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Minimum Contacts in Contract Cases: A Forward-Looking Reevaluation

In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided four cases addressing the extension of state court jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.¹ All four cases denied jurisdiction and marked a trend by the Supreme Court to limit state court jurisdiction.²

In *Shaffer v. Heitner*,³ the Supreme Court required that a defendant have "minimum contacts" with a state before that state could exercise long-arm jurisdiction.⁴ In *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*,⁵ the Supreme Court said that these contacts must make litigation in the state "foreseeable."⁶ These decisions, however, did not address the issue of the contacts necessary to force a nonresident to defend a suit on a contract in a foreign jurisdiction.⁷ Much of the discussion centers around whether the plaintiff's interest in litigating

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⁴ *Id.* at 204. Long-arm jurisdiction is exercised over a defendant who is not present within the state. Whether jurisdiction over persons who are only transiently present within the state may still be exercised without minimum contacts is still undecided. See Ripple & Murphy, *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on the Road Ahead*, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 207 (1980).

⁵ 444 U.S. 286 (1980).

⁶ *Id.* at 297.

should be weighed in determining the necessary contacts. The Supreme Court through Justice White has emphasized that fairness to the defendant is the primary concern and that contacts are therefore required. Others argue that fairness can be ensured by other tests and that contacts are only one way of creating jurisdiction.

This note argues for a middle position. Contacts should be required, but the number of contacts should vary with each case, depending on the plaintiff's interest in litigating in his forum and on whether the defendant could foresee the plaintiff's interest when he established contacts. Part I discusses the minimum contacts test and its rationale as set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen, the commentators' criticism of the World-Wide Volkswagen rationale, and a proposed compromise. Part II seeks support for this compromise in the actual results of the minimum contacts test's application, in World-Wide Volkswagen's discussion of foreseeability of suit, and in an analogy to liability in substantive law. Part III analyzes the contract cases and attempts to reconcile the various holdings by applying a test which considers the defendant's contacts in relation to the foreseeable plaintiff's interest.

I. The Minimum Contacts Test in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

A. Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction

A state court cannot exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant has contacts with the state which make it fair and reasonable for the state to require the defendant to litigate in its courts. Although the state may have a strong interest in providing the plaintiff with relief and the plaintiff may be inconvenienced by litigating in the defendant's forum, the court can-

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9 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.

10 For example, Justice Brennan argues that contacts are only one way of creating jurisdiction. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

11 See notes 14-41 infra and accompanying text.

12 See notes 42-79 infra and accompanying text.

13 See notes 81-103 infra and accompanying text.

14 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
not exercise jurisdiction absent some contact with the defendant.15

The Supreme Court authorized extension of jurisdiction beyond state territorial boundaries when interstate business transactions greatly increased.16 The Supreme Court has held, however, that the due process clause of the United States Constitution limits this extension.17 The due process clause serves two functions in limiting jurisdiction: 1) it protects the nonresident defendant from unfair litigation; and 2) it promotes interstate federalism.18

The fairness requirement is satisfied by finding sufficient contacts between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.19 Courts focus primarily on the defendant’s contacts but may consider both the forum’s and plaintiff’s interest in trying the case in the forum’s courts.20 If the defendant’s contacts should make him aware of the potential forum and plaintiff interest, he should reasonably foresee litigation in the forum.21

Interstate federalism is also a legitimate concern and limits jurisdiction through the due process clause.22 Justice White has given two reasons why federalism should limit jurisdiction: 1) the states’ economic interdependence; and 2) each state’s sovereign power to try cases in its own courts.23

According to Justice White, the commerce clause prevents states from acting as separate economic entities.24 Broad state court jurisdiction over nonresidents could threaten interstate commerce if businesses decided that they should not carry on interstate commerce to avoid the risk of expensive litigation.25

17 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
18 Id. at 291-92. But see notes 33-37 infra and accompanying text.
19 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204. The contacts must make litigation in the forum “reasonable” or “fair” to the defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
20 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. See also notes 44-79 infra and accompanying text.
21 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
22 Id. at 294.
23 Id. at 293.
24 Id.

Early decisions mentioned interstate commerce as a limiting factor in jurisdictional analysis. See Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). See also
A state's sovereign power to try cases arising under its own laws, in its courts, also limits the jurisdiction of other states' courts. This limitation flows from the territorial conception of state sovereignty which is long established in Anglo-American jurisprudence. When a state exercises jurisdiction over a defendant who has no minimum contacts, it encroaches on the sovereignty of the defendant's state and could cause friction among the states. Also, the ideal of sovereign states' coexisting in a federal system would disappear if a state could judge the rights and obligations of persons having no contacts with that state.

B. Criticisms of the World-Wide Volkswagen Approach

Commentators have criticized both the minimum contacts test and Justice White's reasons for requiring minimum contacts. They propose other tests which may also protect the defendant without requiring contacts between the defendant and the forum. For example, one commentator has suggested that the due process clause be interpreted to prohibit only undue burdens on the defendant. In this way, the defendant could be made to defend a suit in a jurisdiction where he has no contacts, but where he will not be unreasonably inconvenienced, as long as the forum has a very strong interest in providing relief to the plaintiff.

In addition, federalism may not be a legitimate limitation on jurisdiction since the due process clause protects only the defendant's liberty interest and does not necessarily limit sovereignty. Both of

Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 234 (1967) (saying that the commerce clause and not the due process clause limits jurisdiction).
26 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
27 Id. See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877).
28 This friction occurs, for example, when one state applies jurisdictional standards to the citizen of a second state simply because the second state would apply the same standard to citizens of the first state. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Anderson, dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 620, 313 A.2d 129, 131 (1973).
31 Redish, supra note 30, at 1137-43.
32 McDougal, supra note 30, at 9-10. Professor McDougal cites Justice Brennan's dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen as a possible application of this approach. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that minimum contacts are only one way to create jurisdiction).
33 Redish, supra note 30, at 1133.
Justice White's reasons for using federalism to limit jurisdiction have been criticized. First, the effects of extended jurisdiction on interstate commerce are not clear and may be beyond the province of the courts to determine. Second, a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant need not divest a sister state of sovereignty. A sovereign's interest lies in enforcing its substantive laws—not in exercising exclusive jurisdiction over its residents. Sovereignty is adequately protected by restricting the forum's choice of law. Restricting the forum's jurisdiction is unnecessary. Also, the principle of comity, recognized in international law, should promote interstate harmony. If all states' jurisdiction extended to equal limits, they would be able to defer to each other without sacrificing their sovereignty.

C. A Proposed Development of World-Wide Volkswagen

Even if the Supreme Court follows the commentators' lead and decides that federalism should no longer limit jurisdiction, the defendant will still have a liberty interest in where he is sued. This liberty interest places territorial limitations on a state's jurisdiction by requiring contacts with the state. If a state could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant simply because he would not be inconve-
nienced by litigating there, the plaintiff would have much greater freedom in his choice of forum, at the expense of the defendant. In a minimum contacts analysis, the plaintiff may have a choice of forum but it is restricted to forums where the defendant has chosen to establish contacts. If no contacts were required, the defendant would be less able to anticipate where he might be sued since the forum would largely depend on the plaintiff's decision.40

Once the contacts requirement is accepted, courts must consider what contacts are necessary to create jurisdiction. The test for determining the contacts necessary to create jurisdiction should consider the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in his forum as well as the defendant's contacts with the forum.41 The emphasis should still be on the defendant's contacts but it should be on the quality and nature of the contacts instead of simply on the quantity of contacts. When the plaintiff has a strong interest in litigating in the forum, few contacts should be necessary. When the plaintiff has a weak interest in litigating in the forum, a greater number of contacts should be required. Part II argues that courts have implicitly done this when deciding the contacts necessary to create jurisdiction.

II. Application of the Minimum Contacts Test

A. The Accepted Test

The Supreme Court's minimum contacts test in World-Wide Volkswagen has lead courts and commentators to focus on the first question in the minimum contacts analysis: whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum to create jurisdiction.42 In contract cases, for example, discussion centers around issues such as whether the defendant was ever present in the forum, whether the

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40 See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978)(denying jurisdiction and mentioning as a factor that the plaintiff could arbitrarily subject the defendant to suit in any state if the plaintiff's unilateral acts could create jurisdiction between the forum and the defendant).

41 The Supreme Court left this approach open when it said that presence of the defendant's property in a forum might be sufficient contact with the state to allow jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff could be unable to obtain relief in another forum. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (1977).

42 Chicago Comment, supra note 8, at 158-64; Boston Note, supra note 8, at 383-84. See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
defendant was a seller or purchaser of goods, whether the defendant was an active or passive purchaser, whether the defendant initiated the negotiations, whether the terms of the contract were F.O.B., or whether the contract applied the forum state's law. The minimum contacts test postpones considering whether the plaintiff or defendant would be unduly burdened by litigating in the other party's forum and whether the state has an interest in enforcing its laws or providing relief for the plaintiff. These factors are weighed only after finding the necessary minimum contacts.

The lower courts usually state that the minimum contacts test involves a two step analysis: 1) does the defendant have the necessary minimum contacts?; and 2) is the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable? After finding the necessary minimum contacts, which create jurisdiction, the court must weigh several factors to determine whether exercising jurisdiction is reasonable. World-Wide Volkswagen provides several factors for determining whether jurisdiction is reasonable and fair: 1) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 2) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 3) the interstate judicial system's interest in resolving conflicts; and 4) the several states' interest in substantial social policies. These interests alone, however, cannot create jurisdiction over the defendant. The threshold determination is the defendant's contacts and not the forum's or the plaintiff's interests.

B. The Implicit Approach

The problem with the accepted test, which courts have attempted to apply, is that the minimum contacts concept has never been a fixed concept which can be mechanically applied to each case. The United States Supreme Court views fairness to the de-

43 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 4, at 79.
44 See, e.g., Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968); Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d 872, 877 (Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). When the contact is a single act or otherwise insubstantial, the cause of action must arise out of the contact. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
45 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
46 Id. See also Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 1974) (weighing the state's interest in providing a forum for the plaintiff, inconvenience to the parties and equity); Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d at 878-79 (weighing the quantity and quality of contacts, the source of the wrong, the interest of the forum in providing relief to its residents and convenience to the parties).
48 See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92.
fendant as the crucial issue.\textsuperscript{49} The Court has emphasized that the quality and nature of the contacts—not their quantity—create jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{50} Following this thinking, courts should consider the plaintiff's interest in litigating in his own forum—when this interest is foreseeable to the defendant at the time the defendant established his contacts—in determining whether the necessary contacts exist. Implicitly, the courts have done this. The results of the minimum contacts test's application reveal that weighing the plaintiff's interest, while making the initial determination, is fair and reasonable. Very few contacts create jurisdiction when the interests of the forum and the plaintiff are great, but numerous contacts are required when the interests of the forum and plaintiff are weak. In effect, then, the courts weigh the interests of the forum and the plaintiff when they decide what contacts are necessary for jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{51}

1. The Forum's and the Plaintiff's Interests

The plaintiff's important interest in jurisdiction analysis is his ability to obtain relief.\textsuperscript{52} When the defendant foresees that the plaintiff will face difficulty in enforcing his cause of action, the defendant subjects himself to jurisdiction by establishing only a few contacts with the plaintiff and the forum. However, when the plaintiff can readily obtain relief in the defendant's forum, the defendant has little reason to anticipate suit in the plaintiff's forum unless he has established more substantial contacts.\textsuperscript{53}

The forum's interest in the litigation is in providing relief for the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{54} This interest is usually expressed in a statute which gives notice to the defendant that he will subject himself to jurisdiction by establishing contacts with the forum.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{49} See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
\textsuperscript{50} See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
\textsuperscript{51} See Paolino v. Channel Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721, 725 (3rd Cir. 1981)("Due process, after all, is a two way street.").
\textsuperscript{52} See McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. at 223. Several state courts have given weight to the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief and exercised jurisdiction based on few contacts. See also Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d at 878-79; Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal.2d 893, 906, 458 P.2d 57, 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 123 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 443-44, 176 N.E.2d 761, 767 (1961).
\textsuperscript{54} See McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. at 223.
\textsuperscript{55} In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court held that under Delaware's long-arm statute accepting a directorship with a Delaware corporation was not a sufficient contact with Delaware to allow jurisdiction over the directors in a stockholder's
The plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief or the forum's interest in providing it does not, however, create jurisdiction absent minimum contacts. The defendant must still establish contacts with the plaintiff and his forum through purposeful activity. A plaintiff who would be inconvenienced by suing in the defendant's forum merely puts the defendant on notice that he will more likely be sued in the plaintiff's forum. Thus, the mere unilateral activity of the plaintiff cannot subject the defendant to jurisdiction.

2. The Defendant's Contacts

The defendant creates jurisdiction by establishing few contacts where the forum and plaintiff interests are great. The defendant also creates jurisdiction where contacts are great but where the forum and plaintiff interests are few. For example, when the plaintiff leaves his domicile to sue a defendant in another jurisdiction, the defendant must have substantial contacts with the forum. Likewise, where a nonresident defendant has contacts with the forum but the cause of action does not arise out of these contacts, courts require substantial contacts. The plaintiff and forum interests in litigating in the forum are few. The plaintiff, who is usually forum shopping, can bring the suit in another jurisdiction. Also, the state has little interest in applying its laws or in providing a forum for its residents. Thus, in

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**NOTES**

57 See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93-94.
58 Id.
59 The Supreme Court recognized the possibility in *International Shoe*, 326 U.S. at 318. In *Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.*, 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952), the Supreme Court allowed Ohio to exercise jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation that was doing sufficiently substantial business in Ohio to subject it to jurisdiction in a cause of action unrelated to that business. *See also* Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
60 Some courts have refused jurisdiction when the defendant had few contacts and the plaintiff had other forums in which to litigate. *See, e.g.*, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1966)(court lacked jurisdiction over nonresident publisher when the plaintiffs were also nonresidents); Washington Scientific Indus. v. Polan Indus., 302 F.
these cases the due process clause requires the defendant to have substantial, rather than minimal contacts with the forum.\textsuperscript{61}

Most courts do not find mechanically fixed "minimum contacts" before weighing the interests of the plaintiff and the forum. Instead, courts implicitly weigh the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in assessing the contacts. Once a court determines that the defendant has some contacts, the quantity of the contacts required to exercise jurisdiction depends on the plaintiff's and forum's interest in litigating in the state.

C. Foreseeability of Suit and Plaintiff and Forum Interests

Development of dictum in \textit{World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson}\textsuperscript{62} supports consideration of the plaintiff and forum interests in determining the amount of contacts necessary for jurisdiction. The Court stated that foreseeability of suit in the forum is critical for long-arm jurisdiction. The Court further stated that the emphasis must be on the defendant's contacts.\textsuperscript{63} However, strong plaintiff interests in the forum, known to the defendant when he established contacts with the plaintiff, would make suit foreseeable.\textsuperscript{64}

According to \textit{World-Wide Volkswagen}, the foreseeability required for jurisdiction, however, is something more than the foreseeability of possibly causing injury in a state.\textsuperscript{65} This would render a person liable to suit in almost any state where he caused some effect\textsuperscript{66} and make it difficult for potential defendants to structure their conduct to reasonably avoid litigation in foreign jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{67} The legal system would consequently lose the degree of predictability necessary to ensure "orderly administration of the laws."\textsuperscript{68}

\textit{World-Wide Volkswagen} requires that the defendant foresee being haled into court\textsuperscript{69} and that he establish contacts with the forum through his own purposeful activity. When a person's conduct in-
vokes the benefits and protection of another state's laws, despite few contacts, he can reasonably foresee suit there as long as the cause of action arises from those contacts.\textsuperscript{70} When a person purposefully establishes contacts with a plaintiff who will be heavily burdened by litigating in the defendant's state, the defendant can also reasonably foresee being haled into the plaintiff's state even when his contacts are few.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, through the foreseeability concept, the Court allows for consideration of plaintiff and forum interests in determining the quantity of contacts necessary to exert jurisdiction.

D. \textit{Analogy to Substantive Law}

A foreseeability test, which considers the plaintiff's interest, finds support in the use of foreseeability to determine substantive liability. Foreseeability in jurisdictional analysis is analogous to its use in substantive law.\textsuperscript{72} A person will not be held liable for damages which were not foreseeable.\textsuperscript{73} Likewise, he will not be subject to suit in a jurisdiction where his contacts do not make litigation foreseeable.\textsuperscript{74} In tort and contract, liability depends on the amount and likelihood of injury.\textsuperscript{75} When the potential damage is great, the defendant can more readily anticipate liability.

Jurisdiction also can depend on the amount of damage. A plaintiff who cannot enforce a claim in the defendant's state without hardship is, in a sense, damaged.\textsuperscript{76} A defendant who has contacts with the plaintiff can anticipate suit in the plaintiff's forum when this hardship would make a suit in the defendant's state inequitable.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{71} See \textit{1 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws} § 37 \textit{caveat a} (1971). The Restatement recognizes three situations where a state has jurisdiction over a nonresident regarding causes of action arising out of his contacts with the state: 1) the effects in the state are intentionally caused; 2) the effects are reasonably foreseeable; 3) the effects were neither intentional nor foreseeable. The first situation allows jurisdiction just as if the defendant had been present when he caused the effects. The second situation allows jurisdiction depending on a variety of factors, including how closely the defendant is related to the state and how closely the plaintiff is related to the state. When the plaintiff has little or no relation to the state then the defendant's contacts must be correspondingly greater to allow jurisdiction. Another factor to consider is the amount of damage to persons and things the defendant could anticipate. The third situation allows jurisdiction only if the defendant and the plaintiff have extensive relations with the state. \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{74} World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

\textsuperscript{75} See note 73 \textit{infra}.

\textsuperscript{76} See Brilmayer, \textit{supra} note 72, at 110.
Jurisdiction, like substantive liability, also depends on the plaintiff's acts as distinguished from his interest in obtaining relief. In substantive law, the plaintiff's contributory negligence or his failure to mitigate damages can reduce and even eliminate the defendant's liability. In jurisdictional analysis, the plaintiff's "unilateral activity" and his reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state can reduce the foreseeability of suit.

The Supreme Court has not discussed the analogy between liability in substantive law and jurisdiction, but the analogy is implicitly contained in the basic concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to enter a binding judgment; this power implies the defendant's liability to be subject to suit. The Supreme Court's discussion of foreseeability in World-Wide Volkswagen at least leaves room to develop this analogy and apply it to the commercial cases that Justice White found so disoriented.

III. The Contract Cases

State legislatures enable their courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents through long-arm statutes. The forum state's long-arm statute is an important factor in determining the state's interest in exercising jurisdiction. When a legislature enacts a statute permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident, the nonresident has a reason to foresee suit in that state.

Many state statutes allow courts to base jurisdiction over a defendant on contacts which arise out of a contract with a resident plaintiff. These statutes usually require more contacts than a contractual obligation with the resident before jurisdiction is allowed. Courts must determine whether the statute applies to the defendant and then whether exercising jurisdiction will deny the defendant due
process of law. Many times either the statute itself or judicial interpretation extends the statute to the full limits possible under the Constitution.

Jurisdiction depends on some contact between the defendant and the forum state. Thus the court must focus on the defendant's acts. In contract cases, however, purchasers and sellers have different "quality" of contacts.

Sellers promise to deliver goods or services which enter the plaintiff's state. When the seller is physically present in the state during the course of performance, his contacts are extensive and the exercise of jurisdiction is usually constitutional. Even when the seller performs outside the state and sends goods into the state, his contacts are usually substantial enough for jurisdiction. Courts usually allow jurisdiction in these cases because a nonresident seller purpose-

85 See 14 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("[a]ny basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."); 4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(6) (1980) ("[a]ny basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the United States").
87 See Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding jurisdiction over a wine importer who traveled to forum state in order to promote his product); National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959) (allowing jurisdiction when defendant's agents entered the state), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1960).
88 See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969) (asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident seller even though the buyer initiated the negotiations, assumed the risk of shipment, and traveled to the defendant's state).

Other courts find that simply selling goods to the plaintiff will not create jurisdiction, especially when the plaintiff himself has reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state. See Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (denying jurisdiction over nonresident seller when the plaintiff initiated the negotiations and assumed risk of loss in the defendant's state).

When the plaintiff lacks a compelling reason for bringing suit in his own forum the defendant may be required to have additional contacts. In Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1965), the court held that negotiating a contract with the plaintiff through the mails and telephone and agreeing to apply the plaintiff's state's law were not sufficient contacts alone. However, the additional contact of shipping the goods F.O.B. the plaintiff's state would be sufficient. Id. at 587-89.

The nonresident seller must foresee that his act will have consequences in a particular state. For example, when a manufacturer sells to a distributor who in turn sells in a state unknown to the manufacturer, the manufacturer may not be sued in that state. But when the manufacturer sells directly to a plaintiff in the state, he may be sued. Compare Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1972) with John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., Inc., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971).
fully avails himself of a state's laws by entering its markets.\textsuperscript{89}

The quality of purchasers' contacts differs from nonresident sellers' contacts.\textsuperscript{90} The nonresident purchaser promises to send payments to the plaintiff. The courts' major concern is under what circumstances does this contact, alone or in addition to other contacts, create jurisdiction.

Early cases dealing with nonresident purchasers generally found payment alone insufficient.\textsuperscript{91} Other cases have distinguished purchasers who had additional contacts. For example, purchasers who enter the plaintiff's state to solicit the contract have more extensive contacts and courts exercise jurisdiction more readily.\textsuperscript{92} Besides making payments or soliciting the contract, the purchaser may have other contacts, such as assuming the risk of damage to the goods, or supervising the performance by using the telephone and mails, or agreeing to apply the forum's law to the contract.\textsuperscript{93} These additional

\textsuperscript{89} See Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d at 994; Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d at 369.
\textsuperscript{90} Ripple & Murphy, supra note 4, at 79.
\textsuperscript{91} See McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 906-07 (D. Minn. 1971)(only contact was payment to resident manufacturer and was not sufficient for jurisdiction); Guardian Packaging Corp. v. Kapak Indus., 316 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (D. Minn. 1970)(payment to resident manufacturer was only contact); Oswalt Indus. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307, 312-13 (D. Kan. 1969)(payment and one visit to plaintiff's state were not sufficient contacts); Rath Packing Co. v. Intercontinental Meat Traders, 181 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1970)(purchaser not amenable to suit when only contacts were payment to resident plaintiff and accepting goods in plaintiff's state); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Hilson Indus., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962)(only significant contact was payment of money).
\textsuperscript{92} Two California cases found jurisdiction over a purchaser whose contacts included sending agents into California to supervise the plaintiff's performance in addition to sending payments into the forum. Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engineers, 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); American Cont. Import Agency v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 2d 317, 30 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1963). See also Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 261-62, 107 A.2d 357, 367 (1954)(allowing jurisdiction when defendant continually entered plaintiff's state to supervise, when contract applied Maryland law and when defendant accepted product in forum in addition to making payments to forum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).

But when the purchaser's only contacts are promising to pay and placing an order through the telephone without entering the state, jurisdiction may be harder to support. See Architectural Bldg. Components Corp. v. Comfort, 528 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1974).
\textsuperscript{93} See Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973)(making visits to supervise and sending numerous documents and telephone calls created jurisdiction); Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974)(purchaser accepting goods had sufficient contacts); Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid Center, 259 Minn. 330, 335-36, 107 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1961)(allowing jurisdiction when defendant purchaser accepted goods in plaintiff's state, attended numerous meetings and where contract was prepared in forum), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961).

When the plaintiff has reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state, jurisdiction may be more difficult to exercise. See Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.
contacts make an exercise of jurisdiction more likely. However, the presence or absence of a particular type of contact such as presence in the forum, initiation of bargaining, or assumption of the risk of damage to goods is not in itself decisive.94

Some plaintiffs attempt to sue nonresident purchasers whose only contact is making payments. The courts consider this contact in light of the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in the forum and the forum state's interest in providing relief, in determining whether making payment alone is sufficient to create jurisdiction.95 A court's decision usually hinges on the extent of these interests. The plaintiff's interests are greater when he has extensively altered his position by relying on the defendant's promise.96 Courts deny jurisdiction when the plaintiff effectively controls his own actions and the contract does not stipulate where the plaintiff must perform.97 Hence, courts do

1967)(denying jurisdiction when defendant's only contacts were acceptance of offer and acceptance of goods in plaintiff's state while payment was made to plaintiff's agent in defendant's state).

94 See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1979)(the acceptance of goods in plaintiff's state is not necessary), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkt., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977)(the initiation of negotiations is not decisive); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 1968)(the presence of defendant during contract performance is not necessary).

95 See, e.g., Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1069 (4th Cir. 1982); Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 695 F.2d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 1982); Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp., 692 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1982); Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 1974).

96 Many times jurisdiction depends on what type of goods or services are provided. Personal services of an individual usually mark a greater plaintiff interest. In Zerbel v. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971), an accountant prepared financial statements in Wisconsin for a New York corporation. The New York corporation carried on no business within Wisconsin and was never present but it did know that the plaintiff would perform there. The court exercised jurisdiction over the defendant even though the plaintiff had traveled extensively to the corporation's places of business in New York.

Courts also exercise jurisdiction when the defendant agrees to accept custom made goods manufactured specifically for the defendant. In Nicholstone Book Bindery v. Chelsea House Publishers, 621 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1623 (1982), the Tennessee Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction when the resident plaintiff purchased expensive specialized materials for custom made goods. The court noted the state's interest in providing relief for its residents and emphasized that the defendant knew the plaintiff would perform in the state. Id. at 564. The court distinguished cases where jurisdiction was denied because the plaintiff's goods came from a readily available inventory and were not custom made. Id.

97 In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied jurisdiction over the nonresident purchaser since the plaintiff promised goods, not services, and since the plaintiff had a choice of where to manufacture the goods. The court said the defendant was not amenable to suit in Wisconsin simply because the plaintiff
not find jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks to base it on his own unilateral activity. The defendant can reasonably anticipate suit in a state when he has reason to know that the plaintiff will perform there.

Two factors will weigh against exercising jurisdiction and require additional contacts. The first is the plaintiff's reciprocal contacts with the defendant's state. In these cases, the plaintiff should anticipate suit in the defendant's state and not in his own state, at least when the defendant's contacts with the plaintiff's state are few. The second factor is the plaintiff's ability to obtain relief in the defendant's state. When the defendant enters into a contract, he should realize the burden the plaintiff will face if a cause of action arises from the contract. If the plaintiff will face a heavy burden if forced to litigate in the defendant's forum, then the defendant can foresee a suit in the plaintiff's forum. A slight burden on the plaintiff can reduce the defendant's foresight and increase the contacts necessary to create jurisdiction. Thus, when a nonresident defendant promises to pay money to a plaintiff who is slightly burdened,
courts will look for additional contacts between the defendant and the forum such as initiating negotiations, assuming the risk of damage, and entering the state to supervise performance.

IV. Conclusion

Jurisdiction over some defendants whose contacts arise from a contractual obligation with a person within the forum is a reasonable extension of long-arm jurisdiction. Long-arm jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s obligations to the plaintiff which arise from contacts with the state. These contacts, and resulting obligations, create jurisdiction when the defendant can reasonably foresee litigating his obligations in the plaintiff’s state. The quantity of contacts necessary to create jurisdiction depends on the plaintiff’s position. The contacts increase as the plaintiff’s ability to litigate in the defendant’s forum and the plaintiff’s reciprocal contacts with the defendant increase. Thus, when a defendant contracts for goods and services which he knows the plaintiff will provide in a particular state, when the plaintiff has few contacts with the defendant’s state, and when the plaintiff will be more inconvenienced by litigating in the defendant’s state—the defendant should foresee suit. The fairness mandated by due process requires additional contacts when the plaintiff’s ability to litigate in the defendant’s forum and when his contacts with the defendant increase.

Any disarray in the lower courts does not result from conflicting jurisdictional standards. The disarray results from a poorly defined method of jurisdictional analysis. Once the law recognizes that the defendant’s interest in due process and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief both determine the contacts necessary for jurisdiction, fixed rules will not be necessary. Two defendants, each with the same amount of contacts, may be treated differently depending on what plaintiff the defendant has dealt with. The question is not simply what contacts create jurisdiction, but also whether the defendant can reasonably foresee litigation when he chooses to deal with particular persons. The Supreme Court’s role in this regard is not to promulgate fixed rules. Instead, it should develop a fair method of jurisdictional analysis.

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104 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
105 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
106 See note 7 supra.