The Influence of Marvin v. Marvin on Housework During Marriage

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When Michelle Marvin was forced to leave the home she shared with what today we would call her partner, Lee Marvin, she had a number of problems. The first ones, of course, were legal: she had no marriage with Lee and no written contract that could distinguish their relationship from "mere cohabitation." Nor had she contributed directly to his career or other assets. What she alleged was his express promise to "take care of her" (for some time period that was not altogether clear) and, less obviously, a promise implied by all she had done with and for him during the seven years they had spent together and, still less obviously, career sacrifices she allegedly made in order to further his career or to accommodate his express desire that...
she not work far away from him. As it turned out, she had fact problems as well and was ultimately unable to show either any sort of promise (agreement) or any benefit lost or conferred.

If the Marvins had been married for seven years instead of scorning the "piece of paper" that was the marriage certificate, the story might well have turned out differently. Even if Lee had not promised to "take care of" Michelle, he would in his vows have committed himself, regardless of his private wishes, to a duty of support for her. Since the couple lived in California, Michelle would automatically have been entitled to a share of the property earned by his labors during the marriage—"community property"—whether or not she could prove that he had gained from her contributions or that her career had suffered because of her sacrifices.

While the California courts would have let Michelle recover if she had been able to show any sort of contractual or equitable claim to relief—and this took them further than most courts would go, even today—we ought to be curious about whether this result, a result

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7 See id.
8 See Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
10 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4334-4335 (West 1994) (providing for support of former spouses for contingent and fixed periods of time, respectively).
11 Id. § 2550.
12 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 provides:

Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall, either in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division, divide the community estate of the parties equally.

Id.
13 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 (Cal. 1976) ("Plaintiff's complaint . . . could be amended to state a cause of action founded upon theories of implied contract or equitable relief. As we have noted, both causes of action in plaintiff's complaint allege an express contract; neither assert any basis for relief independent from the contract.").
14 As of February 2001, six states unequivocally recognized breach of implied contracts for non-business contributions by cohabitants. In addition to California, these states are Connecticut, see Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987); Indiana, see Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Michigan, see Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (including a presumption that services performed are gratuitous, however); Oregon, see Pinto v.
that did not occur in the *Marvin* case but has in countless others from all over the United States\(^\text{15}\) (and some foreign countries\(^\text{16}\)), would have been a just one. Further, while most of the papers in this Symposium are discussing the extent to which cohabitants, heterosexual or same-sex, do and ought to recover twenty-five years later, I am reflecting here on a closely related question: the impact of *Marvin*, and *Marvin*-type thinking, on married couples.\(^\text{17}\)

The inquiry that follows will address several correlative questions. What, besides a piece of paper, do married couples have that cohabiting couples do not? Why, from a factual as opposed to a moral point of view, might this justify different treatment of their finances when the couples break up? Why are the profound *Marvin* implications so closely related to a feminist agenda not only for the family, but also for the labor force? How can the value of "women's work" in the home be compensated to remedy the "gender gap" in earnings, and should it be? Is it fair, good, or wise to deal with these problems when couples divorce but not in a more direct and pervasive way when couples continue to live together? Finally, to the extent that *Marvin* sounds in contract, is there something about marriage that makes

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\(^{17}\) I suspect, with no empirical data to support my notion, that the analysis here will apply exactly to couples electing "civil union" under Vermont’s new legislation. *Vt. Stat. Ann.* tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (Supp. 2000). I also suspect that the distinction between married and cohabiting couples that I will draw for heterosexual couples will hold true for same-sex partners who, at least in Vermont, do not take advantage of such laws. *See id.* I am less sanguine about the results for couples elsewhere who have gone through "commitment ceremonies" and who consider themselves married, but who cannot marry because state law forbids it. Were these heterosexual couples, some states would permit at least the "innocent" party to recover under "putative spouse" laws: they tried, they made the commitment, they conferred every benefit and undertook every sacrifice they would have if married, but, through no fault of their own, that "mere piece of paper" remained illusive. *See, e.g., Marvin*, 557 P.2d at 118; Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979).
thinking in terms of entitlements, as contract doctrine encourages us to do, inappropriate or even destructive?

When Michelle Marvin's case was first appealed through the California courts, she had a formidable ally in University of California-Davis professor Carol Bruch, who wrote the amicus brief for the California Supreme Court\(^\text{18}\) that later turned into a pathbreaking article in the Family Law Quarterly.\(^\text{19}\) In her turn, Bruch had been heavily influenced by the early work of sociologist Lenore Weitzman, whose Legal Regulation of Marriage\(^\text{20}\) stressed the importance of housework, largely done by women, for the earning capacity of the spouse who was the primary breadwinner.\(^\text{21}\) Bruch extended Weitzman's thinking beyond marriage and moved it from social sciences into law at precisely the time when most legislatures were rethinking property division at divorce. For the last twenty-five years, academics of all sorts have pondered the relationship between home and market work.\(^\text{22}\)

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\(^{18}\) Bruch's influence on Marvin shines through the following section of the opinion:

"As Justice Curtis points out 'Unless it can be argued that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper, and homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that if, when she contributes money to the purchase of property, her interest will be protected, then when she contributes her services in the home, her interest in property accumulated should be protected.' Marvin, 557 P.2d at 119 (citing Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 764 (Cal. 1943) (Curtis, J., dissenting); Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 Fam. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976)). The case also states:

But although we reject the reasoning of Cary and Atherley, we share the perception of the Cary and Atherley courts that the application of former precedent in the factual setting of those cases would work an unfair distribution of the property accumulated by the couple. Justice Friedman in Beckman v. Mayhew . . . also questioned the continued viability of our decisions in Vallera and Keene; commentators have argued the need to reconsider those precedents. We should not, therefore, reject the authority of Cary and Atherley without also examining the deficiencies in the former law which led to those decisions."

Id. at 120–21 (citing Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 Fam. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976)).

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\(^{19}\) Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 Fam. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976).

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\(^{21}\) Id. at 1281.

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While the discussion will no doubt continue and will be fueled by exchanges such as that of this Symposium, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) project on Family Dissolution,\(^\text{23}\) adopted in the spring of 2000,\(^\text{24}\) suggests several answers to these questions, as no doubt Professor Ellman, the project’s Chief Reporter, will tell us. The first suggestion of the ALI is that, in domestic partnerships that closely resemble marriages,\(^\text{25}\) the results ought to be the same as for marriage.\(^\text{26}\) The second is that both should be measured, failing a more accurate ac-


Subject to the discussion at the meeting and to final editorial revisions, the Institute completed its review of the project by giving final approval both to Tentative Draft No. 4 and to earlier drafts that had been tentatively approved. The entire work will be integrated into a coherent final text, which is expected to be published in 2001.

\(^{25}\) ALI PRINCIPLES § 6.03(1) defines domestic partners as “two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.” ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 23, § 6.03(1).
by the extent of the career loss of the spouse (or partner) making sacrifices for the relationship. The third, a result approximated in community property states at least, is that the contributions of each, in cash or kind, should be presumed equal if the spouses (partners) stay together for some period of time.

I. HOW DO THE RELEVANT INCENTIVES IN MARRIAGE DIFFER FROM THOSE IN COHABITATION?

At least some notable sociologists of the family agree that marriage seems to benefit participants (and particularly men) in ways that cohabitation does not. Marriage makes men and women live longer. For men, the lifestyle and motivational changes that come with marriage and having children also translate into more stable employment, higher earnings, and more responsibility on the job. For

26 Thus, ALI Principles § 6.04(1) defines domestic-partnership property, subject to distribution “if it would be marital property under Chapter 4, had the domestic partners been married to one another during the domestic-partnership period.” Id. § 6.04(1). Section 6.06(1)(a) provides that unless stated otherwise “a domestic partner is entitled to compensatory payments on the same basis as a spouse under Chapter 5.” Id. § 6.06(1)(a).

27 Some of the pragmatic problems for awarding emotional losses and gains are discussed in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 cmt. at 262–63 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997)]. Problems of allocating gain are discussed id. at 263–64. The contribution rationale for dividing marital property is discussed and rejected by the Reporter in the comments on § 5.05, see id. § 5.05 cmt. at 303–04.

28 See id. § 5.02. The career loss, or opportunity cost, is that alternative that most likely would have been taken by the sacrificing spouse had the couple found the money somewhere else. See id.

29 ALI Principles § 4.15(1) provides: “Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this section, marital property and marital debts are divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in value, although not necessarily identical in kind.” Id. § 4.15(1). For the rationale that supports this section, see id. § 4.15 cmt. (b) at 196–97.

30 See, e.g., Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 SOC. SCI. RES. 235, 243 (1999) (“Several decades of research have shown, for example, that men are the greater beneficiaries of marriage than women.”).

31 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 51.

32 STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 66–68 (1999); see also VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EMPLOYMENT 60 (1988) (reporting that “married men earn more than married women at every age”).

Women’s income and hours of employment decrease following marriage. FUCHS, supra, at 58–59; see also FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 95 & tbl.4.4 (1998).
whatever reason, or combination of them—responsibility, nagging by wives, societal pressure to conform to the "ideal worker" image, or the time freed up by the homemaker's contributions—men get a financial premium from marriage.

The interesting thing, from the perspective of this Article, is that women do not profit in a similar way from marriage. Cohabiting relationships tend to be more egalitarian, and women are more likely to sacrifice careers for the couples' children or their husbands' employment during marriage. An economist would characterize

33 This seems to be the underlying basis of Nock's book, since he bases the changes upon a growth in the man's fundamental masculinity, stating, "Men can judge themselves as good or bad husbands because the standards of normative marriage are also well-known. Good husbands are mature, faithful, generous fathers and providers. Good husbands are expected to achieve, to help others, and to remain true to their promises. Good husbands are good men." Nock, supra note 32, at 8.


35 For descriptions of an "ideal worker" who has the support of a homemaker spouse, see Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What To Do About It 1-6 (2000), and Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559, 1619 (1991).

36 See Fuchs, supra note 32, at 60. See generally Arlie Hochschild & Anne Machung, The Second Shift (1989) (arguing that women's struggles in the workplace are due to men's unwillingness to share in child-rearing and housework).

37 See Fuchs, supra note 32, at 58-60; see also Nock, supra note 32, at 66, app. at 143 (using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth: 1979-1993, showing that the same married men earn $4260.85 more than before they were married, holding age constant).

38 See Nock, supra note 30, at 243 ("In their physical and mental health, social life, and overall satisfaction, marriage gives men more than it gives women. More interestingly, men appear to benefit from marriage regardless of the quality of the union. When women benefit from marriage, it is because they are part of a satisfying relationship.").

39 As Steven Nock puts it, "Cohabiting couples are more likely than married partners to believe that men and women should share equally in household chores, even while they tend to perform such tasks like married couples do. . . . [C]ohabiting couples are less committed to performance." Steven L. Nock, Marriage in Men's Lives 16 (1998).

40 This makes sense because only over the very long run will some of these "investments" bear fruit. Marriage and divorce laws also protect spouses who make them. The economic model of marriage is explained in relatively simple terms in Robert A. Moffitt, Female Wages, Male Wages, and the Economic Model of Marriage: The Basic Evidence, in The Ties That Bind: Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation 302, 303-06 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000). Much of the work on the economics of households began with Gary Becker. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part I, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part II, 82 J. POL. ECON. 811 (1974); see also Gary S. Becker, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30-53 (enlarged ed.
this qualitative difference between the married and unmarried as a problem in joint production.

The economist Armen Alchian tells the story of the individual fishermen who join together to take advantage of specialization and the economies of scale.\(^4\) Eventually, even as they add units of labor and capital until the marginal product of each is equal to marginal cost, they encounter another problem, which he calls the problem of team production.\(^4\) It is the same problem in miniature as the one faced by socialist economies,\(^4\) as well as by corporations\(^4\) and marriages.\(^4\)

Marriage, like fishing, involves commitment and sharing.\(^4\) Experiences are shared, enjoyment is shared, work is shared, and income is shared. What, then, is the problem? The problem is that, when more than one person works on a complicated project so that exact input is hard to measure and one receives an equal share of the outcome, there is a tendency to shirk.\(^7\) The more people involved or the more complicated the task, the easier it is to shirk successfully. Eventually the risks of being caught are so small that only the saint-like will

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1991) (presenting an economic analysis of such family matters as division of labor, procreative decisions, and divorce). For a recent argument, see Waite & Gallagher, supra note 22, at 108-09.

The mechanism for making these investments through marriage and enforcing them at divorce is discussed in June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953, 959 (1991).

41 See Armen Alchian & William R. Allen, Exchange & Production: Competition, Coordination, & Control 163-70 (3d ed. 1983); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 779-81 (1972) (describing the concept of "team production").

42 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 41, at 779-82.

43 For a classic argument, see generally Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 119-47 (1949).


47 Alchian & Allen, supra note 41, at 170.
resist the temptation and continue working to the maximum (according to his ability) to receive an equal share (according to his need). The economic term for this general problem is the principal-agent question. A different, and perhaps more familiar, view of the same problem is the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In group enterprises, societies, and families, happiness and wealth are maximized when everyone contributes one hundred percent to the venture. Still, the actor knows that the best individual outcome is achieved by being the only shirker when everyone else exerts maximum effort.

There are several strategies for reducing shirking. One is to employ a residual claimant who monitors those who use effort and decides how much to reward each person. In the family, usually both spouses live in the marital home; therefore, they are residual claimants for or ultimate beneficiaries of housework, but they may have entirely different values for what is acceptable housekeeping. This results in the familiar "gender war" of "I'd be glad to do the wash, but I don't mind not doing underwear for two weeks.

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49 This is described in Jack Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 283-86, 518 (1988). The idea is that two prisoners accused of a common crime are separated and questioned separately. See id. at 283. Each is told that if he confesses, he will get a reduced punishment. See id. at 283-84. If neither confesses, both will go free because there will not be enough evidence. See id. at 284. The theory is that they will both confess if they cannot communicate, because for each that is the lowest risk strategy. See id. For applications to family law, see, for example, Antony W. Dnes, Applications of Economic Analysis to Marital Law: Concerning a Proposal to Reform the Discretionary Approach to the Division of Marital Assets in England and Wales, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 533, 538-39 (1999); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 605, 646; Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1294-95. For applications to children, see Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 194, 203 (1999).


51 See id.

52 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 41, at 781-82.

53 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 40, at 30-32 (discussing shirking and specialization).

54 See Silbaugh, supra note 22, at 13-14. See generally Williams, supra note 35, at 145-76 (describing how gender wars "take on elements of class and race conflict").
This may be one explanation for why marriages are more stable when, holding other things constant, either men or women do traditional "men's work." "Men's work" contributes to the value of externally verifiable (and objectively priced) things such as homes and cars. "Women's work" contributes to the far more speculative (though important) value of increased comfort and well-being. These more hedonic contributions are important for reasons we have noted already—married men do better than their otherwise equivalent single counterparts on every scale in such diverse areas as employment, job responsibility and salary, health, longevity, mental health, and participation in social groups.

The perception and reality here are the same: Women do disproportionately more housework even when both spouses are employed. Income is shared if the spouses remain togeth-

55 We hold constant other possible contributors to divorce or stability: each spouse's income and education, children, race, divorce in their parent's background, cohabitation, length of marriage, age at marriage.

56 Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce and the Division of Labor (manuscript at 20, on file with author), in Marriage and Divorce: A Law and Economics Approach (forthcoming 2001).

57 The widely published, unusually high dollar divorce of Lorna and Gary Wendt, the former CEO of General Electric Capital, provides a good example of this dichotomy. See Wendt v. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998). For some of the popular literature, see Stanley Bing, Keep Your Mitts Off My Options, Dear!, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 51; Lisa Reilly Cullen, A Headliner Divorce Teaches You How to Get a Fairer Share from Your Spouse, MONEY, Feb. 1998, at 20. While the rationale used by the court is hardly clear, from the order it is apparent that Mrs. Wendt successfully claimed that she should be entitled to some of the vast wealth and income of her husband, because she provided significant "backup" for Mr. Wendt. See Wendt, 1998 WL 161165, at *3. In other words, because she was a model housewife (as the trial court said, she was "an excellent representative of motherhood, very organized, a very good cook" who "even did windows," id. at *7), she relieved him of many of the strains he would otherwise have had in managing his busy schedule. Because he did not have to worry about his personal life, he could work long hours and come home drained. See id. She also attempted to argue that she gave up her career as a piano instructor or public school teacher as what we have termed a marital sacrifice. Id. She said she had stopped working because of Gary Wendt's business requirements, but the court found that it was her voluntary choice so "she could go on luxury trips with him." Id. In other words, she had made no real sacrifice. Nonetheless, the court awarded her very substantial assets (more than $8,000,000) and support primarily because she "did give the defendant's career priority in her life," because both parties were part of the "GE team," and because she was a "team player." Id. at *8.


59 See infra Table 1; see also Bianchi & Spain, supra note 22, at 31-32; Coverman & Sheley, supra note 22, at 420. Women are apparently both more committed and more dependent than are men. See Steven L. Nock, Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. Fam. Issues 53, 66 tbl. 1 (1995).
If they divorce, the spouse with the higher income keeps it or pays the other only a token or time-limited amount in spousal support. Some writers believe that lifetime income-sharing is an integral part of marriage. The part of me believing in covenant agrees, but I would not limit the sharing to finances. The spouses also are residual claimants for "parental consumption" and so should be dividing parenting responsibility more or less evenly as well. But here again, what succeeds in the commercial firm may not be a good analogy, since the spouses probably get entirely different levels of satisfaction from their minor children.

In addition to establishing residual claims, another strategy to defeat shirking is to "pay by the piece," rewarding as each small job is done. A division of duties works for routine or small tasks because the degree of effort is obvious and can be quickly assessed. Of course, assessment may come too late, as it did for two of my friends, both lawyers, who had their phone disconnected twice because the "spouse in charge," the husband, forgot to pay the bill. Strategic behavior may be involved here as well. The outcome for this particular couple is that the wife now pays the utility bills.

60 See infra Table 1.
61 See id.
63 See Margaret F. Brinig, From Contract to Covenant: Beyond the Law and Economics of the Family 31 (2000).
65 They do not seem to do so during most marriages, see Cathleen D. Zick & Jane L. McCullough, Trends in Married Couples' Time Use: Evidence from 1977-78 and 1987-88, 24 Sex Roles 459, 472-73 (1991); therefore, equal time sharing would not be the custody regime I would advocate upon divorce. For my position, which favors adoption of the ALI Principles' "approximation" regime, see Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 126, 157 (2000).
68 See id. at 6-7.
69 That is, the husband may be trying to get out of doing the job by doing such a bad job that the wife takes over in disgust. Cf. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1415, 1456 (1991) (child care).
Piecework is related to a third shirking-reduction strategy, which is to divide the entire project into such small parts that there really is no joint production except in the aggregate. Although the monitoring effort is simplified, the gains from coordination that stem from the smoothness of the entire operation are correspondingly diminished. Participants need to stop whatever they are doing for reporting, the domestic equivalent of clock-punching or paperwork. In fact, an exchange relationship produces less satisfaction than one taking an "internal stance" central to a meaningful interpersonal relationship. In marriage, a relationship based upon short-run exchanges signals instability.

A final strategy to reduce shirking (or equalize work) is to create a very large incentive to maximize the joint effort. This device is used by coaches giving pep talks to their teams, political leaders during "Fireside Chats," or family members supporting reunions. In marriage, the duration of the relationship and the ideal—if not the

See generally Williams, supra note 35, at 1599 & n.221 (discussing the inequitable distribution of household labor).

70 See Cheung, supra note 67, at 8.

71 See id. at 9–10.


73 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Alone Together: Love and the Meaning of Marriage 24 (1999). Regan earlier defined that internal stance in marriage as a universe of shared meaning that serves as the taken-for-granted background for individual conduct. At this moment, a spouse stands "inside" the marriage as a participant who accepts its claims, not "outside" it as an observer who calls those claims into question. This stance makes possible the experience of lives lived in intimate concern, rather than mere parallel association.


74 Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 5, 15–18 (1985) (arguing that the use of collateral—something valued by both parties—helps to ensure that promises will be kept without resorting to threats or violence).

75 See Nock, supra note 30, at 240–41; see also Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 Ind. L.J. 393, 402–04 (1998) (discussing how a long-term relationship with children acts as a bond between the parents; also discussing the concept of "hands-tying") [hereinafter Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody]; Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and at Fault People, 18 INT'L Rev. L. & Econ. 325, 329–30 (1998) (noting that when divorce was more difficult, people had incentives to invest more in marriage).
fact—of love give strong incentives to make the marriage work.\textsuperscript{76} No-fault divorce has unfortunately diminished many of the values of these incentives, particularly because the legal residual claimant for some investments (such as children or professional degrees) tends to be only one spouse.\textsuperscript{77} Putting a spouse through a graduate education, or accommodating the demands of a rising corporate star or military officer,\textsuperscript{78} or building a strong relationship with children will benefit the marriage only, or at best primarily, if it remains intact.\textsuperscript{79} Consequently, the non-student spouse may well choose not to delay her own education or not to live at a reduced standard of living to finance her husband's education, if she thinks it likely that the marriage will break up before the couple gets to enjoy the benefits of the increased earning ability.\textsuperscript{80} Another consequence is that the father may choose not to spend tremendous amounts of time with his children, if he feels that they will be “taken away” and his relationship with them sabotaged by a vindictive former wife.\textsuperscript{81} On the other hand, a joint custody statute that encourages relationships with children after divorce strengthens the incentives.\textsuperscript{82} Perhaps because the invested father values his children more and realizes that divorce is hard on them, there are fewer divorces where joint custody legislation is in place.\textsuperscript{83} Some sort of guaranteed income sharing (whether or not the marriage continues)\textsuperscript{84} should work the same way to keep marriages together and

\textsuperscript{76} For a discussion of marriage vows as hortatory, see Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1230.


\textsuperscript{78} See H. Leroy Gill & Donald R. Marvin, *Wherever He May Go: How Wives Affect Their Husband’s Career Decisions*, 27 Soc. Sci. Res. 264, 277 (1998). Decisions about remaining in the service or leaving it are influenced by potential implications for the wife, especially her earnings capacity. However, traditional men make career decisions without much concern for their wives. Id.


\textsuperscript{80} For a general empirical discussion of why this may explain women’s increased labor force participation, see Parkman, supra note 22.

\textsuperscript{81} One very angry father who apparently feels this way is Robert E. Fay, *The Disenfranchised Father*, 36 ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICS 407, 413–14 (1989).

\textsuperscript{82} See Brinig & Buckley, *Joint Custody*, supra note 75, at 402.

\textsuperscript{83} See id.

\textsuperscript{84} See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, §§ 5.03, 5.05 (providing for compensation for the loss in living standard experienced at dissolution by the spouse with less wealth or earning capacity in a marriage of significant duration). Compare June Carbone, *Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of
counterbalance the distinction between less easily unverifiable (women's work) and verifiable (men's work) investments in the marriage.85

II. COSTS OF SHARING

Gary Becker's disciples and feminist scholars agree that one of the essential components of marriage is sharing.86 This point is where the similarity of their viewpoints ends, however. For law and economics proponents, sharing evolves naturally from comparative advantage and specialization.87 Since the wife (specialist in household production) cannot recoup her human capital investments if the marriage ends, the husband, who retains his market investments, must compensate her with alimony.88 The more specialized the couple, the more efficient the marriage.89 According to this view, alimony is a permanent feature of the marriage landscape.90 For some feminists, on the other hand, income sharing is at best a temporary expedient, at worst an anchor to an inequitable system in which men exploit and dominate women.91 If men and women were truly equal, they would not so

85 Cf. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. Rev. 65, 142-43 (1998) (arguing that monetary contracts should not be enforced because nonmonetary contracts are not enforced; "monetary and nonmonetary components of marriage need to be treated equally in order to properly value unpaid family labor").

86 Becker, supra note 40, at 30-31 ("Virtually all societies have developed long-term protection for married women; one can even say that 'marriage' is defined by a long-term commitment between a man and a woman."); see also Douglas W. Allen, "What Does She See in Him?: The Effect of Sharing on the Choice of Spouse, 30 Econ. Inquiry 57, 66 (1992).

87 See Allen, supra note 86, at 66.

88 See Landes, supra note 22, at 44-45. This concept first surfaced in the legal literature in Krauskopf, supra note 79, at 388.

89 Becker, supra note 40, at 33. For a criticism, see Margaret F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 Geo. L.J. 2461, 2469-73 (1994) (finding that a household is not efficient if diminishing returns to scale and psychic costs as well as financial gains are considered).

90 Brinig, supra note 89, at 2470 n.58.

much specialize, but rather, share household and market work. Both husband and wife would participate in the marketplace to the extent that this made them happy. Both would participate in child rearing and in any other household tasks for which the market did not provide a satisfactory substitute.

The consequences of sharing take a tangible form in the concept of alimony and property distribution. Feminists agree that realizing the dream of sharing has remained elusive in the vast majority of marriages. Women still perform most household jobs and consequently earn only about three quarters as much as their male counterparts. Here the feminist group splits. Some maintain that alimony should serve as a transitional or stop-gap measure for homemakers displaced because of the change in legal and social regimes. Because they grew up, married, and stayed home with children in the reasonable expectation that either the marriage would continue or they would be awarded alimony, basic fairness requires compensation for the changes wrought by divorce reform and gender equality. A minority argues that the promise of alimony discourages potential wives and mothers from investing in their own human capital to the optimal extent, reinforcing dependence, male oppression, and a society in which women can never be players without handicaps. The ALI's proposed solution is to give long term—even permanent—compensation, for career losses suffered because of investments in the marriage,

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92 See Brinig, supra note 22, at 59.
93 Brinig, supra note 89, at 2472 ("[N]either spouse really benefits from 'all work and no life,' as my teenage daughter puts it. Society does not benefit either, as the line for the couple's joint benefits shows.").
94 For many couples, home cooking, home nursing when one spouse is ill, and, certainly, sexual pleasure fall into this category.
96 This is a somewhat circular proposition since wives rationally choose household production because of their lower opportunity costs of remaining out of the job market. See Silbaugh, supra note 22, at 17–21; Wax, supra note 22, at 530.
98 See sources cited supra note 97.
including for the couple's children. This would seem to satisfy the first group of feminists, but not the second.

Thus, the characterization of sharing also matters because it so dominates the rationale for alimony and property distribution. The couple's investment in the reputation of their marital family, as well as its material goods, will continue to bear fruit even after divorce. (Thus, many years after their divorce, one of my former colleagues confesses to true pleasure in his former wife's successful legal career. He is also very proud of their joint achievement, their adult son.) These ongoing portions of the marriage covenant are what I refer to as franchise. Arguably, the part of the relationship that continues, but that may not be currently recognized by law, should be taken into account in determining alimony. If we compensate according to the franchise nature of the post-divorce relationship, the key concept will be the investment in one's spouse or in the relationship. If we do not recognize franchise interests, alimony will instead compensate for opportunities foregone or as an incentive mechanism to promote optimal marriage behavior.

The point that what a supporting spouse contributes to another's earning capacity should be considered an investment rather than a simple loss is explored most carefully in the Iowa case of In re Marriage

100 ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, § 5.05.

101 For a lengthy discussion of this "franchise" concept, see Brinig, supra note 64. See also BRINIG, supra note 63, at 181-207 (describing the "family franchise"—relationships that exist after the legal bonds of family have been broken).

102 The concept is defined for families in BRINIG, supra note 63, at 7. Briefly, it refers to the portion of a covenant family that remains when the legal relationship between participants ends at adoption, emancipation, or divorce.

103 See Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 Fam. L.Q. 93, 106-13 (1997) (discussing why the prevailing "clean break" theory of divorce doesn't fit what happens in most dissolving families); Rosemary Sackett & Cheryl K. Munyon, Alimony: A Retreat from Traditional Concepts of Spousal Support, 35 Drake L. Rev. 297, 302 (1986) ("With the bitterness that frequently follows a dissolution, the ideal situation would be to put the parties' economic differences to rest with the property division. Where possible, each party should be given his or her own separate assets.").

104 To some extent this is captured in Chapters 4 and 5 of the ALI Principles, though in them spouses are compensated at dissolution for career losses occasioned by these investments. In other words, loss (sacrifice) is the basis rather than gain (investment), though the ALI Principles are couched in terms of earning capacity rather than non-human capital assets. See BRINIG, supra note 63, at 171 & n.202 (referring to ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, § 4.07(1), cmt. A). The rationale for equating property distribution and compensatory payments is discussed. See id. at 100-01.

of Francis,106 in which the supporting wife actually received a sum that represented not her loss in earning capacity (since she had worked throughout),107 nor reimbursement for the amount she had contributed to supporting her husband and securing money for his tuition,108 but rather a return on the share of the investment she had made.109

Although sharing in some form is central to marriage, it is obvious that the feminist ideal of shared housework has not been realized even when most married women work outside the home.110 Time studies chronicle the daily behavior of husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, and unmarried cohabitants.111 In each of these situations, labor is sharply divided, even when both adults work at full-time jobs. Most routine household tasks are done by women, who also per-
form most of the child care and associated functions. Couples divide financial management and grocery shopping more evenly. More men than women take care of cars and yard work, so the couples typically divide "inside" and "outside" tasks. As Joan Williams has written, the labor market expects an "ideal worker," who is almost invariably a married man with a homemaker-wife who takes care of most of the behind-the-scenes work. Because women, even post-Marvin, still perform these household tasks, eating into their leisure time, they cannot do as much in the paid job force as the men to whom they are compared. Thus they earn less, progress more slowly, and have lower opportunity costs from engaging in household production that mean their employment sacrifices are more rational than their mate's. In order to change this pattern, either the ideal worker concept (characteristic of the labor force) or the (non)sharing of housework (characteristic of the household) must change. There is some evidence that both are changing gradually. Still, the drawbacks of "women's work," the fact that no one wants to do it, and the reality that, undercompensated as it is at present, it does not add to

112 Fuchs, supra note 32, at 73–74; see also Bianchi & Span, supra note 22, at 32 (reporting that the hours women spend on housework have decreased over ten years, and "[i]n families in which the wife works outside the home... husbands perform a greater share of domestic tasks and child care"); sources cited in Brinig, supra note 89, at 2477 & n.90.
113 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 26, tbl.2).
114 Id. People's time is divided roughly into labor, leisure, and housework. Studies show that women have less leisure time than do men. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 40, at 76, 28.1 (reporting that in 1975 to 1976, the average leisure hours for all married women was 26.7, for men 27.1 and that, when employed full-time, women had 21 hours of leisure per week, men 22).
115 Williams, supra note 35, at 71–72; Williams, supra note 35, at 1596–97.
116 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 27, tbl.3).
117 Paula England & George Farkas, Households, Employment and Gender 80–82 (1986); Fuchs, supra note 32, at 64.
For examples of the differences in compensation, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, National Employment, Hours, and Earnings, 1981–93 (1993), which reports annual average weekly earnings for 1988 of $461 for carpentry
marital stability, all give some support for the Bruch-Marvin view that homemakers’ contributions need to be valued.

III. PRIVACY LIMITATIONS ON SHARING

Despite the importance of sharing, spouses do not share everything, despite any intent to “share and share alike.” They retain some private spaces as individuals. Some of these involve their innermost thoughts, obviously not the subject of legal proceedings. Some involve questions of the appropriate involvement of courts “behind the marital veil.” Some involve such intimate matters as the wife’s choice of whether or not to bear a child to term.

and floor work, id. at 24, §531 for plumbing, heating, and air conditioning, id. at 21, and §299 for auto repair, services, and parking, id. at 438. The same Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows weekly earnings of $215 for residential care, id. at 463, $146 for miscellaneous personal services, §214 for laundry, cleaning, and garment services, id. at 424, and $172 for retail bakeries, id. at 381. In 1985, men employed as repairers and mechanics earned an average of $400 weekly, compared to the $130 women earned in private household service. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 436, tbl.696 (1998).

120 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 28–29, tbl.4).
121 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-98 (1975) (marital homestead); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 143.43 (Anderson 1999) (survivor benefits); 31 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 3621 (1993) (providing that earnings or profits of a conjugal partnership are divided upon dissolution).
122 See, e.g., KAHIL GIBRAN, ON MARRIAGE, IN THE PROPHET 15 (1923).

But let there be spaces in your togetherness,
And let the winds of the heavens dance between you.
Love one another, but make not a bond of love:
Let it rather be a moving sea between the shores of your souls.

Id. at 15.

123 See Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1302–04. Privacy of course has its downside, particularly for women.

Many feminists, as Dean Bartlett recently observed, have questioned the premises of family privacy, insisting that just because relationships are private does not make them beyond public concern. They have challenged the inevitability of naturalness of family privacy, arguing that where the line is drawn between private and public is itself a highly discretionary, political act. And they have exposed the hypocrisy of a construct that purports to be neutral but that suppresses recognition of the kinds of harms from which women disproportionately suffer, while leaving room for prohibition of the kinds of harms men experience.

The first genre of privacy cases involves time-honored questions. For many centuries, spouses could not sue each other in tort because to do so would violate the "marital unity."\(^{124}\) In other words, when they married, the two became one person, and a person could not sue himself.\(^{125}\) Although this marital unity has disappeared largely from the realm of property law,\(^{126}\) it still retains some validity in tort, not so much because of the "unity" concept, but for reasons of privacy.

Courts are afraid that their interference even in more egregious cases involving intentional torts might encourage suits for such day-to-day problems as the "uninvited kiss"\(^{127}\) and, thus, return spouses to an accounting or contract-like type of behavior characteristic of the market, rather than the firm.\(^{128}\) The "inviolable veil" of family autonomy\(^{129}\) hails from high, and perhaps infinitely high, "transaction costs" to use the words of economists.\(^{130}\) It is nearly impossible to recall the context of everyday family affairs, particularly when minor slights and adjustments go on for years.\(^{131}\) Nonetheless, modern courts have abrogated the doctrine for simple unintentional torts, such as auto-

\(^{124}\) There is an extensive discussion of this line of reasoning in the Supreme Court case of United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 43-45 (1980) (discussing immunity from adverse testimony by a spouse). This reasoning appears in Sundin v. Klein, 260 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (Va. 1980), where a murdered wife's estate tried to recover property held by the spouses as "tenants by the entireties."

\(^{125}\) See, e.g., Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'r, 96 S.E. 315, 322 (Va. 1918) (Burke, J., concurring) (The duties of marriage "forbid the idea that this 'one flesh' may so divide itself that either spouse may sue the other."); see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *442.

\(^{126}\) Although the tenancy by the entireties still exists in a few states (for example, Virginia permits this holding if the intent to create it explicitly appears in the deed, Va. Code Ann. § 55–20 (Michie 1995)), and the marital community flourishes in others, customs like dower and courtesy (giving wives and husbands, respectively, shares in the property acquired by the other during the marriage) are abolished. For one of the last holdouts, see Va. Code Ann. § 64.1–19.2 (Michie 1995).

\(^{127}\) Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475, 482 (Wis. 1926) (Eschweiler, J., dissenting) (noting that allowing suits between spouses would encourage litigation over things so trivial as the unwanted kiss).

\(^{128}\) For a modern example of a court struggling with this problem and ultimately declining to allow a wife to recover in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). The opinion states: "Even though one may question the utility of such comments, spouses are also free to express negative opinions of one another. 'You look awful' or even 'I don't love you' can be very wounding, but these statements cannot justify liability." Id. at 1325.

\(^{129}\) The phrase comes from Menefee v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (Va. 1949) (discussing the marital communications privilege).


\(^{131}\) See the discussion in Hakkila.
mobile accidents\textsuperscript{132} and household injuries,\textsuperscript{133} where the parties are covered by automobile or homeowner's insurance.\textsuperscript{134} They have been more resistant to abolishing the immunity for intentional torts,\textsuperscript{135} although some courts have allowed suits where the action complained of was "outrageous" and destroyed any hope of marital unity.\textsuperscript{136}

The second privacy concern involves individual rights on a constitutional level. Despite his obvious interests in and connections with his unborn child, a husband cannot interfere with his wife's right to choose whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term.\textsuperscript{137} In the more recent early-term abortion cases, practical interests, like the employment progress women have made since \textit{Roe v. Wade}\textsuperscript{138} and the concerns about abuse, outweighed the interests of the husband.\textsuperscript{139} In another context, a court rejected a husband's attempt to enforce a contract made prior to marriage that limited the couple's sexual intercourse to once a week (while the wife insisted on more).\textsuperscript{140} This last case reveals concerns both about family autonomy and individual privacy.\textsuperscript{141} Courts are loath to pierce the marital veil by entering the marital bedroom (and an inquiry into the frequency of intercourse, or requests for intercourse, would have had to accompany the husband's suit).\textsuperscript{142} They are also reluctant to second-guess individual decisions

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The connection between the outrageousness of the conduct of one spouse and the severe emotional distress of the other will likely be obscure. Although the victim spouse may well be suffering severe emotional distress, was it caused by the outrageousness of the conduct or by the implied (and privileged) message of antipathy?

\textit{Hakkila}, 812 P.2d at 1325.


\textsuperscript{135} For a survey, see generally Robert G. Spector, \textit{Marital Torts: The Current Legal Landscape}, 33 \textit{FAM. L.Q.} 745 (1999) (outlining the tort actions that are currently available in the marital context).


\textsuperscript{138} 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Casey}, 505 U.S. at 889-94.


\textsuperscript{141} See Bartlett, \textit{supra} note 123, at 488-94 (discussing feminist concerns about sex and reproductive issues).

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Cf. Poe v. Ulman}, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (finding that a law prohibiting the "use" of contraceptives "reaches into the intimacies of the marriage relationship"; proof of its violation involves "an invasion of privacy that is implicit in a free society");
about marital sexuality, a matter over which each individual spouse has complete control.\textsuperscript{143}

Although the strongest claims of marital privacy supported the concept that a man could not rape his wife, violent sexual assault violates covenant promises like the injunction that the husband is to "love his wife as his own body."\textsuperscript{144} Once married women were accorded rights as people and citizens,\textsuperscript{145} the ancient common-law immunity from marital rape charges\textsuperscript{146} necessarily disappeared as well. The assent to marriage was no longer seen as blanket consent to intercourse at the husband's demand.\textsuperscript{147} Once the abortion cases fixed matters involving sexuality firmly within individual control, the husband's immunity from rape became a dead letter,\textsuperscript{148} though there is still a difference between marital rape and stranger rape in many state statutes.\textsuperscript{149} (Of course the proof problems, troublesome in most sexual assault cases, become still more intractable in marital rape cases.\textsuperscript{150})

\textit{id. at 548–49} (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing contraceptive use by married couples).

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{See In re Pamela P. v. Frank S.}, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 346 (Fam. Ct. 1981) ("Constitutional doctrine as to procreative freedom has developed mainly in the context of women's rights. There can be no question, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees to a man equally with a woman freedom of choice to use contraception and avoid procreation.") (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448–49, 453 (1972)).

\textsuperscript{144} Ephesians 5:28.


\textsuperscript{146} \textit{2 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law} 436 (2d ed. reprint 1923) (1898).

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{1 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown} 629 (1736).


\textsuperscript{149} \textit{See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-57.2} (Michie 1996) (criminalizing marital sexual assault); \textit{id. § 18.2-67.2:1} (requiring marital sexual assault to be reported within sixty days of the offense). \textit{See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape}, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (describing the evolution of marital rape laws from the 19th century to today).

The last several paragraphs have described the privacy concerns surrounding married couples in legal terms. The same phenomena may be analyzed in an institutional economic framework as well. The first set of problems—invoking over-regulating the marriage—are rather like the concerns leading to the concept of “bounded rationality” as a limitation on the complete contingent claims contract. In other words, spelling out all the terms of a contract and enforcing each minute detail would itself be destructive of many long-term relational contracts, whether commercial or marital. In marriage, this point explains why there are not more antenuptial (or premarital) agreements—the necessary negotiation and specificity take some of the bloom off the most romantic relationship. In the commercial parallel, if managers or employees of a business firm had to be continually afraid of lawsuits for the most trivial of matters, much worthwhile business simply would not get done. Similarly, over-regulating a marriage, or what Milton Regan calls “the external stance,” hurts marriages by encouraging a constant reexamination of whether continued confidence in or loyalty to the other spouse is worthwhile. Even if all things in a marriage could be foreseen, specific enforcement of marital promises may be harmful. Finally, some of the qualities that make up a good marriage are simply incom-

151 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & Econ. 233, 258 (1979); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1228-29 (arguing that marriage can and should be analyzed as a long-term relational contract).


154 See id. at 50; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 204, 209 (1982). One other reason is that couples during engagement are convinced that their particular marriage will not end in divorce, although they are aware that half of all marriages will. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 439, 443 (1993) (observing that “the median response of the marriage license applicants was 0% when assessing the likelihood that they personally would divorce”).


157 Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J. Legal Stud. 267, 300-02 (1987).
mensurable, so that courts may have difficulty dealing with them because they are at the same time such wonderfully familiar and incalculably worthwhile attributes.

Recent empirical work by Margaret Brinig and Steven Nock shows why one consequence of diminished specialization leads to marital instability. Couples studied in the National Survey of Families and Households were asked, along with many other questions, how many hours they (and their spouses) spent working each week in the paid labor force or on specific household tasks. Meal preparation, shopping, washing dishes, and doing laundry were among the traditional “women’s tasks,” while household repair and auto maintenance were among those usually thought of as “men’s work.” The results for each couple were compared and found to be highly consistent. Five years later, the same couples were surveyed again. Brinig and Nock found that couples in which either husband or wife spent more than the median time doing “women’s work” in 1987–1988 were significantly more likely to have divorced or separated by the second survey, taken five years later. These results remain robust even when the usual indicators of marital stability are held constant and even when labor force employment hours and income are included.

On the other hand, when either husband or wife spent more time than the median doing “men’s work” in the earlier period, the couple was significantly less likely to experience divorce or separation by the second survey. Finally, couples who refused to answer the house-

159 See generally Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (demonstrating “how husbands’ involvement in women’s tasks and wives’ involvement in men’s tasks affects the chances of marital disruption . . . . explor[ing] the extent to which attitudes, as opposed to fair division of labor, matter for marital stability”).
160 See id. (manuscript at 6).
162 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 26, tbl.2).
163 See id. (manuscript at 27, tbl.4).
164 See id. (manuscript at 7).
165 See id. (manuscript at 28–29, tbl.4).
166 See id.
167 See id.
hold labor questions (or who answered “zero hours” for more than three of the questions) also had more stable marriages.\textsuperscript{168} These findings indicate that the early feminist predictions of successful egalitarian marriages are over optimistic. The most likely psychological explanations for these results are that “women’s jobs” are distasteful or have lower status or are less goal-directed than the “men’s.”\textsuperscript{169} The economic explanation for all the differences between men’s and women’s work would seem to be that “men’s work” contributes directly to marital assets (which have value outside the relationship), while “women’s work” does not.\textsuperscript{170} This explanation suggests that couples should rely on third parties (or advanced technology) for “women’s work” and promote or subsidize (to the extent they are not favored anyway) “men’s work,” especially if the couple works on cars or household repairs together. It also suggests that couples who are not keeping track of who is doing what around the house are happier.\textsuperscript{171} This, of course, relates to the theme of unconditional love that differentiates marriages from other close interpersonal relationships.

An alternative explanation, that increased labor force participation by women itself destabilizes marriage, is not borne out by empirical research.\textsuperscript{172} Although women may work more in the labor force

\textsuperscript{168} See id.; see also Nock, supra note 30, at 239–41 (stating that certain behavior in marriage only makes sense if its turn-taking nature is considered and that marriages exist not only in the present, but more vividly in their “histories and futures”); Smith et al., supra note 46, at 321 (reporting that wives do not view their disproportionate share of housework to be unfair when they believe it “helps create a happy and harmonious life”).

\textsuperscript{169} See supra note 119.

\textsuperscript{170} See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want Trust”: Norms, Trust and Autonomy (unpublished manuscript, at 15, on file with author).


\textsuperscript{172} See generally Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women’s Economic Independence and the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination, 21 J. Fam. Issues 906 (2000) (concluding that women’s greater economic independence does not destabilize marriage). Sayer and Bianchi are trying to disprove the common supposition that women’s increased employment (and economic power) destabilizes marriage. They found, using the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFHI), that “indicators of marital commitment and satisfaction are better predictors of marital dissolution than are measures of economic independence.” Id. at 938. Interestingly, Sayer and Bianchi’s piece, supra, found that if the husband felt the marriage was troubled or unhappy, it was not a statistically significant predictor of divorce within the next five years. See id. at 932–33. If the wife felt the marriage was troubled or
after the marriage becomes unstable (at least in part to guard against the chance of having to work at a less satisfactory job after divorce), labor force participation or their earning power was not significantly associated with divorce, while women's emotional satisfaction with the relationship was.

CONCLUSIONS

So, was the influence of Marvin on marriage good or bad? The undisputed good, from a feminist point of view at least, is that Marvin recognizes the value that women confer on men and family. At the same time Marvin was being argued and written, a number of legislatures were enacting property distribution statutes. Many of these "first generation" statutes explicitly recognized spouses' contributions to the family as well as their financial contributions. As will be shown shortly, the question is whether the way that revelation has played out (only at dissolution, instead of more pervasively) poses a problem for marriage. If compensation is made pervasively and does not require periodic cost-accounting, it should not destabilize unhappy, there was a statistically significant relationship, holding other things constant, at least to $p < .01$ and in one model to $p < .001$. Id. at 929-31 & tbl.3.

173 See Stacy J. Rogers & Paul R. Amato, Have Changes in Gender Relations Affected Marital Quality?, 79 Soc. Forces 731, 732 (2000); see also Parkman, supra note 22, at 44 (arguing that married women may work outside of the home in order to protect themselves against the economic consequences of no-fault divorce).

174 See Sayer & Bianchi, supra note 172, at 918-19, 932-33.


176 By the winter of 1983, thirty-two states considered nonmonetary contributions (such as being a homemaker, serving as a parent, contributing to career potential of the other spouse, or contributing to the well-being of the family) in determining property distribution and/or maintenance. Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 Fam. L.Q. 365, 381 & tbl.V (1984).

177 One suggested solution to this problem is to restrict divorce so that the inequalities never surface. Thus some writers have suggested changes in divorce grounds to allow "no fault" divorces only when there is mutual consent. See, e.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 137-40 (1992); Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements at Divorce, 87 Ky. L.J. 51, 61 & n.43 (1999); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. Pub. L. 91, 106 (1993). Scott and Scott, supra note 45, argue that divorce, as the termination of relational contract, requires a reasonable opportunity for "winding down" the marriage partnership so that each spouse can disentangle or realize investment. See Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1263-84. The Scotts' provision basically gives notice that a divorce will occur after, say, two years. Id. at 1262. But this does not help the spouse who has been emotionally abused nor the spouse who is emotion-
marriage. That is the benefit of the fifty-fifty sharing assumptions\textsuperscript{178} that have been in place in intact community property regimes for some years.\textsuperscript{179} The important insight is that home work needs to be dignified and the property/support thus gained treated as \textit{earned}, not as a gift or handout.\textsuperscript{180} In dissolution cases, household work needs to be treated as contributing not only to financial assets, but also to future earnings generally.\textsuperscript{181} The investment made in the other's future earning capacity is not necessarily tied to the contributing spouse's earning potential. That is, to some extent, though the career sacrifice of the homemaker may be quite different, the employed spouse will gain the same whether the homemaker has given up a legal or a secretarial or a nurse's aide career.\textsuperscript{182} This point is missed by the ALI \textit{Principles}, which allow permanent compensation to reduce loss and equalize income, but not rise to the level of the gain to the other spouse.\textsuperscript{183}

But to keep from destabilizing marriage and reducing marital behavior to a series of exchanges,\textsuperscript{184} the contributions of what Nock discusses in terms of marital-specific capital\textsuperscript{185} must be realized during ongoing marriages as well. This concern might argue for something

\textsuperscript{178} For a discussion noting that many feminists favored equal division of property during divorce reform efforts of the 1970s and 1980s, see Bartlett, \textit{supra} note 123, at 479–80. \textit{See also} Fineman, \textit{supra} note 175, at 836 (noting that the Wisconsin Marriage and Divorce Act has a rebuttable presumption of equal division instead of needs-based settlement); Isabel Marcus, \textit{Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State}, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 375, 450 (1988–89) (noting that many feminists find the “rebuttable presumption of equal distribution” more attractive than “equitable distribution”).


\textsuperscript{180} \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Marcus, \textit{supra} note 178, at 438–39 & n.255 (stating that otherwise the system is fundamentally unfair).

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{See} Brinig, \textit{supra} note 64, at 423.


\textsuperscript{183} ALI \textit{Principles} (Proposed Final Draft 1997), \textit{supra} note 27, \S\ 5.05.

\textsuperscript{184} This is what I see as the primary problem of a number of contract-based solutions. \textit{See generally} Brian Bix, \textit{Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage}, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1998) (arguing that a contractual, market-based model of marriage is not entirely appropriate); Wax, \textit{supra} note 22 (describing how strictly market based notions fail to capture the full reality of “marital bargaining”).

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{See} Nock, \textit{supra} note 30, at 238–39.
like the taxation solution proposed by Nancy Staudt. Such a "carrot" or reward approach, as opposed to arguing for equal division of assets upon divorce, might also include the moribund "comparable worth" compensation for traditionally female occupations that require as much training or education as traditionally male "comparables." It might suggest direct compensation from the employer who, as in the case of the university president, requires significant service by the key employee's spouse. For recipients of government benefits, it suggests treating all caretakers as being as dependent upon external wage supports as are their charges. Another positive step may be marriage education, which focuses on communication skills learned prior to marriage and reinforced throughout it. Of course, though this tactic seems to help reduce divorce, it may not promote

186 Staudt, supra note 22, at 1647 (proposing taxing women's contributions to GNP like any other work so that these contributions will be valued and also "earn" such benefits as Social Security). For a more recent approach on getting rid of marriage tax, see Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L. REV. 495, 518–23 (1999) (suggesting that removal of the more burdensome tax on the second, more elastic, earner will reduce women's immiseration; finding the source of the role inequality not in housework but in childcare). See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Women (1997), for a discussion of these principles.

187 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2450–51 (1995) (advocating giving parents privileges to compensate them as fiduciaries unless they are shown to be unfit).


189 See e.g., UGa President's Wife to Receive Stipend, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Oct. 19, 2000, at B5 (reporting that the president's wife will receive a $30,000 annual compensation). See generally Julianne Basinger, A Paycheck for Presidents' Spouses?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 22, 2000, at A37 (citing survey data and discussing the case of Mary Ann Shaw, who has a formal title with the provost's office and earns $65,000 at Syracuse University).

190 See Martha Albertson Fineeman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 161–64, 231–32 (1995) (advocating that "inevitable dependants" should be placed along with their caregivers in the legal category of the family); see also Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2200 (1995).

equality of power during marriage. And, as Katharine Bartlett observed, that continues to be the central problem for family law.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{192} Bartlett, \textit{supra} note 123, at 475. Feminists have questioned “the justice of a legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family members to others.” \textit{Id.}
Table 1. Hours Spent on Housework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonmarried</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married—</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Employed</td>
<td>48.0-43.0</td>
<td>23.0-34.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>20.0-26.5</td>
<td>11.5-20.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonmarried</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married—</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Employed</td>
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<td>3.0-9.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>5.5-8.0</td>
<td>3.0-9.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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</table>

### Table 2. Average Hours Spent on Household Tasks by Husbands and Wives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Task</th>
<th>Husbands</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sig.T.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preparing Meals</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>4377</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Washing Dishes</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>4377</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cleaning House</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>4379</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Outdoor Tasks</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shopping</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Washing, Ironing</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4379</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Paying Bills</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>4378</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Auto Maintenance</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>4379</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Driving Others</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>4372</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male Tasks (4+8)</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>4375</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female Tasks</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>33.98</td>
<td>4381</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
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</table>

* Paired samples T-Test (2-tailed) is significant at p < 0.001

Table from Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 26, tbl.2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Characteristic</th>
<th>Average/Percentage</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Years in Current Marriage</td>
<td>18.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent who Separated/Divorced</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband’s Age at Marriage</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s Age at Marriage</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Couples who Cohabited Before Marrying</td>
<td>18.34%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children Born to Couple</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband’s Wage/Salary Wave I (thousands)</td>
<td>20.76</td>
<td>26.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wife’s Wage/Salary Wave I</td>
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<td>27.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband White</td>
<td>78.97%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Black</td>
<td>10.45%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Hispanic</td>
<td>7.24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Asian</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband American Indian</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses Different Races</td>
<td>13.61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Years of Schooling</td>
<td>12.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wife’s Years of Schooling</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Parents Divorced</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s Parents Divorced</td>
<td>9.15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Hours at Paid Work Last Week</td>
<td>34.30</td>
<td>21.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s Hours at Paid Work Last Week</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>19.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Hours on “Men’s” Tasks Last Week</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Hours on “Women’s” Tasks Last Week</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>13.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wife’s Hours on “Men’s” Tasks Last Week</td>
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<td>4.17</td>
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<td>Wife’s Hours on “Women’s” Tasks Last Week</td>
<td>33.98</td>
<td>23.73</td>
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### Table 4. Cox Regressions Predicting Marital Disruption

#### L. Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>RISK</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabited</td>
<td>1.7717</td>
<td>5.8808**</td>
<td>1.6776</td>
<td>5.3528**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
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<td>.5447**</td>
<td>-.6187</td>
<td>.5987**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Wages</td>
<td>-.0019</td>
<td>.9981</td>
<td>-.0047</td>
<td>.9953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s Wages</td>
<td>-.0101</td>
<td>.9899</td>
<td>-.0130</td>
<td>.9870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Black</td>
<td>.4167</td>
<td>1.5169*</td>
<td>.3728</td>
<td>1.4519*</td>
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<td>1.3607</td>
<td>.2441</td>
<td>1.2765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Asian</td>
<td>.3517</td>
<td>1.4215</td>
<td>.2471</td>
<td>1.2804</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husband American Indian</td>
<td>.5910</td>
<td>1.8058</td>
<td>.4515</td>
<td>1.5707</td>
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<tr>
<td>Different Races</td>
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<td>Husband’s Education</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.0689</td>
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<td>Wife’s Parents Divorced</td>
<td>.6771</td>
<td>1.9681**</td>
<td>.6203</td>
<td>1.8594**</td>
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</table>

* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model
### II. Division of Labor

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband's Hours Paid Work</td>
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<td>RISK</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>1.0155**</td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>1.0155**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife's Hours Paid Work</td>
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<td>1.0020</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>1.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband's Hours Male Tasks</td>
<td>-.0244</td>
<td>.9759**</td>
<td>-.0253</td>
<td>.9750**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband's Hours Female Tasks</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
<td>1.0134**</td>
<td>0.0150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wife's Hours Male Tasks</td>
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</table>

* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model

### III. Sense of Fairness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband Household</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<td></td>
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* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model
### IV. Fairness Hours Interaction

<table>
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<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>RISK</td>
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* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model