for example, couched his arguments not so much in terms of the strife that might attend the legislative creation of school districts like the one for Kiryas Joel, but rather in terms of the sectarianism and separation that would result from such an accommodation. Thus, what the district’s supporters regarded as a program aimed at assisting, in a religion-sensitive way, certain special-needs children, Justice Stevens characterized as an attempt to accommodate a “religious sect’s interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from associating with their neighbors.” For him, it was not only a social and civic flaw, but also a constitutional one, in the district’s creation that it “increased the likelihood that [Satmar children] would remain within the fold.” As in some of the Court’s earlier school-aid cases, then, the controlling concern in Justice Stevens’s opinion was not so much with the division surrounding a decision to fund education in religious schools, but instead with the division created by religious education itself.

Taking a different tack, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the legislature had exploited “political or electoral boundaries” in crafting what could otherwise stand as a commendable accommodation of religion. That is, it was the conflation of political and religious lines—a conflation that presented “the danger of stigma and stirred animosities”—and not speculation concerning the outcome of future legislative battles, that troubled him.

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236. *Id.* at 691 (majority opinion).
237. *Id.* at 704.
238. *Id.* at 703. *But see id.* at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This rationale seems to me without grounding in our precedents and a needless restriction upon the legislature’s ability to respond to the unique problems of a particular religious group.”); *id.* at 726 (“No party has adduced any evidence that the legislature has denied another religious community like the Satmars its own school district under analogous circumstances.”).
239. *See id.* at 711–12 (Stevens, J., concurring)
240. *Cf. id.* at 716 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the law creating the district “singles out a particular religious group for favorable treatment” and was not a “general accommodation”).
241. *Id.* at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring). *But see id.* at 749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Justice Stevens’ statement is less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism. It surpasses mere rejection of accommodation, and announces a positive hostility to religion—which, unlike all other noncriminal values, the State must not assist parents in transmitting to their children.”).
242. *Id.* at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the law as one that “provided official support to cement the attachment of young adherents to a particular faith”).
243. *See id.* at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multi-religious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together become separatist; antagonisms that related to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here.\footnote{244}{Id. at 728–29 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); \textit{see also} id. (noting that a “fundamental limitation” imposed by the Establishment Clause is that “government may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines”); \textit{id.} (“[T]he Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion.”); \textit{id.} at 732 (“The Establishment Clause forbids the government to draw political boundaries on the basis of religious faith.”). For Justice Kennedy, the “lines” or divisions in question have the advantage of being more concrete than those presumed or invoked by, say, Chief Justice Burger in Lemon. Note the tension between this proclamation and Justice Kennedy’s observation that “[p]eople who share a common religious belief or lifestyle may live together without sacrificing the basic rights of self-governance that all American citizens enjoy[.]” \textit{id.} at 730.}

To be sure, Justice Kennedy insisted that he was not confusing the “democratic ideal” with assimilation or cultural homogeneity:

\begin{quote}
[T]he Establishment Clause must not be construed as some sort of homogenizing solvent that forces unconventional religious groups to choose between assimilating to mainstream American culture or losing their political rights. There is more than a fine line, however, between the voluntary association that leads to a political community comprised of people who share a common religious faith, and the forced separation that occurs when the government draws explicit political boundaries on the basis of peoples’ faith.\footnote{245}{\textit{Id.} at 730 (Kennedy, J., concurring).}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
E. THE REVIVAL OF THE POLITICAL-DIVISIVENESS ARGUMENT
\end{quote}

Since Lemon, the argument that “political divisiveness along religious lines” is a phenomenon that judges are authorized and competent to identify and that is relevant to the constitutionality of government action has been employed in dozens of cases by dozens of courts.\footnote{246}{For only a few of many, see, for example, Am. Family Ass’n, Inc., v. City of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2001); Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 224 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2000); ACLU of New Jersey ex \textit{rel.} Lander v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d. Cir. 1999).} The Argument’s purchase, again, appears to have revived somewhat in recent years, providing the structure and animating theme for Justice Breyer’s dissent in Zelman, and also a powerful rhetorical flourish for Michael Newdow in his oral arguments.\footnote{247}{\textit{See} Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).} During those arguments, Justice Breyer opened the door, suggesting to Newdow that the Pledge of Allegiance “isn’t that divisive if . . . you have a very broad understanding of God,” and that, perhaps, the Pledge “serves a purpose of unification at the
price of offending a small number of people like you." Newdow, not surprisingly, resisted this proposed constitutionalization of the "law disregards trifles" maxim, insisting that "there's [nothing] in the Constitution that says what percentage of people get separated out."

Most recently, Justice Breyer's conclusions about the division caused, or not caused, by Ten Commandments displays in Texas and Kentucky were outcome-determinative last Term in Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU. Speaking through ten separate opinions, the Justices disapproved, for lacking a "secular purpose," displays in two Kentucky county courthouses. At the same time, they permitted a six-foot-high stone monolith, inscribed with the Commandments, on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. Although Justice Souter's opinion for the Court in McCreary focused on the secular-purpose question, he tied that inquiry and its importance to claims about "divisiveness" and conflict. He noted, for example, that for government to act with a prohibited religious "purpose" would "clash[] with the 'understanding reached ... after decades of war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens.'" He also warned of the "civic divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs in on one side of religious debate." "Nothing," after all, "does a better job of roiling society."

Justice O'Connor sounded similar themes in her concurring opinion. She pronounced us "fortunate" that "[o]ur regard for constitutional boundaries between religion and government has 'protected us' from the "violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by government." In the Van Orden case, Chief Justice Rehnquist had nothing to say specifically about the divisiveness, or lack of it, associated with the Texas monument.

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248. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 43.
250. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 43.
251. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)
252. According to a news report, the number of separate opinions in Van Orden and McCreary County prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to quip, "I didn't know we had that many people on our Court." See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at A6.
253. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2722.
254. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2854; see also id. at 2864 ("The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group [of monuments on the Capitol grounds] has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government.").
255. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002))
256. Id. at 2742.
257. Id.; see also id. at 2745 ("We are centuries away from the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre and the treatment of heretics in early Massachusetts, but the divisiveness of religion in current public life is inescapable.").
258. Id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2747 ("Allowing government to be a potential mouthpiece for competing religious ideas risk the sort of division that might easily spill over into suppression of rival beliefs.").
But again, Justice Breyer—whose departure from the McCreary majority supplied the deciding vote—certainly did. He highlighted as a “basic purpose[]” of the Establishment Clause to “avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike.” He several times disclaimed any reliance on a “single mechanical formula” and concluded that the monument is not constitutionally impermissible because it is “unlikely to prove divisive.” Indeed, Justice Breyer invoked the possibility of “religiously based divisiveness” resulting from a contrary ruling as an additional reason for permitting the monument. That is, his predictions about political divisiveness along religious lines resulting from state action served not as such predictions usually have—i.e., as a reason for invalidating the action being challenged as an unconstitutional establishment of religion—but instead as a reason for staying the Court’s hand. At the same time, Justice Breyer emphasized that the monument’s forty-year, controversy-free history provided a reason to conclude that its message was not being perceived as religious or exclusionary.

* * * *

The foregoing account shows that the Argument has been put to a variety of uses and has taken many forms. If courts have been neither clear nor consistent with respect to the role that political divisiveness plays in resolving Establishment Clause disputes, they have done no better when it comes to pinning

259. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring); cf., e.g., Lemon, 413 U.S. at 622 (“The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political process.”).

260. Id.; see also id. at 2869 (“I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”).

261. Id. at 2871. For Justice Breyer, this conclusion was supported by the fact that “[t]his display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations.” Id. Justice Breyer’s conclusion that the Texas monument was not so divisive as to require invalidation prompted Justice Souter to quip, “I doubt that a slow walk to the courthouse, even one that took 40 years, is much evidentiary help in applying the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting).

262. See id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring).

263. Cf., e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 341 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There is a danger that in overturning long and widely accepted accommodations, courts will divide a community, rather than unite it. A primary aim of the Establishment Clause is to prevent divisiveness over matters of religion.”); Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1238, 1240 (D. Utah 2001) (rejecting argument that City violated the First Amendment by selling a pedestrian easement in the Main Street Plaza to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, noting that the City’s desire to “bring[] an end to the divisiveness in the community” and “put[ting] to rest an extremely divisive issue” were valid “secular purposes”).

264. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations. That experience helps us understand that as a practical matter of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive.”).

265. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1193 (noting that the Argument has done very little real “work,” but has instead served only “to reinforce the conclusions of the Court”). In similar fashion, Professor Tribe noted that although “the Court has not yet delineated this inquiry’s independent power,” it has “emphasized divisiveness as a factor in striking down various programs, particularly aid to parochial schools.” LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-14, at 1278 (1988). What’s more, “the Court has specifically declined to hold that the threat of divisiveness is alone sufficient to strike a program down.” Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“The Court of
down the phenomenon itself: Sometimes, the "divisiveness" doing the job seems to refer to the fact that members of the political community will argue about, and line up on different sides of, legislative proposals—particularly proposals that involve the allocation of public funds. This "dividing of the house" is thought to be particularly pernicious when the resulting fault lines appear to track religious or denominational lines. In some opinions, though, the division that is treated as constitutionally significant, and troubling, has less to do with election-day tallies than with tone of public discourse, the texture of civil society, and the dispositions of citizens, schoolchildren in particular. In still others, the use of the Establishment Clause by judges as a way to monitor and curb "political divisiveness along religious lines" seems to reflect a determination that certain results are substantively undesirable, and therefore impermissible.\(^\text{266}\)

Because "political divisiveness along religious lines" has meant and can mean so many different things, and observations or predictions about it can be put to a variety of doctrinal uses, it is difficult to respond, both to the Argument itself and to its application in particular cases. It is hard to engage an argument that will not stand still.

III. VARIATIONS ON A THEME

Again, it is not always clear in the relevant cases what is the alleged connection between the existence or prediction of political disagreement; the "religious" nature of the subject matter about which people disagree; the "religious" beliefs or affiliations of those people who are doing the disagreeing; and the test, history, structure, and purpose of the Establishment Clause. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that, in the years since *Lemon*, there has waxed and waned in Establishment Clause cases an Argument that involves a complicated combination of claims about the effects of certain policies or legislative proposals on the tone and content of public discourse, about the connection between such effects and religious affiliations and belief, about the history and purpose of the First Amendment, about the role of courts, and about principles and norms of political morality.

In this Part, I take up the merits of the Argument. The aim here is to examine and determine exactly what it is that those who assert or presume a working doctrinal relationship between constitutional validity, on the one hand, and "division" or "strife," on the other, are claiming. What, in other words, is the "political divisiveness" argument? Perhaps, in the end, a pat answer is not available. Still, the effort is worthwhile, as it helps us to assess the normative

\(^\text{266}\) Cf. *Tribue*, supra note 265, at 1278 n.19 ("[T]he Court has suggested that state aid to parochial schools possesses a uniquely divisive potential."); id. at 1278 ("[T]he Court has suggested that the inquiry applies only in a limited set of cases.").
attractiveness of its premises and several incarnations.

* * * * *

The Argument's staying power and apparent revival might seem surprising, given that it has been frequently and strongly criticized and has rarely received an energetic defense, even by judges who invoke and apply it and scholars who concede sympathy for it. In what appears to remain, after nearly twenty-five years, the only article-length treatment of the Argument, Professor Gaffney asserted provocatively that the Court had inflicted a "wound" on itself by "introduc[ing] into the standards of constitutional adjudication the dubious proposition that judges are empowered to invalidate legislation if that legislation might have the tendency to create 'political division along religious lines.'" 267 Similarly—though, perhaps, less aggressively—Professor Tribe long ago characterized as "troubling" the "suggestion that religion...be kept away from politics." 268

The scholarly criticisms of the Argument incorporate a number of similar, overlapping themes. Professor Tribe, for example, has observed that the Argument purports to authorize a constitutional standard that is "unusually difficult to administer." 269 Others have challenged the premise that religious commitments are more divisive, or that divisions along religious lines should be more troubling, than others. 270 Still others have highlighted the sweeping and quixotic nature of the Argument, reminding us that religious conflict and political disputes are inevitable and will always be with us. 271 Indeed, as Professors


268. Tribe, supra note 265, at 1276. Professor Tribe also grouped the "political divisiveness inquiry" with the Court's "secular purpose" test as two doctrines "suggesting that, when religious believers arrive at political debates, they must check their beliefs at the door or risk losing their efficacy." Id. at 1277–78.

269. Id. at 1280.

270. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 70, at 40–41 ("[R]eligiouly grounded moral discourse is not necessarily more sectarian than secular moral discourse."); id. at 154–55 n.11 ("American history does not suggest that debates about religious (theological) issues are invariably more divisive than debates about political issues."); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555, 563–64 (1998) ("There is nothing about religious belief and practice in contemporary America that is uniquely disruptive of the social order."); Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 830 (1984) (describing as "problematic" the "factual assumption" that "religious disputes and religious people are particularly contentious"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 Notre Dame L. REV. 1597, 1608 (1997) ("If political peace is the goal, the religion clauses are not at all well tailored to achieve it. They are radically underinclusive in the subjects of possible divisiveness that they cover."); Smith, supra note 14, at 1248 (noting the objection that "religion has been no more generative of conflict in modern America than various other issues and movements"); cf. Marshall, supra note 24, at 859 n.80 (noting that "religion's unique relationship to one of humanity's deepest fears suggests that it possesses an inherent volatility that secular ideologies do not").

271. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1193 ("If the political divisiveness test is in fact being used by the majority to ban religious conflict, the attempt would appear to be futile at best."); Tribe, supra note 265, at 1281 ("[S]ome degree of division is inevitable . . . .").
Nowak and Rotunda have noted, it could be that judicial efforts to impose tranquility and cohesion exacerbate the conflicts, and sharpen the cleavages, that the political-divisiveness inquiry purports to police.\textsuperscript{272} Relatedly, it has been observed that some efforts to soothe the social irritation of religion-related strife have the effect—an effect that should be regretted in a democracy committed to equal-respect and full-political-participation norms—of silencing or excluding from public deliberation those citizens whose views and values are connected to, or emerge from, their religious commitments.\textsuperscript{273}

At the same time, there is in much of the relevant commentary a suggestion that, while misplaced as a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Argument touches on and points toward some important truths of political morality. Thus, Professor Tribe frames his critique around an acknowledgement that the Argument begins from “two valid precepts”: First, “it correctly focuses on outsiders’ reactions as importantly measuring establishment clause violations”; and second, it “correctly notes that religious cleavages could fragment politics, and that the first amendment in part reduces this danger.”\textsuperscript{274} At the same time, he continues, it does not follow from the fact that the First Amendment, properly understood, is useful in reducing religion-based strife that the Constitution authorizes, “requires, or even permits, whatever steps might be needed to reduce religion-based political divisiveness.”\textsuperscript{275}

The question remains: What exactly is the Argument? To answer this question, assume a proposed or enacted regulatory, spending, or expressive policy (“the Policy”), and assume also that the Policy’s opponents say it is unconstitutional because of its “divisive political potential” or because, more specifically, of the observed or predicted “political division along religious lines” associated with it. If pressed, how would an opponent of the Policy articulate precisely her constitutional objection?

\textsuperscript{272} NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1194. See also Berg, supra note 31, at 192 (“Currently, considerable political and social strife stems from the denial of educational choice . . .”); Johnson, supra note 270, at 830 (“One sure way to encourage conflict . . . is to encourage people to think that what seem to be minor irritations are in reality violations of some sacred principle for which they have a duty to fight.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 31, at 954 (suggesting that Justice Breyer’s position and opinion in \textit{Zelman} is “a cause, not a cure, of social strife’’); Smith, supra note 14, at 1248 (“It is not clear that any particular constitutional provision on this subject is well calculated to eliminate contention: excluding religion from some area of the public domain can be as controversial as including it.”). Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in \textit{Van Orden} recognized as much. See \textit{Van Orden v. Perry}, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Cf., e.g., Michael W. McConnell, \textit{Religious Freedom at a Crossroads}, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 192–93 (1992) (criticizing the “endorsement approach” to Establishment Clause questions because “it exacerbates religious division and discord by heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic injuries” (emphasis added)).

\textsuperscript{273} See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 222–27; PERRY, supra note 70, at 32–33; PAUL J. WETHERMAN, \textit{RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP} 121–47 (2002).

\textsuperscript{274} TRIBE, supra note 265, at 1279.

\textsuperscript{275} Id. (citing judicial criticisms of the inquiry); see also, e.g., Alan Schwarz, \textit{No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value}, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 716 (1968) (questioning whether the state’s conceded “interest” in “secular unity” makes maintaining such unity an enforceable “constitutional requirement”).
The Policy is unconstitutional because many people disagree with or about it. Our imagined objector to the Policy would, almost certainly, have more to say—and would have to say more—than this.276 Neither our Constitution nor any sane political charter would demand unanimity, or even consensus, as a prerequisite for legal validity; no reasonable person would expect or desire such a requirement. Disagreement and discord, standing alone, tell us nothing about the merits—let alone the constitutionality—of a measure, other than that the measure has been composed by, and proposed to, human beings.277 “Disagreement on matters of principle is,” Professor Jeremy Waldron has underscored, “not the exception but the rule in politics.”278 Even if one concedes that sharp disagreements and divisions over public policy are regrettable, it would be a long way from that concession to the conclusion either that such disagreements reveal or create constitutional infirmity or that courts are authorized to exercise the power of judicial review to soothe or remove them.279 Professor Schwarz put it well, nearly forty years ago: “If avoidance of strife were an independent constitutional value, no legislation could be adopted on any subject which aroused strong and divided feelings.”280

All this might seem to go without saying. However, for purposes of this Article’s examination of the argument that political division along religious lines not only correlates with but also defines and determines unconstitutional state action, the point is worth emphasizing: We always have disagreed and always will disagree about and divide over things that matter. As Jeremy Waldron puts it:

276. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“[T]his Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.”).

277. Cf., e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (“Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government . . . .”); Freund, supra note 97, at 1692 (“[P]olitical debate and division is normally a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations . . . .”).

278. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 15 (1999); see also, e.g., PERRY, supra note 70, at 21 (“[W]e are perennially divided about the proper role of religious grounded morality in our politics. This is due in substantial part, no doubt, to the fact that we are perennial divided in our judgments about a host of important moral issues—and about a host of connected political issues.”).

279. See, e.g., Steven D. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 40 (2004) (“Religious wars have plagued the world for many centuries. . . . Nonetheless, it goes too far to suggest that that a significant purpose of the Establishment Clause is to assure that the polity is not divided politically along religious lines.”) Indeed, there is reason to think that the contrary is true; that is, that government policies and state action motivated by a dislike for disagreement are, for that reason, suspect. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 n.9 (2004) (plurality opinion) (insisting that “[t]he Constitution . . . does not share appellants’ alarm at the asserted tendency of partisan gerrymandering” to produce “hard-core Democrats” rather than “wissy-wissy Democrats”); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) (noting the “inadmissibility” of an alleged state interest in “producing nominees and nominee positions other than those the [political] parties would choose if left to their own devices”); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995) (rejecting asserted state interest in “requir[ing] speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own”).

280. Schwarz, supra note 275, at 711.
There are many of us, and we disagree about justice. That is, we not only disagree about the existence of God and the meaning of life; we disagree also about what count as fair terms of co-operation among people who disagree about the existence of God and the meaning of life.\textsuperscript{281}

From the outset, then, we should put on those who would calibrate a measure’s constitutionality to the consensus surrounding it the heavy burden of explaining how political divisiveness along religious lines is so different from an unremarkable and unavoidable fact of real persons’ political lives that it authorizes invalidation by reviewing judges of democratically enacted measures.

The Policy is unconstitutional both because it concerns a “religious matter,” and because many people disagree with or about it. This argument reworks the previous one and seeks to cure its absurdity by limiting the applicability of the proposed connection between discord and invalidity to “religious matters.” In other words, it is not disagreement, division, partisanship, or faction-generation against which the First Amendment protects; rather, it is division, partisanship, or faction-generation concerning “religious matters” that either indicates or constitutes a constitutional violation.

There are, however, (at least) four problems with this retooled objection. First, the attempt to narrow the applicability, or shorten the reach, of the antidismissiveness principle to “religious matters” depends on the possibility of identifying such matters and distinguishing them meaningfully from other “matters” about which people deeply disagree.\textsuperscript{282} It is not enough to respond here that “religious matters” include matters of religious liturgy, ritual, membership, and creed. After all, no “political division along religious lines” doctrine is necessary to prohibit government from legislating with respect to such things. Several far less controversial First Amendment rules—the “secular purpose” requirement, for example,\textsuperscript{283} or the “no religious decisions” principle\textsuperscript{284}—and fairly well-entrenched commitments to church autonomy would preclude almost

\textsuperscript{281} WALDRON, supra note 278, at 1.


\textsuperscript{283} See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 39; see also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 90–91 (1988) (“A liberal society... has no business dictating matters of religious belief and worship to its citizens.”). Professor Lupu has explained how the secular-purpose requirement helps us to avoid “the political hazards of sectarian religious conflict.” Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 368 (1996).

any imaginable Policy addressing such matters. What, then, would the objector have in mind in declaring unconstitutional controversial state action touching on “religious matters”? Most religions, after all, purport to speak to the complete human experience. Religion might be a “private matter,” but it certainly purports to speak to more than the interior life. For many religious people, much or even all that they do—whether or not it is done in the context of prayer, liturgy, or ritual—is “religious.”

A second objection to this revised, narrowed argument is that it depends on another, unarticulated claim, namely, a descriptive or predictive claim that disagreements about some matters are not only more searing, difficult, or regrettable than others, but also that disagreements about some matters, but not others, render unconstitutional legislation touching on those matters. Certainly, this premise is asserted explicitly, if not defended in any detail, both in Chief Justice Burger’s Lemon opinion and in the Freund comment on which the Chief Justice relied. But what is it, exactly, about disagreements concerning “religious” matters—as opposed to others—that creates this effect? As Justice Brennan once put it, “[t]hat public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse emotion, may incite, may foment religious divisiveness and strife does not rob it of constitutional protection.” If the mere fact of disagreement about the Policy cannot seriously be regarded as enough to invalidate it, what is it about the proposed sub-set of disagreements—i.e., disagreements about “religious matters”—that make them more objectionable or, more precisely, unconstitutional?

It should not be enough simply to assert that our “traditions” authorize, let alone compel, such a conclusion. As was noted above, warnings about division, and calls for unity, are nothing new. However, that those who drafted and ratified the Constitution knew about, and hoped to avoid repeating, the history of religion-related strife, division, persecution, and violence does not mean that it is a “basic purpose” of the Establishment Clause to “avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict” or, more specifically, that such a “purpose” provides its enforceable, substantive con-

285. But see, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 77 (Cal. 2004) (upholding California’s law requiring all employers within the state to provide contraceptive coverage to their employees in the face of the argument that an organization describing itself as “an organ of the Roman Catholic Church” should be exempt from a law requiring conduct violative of Catholic moral teaching).

286. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (“[T]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice . . . .”).

287. See, e.g., Smith, Secular, supra note 282, at 500 (discussing, among other things, the “ontological synthesis”).


289. But see, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623 (“It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government.”).

tent. As Professor Smith has explained, the founding generation's fears, hopes, and expectations regarding the First Amendment's social effects—that is, regarding the political and other consequences of adopting and enforcing it—should be distinguished from the Amendment's meaning. (In fact, he insists, the better reading of the Establishment Clause is one that makes no claims about "principles" of religious freedom or social life at all.) The point is, observations about the extent to which we have regarded and reasonably regard "religious" disagreements as particularly searing, or "religion" as something that is particularly likely to be divisive, do not—standing alone—justify the conclusion that the First Amendment authorizes judges to invalidate laws touching on or relating to "religion." The claim here is not that "religion" is not different or that religion's difference does not matter; it is that the asserted salience or intensity of political divisiveness along religious lines does not authorize the invalidation on Establishment Clause grounds of assertedly divisive state actions.

Third, it is not clear what additional work the existence of disagreement or division really does. Is the new claim that (a) disagreement and division are unavoidable, and therefore constitutionally permissible; (b) state action or policy touching on religious matters is, or can be, constitutionally permissible; but (c) state actions or policies (i) touching on religious matters and (ii) about which people disagree strongly are not constitutionally permissible? One would think that if religious matters and state actions touching on or directed toward them are identifiable by reviewing judges, then the better rule might be simply to invalidate such actions, period, without inquiring further into the existence vel non of "division," given that, as was noted above, division standing alone does not establish or even suggest unconstitutionality. But, of course, it is not the case that laws relating to or touching upon "religious matters" are, for that

291. Professor Perry put the matter well: "If Policy X 'establishes' religion, Policy X is probably divisive along religious lines. But that Policy Y is divisive along religious lines does not entail that Policy Y 'establishes' religion." E-mail from Michael Perry, Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Emory Law School, to Richard Garnett, Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 27, 2005) (on file with author).

292. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[The Establishment Clause's] prohibitions...act on religious lines and to reduce any tendency toward religious divisiveness in society. Beyond enforcing these prohibitions, however, government may not go. The antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots who would inject sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to refutation in the marketplace of ideas, and their platforms to rejection at the polls.").


294. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 3 (2000) ("[It] is virtually impossible to understand our tradition of the separation of church and state without recognizing that religion raises political and constitutional issues not raised by other institutions or ideologies.").
reason, unconstitutional.295

Fourth, there remains the quantification problem with this and any other version of the Argument. Even assuming that we have shortened the Argument's leash, so that it is not disagreement, discord, and strife that indicate or cause unconstitutionality, but only disagreement about certain things; and assuming also that these things—that is, "religious" matters—can meaningfully be segregated from the run of issues about which people in a free society disagree; how much disagreement will invalidate a measure touching upon such matters?296 Relatedly, whose disagreement or objections will count?297 "Reasonable" people only? Nonreligious people particularly? Members of religious minorities especially?298 Is "divisiveness" constitutionally unobjectionable, so long as it taints relations and conversations only between unreasonable people? Surely, the fact that there is a plaintiff—that is, that someone has created "division" by filing a lawsuit—does not even indicate, let alone establish, "divisiveness" of the kind that might raise concerns of a constitutional dimension? True, words like "strife" and "divisiveness," fairly understood, carry a connotation of substantial conflict, not just trivial disagreements. Nevertheless, this and any other version of the Argument that purports either to deduce or infer unconstitutionality from "political divisiveness along religious lines" appear vulnerable to a "how much?" objection.

The Policy is unconstitutional because it concerns a "religious matter" and people tend to disagree, or have historically disagreed, or are assumed to disagree about such matters. "Religious matters," in other words, are inherently divisive.299 This version of the Argument seems to avoid the "who counts?" and

295. It is widely accepted, for instance, that governments may accommodate, without unconstitutionally establishing, religion. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (2005) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act provisions accommodating religious exercise in prison). See generally McConnell, supra note 294, at 3 ("My thesis is that ‘singling out religion’ for special constitutional protection is fully consistent with our constitutional tradition.").


297. Compare Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 765-69 (1995) (insisting that "erroneous conclusions of state endorsement . . . do not count" against the constitutionality of permitting private religious expression in an open forum), with id. at 778-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that a "reasonable observer" should be aware of the history and context of a public park where diverse groups engage in expressive conduct, and therefore should not perceive the display of a cross by a private speaker as government "endorsement" of religion), and id. at 807-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a "reasonable observer" should not be presumed to have detailed knowledge of the history of the relevant forum, and that the "endorsement test" should take more seriously the perspective of dissenters and outsiders).

298. Cf. Feldman, supra note 9, at 238-44 (arguing that one "way toward greater national unity in the face of our religious diversity" is for "legal secularists" to appreciate that "so long as all citizens have the same right to [speak as individuals or as groups], no one group or person should be threatened or excluded by the symbolic or political speech of others, much as they may disagree").

299. Cf. Marty, supra note 87, at 655 ("[R]eligion, when vital, is never easily contained within a defined and disciplined sphere. Religion is never self-contained, never unconnected. It always stands
“how much?” challenges. It is also close both to the heart of Chief Justice Burger’s complaint in Lemon and to Justice Breyer’s concerns in Zelman. Both of these Justices, remember, linked the argument from division to certain assertions and presumptions about the history of our debates about public education and parochial schools. For this version to work, all that needs to be established is that the policy in question concerns such a matter. This version also responds, in a way, to the second and third objections to the previous version of the Argument. Like the previous version, this one invites the question whether and how “religious matters” can be identified. Still, it purports to avoid difficult empirical or sociological inquiries into the existence or intensity of contemporary disagreements about the specific Policy at issue. This is because once it has been determined that the Policy concerns a “religious matter,” political divisiveness is presumed and the Policy is invalid. This version collapses, then, into the claim that “any law concerning a ‘religious matter’—because such matters cause divisiveness—violates the Establishment Clause.” But again, this claim cannot possibly be right, given that laws accommodating religion are permissible. In any event, any workable content this version of the argument has is provided by other, more plausible, First Amendment doctrines, including Lemon’s “secular purpose” requirement. What’s more, it is not clear that religion has been a “distinctively divisive force in our society.” After all, as Judge McConnell has urged, “[r]eligious differences... have never generated the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the Vietnam War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery.”

Another variation on the Argument might turn from the nature of the issues or conduct addressed by the Policy to the nature of the arguments and motivations supporting and behind it. In other words, instead of examining the Policy’s content, the objector would highlight its purpose. Instead of asking “Does this Policy concern a ‘religious matter’?”, a challenger would ask, “Why, or for

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300. Cf. Feldman, supra note 9, at 245 (asserting that school vouchers “create[] conflict and division”); Freund, supra note 97, at 1692 (“Although great issues of constitutional law are never settled until they are settled right, still as between open-ended, ongoing political warfare and such binding quality as judicial decisions possess, I would choose the latter in the field of God and Caesar and the public treasury.”).

301. See supra note 295.

302. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s own trimmed-down version of the Argument—in which its applicability is confined strictly to cases concerning public funds and parochial schools—is not unlike this version. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 308, 404 n.11 (1983) (stating that the question of “political divisiveness” should be “regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools”).

303. Smith, supra note 267, at 208 (emphasis added).

what reasons, was the Policy proposed or enacted?" This version, then, would go something like this: The Policy is unconstitutional because many people support it for "religious" reasons. The Policy has been rendered unconstitutional not so much because of its subject matter, but because its supporters have been insufficiently attentive to their purported obligation to invoke in support of government action only "accessible" arguments sounding in "public reason."

This claim is not very different from Lemon's secular-purpose requirement. Remember, though, that the Court's most prominent deployment of the secular-purpose requirement, in Edwards v. Aguillard, was animated precisely by a desire to exclude "divisive forces" from the public schools and by the view that the public school "is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny." On the other hand, the focus of courts' inquiry under the secular-purpose requirement seems less on public reaction to or effects of a proposal than on the "purpose that animated [its] adoption." What is not clear in the cases, though, is whether the absence of a secular purpose invalidates a law because laws lacking such a purpose are, constitutionally speaking, ultra vires; because such laws are, precisely in that they lack a secular purpose, outside the competence of secular actors to enact; or because such laws are thought likely to have undesirable social effects, including causing "divisiveness."

In his important treatment of the secular-purpose requirement, Professor Koppelman points toward this last rationale, defending the requirement's necessity in part on the ground that the "doctrine cannot be discarded... without effectively reading the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution altogether. The result would be heightened civil strife, corruption of religion, and oppression of religious minorities." That said, the core, for Koppelman, of the

305. Of course, one might just as well add, to this formulation, "or oppose it."
306. See generally John Rawls, Political Liberalism 212–54 (1993) (defending an ethos of "public reason" that requires, inter alia, that arguments about public policy be couched in terms that are "accessible" to all citizens and that do not presuppose adherence to any religion or other "comprehensive" philosophy); William Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 Hastings L.J. 843, 844 (1993) (contending that "religion and religious conviction are purely private matters that have no role or place" in the political arena).
307. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). More recently, of course, the Court invalidated the Ten Commandments display at issue in McCreary County on the ground that it lacked a "secular purpose." See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735–36 (2005). And, Justice Souter explicitly linked the secular-purpose inquiry with judicial concerns about, and perhaps a constitutional duty to avoid, religious divisiveness. See id. at 2742–43.
309. Id. at 584 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 131 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Such recruiting meetings may introduce divisiveness and tend to separate young children into cliques that undermine the school's educational mission.").
310. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585; see also id. ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
secular-purpose requirement is not its instrumental value in achieving civic peace or political unity, but is rather the fundamental “principle” that “government may not declare religious truth.”312 He takes care to emphasize that the secular-purpose requirement, properly understood, “focuses on what government is saying rather than on who supported any particular law.”313 As expounded by Koppelman, it turns out that the secular-purpose requirement reflects not so much constitutional squeamishness about political divisiveness as it does a worry that, without it, government would be too powerful—its sphere of imagined competence too vast—and that a government so empowered or deluded would pose serious threats to the freedom of conscience.314 An increase in division and strife might be a foreseeable consequence of jettisoning the secular-purpose requirement, but it does not appear that the secular-purpose requirement is, for Koppelman, merely a translation of Justice Burger’s equation in Lemon of divisiveness and entanglement.

Returning, then, to the current version of the Argument—that is, “The Policy is unconstitutional because many people support it for ‘religious’ reasons”: It is convincing only to the extent we believe that the Constitution in fact incorporates Rawlsian or similar restrictions on political argument and action. But even if one embraces Koppelman’s defense of the secular-purpose requirement, one need not accept the suggested incorporation into the First Amendment of “public reason” rules for political activity and argument.315 The case has not been made, in other words, that the Constitution’s ban on “law[s] respecting an establishment of religion”316 prohibits the use of religiously grounded arguments in public life or about public matters, or requires the invalidation of policies that were supported, by some, using such arguments.317

312. Id. at 89. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see, for example, Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (2004). See also Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (2003).
313. See Koppelman, supra note 39, at 93.
314. Id. at 166 (“[T]he case for the secular purpose requirement goes beyond the purposes of the Establishment Clause. Religious justification is a powerful thing. If there were no restraints on the ability of the state to rely on such justifications, then the state could invoke such justifications whenever it wanted to override any constitutional constraint. Such justifications are by their nature so powerful as to override any countervailing constraint, for what could be more important than carrying out the will of God?”).
315. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 644–48 (arguing that the “principle of secular rationale” is “inconsistent with the American constitutional tradition”).
316. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Next, a slight variation on the version of the Argument just considered: *The Policy is unconstitutional because many people disagree with, or about it, and many of those who support or oppose it have advanced religious arguments for doing so.* This version reincorporates what was missing in the previous one, namely, the fact of political disagreement or division relating to the Policy. Remember, that a policy fails *Lemon*'s secular-purpose requirement does not mean that it is divisive. In fact, it is easy to imagine, in many jurisdictions, proposals that, under *Edwards*, lack a “secular purpose” but that are not, in any meaningful or worrisome sense, politically divisive. This version of the Argument combines the fact of observed or predicted social division with claims about the reasons underlying the contending factions’ positions. Political disagreement alone could hardly be treated as evidence, let alone conclusive evidence, of unconstitutionality. However, political disagreement that proceeds from or rests upon religious disagreements, it is claimed, is more threatening to democracy and is therefore constitutionally suspect in light of the First Amendment.  

In light of what has already been said, though, this variation is no more convincing than the others. If disagreement, standing alone, does not raise constitutional red flags, and if we do not accept as a foundational premise the constraint that political argument and action must comply with (certain versions of) “public reason” requirements, then it is not clear, as a matter of political morality or as a matter of constitutional law, why the combination of two innocuous features of the public debate about a particular Policy should point toward its invalidity.  

Certainly, if one elects to proceed from “public reason” premises—if one decides, *ex ante*, that we are or will be deemed to be acting within a constitutionally established “secular public moral order”—then this version of the argument might seem plausible, even appealing. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting the fact that the workability and attractiveness of this and other versions of the Argument depend crucially on what are in fact contestable and controversial claims about political morality, activity, relations, and arguments. Accordingly, we might adjust the Argument even further: *The Policy is unconstitutional because many people disagree with or about it, and the “lines”*  

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318. As the discussion in Part II illustrated, Justice Powell’s use of the argument from division appears tightly connected to his concerns for the stability of the political process, and his belief that arguments cast in religious language, or concerning certain matters, posed special risks to that process.  

319. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, *Religious Freedom at a Crossroads*, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 130 (1992) (“[T]he political victories of either side in [political] controversies could be divisive; but the doctrine did not—and could not—work both ways. In effect, the doctrine blamed the religious side of any controversy for the controversy.”).  

of disagreement appear to "track" religious "divisions." This version does not address the purpose or subject matter of the Policy; nor, unlike the previous one, does it address the motives or supporting arguments of the Policy's fans and detractors. Rather, it purports to reduce the Argument's predicates entirely to sociological data: The claim is that the lines separating the Policy's supporters and opponents overlap or resemble other existing lines—namely, religious or denominational lines—in the polity, and that the Policy is therefore constitutionally suspect. Again, however, what is doing the work in this claim is not—and cannot reasonably be—the mere fact of disagreement. Rather, the point is that the political and cultural fault lines created or exposed by the Policy coincide with pre-existing divisions, namely, religious divisions. Under this version, the objector need not establish, or even offer, an explanation for this coincidence; perhaps it is not because of religion, and has nothing to do with doctrine or discipline.

Because two innocuous facts, when combined, are no more troubling than one, the claim must be that lines of disagreement that track or reveal religious differences are, for that reason, worse than those that track or reveal other cultural, social, and political differences (for example, race, gender, age, ethnicity, class, etc.). But we need not accept this claim. At the very least, one advancing it should be required to explain why—as a matter of constitutional law, and not simply societal aesthetics—public reactions to a Policy that follow, say, racial or gender fault lines do not, for that reason, tend to invalidate the policy, while reactions that track purported religious divisions do. "Division" in society and in politics might well be unattractive and troubling. However, it remains to explain why it would be that the religious divisions, if any, that manifest themselves in response to state actions or legislative proposals should be relevant to the validity of such actions.

If this last version of the Argument turned away from the motives or supporting arguments of the Policy's supporters and detractors, yet another version might return the focus to the motives or purposes of government officials: The Policy is unconstitutional because the government has acted in order to, or with the intent to, "divide" the polity along religious lines. This version of the Argument seems plausible at first, if only because most of us would regard state action designed merely to "divide"—let alone to divide along religious lines—as unseemly and unworthy. At first blush, it seems unlikely that any American government or state actor would ever act with this purpose—or, at least, solely with this purpose. Is it sensible or worthwhile, then, to construct Establishment Clause doctrine around a predicted or feared phenomenon that is so strange, and therefore so unlikely? To be sure, governments do act, and can hardly avoid acting, with the knowledge—perhaps with the sure knowledge—that the people will be divided in response. Such division is, government actors can reasonably conclude, inevitable.

In fact, however, the challenger might insist, government officials and legislators do act with the purpose of dividing the public. What in the world of
political pundits are known as “hot button” or “wedge” issues are matters concerning which legislators act, not only with the awareness that their actions will be controversial, but with the desire to create controversy, to sharpen disagreements, to stir up engagement and activism, and so on. Issues are often brought to a head, and put to a vote, primarily to require one’s political opponents to make a public decision that will, it is hoped, be offensive or infuriating to certain people. Symbolic votes on symbolic policies are regularly engineered, then, precisely to divide. But precisely because these votes and policies are an unremarkable staple of political life in our democracy, it is hard to accept an argument whose conclusion is that they are unconstitutional.

Perhaps, though, the objection to such legislative moves is more focused. That is, even if intentionally divisive state actions on “hot button” matters are unavoidable and, in a free society, unobjectionable, state actions that are intended to cause or exploit divisions along religious lines are particularly offensive. Such a motive by legislators or officials is so base, it is argued, that a policy animated by it should be invalid. Divisions over policies—even divisions along religious lines—might well be unavoidable, but these latter divisions in particular should not and may not be exploited. Like the previous version, though, this argument collapses in the end into a claim that religious divisions are just worse, and that their worse-ness is constitutionally relevant. If a legislative motive to exploit cultural or other divisions for political purposes does not (and cannot) invalidate a policy animated by such a motive, then it remains to be explained why, exactly, the conclusion should be any different when the divisions in question track religious lines.

Finally, there is perhaps the most modest version of the Argument, in which it is not maintained that the existence of “political divisiveness along religious lines” concerning a Policy, or an official desire to create or exploit such divisiveness, is by itself what invalidates a policy. Rather, the now-chastened objector’s claim is that the existence of “political division along religious lines” concerning the Policy serves as a “warning signal” that the Policy could be unconstitutional, and triggers careful scrutiny, using other doctrinal tools, the application of which determines the Policy’s validity. Importantly, the existence or prediction of such division does not itself serve as such a doctrinal tool.

321. Just as earlier versions of the Argument ran up against the problem of distinguishing between “religious” and other subject matters, this version invites the question, “What are ‘religious lines’?” Are the “lines” that we do not want our political splits to overlay the lines between the irreligious and the religious? Among Christian denominations? Between the orthodox and the latitudinarian? And so on.

322. See Tribe, supra note 265, at 1282 (stating that division should serve as a “warning signal[”, suggesting stricter judicial scrutiny but not serving to condemn what government has done”); see also Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797–98 (1973) (“[W]hile the prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this Court, it is certainly a ‘warning signal’ not to be ignored.” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971))). Professors Larry Solum and Larry Alexander made a similar point when I presented this Article at the University of San Diego Law School’s faculty workshop.
To the extent that Chief Justice Burger suggested otherwise in *Lemon*, he was simply mistaken, or carried away. In fact, this version goes, when one considers carefully what the Court actually did in *Lemon*, and in the many other cases—reviewed in Part Two—where “political divisiveness along religious lines” is invoked in the context of Establishment Clause review, one sees that division often serves as a “signal,” not as a standard. Difficult questions remain, certainly, about what doctrinal tools should be employed, and how, after such a signal; nevertheless, “political divisiveness along religious lines” remains relevant to, but not outcome-determinative of, the question of a Policy’s constitutional validity.

At first, this version of the Argument seems reasonable and restrained. It also appears to capture accurately what most courts are actually doing with their observations about and predictions of “political divisiveness along religious lines.” That is, this version is consonant with the observation above that the political-divisiveness argument seems to have served primarily as a rhetorical device or as a concluding flourish to the application of other doctrinal “tests.” Still, we should ask, what is it about “political divisiveness along religious lines” that should trigger the application of tools that would, presumably, not be applied in its absence? What does an observation or prediction about the presence or threat of “division” add to the set of facts presented in a complaint alleging a violation of the Establishment Clause? Do such observations and predictions trigger the deployment by judges of different First Amendment tests and tools? Are there two layers of scrutiny: Establishment Clause analysis in the absence of division, and such analysis in its presence or under its shadow? Or, is it that the usual tests and tools are applied in cases involving such observations and predictions with greater zeal or precision? A constitutional rule applied with “greater zeal or precision” in a certain kind of case is, however, a *different* rule from the one applied on another kind of case. Even this final reformulation of the Argument requires its defenders to explain what is meant by a “warning signal” and whether the sending or perceiving of the signal works any change in the doctrine or standard being applied.

In addition, this “warning signal” variation calls for an explanation of why the presence of division or divisiveness should serve as a “warning signal” of anything at all, let alone that something is constitutionally amiss. That a Policy is prompting “political divisiveness along religious lines” certainly tells us *something* about the Policy and also about religion. It is not clear, though, that it tells us anything about the Policy’s merits, let alone its constitutional validity. Stated simply, while “political divisiveness along religious lines” might well be undesirable and unattractive, and might well “signal” problems in the political life of a community, and might well attend violations of the Establishment

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323. See *Lemon*, 403 U.S. at 624–25. Chief Justice Burger contended that entanglement between government and religion is *both* an “independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect” and a “warning signal” that further evils are menacing.
Clause, it nonetheless should play no role in the evaluation by judges of First Amendment challenges to state action. What it "signals"—disagreement, pluralism, and the exercise of religious freedom—are, in the end, constitutionally protected facts of life.

CONCLUSION

Few epithets in contemporary discourse are as wounding, yet tedious and vacuous, as the charge that a person, claim, argument, proposal, or belief is "divisive." The term—like "controversial," "extremist," and "partisan"—often does little more than signal the speaker's disapproval, and his desire that the offending target either be quiet or change his tune.324 The point of this Article has been to investigate, in a more precise way, the claim being made about the relation between what is asserted or assumed to be a real-world fact—that is, "political fragmentation on sectarian lines"325—and the constitutionality of challenged state action.

James Madison acknowledged, in The Federalist No. 10, that "[t]he instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished," and he conceded that the "violence of faction" was such governments' "dangerous vice."326 The solution, though, was not and could not be the suppression or elimination of disagreement and faction. He explained:

The diversity in the faculties of men...is...an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensures a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.327

324. Justice Scalia made a similar point, regarding the term "corruption," dissenting in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) ("[V]irtually anything the Court deems politically undesirable can be turned into political corruption—by simply describing its effects as politically 'corrosive,' which is close enough to 'corruptive' to qualify."). See also Christopher Hitchens, Bring on the Mud, WILSON Q., Autumn 2004, at 44, 44 ("What's the most reprehensible thing a politician can be these days? Why, partisan, of course. What's the most disapproving thing that can be said of a 'partisan' remark? That it's divisive.'").


327. Id.; see also Sullivan, supra note 20, at 6 ("The U.S. Constitution was devised not as a means to avoid social and cultural polarization, but as a way to manage it without splitting the country apart.").
The widely discussed and regretted divisions that run through our politics and communities make appealing to many a more managerial approach to politics and public life. But division and disagreement about important things is, this side of Heaven, a fact.\textsuperscript{328} In any event, Madison’s warning remains as powerful as ever: “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.”\textsuperscript{329}

\textsuperscript{328} See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 360 (1996) (noting that “[m]any theorists of democracy refuse to face up to [the] moral fact of political life” that, “given the intractable sources of disagreement, citizens cannot expect to reach mutually justifiable agreement over the whole range of significant issues in politics”).

\textsuperscript{329} The Federalist No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 n.8 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Madison suggested in the Fifty-first Federalist that the religious diversity which existed at the time of the Constitutional Convention constituted a source of strength for religious freedom, much as the multiplicity of economic and political interests enhanced the security of other civil rights.”).