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STATUTORY RESPONSES TO INTERESTED DIRECTORS' TRANSACTIONS:
A WATERING DOWN OF FIDUCIARY STANDARDS?

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I. Introduction

Twenty-seven states\(^1\) have enacted statutory provisions dealing with interested directors\(^2\) transactions or contracts.\(^3\) California was one of the first states to enact such a provision\(^4\) and most of the statutes are modelled upon or similar to the California section.\(^5\)

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2 Some states have included officers under the purview of the statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1400.3 (Purdon Supp. 1976).

3 This article will not attempt to deal with those statutory provisions which may validate or invalidate specific transactions or contracts between interested directors or officers and their corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143 (1975) and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 47 (1971) dealing with loans to directors or officers. This article, however, focuses upon transactions between a corporation and a director, and upon transactions between two corporations, with directors common to both.

4 West Virginia and Rhode Island had statutory provisions predating the California statute but they have not served as a model for other states.

5 Although California has recently revised its corporation's law and its statutory provision on interested directors' transactions (See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310, 132-156), reference in the article to the California model will mean CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 820 (West 1955) which provides:

Duty to act in good faith, effect of personal financial interest or common directorship. Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good faith, and with a view to the interests of the corporation. No contract of other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any corporation, firm, or association in which one or more of its directors are directors or are financially interested, is either void or voidable because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes or approves the contract or transaction, or because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if the circumstances specified in any of the following subdivisions exist:

(a) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or known to the board or directors or committee and noted in the minutes, and the board of committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the vote or votes of such director or directors.
These statutes specify the methods to enter into such transactions. Such transactions are permissible: 1) if approved by the board or shareholders, or 2) if the transaction is found to be fair. Since the statutes are phrased in the disjunctive, the question arises as to whether board or shareholder approval eliminates the consideration of the substantive fairness of the transaction. If fairness is eliminated, it would be a significant departure from traditional concepts of fiduciary duty. Given the importance of state law because of the recent reluctance of the Supreme Court to use federal securities law as a means of insuring fiduciary duty and the possible broad scope of these statutes, the elimination of substantive fairness by these statutes would remove an important protection for shareholders. This article will analyze the California model and its progeny in an attempt to suggest a resolution of this issue.

II. The Common Law View

The common law view of interested directors’ contracts or transactions has a varied history. Early American courts followed the traditional English rule and held such contracts or transactions to be voidable at the option of the corporation. The underlying rationale for this rule was that directors, as fiduciaries, have a duty of loyalty and therefore their interests should not conflict with those of the corporation. There was no inquiry into the fairness of the contract or transaction. This rule was also applied to transactions between

(b) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or known to the shareholders, and they approve or ratify the contract or transaction in good faith by a majority vote or written consent of shareholders entitled to vote.

(c) The contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized or approved.

Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies a contract or transaction.

7 See note 33 infra.
8 All but three of the states (IDAHO CODE § 30-142 (1967); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-67 (1972); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 1888 (1973)) found in note 1 supra, resemble California’s model by using the alternative approach of board approval; shareholders approval or fairness.
9 See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966), for an excellent analysis of the common law principles [hereinafter cited as MARSH].
10 Id. at 36; W. FLETCHER, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 917 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
12 Munson v. Syracuse Geneva and Corneng R. R. Co., 103 N.Y. 58, 73, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886). See H. BALLANTINE, On Corporations § 66 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE]. Some courts have analogized directors to trustees and have found the contracts to be voidable. See, e.g., Knox Class Bottle Company v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699, 89 So.2d 799 (1956). See Sealy, The Director As Trustee, 1967 CAMB. L. J. 83 (1967), which distinguishes corporate directors from trustees. Other courts have compared directors to “agents” who cannot self-deal with their principals. See, e.g., Wardell v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 103 U.S. 651 (1880). However, directors who act in their individual capacities generally are not viewed as agents. BALLANTINE at § 44. But see Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 328 (1876) which utilized both the trustee and agent rationale to void the contract.
13 It [the law] does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction, or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party when the fiduciary undertook to represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of abstract justice in the particular case.

Munson, supra note 12, at 74.
corporations with common directors (interlocking boards). 14

A variety of reasons was offered by the early courts for this rule. One reason typically advanced was that since directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation, they cannot adequately represent both themselves and the corporation. 15 In other words, the corporation is entitled to representation by all the directors using their unbiased judgment. 16

Courts have also indicated that when interests of the individual director conflicted with a duty he owed to the corporation, it was assumed that the director would favor his own interest. 17 In addition, the disinterested directors representing the corporation may inevitably be influenced by their co-director and that influence is difficult if not impossible to evaluate. 18

A weakening of the early inflexible rule began as the courts accepted the idea that a majority of the disinterested directors could approve the agreement on behalf of the corporation, provided that the contract was fair. 19 Courts were initially more willing to depart from the inflexible rule in the case of transactions between interlocking boards. This resulted from a judicial recognition of the trend in modern business of intercorporate relationships and the prevalence of directors serving on more than one board. 20

This modernized version of the rule validating contracts approved by a dis-

14 Marsa, supra note 9, at 37-38. The rule also extended to parent-subsidiary relationships even in the absence of common directors. Id. at 38. See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Parent to Subsidiary Corporations, 57 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1971) [hereinafter cited as VIRGINIA NOTE].

15 Note, Legal Safeguards About Transactions Between A Director and his Corporation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 56, 57 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Note, Legal Safeguards].

16 BALLANTINE, supra note 46, at 171.

17 In Smith v. Pacific Vinegar & Pickle Works, 145 Col. 352, 78 P. 550, 554 (1904), the court states:

The philosophy of this rule is quite apparent, and its inflexibility is the strongest safeguard which the law can offer for the protection of the interests of the beneficiary. The great purpose of the law is to secure fidelity in the agent. When one undertakes to deal with himself in different capacities—individual and representative—there is a manifest hostility in the position he occupies. His duty calls upon him to act for the best interests of his principal. His self-interest prompts him to make the best bargain for himself. Humanity is so constituted that, when these conflicting interests arise, the temptation is usually too great to be overcome, and duty is sacrificed to interest. In order that this temptation may be avoided, or, if indulged in, must be at the peril of the trustee, it has been wisely provided that the trustee shall not be permitted to make or enforce any contract arising between himself as trustee and individually with reference to any matter of the trust, nor will the court enter into any examination of the honesty of the transaction.

18 In Munson, supra note 12, at 358, the court explains:

[The law] cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee with his associates nor will it enter into the inquiry, in an action by the trustee in his private capacity to enforce the contract, in the making of which he participated. The value of the rule of equity to which we have referred, lies, to a great extent, in its stubbornness and inflexibility. Its rigidity gives it one of its chief uses as a preventive or discouraging influence, because it weakens the temptation to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part of the trustees, vitiating, without attempt at discrimination, all transactions in which they assume the dual characters of principal and representative.

19 Marsa, supra note 9, at 40 n.18, and cases cited therein. The rationale for this rule was that a trustee could deal directly with the cestui qui trust if he took no advantage of his position, and he made full disclosure, and the transaction was fair and reasonable. Thus a director also should be able to deal similarly. Id. at 41. See also 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS 1275-76 (2d. ed. 1956).

interested majority, however, had its own rigid aspects. Some courts would not inquire into fairness to validate the transaction when the interested director was himself necessary either to constitute a quorum of the board or to constitute a majority to authorize the transaction. This disinterested quorum rule was sometimes found inapplicable to interlocking boards. Some state courts eventually abandoned the disinterested quorum requirement in all cases, leaving only an inquiry into fairness.

Thus the common law moved from the traditional inflexible rule with its certainty of application to a more flexible but uncertain approach involving questions of fairness. This change has been justified in several ways.

The Supreme Court, for example, felt that it was desirable for those closely associated with a corporation to assist it, since those individuals would be the most interested and the "best qualified to judge of the necessity of that aid, and of the extent to which it may safely be given." It has also been argued that the "exigencies of modern business" necessarily justified a change in the rule. But as one leading commentator points out,

One searches in vain in the decided cases for a reasoned defense of this change in legal philosophy, or for the slightest attempt to refute the powerful arguments which had been made in support of the previous rule. Did the courts discover in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century that greed was no longer a factor in human conduct? If so, they did not share the basis of this discovery with the public; nor did they humbly admit their error when confronted with the next wave of corporate frauds arising out of the era of the formation of the "trusts" during the 1890's and early 1900's.

III. Statutory Responses

The common law has moved from a predictable standard which rendered transactions with interested directors voidable at the option of the corporation to a more flexible, but uncertain standard, under which these transactions are valid, only if they are found to be fair. In 1931, California adopted a general statute dealing with these transactions. While the statutory provision was designed to

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22 See, e.g., Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 A. 842 (Ch. 1903). LATTIN, supra note 9, at 8931.
23 MARSH, supra note 9, at 43-44; FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 8931. Most of the statutory provisions in note 1, supra, concern the necessity of an interested director's vote or his presence at a directors' meeting for the purposes of a quorum. Generally, these provisions allow the interested director's vote and allow his presence to be counted toward quorum.
24 LATTIN, supra note 10, at 291.
26 Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CAL. L. REV. 465, 476 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Ballantine, Questions of Policy].
27 MARSH, supra note 9, at 40.
28 CAL. CIV. CODE § 311 enacted in 1931 was amended in 1933 and then amended and retitled CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 820 in 1947. It was amended and retitled CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 in 1977. Each of these changes prior to 1977 involved changes in language but did not change the basic effect of the statute. For a discussion of the 1977 changes, see text accompanying notes 134-58 infra.
deal with the common law in the area which had developed in California, it has greater significance since many states have enacted similar provisions or have relied heavily upon the California statute as a model. Thus, unless there is a clear deviation from the California model, or legislative history in a given state indicates contrary intent, California’s rationale and case law development should afford insight into the effect of similar statutes in other states.

A. The California Model

Former section 820 of the California Corporation Code (the “California Model”) provided in essence that contracts or transactions between a corporation and its directors (either directly or indirectly through an interlocking board

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29 Ballantine, Questions of Policy, supra note 26, at 475; Comment, Corporations: Effect of Director’s Adverse Interest or Conflicting Duties to Invalidate Contracts: California Civil Code Section 311, 29 Cal. L. Rev. 480 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Corporations].


31 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 329-37 (4th ed. Sands, 1973); Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 597-604 (2d ed. 1911). It is not necessary for the statute in question to be identical to the California model, nor is it necessary for the state legislature to manifest a clear intent to follow California in the formulation of the statute.

32 See note 5 supra for the text of statute in full. Former Cal. Corp. Code § 820 has generally served as the model for the other statutes, in terms of both statutory language and as a guide for interpretation.

33 All the statutes use the term “transactions.” The use of the term transaction significantly expands the coverage of the statutes. It is a term broader in scope than the term contract. United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Eberstein, 150 Kan. 790, 96 P.2d 661, 663 (1940). Transaction could include “an act or agreement ... having some connection with each other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between themselves are altered.” Baker v. S. A. Healy Co. 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E.2d 228, 234. Thus the statute covers not only the usual contractual relationship contemplated in the common law but may include situations when the director unilaterally acts which adversely affects his corporation, e.g., a dissolution. Northway Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 108, 115 (1973). It may also apply to sale of control; dividend policy; and recapitalizations. See Marsh supra note 9, at 57-65. It may also apply to corporate opportunities usurped by directors. Cf. Folk, infra note 48, at 92-93. There has been a recent trend of going private transactions where minority shareholders have been frozen out of their corporation. Those transactions often involve board action with actual or potential conflicts of interest. See generally, Note, Going Private, 84 Yale L.J. 903 (1975). Thus, compliance with the statute and an inquiry into fairness may be required. Cf. Folk letter dated July 19, 1973 found in Northway Inc. v. TSC Industry, 512 F.2d 324, 337, n.27 (7th Cir. 1975). The use of other statutory provisions to effectuate going private, such as merger provisions with appraisal rights, should not preclude an inquiry into fairness. Cf. Singer v. Magnavox, N.Y.L.J. 5, 6 (Del. Supp. Ct. Oct. 4, 1977). Given the broad definition of transaction, a court conceivably could read the statute into many other situations.

34 The California model covers transactions with directors. Although the statute does not specifically deal with transactions between shareholders, who are not directors, and their corporation, it is possible to argue that they are also covered. If they are controlling shareholders, the transactions may be reached under the theory that the directors are in reality puppets of the shareholders. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation, 162 F.2d 36 (3rd Cir. 1947), or that they were deputized. (Cf. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962)), or under the theory of de facto directors. H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 206 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Henn]. In addition, the model does not deal with the problems of transactions with relatives of directors or the voting of relatives as directors on transactions with their relative who is a co-director. At the common law, courts scrutinized such transactions and should continue to do so under the statute. Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699; 89 So. 2d 799 (1956); Imberman v. Alexander, 16 Misc. 2d 350, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 801 (1959). See Kendrick, Interested Director in Texas, 21 S.W.L.J. 794, 798 (1967); Sarner v. Fox Hill, 199 A. 2d 6 (1964) (an attorney was disqualified). See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-323 (1960), which specifically includes spouse, parents and children as interested under the statute.
of a corporation in which the directors are financially interested) are neither void nor voidable because the directors are present or voting on the transaction if any of three circumstances have occurred: (1) disclosure of the common directorship or financial interest to the disinterested directors who in good faith and sufficient number approve the transaction; or (2) a similar disclosure to the shareholders who in good faith approve the contract; or (3) the contract is "just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized or approved."  

The language is clearly disjunctive in that all that is required under the statute is "any one of the following" circumstances (emphasis added). On its face, the statute seems to allow enforcement of an unjust and unreasonable contract, as long as the board of directors or shareholders approved the transaction pursuant to the statute. Thus, it would appear that the statute has elimi-
nated the requirement of fairness and correspondingly lowered the fiduciary responsibility of directors who deal with their own corporations. If fairness is eliminated as an overriding principle by the statute, it would be a significant departure from the common law which has always required fairness. All that would then be required under the California model is disclosure of the director’s interest to the board and shareholders and approval pursuant to the statute. Thus, minimum disclosure would become the substitute for fairness.

Twenty-three states have enacted statutes which substantially conform to the California model of using a disjunctive approach requiring board or shareholder approval or fairness. Different views have been expressed by the commentators on whether fairness is an overriding principle under these statutes. Most commentators argue for the continued use of fairness notwithstanding the disjunctive approach of the statute while others advocate that fairness has been expressly eliminated.

The first case to deal with the question of fairness in the context of the California model was Remillard Brick Co. v. Dandini Co. Remillard Brick Co. (wholly owned by a Lillian Dandini), a minority shareholder of Remillard-Dandini Co., brought a derivative action on behalf of Remillard-Dandini and its wholly owned subsidiary San-Jose Brick Tile, Ltd. (“the manufacturing companies”). The suit sought to recover profits and declare void a contract between the manufacturing companies and Remillard-Dandini Sales Corporation (“the sales corporation”). The sales corporation was organized and wholly owned by defendants Stanley and Sturgis, who through proxies and contracts also controlled the manufacturing companies.

Initially, Stanley and Sturgis offered to purchase the shares in Remillard approval by the disinterested directors yet, still inquired as to fairness. Under Scott the Remillard court would not have had to go further after that finding of no board approval. Thus Scott’s reliance on Remillard is unfounded. In addition, there is no support for the Scott approach in the legislative history of the California model or in the New Jersey Commentary. The requirement of fairness has been viewed as a protection for shareholders. See text accompanying notes 163-199 infra, for a discussion of fairness.

Note that the California model requires minimum disclosure of interest by the director and not additionally the facts and circumstances as to the transaction. But see Armstrong Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal. App. 447, 14 Cal. Rptr. 338, 343 (1961). The following states follow the California model of requiring only minimal disclosure of interest: Arizona; Connecticut; Florida; Indiana; Kentucky; Maryland; Nevada; New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; Virginia; West Virginia; Wisconsin. See note 81 infra for those states which require full disclosure.

46 See note 8 supra.


Brick Co. owned by Lillian Dandini. When she refused, they decided to separate the sales function from the manufacturing companies by setting up the sales corporation. A contract which transferred the sales function away from the manufacturing companies was entered into between the manufacturing companies and the sales corporation. Although a majority of the disinterested directors of the manufacturing companies did not approve the contract, the majority shareholders (i.e. Stanley and Sturgis) consented to the transaction. Defendants argued that since there was disclosure and shareholder approval, the statutory requirement had been satisfied and thus the contract was valid.

The Supreme Court of California rejected the defendant's contentions and voided the contract. The court held that "[e]ven though the requirements of Section 820 of the California Model are technically met, transactions that are unfair and unreasonable to the corporation may be avoided." The court appears to have reached this conclusion by relying on the good faith requirement for all directors found in the first paragraph of the statute.50

The court could have reached the same result of voiding the contract without making fairness a mandatory requirement under the statute. It could have found that the defendants were not in technical compliance with the statute because the facts justified a finding that the directors acted in bad faith. The court described the defendant's action in such terms as "mulct; harsh and unfair"; and to "strip" a corporation of its assets.52 These findings could easily have led to a conclusion of bad faith. There were also express findings by the trier of fact53 of fraud and breach of the fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by the controlling majority.54 Despite these express findings, the Remillard court did not limit its decisions to situations where there is a showing of bad faith, fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. The important thing to note is that the court held that unfair transactions are voidable notwithstanding compliance with the shareholder approval requirement of the statute.55

50 Id. at 74.
51 Id. at 73. This seems to equate good faith with fairness. See Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parents Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L. J. 338, 342 (1964) [hereinafter cited as YALE NOTE]; Contra Folk, supra note 46, at 88. Most cases which speak of good faith and fairness always refer to them separately, implying that they are not equitable. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 296, 306 (1939); Mueller v. Machan, 62 Cal. App. 3d 258, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976). Yet in Pepper, the Supreme Court in articulating a test — i.e., an arm's length bargain—doesn't indicate whether the test is for fairness, good faith or both. See quotation from Pepper in text accompanying note 169 infra. In the context of the statute equating good faith and the statutory requirement of fairness would appear to be contrary to the rules of statutory construction. See CORPORATIONS supra note 29, at 485. However, it would not be contrary to statutory construction if the requirement of fairness in the statute were procedural fairness. See discussion of procedural fairness in text accompanying notes 64-69 infra.
52 See note 42 supra at 73-74.
53 Id. at 71.
54 Id. at 73. Controlling shareholders have been viewed as fiduciaries with respect to other shareholders. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 296 (1939).
55 Accord KENNERMAN, supra note 37. See also Schoff v. Clough, 380 P.2d 464, 465 (Nev. 1963). One commentator indicates that Noe v. Rousell, 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975), suggests that the Remillard approach is adopted in Louisiana under their statute. Note, Corporations, Fiduciaries and Conflicts of Interests. 36 LA. L. REV. 320, 325 (1975). A close examination of the case reveals that this contention is without substance. The court deals with the issue of burden of proof placing it upon the fiduciary (the liquidator) to show that the transaction was an arm's length affair without discussing the effect of the statute. There was no discussion of whether there was board or shareholder approval pursuant to the statute 310 So. 2d at 818-19.
In other words, the Remillard approach would allow interested directors' transactions to be voided if they were found to be unfair even though the specific requirements of the statute—disclosure to and approval of disinterested shareholders—had been complied with. Such a radical departure from the apparently obvious wording of the statute can only be justified in light of the legislative history of the California statute in conjunction with the common law development to that point. According to Henry Ballantine, a drafter of the statute, its purpose was an attempt to relax "the strictness of the California decisions to the effect that the interested directors' vote may not be counted toward a majority and that his presence may not be considered in determining whether a quorum of directors is present." The drafters of the statute did not intend to affect the voidability of transactions which were unfair, but to overcome the problems created by the "involvement" of interested directors in the approval or ratification process. Thus the statute, by dealing only with the director's involvement, was aimed at curing procedural problems, not at assuring substantive fairness. If it were to be read as somehow limiting a court's ability to inquire into substantive fairness, it would clearly run contrary to developing common law on point which emphasized a concern for substantive fairness. The drafters wanted merely to clear up a procedural point and not to change the entire course of the common law dealing with fairness.

On the other hand, it might be argued that if fairness is viewed as an overriding requirement, then the statutory provision of fairness as an alternative to board or shareholder approval would be mere "surplusage," and thus contrary to traditional principles of statutory interpretation. This conclusion need not necessarily follow, however, if one views the statutory fairness requirement as being operative as a savings clause for certain procedural defects, i.e., as a concern

56 BALLANTINE, Questions of Policy, supra note 26, at 475. Note that the statutory language itself indicates the contract is neither "void nor voidable because" of the voting, or presence of the director thus leaving nonprocedural grounds for attacking a transaction.

57 According to Ballantine, it was the view of the majority of the committee on corporations, however, that transactions with a director or between corporations with common directors should be merely voidable for unfairness and not void or voidable at the option of the corporation by reason of the fact that such director participated in a quorum or a majority. Id. at 476 (emphasis added). But see changes in the California Corporation Law effective August 14, 1931 and analysis by legislative counsel bureau of assembly bill no. 1000 (Ch. 862) at 116 which indicates that the section was a means by which directors may avoid violating their fiduciary duty. The Analysis stated that any transaction with interested directors "is valid under the following circumstances even though the interested director is present and voting . . . [the circumstances are essentially subsections a through c of §§ 820]" (emphasis added). While this analysis may indicate that the statute is a validating provision, this validation may be limited by the previous quote which indicated that the validity may apply only to the problems under the common law of presence and voting by the director, leaving the question of fairness open.

58 Id. at 475. See BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW (1949). Under the common law, a transaction would still have been voidable even though the interested director was not necessary for the vote or absent himself to avoid a conflict of interest. See Note, LEGAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 15, at 60.


60 Cf. Comment, Corporations, supra note 29, at 485 indicates:

May authorization or ratification in good faith be equated to a just and reasonable contract? Such a view would violate a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation by making subdivisions (a) and (b) largely surplusage.

MARSH, supra note 9, at 47.
for procedural fairness.61 This concern with procedural fairness is consistent with the common law which looked at the presence or vote of the interested director62 (procedural considerations) in addition to fairness.63

The fact that the statutory requirement of fairness focuses at the time of the authorization or approval of the transaction64 further supports the view that the statutes are concerned with procedural not substantive fairness. Both the common law prior to the adoption of the statutes65 and cases decided under the statutes66 have viewed the substantive fairness of the transaction at dates subsequent to the approval—a view which is contrary to the statute.

This procedural savings clause of the statute may operate in those cases where there is a failure to comply with either board or shareholder approval as required by the statute. A court could review the board or shareholder approval process or lack thereof to determine if the failure to comply with the statute would affect procedural fairness. For example, a technical non-compliance with the California model such as a failure to note disclosures of “interest” in the corporate minutes, should not necessarily render a contract void. The savings clause could save the transaction as still being procedurally fair. Similarly, in the context of a closed corporation, all the facts may be known by all the directors and shareholders but there may be no formal approval pursuant to the statute. The transaction should still be valid because it was procedurally fair, given the full disclosure67 and the usual informal manner in which close corporations are run.68

Thus, fairness under the statute, if viewed in a procedural context, leaves the question of substantive fairness open for judicial inquiry and is not precluded by the disjunctive approach of the statutes.69

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61 Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir., 1965) which involved the concept of “unconscionability” under § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1962). The court in applying the concept looked at both procedural considerations (e.g., the manner in which the agreement was entered into) and substantive considerations (e.g., the terms of contract). See Leff, Unconscionability And The Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967).

62 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra, for a discussion of the common law view.

63 Cf. Harvard Note note 47 supra, at 340. The Note suggests that fairness involves questions about the contract itself and the process of approval:

In practice we have found that a court will look first to the terms of the contract, but this inquiry usually throws insufficient light on the question of whether acceptance of the contract was an exercise of business judgment. An examination of the conduct of the directors — as a coordinate line of inquiry — yields more illuminating data.

64 CAL. CIV. CODE § 820(c). Some statutes add the term “ratification.” See, e.g., Delaware infra note 78.


66 See Remillard, supra note 42, at 76; Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 n.2 (Del. 1976). Neither case makes reference to the statutes in making its determination of fairness at a date which conflicts with the statute.

67 The use of procedural fairness to save transactions which do not comply with the requirements of board or shareholder approval would normally mandate full disclosure of both the interest and the terms of the transaction. Cf. 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice 439 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hornstein].


69 If the statutory requirement of fairness is procedural in nature, then it could invalidate an otherwise fair transaction. For example, a corporation has ten directors of which six enter into a contract with the corporation. If the contract is substantively fair but all the disinterested directors vote against it, then the contract could be voided. This results from the failure to meet any of the statutory requirements. There has been no board or stockholder
The Remillard approach may also be justified if the statutes are viewed as only determinative of who has the burden of proof.70 Under the common law, the burden of proving the fairness of a transaction was usually on the interested director.71 Thus compliance with board or shareholder approval under the statute arguably would either lessen that burden72 or shift it to those challenging the transaction.73 Failure to comply with board or shareholder approval would, on the other hand, bring into play the fairness requirement of the statute. This requirement would then place the burden of persuasion on the interested director to prove substantive fairness. Although this approach is consistent with the disjunctive nature of the statute because substantive fairness remains an issue, a shifting of burden of persuasion to those challenging the transaction may create an insurmountable obstacle, thus precluding fairness. This would be contrary to the Remillard approach. To avoid this result, compliance with statute should only have the effect of removing the presumption of unfairness and only shift the burden of going forward to the plaintiffs.74

approval pursuant to the statute. This result is consistent with the policy of requiring corporate interests in cases of self-dealing to be the concern of those disinterested directors.

70 Israels, supra note 43, at 627. There is no legislative history or intent by the draftsmen indicating that the California model was designed to deal with burden of proof. Chase v. Super-Cold Corporation, 328 P.2d 812, 814 (Cal. 1958). But see Tevis v. Beigel, 344 P.2d 360, 363 (Cal. 1959). There is no statutory language indicating that the statutes were designed for that purpose. In fact, some states have specifically included language which indicates that the burden shifts upon compliance with the statute. See, e.g., Virginia and the new California statute. See part C of text, infra.


72 In Scott, supra note 36, the court held that the burden does not shift to those challenging the transaction under New Jersey's adaptation of the California Model. The court states that compliance with the statute "sets a less stringent standard for the requisite proof, substituting the preponderance of evidence test for the clear and convincing requirement." Id. at 68. The court relies on the Commissioners' Note accompanying N.J. Stats. Ann. 14A:6-8 which indicates that the statute was designed to change the rule of Abeles v. Adams Engineering Co., Inc., 33 N.J. 411, 173 A.2d 246 (1959). There is no statutory language indicating that the statutes were designed for that purpose. In fact, some states have specifically included language which indicates that the burden shifts upon compliance with the statute. See, e.g., Virginia and the new California statute. See part C of text, infra.

73 See Israels, supra note 43. Cf. Tevis v. Beigel, 156 Cal. App. 2d 319 P.2d 98, 102-103 (1957). Some case law indicated that a charter or by-law provision allowing such transactions would at least "exonerate them from adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against them." Spiegel v. Beacon Participations 8 N.E. 2d 895, 907 (1937); see also Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227. This is not shifting of the burden of persuasion, but only a removal of the inference unfairness, thus requiring plaintiffs to bear the initial burden of going forward.

74 Ward, Some Notes on Transactors Involving Interested and Interlocking Directors in Pennsylvania, 23 Temp. L. Q. 107 1949. Under the common law some courts held the burden of persuasion was on the directors to prove fairness, i.e., that the transaction was presumptively unfair. Other courts required those challenging the transaction to at least allege some facts or circumstances besides interest, which could appear to be unfair. That is, a burden of going forward was on the plaintiff. The burden of persuasion would still be on the interested directors to convince the court that the transaction was fair. Id. at 113. This view should be the effect of the statute since it is consistent with case law seemingly indicating that only the pre-
The California approach as reflected by Remillard with fairness as an overriding requirement, therefore, may be rationalized by the drafters’ view as reflected by Ballantine; or by viewing the statutory requirement of fairness as a procedural savings clause; or by classifying the statutes as dealing with burden of going forward; or on a policy that fairness is necessary to protect shareholders.\(^7\)

### B. The Delaware Approach

Professor Ernest Folk maintains that the Remillard approach is inapplicable in Delaware because California has “a very different statute and a judicial point of view at variance with Delaware . . .”\(^7\) He argues that the purpose and effect of the Delaware provision “is to validate a contract between a corporation and one or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and other entities which are linked by common directors or officers, if any one of statutory tests is met” (emphasis added).\(^7\)

Section 144 of the Delaware Corporation Law\(^7\) does differ from the

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**NOTES**

7. Id. at 75. Cf. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co. v. Hall, 519 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tenn. 1975), criticized in Recent Developments, Corporations Duty a Loyalty and Corporate Opportunity — Transactions Between Corporations with Common Directors, 43 TENN. L. REV. 155 (1975). But see The Comment to the Model Act § 41 (which follows the California model and does not require full disclosure of the transaction) at 842 which initially indicates that “its purpose is to establish statutory guidelines for determining the validity of transactions . . . It validates, if the prescribed tests are satisfied, transactions with interested directors which common law rules often make voidable, if not void” (emphasis added). However, it later states that “The function of section 41 is not to provide a basis for validating for all purposes a contract or transaction . . . but simply to establish that such contract or transaction is not automatically void or voidable solely by reason of the director’s interest.”

76. See supra note 33. But see Singer v. Magnavox, note 33 supra. See text accompanying notes 61-69 supra for a discussion of fairness.

77. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 144 (1975) reads:

(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or soley because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or soley because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if;

1. The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
California statute.\textsuperscript{79} The Delaware statute, unlike its California counterpart, has no general requirement of good faith for directors\textsuperscript{80} although, like California, good faith is specifically required for board or shareholder approval.\textsuperscript{81} Significantly, the disclosure requirement in California is limited to disclosure of the adverse interest,\textsuperscript{82} while Delaware requires disclosure of “material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction . . .”\textsuperscript{83} (emphasis added). In essence, Delaware requires full disclosure.

If Folk’s view is correct and it is a validating statute, then this requirement of full disclosure removes the question of fairness from judicial inquiry when the board or shareholders approve a transaction pursuant to the statute.\textsuperscript{84} The question of the propriety of the transaction is then left to the board or shareholders, not the courts.\textsuperscript{85} This view substitutes full disclosure for fairness.\textsuperscript{86} Is the Folk view justifiable? There appears to be no legislative history\textsuperscript{87} to

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  \item[(2)] The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
  \item[(3)] The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{79} The Delaware statute unlike California specifically provides for board approval with “a majority of the disinterested directors even though the disinterested directors are less than a quorum.” See note 37 supra, for a discussion of California requirements. This provision clearly does not require a majority of all the directors present. But the statute is unclear whether one needs a disinterested majority of the whole quorum or a majority of disinterested directors present. Contra Arshit note 35 supra. Thus in the example in note 37 supra, the quorum was seven directors. Under the former approach the four disinterested directors are required, while under the latter, only three of the five disinterested are required.

\textsuperscript{80} See A. Conard, Corporations In Perspective 34 (1976). This distinction from California should not be significant. Although the statute doesn’t require good faith, Delaware case law views directors as fiduciaries operating within the business judgment rule which presumes good faith. Delaware Bar Association, Resource Document on Delaware Corporation Law 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Resource Document].

\textsuperscript{81} Delaware Ann. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1), (2) (1975). The following states also require good faith approval by the shareholder: Georgia, Kansas, California, Louisiana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.


\textsuperscript{83} The following states require full disclosure of both the interest and the facts as to the transaction: Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee. See note 44 supra, for those states requiring only minimal disclosure of interest.

\textsuperscript{84} But see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. Sup. 1976), and text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.

\textsuperscript{85} Courts are reluctant to inquire into the decision-making of directors, or shareholders when the business judgment rule or shareholder ratification applies. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960).

\textsuperscript{86} See text accompanying notes 114-22 infra. See generally Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 408 (1962). According to Cary, full disclosure may have a prophylactic effect on controlling shareholders or directors in the context of publicly held companies. But full disclosure does not necessarily restrain the activity of such shareholders or directors in the context of smaller corporations, without public shareholders. It would not be surprising for a controlling shareholder to inform the minority of proposed oppression. Cf. Remillard, supra note 42. at 74.

clarify the apparent statutory effect which validates contracts upon board or shareholder approval.88 Prior Delaware case law arguably supports Folk’s view.

Under Folk’s view, the requirement of board approval under the statute appears to be an extension of the business judgment rule.89 Delaware courts, prior to the enactment of the statute, did not inquire into the question of fairness whenever the business judgment rule was found to apply. That rule was used to uphold transactions whenever a disinterested majority of the board approved it.90 The Delaware Supreme Court in articulating the rationale for this rule, indicated that, “At most, therefore, we find ourselves in the twilight zone where reasonable businessmen, fully informed might differ. We think, therefore, we are precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced business managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the outcome . . .”91 (emphasis added) The rule was inapplicable, however, whenever a majority of the board was interested.92 According to Folk, the statutory requirement of board approval extends the application of the business judgment rule to situations where a majority of the board is interested. This results from the statutory language93 which allows approval of a majority of disinterested directors even though they constitute less than a quorum.94 Under this rule then, upon board approval pursuant to the statute, the only way to attack the transaction would be to prove that the business judgment rule should not apply.95

Since the requirements of the Delaware statute under Folk’s view are in the alternative, good faith shareholder ratification with full disclosure would also preclude questions of fairness.96 With such a ratification, a disinterested shareholder could only attack the transaction if he could show “the terms are so unequal as to amount to waste.”97 But Folk argues that the statute does not require

88 It is interesting to note that the Resource Document, supra note 80, prepared by the Delaware Bar Association in response to critics of Delaware corporate law ignores Section 144 and Folk’s analysis of that section. The Document indicates that a director as a fiduciary should not profit from his position and further that, “[w]hen challenged, he must prove, that transactions in which he has interest are fair.” Id. at 22.
89 Folk, supra note 48, at 82-83.
90 Beard, supra note 85, at 737-38.
91 Id. at 738-39.
92 Gottlieb, supra note 85. Approval by disinterested shareholders may insulate a transaction approved by the interested board from an inquiry of fairness. The court states: “[T]he entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked where formal approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed (share)holders.” Id. at 59.
93 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 8144 (a) (1). Folk, supra note 48, at 83. See note 79 supra, for a discussion of the language.
94 Under Folk’s analysis, the statute changes Gottlieb, supra note 83. In that case a nine-member board, of which six directors were interested, approved of an option plan unanimously. In Gottlieb, the court still looked to fairness because there wasn’t a disinterested quorum. Under the statute, since all three disinterested directors approved the transaction, fairness would not be an issue.
95 Folk indicates that the business judgment rule does not apply to findings of:
Fraud, actual or constructive, such as improper motive or personal gain or arbitrary action or conscious disregard of the interests of the corporation and the right of stockholders or “fraud or gross abuse of discretion” or “bad faith in the transaction” or if the transaction is “so manifestly unfair or to indicate fraud” or there “is a showing of gross and palpable overreaching.”
See note 48, supra at 76.
96 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 144 (a) (2); id. at 85-86. Cf. Gottlieb, supra note 85, at 59.
97 Gottlieb at 58. The transaction may be attacked if shown “that no reasonable businessman, fully informed as to the respective value and acting in good faith, could be expected to consider the bargain attractive to the corporation.” Id. at 59.
the ratification of disinterested shareholders.98 Under his view, a transaction ratified by interested shareholders could not be attacked for unfairness.99 While the statute does not refer to interest when discussing shareholder approval,100 nonetheless, a requirement that only disinterested shareholders may vote can be implied by the statute's requirement of good faith approval.101 Otherwise, Folk's view is a significant departure from fiduciary duties under existing Delaware case law and such a departure would require a clear expression of legislative intent to do so.

A recent decision in Delaware indicates a view contrary to Folk's. In Fliegler v. Lawrence,102 the Supreme Court of Delaware dealt with a Section 144 transaction where Agau Mines, Inc. ("Agau") a Delaware Corporation, had been granted an option to acquire another corporation whose stock was controlled by some of Agau's directors and shareholders. In return for the option, Agau transferred 800,000 shares of its stock to that corporation. The transaction was approved by the board of directors and the shareholders. Those attempting to uphold the transaction argued Folk's view that there was a validation of the transaction because of compliance with the statutory requirement of shareholder approval, even though there was no disinterested majority. The court rejected this contention and determined that fairness was still an issue notwithstanding the shareholder approval. The court stated:

We do not read the statute as providing the broad immunity for which defendants contend. It merely removes "interested director" cloud when its terms are met and provides against invalidation of an agreement "solely" because such a director or officer is involved. Nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness to Agau or removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny.103

This view indicates that compliance with the statute does not necessarily validate transactions, but, like the California model and the Remillard approach, it leaves the question of fairness open. While the decision may be restricted to situations where there is approval by interested shareholders,104 the emphasis on the term

98 FOLK, supra note 88. Contra Fliegler, supra note 84. Tennessee and North Carolina exclude all interested shareholders from voting while Maine and the new California statute exclude interested directors from voting their shares. Nevada specifically allows interested shareholders to vote.
99 Id. at 84-85.
100 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 144 (a) (2).
101 See KANSAS NOTE, supra note 47, at 666. But see FOLK, supra note 48, at 86. In BEARD, supra note 85, at 737, the court indicates that ratification even by disinterested shareholders may "not supply the necessary element of good faith exercise of business judgment by Directors." Arguably, approval by only interested shareholders could not be in good faith. See note 79 supra, for a listing of those states which also require good faith approval. In those states which do not have a provision for good faith approval, a requirement of disinterest would depend upon the common law rule in that state. BLACK, supra note 31, at 360. If there is no such requirement of disinterested shareholders' approval and the statute is deemed to validate transactions, then in the case of an unfair transaction, one would have to argue under the limitations of shareholder ratification. See text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
102 361 A.2d 218.
103 Id. at 222.
104 The court did not address itself to § 144 (a) (1) and whether or not board approval pursuant to the statute would preclude a review for fairness. The reason for not considering the issue was that the only disinterested director did not participate at the meeting in which the Board exercised the option. Id. at 222 n.3.
"solely" by the court could be a basis for arguing that fairness is also an issue where there is approval by the board of directors under the statute. Since "solely" appears in the introductory clause and was found applicable to the alternative of shareholder approval, it should likewise apply to the alternative of board approval.105

Even if Fliegler is restricted, or if the Folk view is adopted,106 those transactions could still be attacked on other grounds. First, one could argue that full disclosure was not made. Second, one could argue that approval was not made in good faith either by the board or the shareholders. Third, the transactions do not fall within the business judgment rule or the shareholder ratification rule. Any of these grounds of attack may in substance be an indirect method of arguing fairness and thus be a means of retaining the fairness test.107

Some courts have taken the position that full disclosure may be a factor in determining fairness,108 and one court has found that the failure to disclose is in itself unfair.109 Full disclosure, however, has never been equated with substantive fairness.110 Yet, under the Folk analysis, it appears that full disclosure has replaced fairness. This may not be significant because in self-dealing situations, there will rarely be full disclosure.111 If a court concludes that the requirement of full disclosure has not been met,112 then the fairness requirement of the statute would come into play.113

The good faith requirement of the Delaware statute is directed at both board and shareholder approval.114 It is arguable that good faith is the equivalent of fairness under the statute.115 While "good faith" can be viewed both subjectively and objectively,116 it normally requires use of a subjective test.117 Yet the statutory language focuses on good faith board or shareholder approval, not on the individual good faith of the directors or shareholders, thus implying an

105 See Sutherland, supra note 31, at § 4605, 56-57.
106 An adaptation of the Folk view appears to be adopted in the new California statute in the context of mere interlocking boards. See Part C infra.
107 See Part D infra, for a discussion of fairness.
110 Note, Corporation-Directors-Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 42 Ore. L. Rev. 61, 65 (1962).
112 In many if not most corporate self-dealing transactions touching securities, state law does not demand prior shareholder approval. In these situations it makes sense to concentrate on the impropriety of the conduct itself rather than on the "failure to disclose" it because full and fair disclosure will rarely occur.
113 But in the closed corporation context you may find full disclosure and knowledge by all shareholders of everything going on even when there is self-dealing and thus full disclosure would not protect the minority's interest. Remillard, supra note 42, at 74.
114 It would be necessary for those seeking the protection of the statute to initially convince the court that the statute's requirements are met. Cf. Tevis, supra note 70, at 363.
115 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 144 (a) (3).
116 Id. at § 144 (a) (1) & (2).
117 Remillard, supra note 42, at 73. See note 49 supra.
118 Kansas Note, supra note 47, at 665-66.
objective standard.\textsuperscript{118} Whether or not an objective or subjective test is used may not be significant because a court should in either case look to the facts and circumstances from which an inference of good faith or lack thereof could be drawn.\textsuperscript{119} In so doing, a court must necessarily look to the substance of the transaction, which in essence would be an inquiry into fairness.\textsuperscript{120}

Good faith would also be available to attack a transaction when a director or shareholder improperly influences or dominates other directors or shareholders.\textsuperscript{121} Good faith may also allow a direct action against those interested and disinterested directors who approve an unfair transaction.\textsuperscript{122}

The business judgment rule precludes judicial inquiry into decision making by a board because directors are presumed to be acting in best interest of the corporation.\textsuperscript{123} Traditionally this rule was inapplicable whenever self-dealing was involved,\textsuperscript{124} and when there was a majority of interested directors on the board.\textsuperscript{125} As previously discussed, Folk argues that the statute has extended the business judgment rule to self-dealing situations even when the disinterested directors who approve the transaction are less than a quorum.\textsuperscript{126} If this rule is demonstrated to be applicable, it is incumbent upon those challenging the transaction to show actual or constructive fraud, bad faith, manifest unfairness, or gross or palpable overreaching.\textsuperscript{127} While these limitations on the business judgment rule do not appear to approach a fairness standard, one may argue that an unfair transaction amounts to fraud because of the breach of fiduciary duty. As one court indicated:

Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments, which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.\textsuperscript{128}

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\item It is impossible to infer a subjective state of mind from group activity like action by the board or shareholders as a whole.
\item Although a subjective test focusses on the state of mind of the person involved, it, like any fact, involves an inquiry into circumstances. In Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d 187, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251-52 (1967), the court in analyzing good faith in the context of an interested director's transaction indicated good faith is "used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or obligation." That is, a subjective test is employed. In their analysis of good faith, the court examined the transaction and found: "Upon substantial evidence that the contract entered into was, because of the terms of payment, not just and reasonable, that is, that it was unfair to the corporation, it follows that the contract was in that sense and that sense only not entered into in good faith."
\item The Kansas Note suggests that an objective test should be used when a transaction is fair and a subjective test when it is unfair. See note 47, supra at 665.
\item Cf. Recent Developments, supra note 77, at 160. The business judgment rule which may protect the directors would only operate if it can be shown that informed directors exercised due care by directing "some thought and attention to the transaction they are asked to approve." Folk, supra note 48, at 81.
\item Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
\item Folk, supra note 48, at 83.
\item Id.
\item Id. at 76.
\item Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court in reversing indicates that the Second Circuit's definition of fraud was inapplicable to SEC Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 because of the specific requirement of
\end{enumerate}
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Compliance with shareholder ratification under the statute, according to Folk, validates the transaction even if the shares of the interested directors are needed for approval. If that ratification rule applies, those challenging the transaction may have to show that the transaction amounts to waste, fraud or oppression, or even that the transaction is not "the product of honest business judgment." These limitations to shareholder ratification are like those of the business judgment rule and arguably may also equate with a fairness standard.

C. New California Section 310

In 1975, California enacted a new Corporations Code which was effective on January 1, 1977. Section 310 deals with interested directors' transactions.

contracts in which director has material financial interests validity

(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any corporation, firm or association in which one or more of its directors has a material financial interest, is either void or voidable because such director or directors or such other corporation, firm or association are parties or because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction, if

(1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's interest are fully disclosed or known to the shareholders and such contract or transaction is approved by the shareholders (Section 153) in good faith, with the shares owned by the interested director or directors not being entitled to vote thereon, or

(2) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's interest are fully disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the board or committee authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith by a vote sufficient without counting the vote of the interested director or directors and the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, or

(3) As to the contracts or transactions not approved as provided in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subdivision, the person asserting the validity of the contract or transaction sustains the burden of proving that the contract or transaction was just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized, approved or ratified.

A mere common directorship does not constitute a material financial interest within the meaning of this subdivision. A director is not interested within the meaning of
and its language appears to be much clearer than the California model on the role of fairness. The statute has two different rules. One rule applies to cases in which a director contracts with his corporation directly or to cases where the contract is between two corporations in which the director has material financial interest. The other rule applies to transactions between corporations with interlocking directors where the directors have no financial interest in either corporation i.e., the outside director.

Under the first rule, if the transaction and interest are fully disclosed or known to the shareholders and approved by them in good faith without counting the shares owned by the interested directors, then the transaction appears to be valid. If the material facts as to both the transaction and interest are fully disclosed or known to the board which approves the transaction in good faith without counting the votes of the interested director and the transaction is "just and reasonable as to the corporation" at the point of board action, then the

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this subdivision in a resolution fixing the compensation of another director as a director, officer or employee of the corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the first director is also receiving compensation from the corporation.

(b) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and any corporation or association of which one or more of its directors are directors is either void or voidable because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction, if

(1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's other directorship are fully disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the board or committee authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith by a vote sufficient without counting the vote of the common director or directors or the contract or transaction is approved by the shareholders (Section 153) in good faith, or

(2) As to contracts or transactions not approved as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision, the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized, approved or ratified.

This subdivision does not apply to contracts or transactions covered by subdivision (a).

(c) Interested or common directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies a contract or transaction.

135 Id. The California model used the term financial interest. The requirements of the new California statute that the interest be material are consistent with the policy underlying the rules with regard to interested directors' transactions. Cf. Cary, supra note 86, at 410. The rationale for the rule is "to secure faithful discharge of duty, and at the same time, to close the door as far as possible against all temptations to do wrong." Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott, 195 Md. 496, 74 A.2d 17, 20 (1950). Only a material financial interest might affect one's judgment. A "might" test should be used to determine materiality as consistent with limiting temptation. Thus materiality should not be a question only of actual amount of interest but should consider other factors including the size of the corporation; the holdings of other directors; the holdings of relatives and others associated with the director; the size of the benefit to the director; etc. Section 310(a) specifically excludes mere common directorship as meaning a material financial interest. In addition, the fact that a director who receives compensation votes to fix the compensation of another director, will not be considered a material financial interest.

136 California has adapted the Delaware approach of full disclosure of both interest and material facts as to the entire transaction. See note 83 supra, for the other states requiring full disclosure.

137 Cal. Corp. Code § 310 (a) (1).
transaction also appears to be valid. If the transaction is not approved pursuant to the alternatives of board or shareholder approval, then the statute requires that the person asserting the validity of the transaction must sustain the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction at the time it was authorized, approved, or ratified. Thus if shareholder approval necessarily validates transactions, the fairness requirement has been eliminated.

Transactions between interlocking boards of corporations where none of the directors has a material financial interest fall under the second rule. As long as there is full disclosure to the board and subsequent approval by the disinterested directors acting in good faith, the transaction appears to be valid. If shareholder approval necessarily validates transactions, the fairness requirement has been eliminated. In the alternative, the transaction appears to be valid if there is shareholder approval. Only if there is no such board or shareholder approval, must the transaction be established as “fair.” Thus in the case of mere interlocks, fairness would not be an issue if there were either board or shareholder approval pursuant to the statute.

This new statute, contrary to the original California model, appears to be a validating statute. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the title of the statute specifically says “validity.” Second, under the first rule there is a specific requirement of fairness when only the board approves a transaction, but not when there is shareholder approval; and there is no requirement of fairness under the second rule when either the board or the shareholders approve. Thus fairness has been eliminated as an overall requirement because the express inclusion of it in one case implicitly excludes it in all others. Third, the legislative history indicates that each alternative under the statute is for validation.

Under the second rule, the elimination of fairness in the context of interlocking directors when there is board or shareholder approval seems justifiable. Although the California model made no distinction between transactions with interlocking directors and those between a corporation and its directors, the

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138 Id. at § 310 (a) (2). Fairness under Remillard, supra note 42, was viewed at a later date notwithstanding the statute. See note 66 supra. This may now preclude courts from viewing fairness at a later date unless the courts in equity fear waste. Cf. Rogers, supra note 65, or view the statute as a codification of Remillard. See note 161 infra.

139 Id. at § 310 (a) (3).

140 Id. at § 310 (b) (1).

141 Id. The statute appears to eliminate the requirement of full disclosure to the shareholders. Arguably the requirement of approval in good faith by the shareholders mandates such disclosure.

142 Id. at § 310 (b) (2).

143 See Sutherland, supra note 31, at § 47.03, 72-73. Black, supra note 31, at § 83, 244-52. Former Cal. Gen. Corp. Code § 6 (West 1955), provided that the headings of the sections do not affect the “scope, meaning or intent” of the Corporation code. The new California General Corporation Law contains no similar provision, thus § 6 is repealed. Black, § 168. This would indicate an intent to give headings some meaning.

144 Compare Cal. Corp. Code § 310 (a) (2) with (a) (1); and (b) (2) with (2) (1).

145 Sutherland, supra note 31, at § 47.23, 123; Black, supra note 31 at § 72, 219.

146 California Legislative Assembly Select Committee on the Revision and the Corporation Code. Report of the Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporation Code 54-55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Select Report]. The Select Report states that, “Invalid in prior law, alternative methods are stated to provide independent procedures for the validation of ‘interested transactions’ (emphasis supplied).” Id. at 54. Note that prior law didn’t provide for alternative validation procedures. See Remillard, supra note 42, and discussion in Part A of text supra.
common law often distinguished the two situations. This change in the new California statute is sound because it is only applicable in cases where there are common directors without a material financial interest in either corporation. If the directors have a material financial interest, then the transaction falls under the stricter first rule which requires fairness with board approval. The removal of fairness under the second rule appears to be based upon the business reality that certain individuals may sit on several boards as outside directors without a financial interest. Moreover, this use of outside directors may serve definite business advantages. The common law rule against contracts between a corporation and its director is inapplicable in this context since a director without a substantial financial interest will normally not be influenced by self-interest, and thus will not unduly influence his board to enter into unfair contracts.

Under the first rule, however, the elimination of fairness may be unsound. While there may be theoretical reasons to distinguish between approval by the board or shareholders, this statutory change is significant and may work to the disadvantage of minority shareholders. The statute only requires approval by “the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares entitled to vote.” (interested shareholders are not entitled to vote) represented at a duly held meeting at which a quorum is present. A quorum is normally a majority of the shares entitled to vote at a meeting. Since the interested shares are not entitled to vote on the approval of the transaction, the quorum focuses upon a majority of those entitled to vote on the issue. Section 602(a) provides that this quorum requirement may be varied and lowered to one third if provided for in the certificate of incorporation.

The key is obtaining a majority of the disinterested shareholders which make up the quorum. For example, suppose that a corporation with 99 shares issued and outstanding, of which 33 shares are owned by interested directors, convenes a shareholder meeting to affirm an interested directors’ transaction. If there is a provision in the certificate requiring a quorum of only one third of the share-
holders entitled to vote and only 22 shares of disinterested shareholders are represented, then the statute may serve to validate a transaction where only 12 shares out of a possible 66 were voted in favor of the transaction, i.e., a majority of the disinterested shares represented at the meeting. The votes of these 12 shares completely eliminate the question of fairness from the court's consideration. This problem is aggravated by increasing the outstanding shares when there is limited attendance by disinterested shareholders.

This provision raises special problems in both the context of the closely held corporation and the publicly held corporation. In the closely held corporation, the principal shareholders may be family members. Under the first rule, it is conceivable that an unfair transaction could be ratified by a majority of financially disinterested shareholders which are represented at the meeting consisting of family held shares. Thus a minority shareholder could be prejudiced unless those shares could be disqualified.

In the publicly held corporation, it is generally recognized that the proxy machinery in the control of management precludes real decision-making on the part of most shareholders. In fact the SEC Proxy Rules specifically preclude a shareholder from presenting counterproposals in management's proxy material. Thus, a shareholder would be required to solicit proxies at his own expense to oppose the transaction.

The new California statute has codified the Remillard approach only in the context of board approval, and not in the context of shareholder approval. Without fairness as an issue other grounds of attack must be used. One would have to argue lack of full disclosure; or a lack of good faith; or that the transaction were not subject to the shareholder ratification rule which as previously

156 If the amendment of the certificate to lower the quorum requirement is part of a plan to have an interested transaction approved it may require compliance with the interested director's statute. See broad definition of transaction in note 33 supra.

157 For example, a corporation with 100 shares of which the interested director owns 25 shares; his father owns 25 shares; his brother owns 25 shares; and another person owns 25 shares. An unfair contract could arguably be validated under the statute by the affirmative votes of the director's father and brother without regard to fairness.

158 Arguably, family members may be included as interested under the statute and thus be disqualified from voting. See note 34 supra. One may also argue breach of fiduciary duty of the majority shareholders to the minority which may be more stringent in a closed corporation context. See Donahue, supra note 117.

159 See M. Eisenberg, A Structure of the Corporation. A Legal Analysis 97 (1976) Nader, supra note 76, at 89. The S.E.C. recently announced a complete review of their proxy rules because of a concern for the ineffectiveness of shareholder democracy. There may also be a proposal to disallow the use of proxies by management. Hershey, SEC Plans Review of Rules Governing Corporate Proxies, N.Y. Times 1 Apr. 28, 1977 at 1. Such a disallowance appears justified when interested transactions are involved.

157 SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8 (a), 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-8 (a) (1974). One can argue that the decision to use the proxy machinery itself in the context of a proposal to approve the transaction under the statute must also comply with the statute. The vote of the board to submit the proposal may be viewed as a transaction. See the broad definition of transaction in note 33 supra. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 129. Since fairness is still required for such board approval, then fairness in this context conceivably may require counterproposals which are contrary to the proxy rules. Id. at 135-36.

160 The Select Report, supra note 146, at 55, indicates that the requirement of fairness with board approval under the statute was intended to codify Remillard, supra note 42. But that case involved a review of fairness when there had been interested shareholder approval, but no board approval. Yet the holding that fairness is an overriding requirement of the statute would also apply to board approval.
discussed may amount to an indirect inquiry into fairness.\footnote{See text accompanying notes 108-122 supra, for limits on the Delaware Approach.}

\section*{D. The Role of Fairness Under the Statutes}

The previous discussion focused on the conflict between the California and Delaware approaches and the changes wrought by the new California Statute. The conflict centered on the treatment of substantive fairness as an overriding requirement when testing the validity of interested directors' transactions, even where the transaction was technically in compliance with the statute. If it is not an overriding requirement, fairness can still be an important consideration under the statutes as an alternative to board or shareholder approval.\footnote{See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (a) (3).}

Commentators\footnote{See, e.g., FORDHAM NOTE, supra note 47, at 661.} and courts\footnote{See, e.g., Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., 19 Ill.2d 268, 168 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1960).} view the requirement of fairness as sufficient protection of the interests of shareholders. In addition, the fairness test, as opposed to the earlier inflexible common law rule which voided transactions merely because of interest,\footnote{See text accompanying notes 9-27 supra, for a discussion of common law.} allows directors to engage in legitimate and desirable activity with their corporation.\footnote{BALLANTINE, supra note 10, at § 67, 171 indicates that: "it has been found impractical to disqualify directors from any or all dealings with the corporation, for fear of possible dishonesty or unfairness, when they may have the greatest interest in its welfare and may be willing to deal with it upon reasonable terms. The policy of facilitating business has prevailed over the policy of removal of temptation."} An evaluation of these assertions will be considered by examining the difficulties inherent in the fairness concept.

Courts have used various tests in determining what constitutes fairness.\footnote{Courts have used the terms “fairness” (see, e.g., Remillard, supra note 42), “inherent fairness” (see, e.g., Pepper, supra note 51), and “intrinsic fairness” (see, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corporation, supra note 124). Arguably, “fairness” is a broader concept viewing the transaction both procedurally and substantively; while the other concepts seem to focus on the terms of the transaction, i.e., substantive fairness. Courts using these terms do not seem to articulate any distinction.} In \textit{Pepper v. Litton}, the Supreme Court indicates that the dealings between a corporation and one in a fiduciary relationship are subject to vigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged, the burden is on the director or stockholder, not only to prove the good faith of the transaction, but also to show inherent fairness—from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction covers the earmarks of an arms length bargain.\footnote{Pepper, supra note 51, at 306-07.}

This classic and oft-quoted passage clearly sets forth the various elements of fairness which later courts have developed and used. Each of these elements, however, is difficult to apply. As a result, judicial development of the “fairness” concept has little uniformity. Some courts have concentrated on the requirement
of good faith,\textsuperscript{170} and one court even appears to have equated it with fairness.\textsuperscript{171} The "good faith" standard is problematic since it is unclear whether good faith should be viewed subjectively (the intention of the parties) or objectively (consideration of the contractual terms). If viewed subjectively, the actual belief or state of mind of the parties must be proven; while if one follows an objective standard, subjective protestations as to belief are not considered. In either case, however, the fairness of the transaction is relevant to the issue of good faith.\textsuperscript{172}

As a result, the good faith standard reduces to a tautology: Fairness is a function of good faith, which is determined by examining the fairness of the transaction. In other words, fairness itself may be a necessary element in proving good faith. Thus, good faith cannot be a useful test for determining fairness.

Other courts have focused their attention on the "arms-length bargain" test.\textsuperscript{173} Under this test, it is the function of the court to determine whether the terms agreed to are within the range of terms that two parties with approximate bargaining equality would accept.\textsuperscript{174} This test is difficult to apply because of the practical problem of finding a similar context to determine appropriate comparative values.\textsuperscript{175} The arms-length bargain test has been criticized as being inappropriate in the parent-subsidiary context, because that situation does not lend itself to bargaining.\textsuperscript{176}

The concept of fraud has also been used as an equivalent to the fairness concept.\textsuperscript{177} If fraud in this context means actual fraud, then the court must find a wrongful intent on the part of the interested director. This places a heavy burden upon a plaintiff trying to set aside an "unfair" transaction.\textsuperscript{178} Some courts have been willing to dispense with the requirement of showing wrongful

\textsuperscript{170} See cases cited in YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 342.
\textsuperscript{171} Remillard, supra note 42.
\textsuperscript{172} See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra. See KANSAS NOTE, supra note 47, at 665-66.
\textsuperscript{174} YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 340.
\textsuperscript{176} Ewen, supra note 173. In Ewen, the arm's length bargain test was found inappropriate and instead, the court looked at the parameters of the deal to see if the subsidiary "would have been unwilling to accept less" and the parent "would have been unwilling to give more." Id. at 317. See also YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 340, which argues that the test "ignores the economic leverage and decision-making powers possessed by the control group." The YALE NOTE maintains that shareholders' expectations in the context of parent-subordinates do not require a fairness test at the time of the transaction, but fairness should be viewed at the time and under the circumstances when the relationship of parent-subsidiary was "entered into or perhaps as of the last time when the complainant had a realistic chance of ending his participation therein," i.e., an "expectations test." Id. at 351. But see VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 14, which argues against the fairness test and the expectations test and instead emphasizes an "advantage-disadvantage test." See Sinclair Oil Corp., supra note 124, at which in a parent-subsidiary context, the court initially used an "advantage-disadvantage test" which focused on the receipt of benefits to the exclusion of the subsidiary. If there was such an advantage to the parent company, then the court applied an intrinsic fairness test. Sinclair has been criticized in Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 690-81 (1974).
\textsuperscript{177} YALE NOTE, supra note 49, at 341; VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 12, at 1229.
\textsuperscript{178} Id. at 341. Those courts using actual fraud as the test have rarely found in favor of the plaintiff. VIRGINIA NOTE at 1229 n.38.
intent by invoking the doctrine of constructive fraud. But exactly when a court will be willing to invoke the doctrine of constructive fraud seems impossible to forecast because of the difficulty of defining the concept. After examining the cases in which the doctrine had been defined, one writer concluded that "the results failed to fall into a discernable pattern."

These tests used to determine fairness have a common weakness inherent in the concept of fairness itself. They are not subject to precise definition because they involve a primarily factual and circumstantial inquiry. Thus, judges reviewing transactions would be called upon to make business judgments. To further confuse matters, courts have often used some of these tests in "complimentary pairs" such as "fraud and constructive fraud" or "fraud and the arms length test," or "good faith and fairness."

Because of the conceptual problems posed by the fairness test, the burden

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179 Id. at 342; see, e.g., Efron v. Kalmanovitz, supra note 119, at 157. According to the court, "Constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealments involving breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, and resulting in damage to another."

180 Id. "Fraud assumes so many shapes that courts and authors have been cautious in attempting to define it. Each case must be considered on its own facts."

181 YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 342.

182 Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). As Ward, supra note 74, at 112, points out, "[u]sually the court will outline the facts of the case and then, after declaring the transaction fair or unfair, will paraphrase one of the above generalities as authority for its decision."

183 In Heller, supra note 175, Judge Collins articulates the problems faced by courts in determining fairness:

Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what yardstick is to be employed? Who or what is to supply the measuring rod? The conscience of equity? Equity is but another name for a human being temporarily judicially robed. He is not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so arrogant as to hold that it knows more about managing this corporation than its stockholders?

Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments, but openness forces the confession that the pruning would be synthetic and artificial rather than analytic or scientific. Whether or not it would be fair and just is highly dubious. Yet, merely because the problem is perplexing is no reason for eschewing it. It is not timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for revising these figures were I inclined to do so. No blueprints are furnished. The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the imponderables, manifold. To act out of whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would be more than inexact—it would be the prime antithesis of justice; it would be a farce.

If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation are they to be made—executives? Those connected with the motion picture industry, radio artists? Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States? The President of the United States? Manifestly, the material at hand is not of adequate plasticity for fashioning into a pattern or standard. Many instances of positive underpayment will come to mind, just as instances of apparent rank overpayment abound. Helplessly, intrinsic worth is not always the criterion. A classic perhaps might produce trifling compensation for its author, whereas a popular novel might yield a titanic fortune. Merit is not always commensurately rewarded, whilst mediocrity sometimes unjustly brings incredibly lavish returns. Nothing is so divergent and contentious and inexplicable as values.

Courts are ill equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province.

Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by its directors, with the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is reasonable compensation for his officers is primarily for the stockholders.

184 VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 14, at 1231.
of proof is of critical importance. By placing the burden on one party, courts can conclude that it has not been met without articulating the reasons a transaction is fair or unfair. Additionally, many transactions may not be characterized clearly "fair," or "unfair." Thus, the allocation of the burden of proof would often be determinative of the litigation itself.

The elusive character of the fairness concept and the differing standards courts apply leave the validity of prospective transactions uncertain. This uncertainty neither adequately protects shareholders nor does it necessarily encourage the legitimate activity of directors. Under the test, a transaction may be upheld as valid even though it may not be the best deal independent directors would have bargained for, thus sacrificing shareholder interests. The uncertainty of the fairness test may also restrain a director from entering into legitimate transactions with a corporation. Yet it may, because of a fear that it will be voided, also encourage some directors to engage in abusive self-dealing because the uncertainty may allow or encourage a dishonest director to gamble on the uncertainty.

In addition to the problems of the uncertainty of the fairness test, the occasions on which such transactions are questioned may be rare. A corporation is unlikely to bring a suit to rescind a transaction with one of its directors. Only with a change in management does the possibility of an action increase. As a result, the shareholder derivative suit is often the only practical way to challenge interested director transactions. These difficulties, procedural as well as substantive, may in fact immunize most transactions.

Even though the fairness concept engenders these difficulties in application, it remains the one method by which courts can scrutinize transactions to protect the minority shareholders. It represents a balance between the strict voidability rule of the earlier common law and the pro-management concepts of the business judgment rule. The possibility that a transaction may be challenged will force management and the directors to themselves carefully scrutinize interested directors' transactions. It thus remains a necessary concept, despite its limitations.

In the context of the publicly-held corporation there have been suggestions...
that Federal regulation\textsuperscript{192} or requiring full disclosure\textsuperscript{193} may protect shareholders. In the absence of congressional action on these proposals, the fairness concept under state law is increasingly significant. Given the current predilection of the Supreme Court to limit access to the Federal courts and to narrow the scope of Rule 10b(5);\textsuperscript{194} the proxy rules,\textsuperscript{192} and the insider trading rules,\textsuperscript{196} rights and remedies under state law are becoming more important. In view of the potentially broad scope of these statutes,\textsuperscript{197} the fairness requirement under state law may provide a remedy for aggrieved shareholders which is not available under federal law.

In the context of small corporations, fairness remains of even greater importance. Neither disclosure nor federal regulation is of assistance in this setting. The realities of small businesses often require transactions between directors and their corporation. Thus the fairness requirement is essential in this context to avoid the oppression of minority shareholders.

In both situations—publicly or closely held corporation—the fairness test admittedly has its weaknesses. Application of a concept which is subject to such varying interpretation leads almost inevitably to decisions which are apparently inconsistent. This inconsistency makes prediction of the validity of individual transactions very difficult. However, the test also has one great strength; it retains for the courts the measure of discretion necessary to protect shareholders from voiceless submission to potentially harmful interested directors' transactions.

IV. Conclusion

This article has focused on the effect of the statutory responses to interested directors' transactions. Such transactions are permissible under the majority of state statutes if they are either approved by the board or shareholders or if they are found to be fair. The disjunctive phrasing of the statute would appear to eliminate fairness as a consideration wherever there was approval. The removal of fairness as a factor in validating a challenged transaction would be a significant departure from the common law's zealous protection of the minority shareholder. Because of the limited scope of federal relief available in this area, state law is very important. The California statute and its progeny all treated the two factors of approval and fairness in the disjunctive, yet the courts have continued to consider fairness as an issue when examining the interested directors' transactions. Even if some courts adopt the disjunctive approach, however, the limits which can be placed upon the operation of either the business judgment rule or the shareholder ratification rule, arguably reduce to questions of fairness.

\textsuperscript{192} Marsh, supra note 9, at 74-75; Nader, supra note 76.
\textsuperscript{193} Cary, supra note 86.
\textsuperscript{194} See, e.g., Green, supra note 6; Ernst, supra note 128; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
\textsuperscript{197} See note 33 supra.
The new (1977) California statute appears to finally eliminate fairness only in the context of interlocking boards and disinterested shareholder approval by limiting fairness as a consideration to those transactions without disinterested shareholder approval or transactions where the directors on the interlocking boards had a substantial financial interest. This, however, could lead to the oppression of minority shareholders. In order to avoid this, the courts should continue to scrutinize the approval of the transactions to be sure of more than just technical compliance with the statute. This can be done if the fairness doctrine has some continuing validity despite its apparent elimination by the statute. The doctrine has proven its value through both a long tradition in common law and also continued application by the courts in the face of apparent statutory elimination. Until there is some effective alternative, the courts must retain the fairness test in examining interested directors' transactions.