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## Book Reviews

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The time when the injury occurred, *i.e.*, during the game, returning from the game, or during the lunch period has not been used by the courts as a determining factor in awarding compensation, yet this factor should be helpful in bringing particular factual situations within the coverage of the compensation acts. In the instant case there should be little doubt that the court was correct in granting the award. The employer here had actual control over the association in all particulars, excepting name only. Moreover, the benefits to the employer were many: closer and more friendly employer-employee relationship, increased worker morale, advertising, *etc.* There also should be little doubt that the courts were correct when they refused awards to ballplayers injured while going to and from a game. Yet should it be said that employees hurt during the lunch period have no rights under the compensation acts? It would seem that they too should have those rights.

*J. Robert Geiman*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

JUSTICE GEORGE SHIRAS, JR. OF PITTSBURGH. By George Shiras 3rd.<sup>1</sup> Edited and completed by Winfield Shiras. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951. Pp. xx, 256. \$4.50. — In the preface the author,<sup>2</sup> speaking of the aim of the book, says,<sup>3</sup> “. . . it is hoped that its aim has been in some measure accomplished: to present the life and work of Justice George Shiras, Jr., in relation to his family and times.” To accomplish this aim, the author has selected the material in this rather short biography with a great deal of care and skill. The book is divided into twelve chapters which fall into four somewhat natural divisions: the early life and education of Shiras, his practice of law and appointment to the Supreme Court, his work as Justice of that Court, and a final chapter devoted to his retirement. These are not closed divisions, for there are several themes that run through all parts of the book.

The relation of Shiras to his times is kept constantly before the reader; especially is this true of the period when he is receiving his education.

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<sup>1</sup> Lawyer, former Congressman, noted faunal naturalist, and “father of wild life photography.”

<sup>2</sup> The portion of this book contributed by the author and by the editor is indeterminate. The amount contributed by the editor is certainly considerably more than is usually encompassed by the term “editor.” In the preface at xi, the reader is told that George Shiras, 3rd, when he was seventy-nine decided to write a biography of his father who had died fourteen years previously. “Realizing, however, the need of assistance in gathering and preparing his material, he enlisted me as ‘editor’ of this proposed book about his father, George Shiras, Jr., who was my own grandfather.”

<sup>3</sup> Text at xviii.

The skill of the author is most apparent in his choice of incidents and details for this presentation of environmental conditions. There are not many of these details: the difficulties of travel which slowly improve — from the Conestoga wagons, to the stagecoach, to the steamboat and railroad; a list of merchandise available to housewives in 1800 — venison, turkeys, geese, ducks, and other wild game, beef, mutton, pork, and chickens; the arrival of those who are on their way farther west. But these details, often made vivid by a briefly sketched dramatic incident, effectively recreate the combination of wilderness and civilization that existed during Shiras' formative years.

There are innumerable sketches of the friends of Shiras and of the Shiras family in this biography. These sketches vary from a sentence to several paragraphs. For example, after describing Henry W. Oliver as not only having<sup>4</sup> "vision, shrewdness, and energy" but also as having "a singular optimism and integrity which made it almost impossible, in spite of his occasional crashes, for other business men to refuse to lend him capital," the author shows Oliver in action after he had heard of the discovery of the Mesabi iron ore range:<sup>5</sup>

Immediately there was a rush of promoters to Minnesota, with Oliver in the van. Reaching Duluth and unable to find a bed, he spent the night stretched out on a billiard table and left at dawn next day on horseback for the Mesabi. The ore was there, soft and rich and on the surface. It could be scooped up by a steam shovel at a cost of five cents per ton. Oliver leased a huge tract, formed the Oliver Mining Company, built a railroad to Lake Superior, and eventually organized his own ore-carrying fleet, called the Pittsburgh Steamship Company, which is now one of the largest fleets on the Great Lakes. . . . Eight years later the Oliver iron-ore interests, originally organized for about half a million dollars, were bought by the newly formed United States Steel Corporation for \$17,000,000. This was a sample of what Pittsburgh began to call the "Oliver luck."

These short biographical sketches emphasize the frontier virtues that were needed for the conquest of the wilderness. Since most of the Justices who served on the Court with Shiras were educated during this same period, this background material may be intended to give point to the author's comment about the Fuller Court:<sup>6</sup> "The economic preconceptions of these men, however sincere, were affected necessarily by inheritance and environment, by training and association, and by the impact of history past and present. No apology for the Court is intended here, for none is needed."

In developing another theme, the relation of Shiras to his family, the author utilizes many outdoor settings. Shiras, his ancestors, and his descendants had a deep and understanding love of nature, and members

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<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 78.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 79.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at 196.

of this family were among the first to become interested in conservation. These scenes are described by one who shared this same feeling.<sup>7</sup>

One of the most interesting chapters in the book concerns the system of education at Yale in the fifties, which is described as<sup>8</sup> “. . . composed almost entirely of ‘book-learning’ in the narrowest sense of the phrase. Lectures were few and far between, and knowledge was derived from the book rather than from the man.” The conditions and atmosphere of the school are convincingly reproduced. And it is clear that a great deal of the education was derived from sources outside of the regular classes — from the debating societies and from the close association of the students with each other. The system developed in each student a strong loyalty to his classmates and to the school.

The least effective section of the book is that which deals with Shiras as a lawyer and as a Justice. Since the editor is not a lawyer, perhaps he has overlooked some of the incidents that could have made the Justice more lifelike, or, as may be more likely, there may have been no material available for this purpose at the time the biography was begun. There is no attempt to make extravagant claims for Shiras' ability as a lawyer or as a Justice. In the midst of all the people in the book who are doing things, Shiras in his own field seems to be an onlooker. He overcomes no obstacles. He is pictured as a very competent and diligent workman who found outlets “in his affection for his family, his quiet capacity for friendship, his fondness for reading, fishing, and cardplaying.”<sup>9</sup>

Still, one of the four chapters about Shiras as a Supreme Court Justice, the chapter on The Income Tax Case,<sup>10</sup> which is handled in a competent manner, should be the most interesting to students of constitutional law. It will be recalled that the Court held in its first decision<sup>11</sup> that the tax on income from real estate was invalid but that the Court was evenly divided as to the separability of the act and as to other issues. Since Justice Jackson had been ill at the time of the first hearing, it was assumed that on the final hearing his vote would determine the outcome of the case. But after that hearing, Justice Jackson was one of the dissenting Justices who thought the tax not unconstitutional.<sup>12</sup> Hence it was believed that one of the Justices had changed his vote. Justice Shiras was chosen for this role by the press. Every hypothesis so far suggested as to the Justice who could have changed his vote is presented, and though no conclusion is reached, there seems to be good reason to believe that Shiras was not the one who changed his mind.

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<sup>7</sup> *E.g.*, *id.* at 23-4.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 48.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 67.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 160.

<sup>11</sup> *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.*, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*, 158 U.S. 601, 696 (1895).

The last chapter, describing Shiras in retirement, is effective in a high degree and reveals the warm human qualities that enabled him to acquire so many life-long friends. In the last page and a half the author catches the imagination of the reader in a poetic summary of the book. Perhaps in two sentences of this summary the author places Shiras in the perspective in which he believes the reader should place him:<sup>13</sup>

Nor had he been simply a bystander while this industrial revolution was going on. The destinies of many such patents, and of the companies and corporations which made such patents a reality, had been affected to some extent, at least, by his exertions and abilities as a lawyer and judge.

*Hugh W. Divine\**

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1953 COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED. Edited by Theodore R. Kupferman.<sup>1</sup> Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1953. Pp. 280. \$6.75. — Mr. Kupferman and the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut have again come up with an excellent contribution to copyright and related legal fields. Their 1952 series of lectures which was published under the title 7 COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED<sup>2</sup> is well known for its high quality. These seven 1953 lectures are of comparable quality. The distinctive mark of both volumes is the scholarly treatment of very concrete problems in this field.

The first two lectures are primarily descriptive. Arthur Fisher<sup>3</sup> describes the work of the Copyright Office and poses the question: What is the nature and extent of the examination which the Copyright Office should make of claims to copyright? The interest in expeditious handling of applications conflicts with the interest in detailed examination. Mr. Fisher's lecture is designed to evoke suggestions from members of the bar in respect of the question he poses.

In the second lecture William Klein, II,<sup>4</sup> describes the various protective societies for authors and creators, such as, The Authors' League and its affiliated Guilds and the Artists' Guild, Songwriters' Protective Association and Mystery Writers of America, Inc. In view of the fact that ASCAP and BMI had been described in the 1952 lecture series they were not considered by Mr. Klein. A valuable adjunct to Mr. Klein's lecture is a number of uniform painters', songwriters' and other authors'

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<sup>13</sup> Text at 219.

\* Research Associate, Law School, University of Notre Dame.

<sup>1</sup> Member of the New York Bar.

<sup>2</sup> Commerce Clearing House (1952).

<sup>3</sup> United States Register of Copyrights.

<sup>4</sup> Partner, Hays, St. John, Abramson & Schulman. New York City, New York.

contracts as well as the codes of fair practices of the Artists' Guild and the National Society of Mural Painters.

The other lectures are devoted to specific legal problems. David M. Solinger<sup>5</sup> considers some of the legal difficulties which may arise when unsolicited advertising ideas are submitted to a prospective user. The problem is becoming more serious according to Solinger because courts are revealing a greater solicitude for the plaintiff who claims his idea has been pirated. Whereas in the past courts were prone to find as a matter of law the plaintiff had failed to establish either novelty or any basis for an implied contract or concrete form, the tendency now is to leave these questions to the jury, thus enhancing the plaintiffs' chances. Solinger presents a number of possible solutions to the problem of unsolicited ideas indicating that he considers the policy of considering no unsolicited ideas the only real solution.

Edward B. Colton<sup>6</sup> analyzes twenty or more contract provisions which are common to a great many contracts in this field in his lecture, *Contracts in the Entertainment and Literary Fields*. Among other things, Colton indicates the dangers involved in authors' making blanket warranties, agreeing to blanket indemnity provisions and making grants of rights in the work without specifying exactly what rights in use the author retains.

Alfred H. Wasserstrom's<sup>7</sup> lecture on *Magazine, Newspaper and Syndication Problems* illustrates strikingly the need for the careful consideration of contract provisions in the grant of rights to serial publication, to works of art or photographs, to comic strips or to any other literary material published in magazines or newspapers. Unless the parties direct their attention to who will apply for a copyright and what type will be employed, there is great danger that publication in the magazine or newspaper will result in a dedication to the public. The blanket copyright for the entire contents of a magazine or newspaper will not apply to specific contents if the publisher is not the author or proprietor or has not acquired sufficient interest in the property to be considered an assignee. For example,<sup>8</sup>

If only serial rights or periodical publishing rights to a theretofore unpublished literary work have been acquired . . . it will be held that a license rather than an assignment has been granted by the author to a magazine publisher.

The blanket copyright for the entire magazine would not apply to this material since Section 9 of the Copyright Act states "the author or proprietor of any work . . . or [his] assigns, shall have copyright to such

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<sup>5</sup> Solinger & Gordon. New York City, New York.

<sup>6</sup> Motion Picture negotiator for the Dramatist's Guild.

<sup>7</sup> Member, McCauley & Henry. New York City, New York.

<sup>8</sup> Text at 165.

work.”<sup>9</sup> Wasserstrom’s lecture is a concise, scholarly consideration of magazine, newspaper and syndication copyright problems.

Harriet F. Pilpel’s<sup>10</sup> lecture on Tax Aspects of Copyright Property is a discussion of ways and means to reduce authors’ taxes. Generally such efforts take two approaches:

- (1) efforts to attain capital asset status for the property, and
- (2) efforts to spread the income either as to time or as to persons.

Miss Pilpel’s lucid analysis reveals that efforts to attain capital asset status for an author’s property will almost surely fail. In her view the most practical approach is to either spread the income by assignments of interests in the literary property to a wife, children or others so as to reduce the impact of the graduated tax rates, to qualify under Internal Revenue Code Section 107(b) spreading back the income if eighty percent of the total income from the work is received in one year, or to spread the income forward by entering into contracts specifying limited amounts to be received over a period of years. Also discussed in the lecture is the author’s use of the corporate form for doing business, expenses, deductions and damages and the special tax problems of non-resident alien authors as well as proposals for changes in the tax laws which would benefit authors.

In the very appropriately titled lecture, Copyright No-Man’s Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic Property, Professor Walter J. Derenberg<sup>11</sup> analyzes the “no-man’s land” between trade-mark, copyright, design patent, and unfair competition protection for three-dimensional configurations and works of the applied arts. Professor Derenberg believes that present law does not adequately protect these works. If the courts uphold the Commissioner of Patents’ in his refusal to register three-dimensional devices as trade marks under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act there will be little trade-mark protection in the domestic field.<sup>12</sup> The hopes raised by the provision in Section 23 of the Act for so-called Supplemental Registration of “configurations of goods” will have proved vain. Also the Commissioner has denied registration to some three-dimensional devices under the new “service” mark provision of the Lanham Act where the device is not used to sell or to advertise the applicant’s service or is not a distinctive feature of advertising.<sup>13</sup>

The recent expansion of copyright protection to three-dimensional works of industrial art is rather extensively presented. Derenberg reviews

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<sup>9</sup> As quoted in text at 166.

<sup>10</sup> Member, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, New York City, New York.

<sup>11</sup> Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

<sup>12</sup> Text at 219.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 222.

the litigation testing the validity of the copyright of a statuette or sculpture of Bali dancers which had been used as a base for table lamps. At the time of his lecture the question had been litigated in a number of courts which reached conflicting conclusions. Undoubtedly Professor Derenberg is happy about the final disposition made of this question. In *Mazer v. Stein*,<sup>14</sup> decided after this book was published, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of the copyright even though the article was used industrially and even though it might be eligible for patent protection.

Professor Derenberg persuasively argues the delusory nature of protection of the design patent statute. Statistics he cites<sup>15</sup> indicate that design patents are so often held invalid primarily because the court is unable to find any "inventive genius" behind the article. Finally, unfair competition is of slight value says Derenberg because of the dominance of the rule of the *Cheney Bros.* case.<sup>16</sup> This rule requires that there must either be statutory protection or the plaintiff must establish "secondary meaning"<sup>17</sup> before unfair competition will lie. This, of course, is a rejection of the principle of the *International News* case<sup>18</sup> which rejection Professor Derenberg deplores.<sup>19</sup>

*Thomas Broden, Jr.\**

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SUCCESSFUL APPELLATE TECHNIQUES. By John Alan Appleman. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1953. Pp. vii, 1081. \$17.50. This recent addition to the literature of appellate practice is based on the author's long experience. It has throughout therefore, an atmosphere of reality and is refreshingly free of the "pious professional padding" and unhappy generalizations all too common in the average lecture, article or book on "what to do when an appeal comes."

Mr. Appleman is aware that, "No lawyer can tell another attorney how to win any given case upon appeal."<sup>1</sup> He says that, "If there is any single magic touchstone to success in reviewed cases,"<sup>2</sup> it is unknown to him. After shuddering at the "ineptness of attorneys in the preparation

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<sup>14</sup> 74 Sup. Ct. 460 (1954).

<sup>15</sup> Text at 239.

<sup>16</sup> *Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.*, 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), *cert. denied*, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).

<sup>17</sup> Text at 250.

<sup>18</sup> *International News Service v. The Associated Press*, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).

<sup>19</sup> Text at 257.

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<sup>1</sup> Text at iii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



of briefs and [in] oral arguments," he is frank to admit that his recommendations are more "things 'not to do,' rather than things 'to do.'" <sup>3</sup>

In Part I (about 500 pages) he discusses appellate procedure. There is a thorough presentation of the problem of laying the proper foundation for appeal and of the various methods of appeal. The tedious task of making the record and the abstract of the record is explained with copious forms and illustrations. These are taken from Illinois practice and the Illinois practitioner will find many of his prayers answered simply and directly. Of course, appellate practice and procedure differ widely from state to state, but the "horse sense" suggestions made by the author will be helpful in any jurisdiction. Another particularly valuable addition is the petition for certiorari and supporting brief in one of the author's successful cases in the United States Supreme Court.

Mr. Appleman devotes Part II (again about 500 pages) of his work to brief writing. Again "live briefs" are included almost (because of minor typographical changes) exactly as they were presented. It is possible therefore to check the author's suggestions on brief writing with the briefs he has actually prepared himself. One can hope for the day when some of our eminent appellate practitioners will develop this method and publish their successful (or *unsuccessful*) briefs with such instructive annotations as "why I put it this way" or "why I cited but these two cases on the point," etc.

Probably no one will ever come up with a unanimously accepted answer to the question, "What is the *one* way to write a brief?" Some of the "how not to do its" of Mr. Appleman have been heard before. He warns again about the easy "paste pot and shears" method of "assembling a vast body of quotable precedents." He adds, however, a suggestion which, if followed, might make many a brief a pleasure rather than a "weariness in the flesh" to read (or to listen to):<sup>4</sup>

. . . I like to go back to very old cases. Whenever the construction of a statute, or a question of constitutionality is involved, I find it most helpful to search the ancient — and scholarly — legal digests for that state and to trace down the first three decisions which dealt with the provision at issue. Those judges faced with a question of first impression, were forced to reason out the fundamental meanings of that law. Such reasoning frequently is most helpful to the appellate lawyer.

The "great" appellate brief is concerned with underlying legal principles and not merely with matching or un-matching the "latest spring line of decisions." Fashions come and go. Principles remain.

Mr. Appleman devotes the last sixty pages of his work to the problems of oral argument on appeal. Surely no one will accuse him of synicism when he says that "fully 70% of all arguments which I have heard de-

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Text at 555.

livered before higher tribunals are deplorable.”<sup>5</sup> Few counsel seem to know the purpose of oral argument; many are unwilling to take time to find out. The result is that the oral argument is often a perfunctory oral summary of the written brief which might just as well have been waived. Mr. Appleman’s discussion of the place and purpose of oral argument is, in this reviewer’s opinion, the best part of the book. It is down to earth dealing with such questions as: Should there be an oral argument? — Who should argue the case? — How should one prepare for oral argument? — How to deal with questions from the bench? — What is the difference between appellant’s and appellee’s oral argument? The answers are practical and tested examples are given from the author’s own experience.

While *Successful Appellate Techniques* is intended for the appellate practitioner, young or old, it is to be hoped that law students will also consult it. They will be saved many a headache unlearning later on, perhaps at a client’s expense, some widespread and fundamentally false notions of appellate work.

Edward F. Barrett\*

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SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW. Edited by Edmond Cahn.<sup>1</sup> Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954. Pp. ix, 250. \$4.00. — Six authors<sup>2</sup> prominent in the domain of American legal scholarship have produced a series of eleven essays on judicial review, which essays together with transcripts of discussions by the group are made available to the reading public in this book. We are told in the preface that the<sup>3</sup> “book is the outcome of meetings held at the New York University School of Law in 1953 by way of observing the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of *Marbury v. Madison*.” Doubts as to whether there remained much unsaid that required saying with respect to that famous case or, indeed, with respect to judicial review, in view of the lapse of so many years and the mass of literature on these matters that has accumulated in that great interval, will be dispelled by an inspection of this little volume. The authors have unquestionably made substantial contributions

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<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 995.

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<sup>1</sup> Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

<sup>2</sup> Besides Professor Cahn these are Ralph F. Bischoff, Assistant Dean, New York University School of Law; Charles P. Curtis, of the Massachusetts Bar; John P. Frank, Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Paul A. Freund, Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; and Willard Hurst, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.

<sup>3</sup> Text at vii.

to a deeper understanding of the meaning, importance, and worth of what has become the cardinal doctrine of American constitutional law. Their contributions might have been even more valuable, however, had they taken into account the incomparably more significant work of Professor William Winslow Crosskey, *Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States*,<sup>4</sup> which was published almost exactly a year before the publication of the present book. Of course, the essays in the present book were probably written before Crosskey's book became accessible to the authors, but it seems unfortunate that Crosskey's magisterial work, which has brought to light much important new evidence and conclusions therefrom with respect to judicial review, was ignored in preparing the present essays for the press.

Professor Edmond Cahn, who edited the book, states in the preface that<sup>5</sup> "we did not attempt either to attack or to defend the institution [of judicial review], but for once to differentiate, comprehend, and evaluate it." In the first essay, however, which is also by Professor Cahn, most readers are likely to get the impression that the settling of constitutional issues by appeals to courts is extolled as preferable to other possible methods. No exception is intended to be taken here to advocacy of the institution of judicial review on pragmatic grounds, but it seems clear that a good deal of the material in the present book could well be taken as tending on balance as a defense of the institution. In fairness to Professor Cahn it should be stated that these pragmatic views are not shored up by the traditional legal arguments from the text of the Constitution, which are so highly questionable, except by way of a descriptive treatment of Chief Justice Marshall's own argument. The latter may owe, Professor Cahn says,<sup>6</sup> a great deal less to Alexander Hamilton's famous advocacy of judicial review in *The Federalist* than is commonly supposed and rather more than is commonly supposed to the opinions of the judges in the Virginia case of *Commonwealth v. Caton*,<sup>7</sup> decided in 1782. It is impracticable to comment on the many interesting and instructive views expressed by Professor Cahn, but, perhaps, even in a brief review note should be taken of Professor Cahn's disclosure of what seems to be a certain bias that may be not without significance. After quoting from Bentham's strictures on the worth of promissory oaths, he says:<sup>8</sup>

As usual, Bentham was correct. For sheer unmitigated insolence, men who presume they have God's power at their beck and call to enforce their paltry engagements can hardly be surpassed — except perhaps by men who purport to "demonstrate" syllogistically that God exists.

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<sup>4</sup> The University of Chicago Press (1953).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at 16.

<sup>7</sup> 4 Call 5 (Va. 1782).

<sup>8</sup> Text at 14.

Yet only a few pages<sup>9</sup> before the passage quoted above Professor Cahn is at pains not to leave Locke appearing "ridiculous" in spite of claims made by the latter, which, according to Professor Cahn's own views, it would seem, are at least just as much without warrantability.

Next Dean Ralph F. Bischoff contributes a short paper in which he advocates a relaxation of the Supreme Court's requirements concerning standing to sue in cases involving civil rights. Following this paper is a discussion of it by the other authors. This is the first of six such discussions, which constitute a noteworthy feature of the book, especially so since they are presented as<sup>10</sup> ". . . recorded by a stenotypist, the speakers having been afforded no opportunity to polish or revise their remarks." The authors are to be congratulated on the high quality of these discussions. They came through unscathed after what would seem to have been a gruelling test of their effectiveness as speakers. Professor John P. Frank with his paper on political questions and Professor Paul A. Freund with his companion piece on the review of facts in constitutional cases round out the discussion of the conditions and scope of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

The next three papers deal with the process of constitutional construction. Professor Willard Hurst discusses very briefly the role of history in that process. Mr. Charles P. Curtis discusses the role of the constitutional text and Dean Bischoff the role of official precedents. Many acute observations are made in this section of the book both in the prepared papers and in the panel discussions. A very important point made by Dean Bischoff and repeated by him in the panel discussion, while obvious enough to many of us, requires particular emphasis because of the seeming lack of recognition of its cogency by many influential members of the legal profession, namely:<sup>11</sup> "If *laissez faire* had not been put into the Constitution by the Court, then *laissez faire* would not have to be removed from the Constitution."

The four papers making up the rest of the text of the book consist of descriptive accounts of the effects of judicial review in action on what are generally regarded as fundamental principles of our constitutional system. Professor Freund's topic is federalism, Professor Frank's individual liberties, Professor Hurst's separation of powers, and Mr. Curtis' majority rule. They make good reading. They are brilliant as descriptions, but not altogether satisfactory as appraisals. Without the benefit of Professor Crosskey's tremendously destructive criticism of the role of the Court in our history, these essays could hardly be otherwise than unsatisfactory as appraisals. However, Professor Frank's paper on individual liberties might be considered an exception to the last state-

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<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at vii.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 84.

ment. Those readers who look to the Supreme Court as the great guardian of our liberties will be shocked and annoyed by some of his appraisals. He states, for example, that:<sup>12</sup>

. . . testing constitutional significance by what seems in our own generation worth calling to the attention of law students may be too brutal a standard; by that test there is not a single case of real consequence in which, in 160 years, judicial review has buttressed liberty.

It should be noted that what is meant by "judicial review" in the statement just quoted is restricted to review of the validity of Acts of Congress. Professor Frank builds a convincing argument for the soundness of his position. This essay of his should be required reading for all of us concerned with civil liberties.

The book, as might be expected, is well documented, with notes relegated to the back of the volume, and it contains a table of cases and an index.

Itself a document of note for our constitutional history and the history of our constitutional law, as setting forth the views of representative legal scholars of our time on a basic institution of our legal system, the book affords fascinating reading not only for the present but also, in all likelihood, for many years to come. It should prove of great benefit as an aid to a deeper understanding of our constitutional law.

*Roger Paul Peters\**

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<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 111.

\* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIAL. By Louis L. Jaffe. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954. Pp. xvii, 647. \$10.00.
- FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: New York University Press, 1954. Pp. xxii, 367. \$7.50.
- \*JUSTICE GEORGE SHIRAS, JR. OF PITTSBURGH. By George Shiras III. Edited and completed by Winfield Shiras. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1953. Pp. xx, 256. \$4.50.
- HATRED, RIDICULE OR CONTEMPT: A Book of Libel Cases. By Joseph Dean. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954. Pp. 271. \$3.75.
- HOW TO PREPARE A CASE FOR TRIAL. By Elliott L. Biskind. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954. Pp. xii, 206. \$5.65.
- NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC ADDICTION. By David W. Maurer and Victor H. Vogel. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1954. Pp. xv, 303. \$7.50.
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\*Reviewed in this issue

