Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and Crime

The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation

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YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION: STREET LESSONS ON DRUGS AND CRIME

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Flora Lewis has observed in the New York Times that capitalism and freedom have triumphed over European communism—but that American society hardly can rest on its laurels:

"The scourge of drugs should suggest much more than inadequate law enforcement, greed, failed family responsibility. It has to mean that there is something missing, something our society is failing to provide in its basic promise of community.

We are producing not only youths with inferior education and desire to learn, we are producing crack babies who may be ineducable because of birth defects. We are
producing homeless who live on park benches and streets in the midst of empty buildings where they cannot afford space. We let developers blow up old buildings that could be repaired so they can invest in expensive new ones, another part of the H.U.D. scandal.

We have the capacity and the social system to do better. . . .

Well aware of our capacity, many of America's North Atlantic allies have despaired over how the seeming European victory over Communism has not been accompanied by similarly effective domestic policies in the U.S.

At the recent European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention, an American big city mayor told his peers in a major address that deprivation, poverty, drugs and crime were unrelated. He advocated tough law and order, prison building and greatly enhanced border interdiction of drugs.

But Europeans and Canadians at the Conference were critical. On border interdiction as an American priority, a British delegate observed, "As if you enterprising Americans would not be smart enough to produce drugs inside the United States if the imports were stopped." A questioner from France politely reminded Americans that the United States already had spent billions on prisons and they had not been successful in reducing crime. A Dutch representative working on prisons and parole said, "You Americans pursue a strategy, it doesn't work, so you double your efforts and pour obscene amounts of money into the same strategy. It doesn't seem to occur to you to retreat and try a new tack." The Mayor of Toronto expressed dismay at the failure of the United States to see employment in the inner city as key. Other Canadians observed that the U.S. was "dealing with the iceberg by rearranging the deck chairs." The Secretary General of the Council of Europe encouraged the world community to reject American solutions and deal with crime at its roots. In France, this means local social development through coordinated employment, education, neighborhood services and policing.

With a concern similar to Flora Lewis', one former U.S. trade negotiator has concluded that our trade deficit springs from "the same willful disregard of reality and self-delusion as the decay of our central cities, the permeation of our society with drugs, and the decline of the educational system."

These concerns are not new. They have been shared by many Americans for more than two decades.
Twenty years ago, the bipartisan President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) concluded, "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."

Shortly thereafter, the bipartisan National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Eisenhower Violence Commission), surveying the carnage in many American cities in the wake of the ghetto riots and rising crime rates of the late 1960s, declared that "safety in our cities requires nothing less than progress in reconstructing urban life."

As the private sector re-creation of these Commissions, the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation has worked since the early 1980s to carry out their agendas—by reducing urban violence and drug abuse through youth empowerment, community revitalization and grass-roots action.

In 1982, the Foundation, with major seed funding from the Ford Foundation and assistance from IBM, Exxon, the Metropolitan Life Foundation, the Burden Foundation and more than sixty other local and national funders, launched a neighborhood self-help crime prevention program based on those principles in 10 inner cities.

In this report, we summarize the results and lessons of our demonstrations during the last decade, describe our resulting next generation of private sector ventures and propose new, politically feasible, national policies for the inner city that build on our practical experience in day-to-day street-level implementation.

Today, with crime and drug-related violence tearing the social fabric of our cities as never before, it is critically important that we build on the accumulating knowledge and experience already gathered on the "front lines" of America's inner cities. Through trial and error over the last decade in places like the South Bronx, East Brooklyn, Liberty City in Miami, Dorchester in Boston, Washington, D.C. and Newark, we learned as much from failures as from successes.

As a result, there now are some answers to seemingly intractable questions. How effective are specific anti-crime and anti-drug strategies, like neighborhood watch, in the inner city, whatever their popularity in the media? What are the relative roles of minority non-profit community organizations and the police? Of private organizations and public sector agencies? What are the uses—and limitations—of volunteers? Can a wise policy invest simultaneously in both individual high risk youth and the neighborhoods where they live? What is the cost? Is it
cheaper than prison building? How do we pay? Is an inner city youth empowerment and community reconstruction policy now feasible politically, as rhetoric over a “peace dividend” again is heard, as in the 1970s?

We offer the report in the spirit of illuminating these issues.

We can anticipate one central conclusion here—and it is a hopeful one. Community-based organizations can create effective strategies to reduce crime and drug abuse in inner cities. But we caution that effective programs cannot be developed “on the cheap.” Our experience tells us that these inner-city ills require comprehensive solutions, not piecemeal, hit-and-miss efforts. The most successful programs reach well beyond the immediate symptoms of crime or drug abuse to address the deeper problems of the surrounding community, and particularly the multiple needs of disadvantaged youth. Providing comprehensive, multiple remedies for those overlapping problems requires a serious commitment of resources—more serious than our nation has been willing to contemplate up to now. But we believe that the easing of world tensions on the wake of the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe offers an unparalleled opportunity to give these problems the resources they deserve—to finish, at long last, the agenda set out by the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions.

Dr. David Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York has concluded:

We’ll never know as much as we like, as evaluations are difficult and can direct resources away from the strategies themselves, but we know enough to act and we can’t afford not to act.

As the 1990s begin, we now know enough to act on the common principles that so often spell success for inner city youth and communities.

1. More Separate, Less Equal

Early in 1968, the Kerner Commission, established during the “long hot summer” of 1967, issued its devastating report on the causes of the urban riots of the 1960s. In a momentous passage, the Commission declared that America was moving toward “two societies, separate and unequal.” And it called for “compassionate, massive, and sustained” national action to address the roots of urban violence.

But by the Spring of 1968 America’s cities were in flames again. Two leaders who had been among those most deeply
concerned with the fate of America’s “two societies”—Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy—lay dead. For some, there was a growing fear that continuing violence was fraying the bonds that held American society together.

It was in that tense, urgent atmosphere that President Lyndon Johnson established the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, under the leadership of Milton Eisenhower. Like the Kerner Commission, the Violence Commission recognized that the problems of violent crime and civil disorders were deeply rooted in the conditions of urban life in the United States. In its final report, released in December 1969, the Commission concluded that violence was “like a fever in the body politic; it is but a symptom of some more basic pathology which must be cured before the fever will disappear.”

The Violence Commission declared that “the way in which we can make the greatest progress toward reducing violence in America is by taking the actions necessary to improve the conditions of family and community life for all who live in our cities, and especially for the poor who are concentrated in the ghetto slums.” The Commission acknowledged that violence had to be controlled through law enforcement and the courts—in the short run. But it also insisted that in the long run, “Safety in our cities requires nothing less than progress in reconstructing urban life.” The Commission concluded that “the poverty and social isolation of minority groups in central cities is the single most serious problem of the American city today”; and it called for neighborhood-level efforts to reduce violence by diminishing that isolation and poverty.

Individual and Community Development

Others shared this vision of neighborhood capacity building and community self-determination. In his 1967 book, To Seek a Newer World, Robert Kennedy suggested that rebuilding the inner city and transforming the lives and futures of its people would take something more than the “individual achievement” through which a handful of people up to then had escaped the urban ghetto. It would take something much deeper: The people of the inner city had to be helped to “build communities of security and achievement and dignity”—to “gain self-sufficiency, control over their own destiny.”

The ills of the inner city had to be attacked through a comprehensive “process of community development”—which in
turn must "begin on an economic base; a foundation of individual and community self-support."

Proponents of this view of community development believed that the creation of new, indigenous community enterprises within the inner cities could be the basis for a revitalization of the community as a whole—in its social aspects no less than its purely economic ones. Many saw the emerging community development corporations of the time (like the one Robert Kennedy was instrumental in creating in Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood) as models for that community self-regeneration. These decentralized, locally based institutions could take over some of the governing and community-building functions usually performed by more distant governmental bodies—from social services, through education, to drug and crime prevention.

But a pessimistic view was in the air in the 1970s and 1980s. In place the stirring vision of the Kerner Commission, which wanted to turn cities into "citadels of the human spirit," there was a growing perception that not much could be done about the roots of crime, inner city isolation and deprivation.

We did not engage in that reconstruction of urban life the Violence Commission had called for; on the contrary, we slashed many existing urban programs, including many of the most innovative and promising. We cut not only some ineffective programs that seemed to promise only continued dependency and stagnation for the urban poor—but also many of those that sought to contribute to that self-sufficiency and self-determination of which the Presidential commissions had spoken.

On the national level, our response to the continuing—indeed increasing—problem of crime and violence in the cities was largely reactive. We poured substantial amounts of scarce resources into "hardware"—including armored equipment whose value was questionable at best. We began steadily to put more and more people behind bars—in the nation's prisons and in local jails. Expenditures for criminal justice in the 1980s increased 4 times as rapidly as for education, and twice as rapidly as for health and hospitals. Over the decade the number of adults behind bars doubled. Nearly 1 in 4 Black men aged 20 to 29 would be behind bars, on probation or on parole on any given day. The U.S. had the highest rates of imprisonment in the industrialized world—except, significantly, for the Soviet Union and South Africa.
The impact on crime of all the prison building was problematic. [...] While the number of adults in prison steadily rose, the serious crime rate first declined and then rose. With each new prison cell costing $75,000 on the average, it became difficult to justify to the American taxpayer how prison building was an effective, or cost-effective, way to stop crime.

Over the 1970s and 1980s, to the extent that we devoted significant resources to crime prevention at all on the national level, they went mostly to support “target hardening” — defensive measures designed to reduce the opportunities for crime without trying simultaneously to address its causes. To be sure, some of those measures were useful in protecting individuals from victimization in crime-ridden communities. But the vision that called for linking them to a broader strategy of community regeneration was too often abandoned.

Obviously more was needed; and the Eisenhower Foundation was created on the idea that the “reconstructive” tradition represented by the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions was even more relevant in the 1980s than in the 1960s. Surely the nation needed a strong and efficient criminal justice system; certainly efforts to reduce the opportunities for crime had a place in an overall strategy against crime in the cities. But we had begun to stray too far away from the understanding that crime reflected deeper pathologies of urban life in America. A truly effective strategy against violence and crime in the cities would need to address those pathologies as well; particularly the blocked opportunities and multiple disadvantages of low-income youth, the disruption and stress of family life in the city, the erosion of community institutions and a sense of purpose.

2. Early Influences: Alternative Investments for the Taxpayer’s Dollar

There were some encouraging examples available of programs that had tried to address these interrelated problems. For despite the generally reactive character of much social policy toward crime in the 1970s, a number of innovative programs, both public and private, had emerged which showed real promise of reducing crime, delinquency, and drug abuse.

These programs had varying approaches. Some emphasized providing intensive services to address the multiple problems of disadvantaged children and youth. Others emphasized community revitalization through resident organizing or the development of new opportunities for the young in schooling and work. All had in common the general aim of prevent-
ing crime rather than simply reacting to it after the fact. Early influences on the Eisenhower Foundation included, but were not limited to, Head Start, Job Corps, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, Fairview Homes, the Argus Community and the House of Umoja:

**Head Start and Day Care**

The Head Start program provided preschool education and enrichment for poor minority children. Preschool has been evaluated as one of the most cost-effective inner city crime and drug prevention strategies ever developed. In 1985, the Committee for Economic Development, composed of American corporate executives, concluded, "It would be hard to imagine that society could find a higher yield for a dollar of investment than that found in preschool programs for its at-risk children. Every $1 spent on early prevention and intervention can save $4.75 in the cost of remedial education, welfare, and crime further down the road."

Figure 3 shows dramatically how disadvantaged kids in the Perry Preschool program in Michigan, compared to similar children not in preschool, had significantly fewer arrests, school drop outs, cases of mental retardation, and experiences on welfare—as well as significantly higher literacy, employment and attendance rates in vocational school or college by the age of 19. All of those welcome outcomes seemed interrelated. That is, the secret to preschool seemed to be not only early intervention, but also "multiple solutions to multiple problems." Head Start operated on the premise that disadvantaged children had many needs at the same time—including cognitive stimulation, better nutrition, improved health care and more social support.

As for related day care and family enrichment, the Yale Child Welfare Research Program has assessed coordinated pediatric child care, social work and psychological services given to low income mothers and their first child over 30 months from birth. Ten years following the end of the services, program boys were statistically less likely to be involved in predevelopment behavior (like truancy) than comparison group boys.

**Job Corps**

"Multiple solution" principles somewhat similar to Head Start also became apparent in a number of successful public and private programs for older disadvantaged youth. In the
public sector, Job Corps became one of the most successful national crime and drug prevention programs.

Job Corps was an intensive program that took seriously the need to provide a supportive, structured environment for the young people it sought to assist. Job Corps featured classroom courses, which could lead to G.E.D.'s, counseling and hands-on job training for very high risk kids. Corps programs were located in rural and urban settings. Some of the urban settings were campus-like. Others essentially were "on the street." In the original design, a residential setting provided sanctuary away from one's home. Today, non-residential variations are being tried, and it will be important to compare their cost-effectiveness to the live-in design. Yet even for the non-residential programs, the notion of an extended-family environment has been maintained.

According to Labor Department statistics, during the first year after the experience, Job Corps members were a third less likely to be arrested than nonparticipants. Every $1.00 spent on the Job Corps results in $1.45 in benefits to society, including reduced crime and substance abuse—which account for $0.42 in benefits alone—reduced welfare dependency, and increased job productivity, income, and taxes. Evaluations found that 75% of Job Corps enrollees move on to a job or full-time study; graduates retain jobs longer and earn about 15% more than if they had not participated in the program. According to one evaluator, "Naysayers who deny that labor market problems are real and serious, that social interventions can make a difference, or that the effectiveness of public problems can be improved will find little to support their preconceptions" in the experience of programs like Job Corps.

Centro Sister Isolina Ferre

Other promising programs were based in disadvantaged communities and sought comprehensive community-based strategies against crime and violence.

One such program, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, in the LaPlaya neighborhood of Ponce, Puerto Rico, was started in 1968 by a Catholic nun, Sister Isolina Ferre, who had spent the past several years working on New York City's toughest streets. Playa de Ponce was a community "where 16,000 people lived neglected by government and private agencies"—with delinquency rates more than twice that of the rest of the city of Ponce, high unemployment, poor health conditions, no basic health care services, and "few, if any, resources." Centro
began on the premise that, "If family and community could be strengthened, and meaningful employment made available," it might be possible to "make substantial progress in the struggle against neighborhood crime and violence."

Like the vision of Robert Kennedy and of the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions, Centro's strategy was based on the fundamental idea that attacking crime and violence required addressing the development of the community as a whole. "We wanted to bring the community to an awareness of its hidden strengths," writes Sister Isolina, "to develop among the people of the community the competence to protect themselves and their children." At the heart of Centro's approach, in other words, was the assumption that there were important strengths even in this very poor community—and that what was needed was to find ways to nurture and mobilize them; that the community, though deprived and troubled, was potentially "competent" to deal with its own problems.

With this vision, Sister Isolina began to put into place several programs designed to develop that community competence. One example stands out especially—the system of youth advocates or "intercesores." These were young, streetwise community people who became all-around advocates and mentors for young people brought before the juvenile court. The advocates would "get to know the youth and his or her peers and family, and would look into the schoolwork, family situation, and day-to-day behavior of the youth"; they would involve the youth in a range of developmental programs the Center began to create, including job training, recreation, and tutoring. Their role went well beyond simple individual counseling; the advocate was to "become familiar with the whole living experience of the youth," to work with "the family, the peers, the school, the staff, the police, and the court"—in short, "to help the community become aware of the resources it had that should help the youth develop into a healthy adult." After some initial mistrust, the police began to work closely with the intercesores, often calling them first before taking a youth to court.

Centro also developed community-based health services, innovative educational alternatives for youth at risk of dropping out of school, and a program of family supports through "advocate families" who took the lead in helping their neighbors with family problems. They created an extensive job-training program, especially strong in crafts and photography, on the premise that "building a community without jobs is like trying to build a brick wall without cement."
The journalist Charles Silberman, in his 1978 book *Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice*, called Centro "the best example of community regeneration I found anywhere in the United States." LaPlaya is considered the toughest neighborhood in Ponce. Over the period of initial operations of Centro, from 1968 to 1977, the rate of reported juvenile offenses was fairly constant in Ponce, while it showed a two thirds decline in LaPlaya. Whether the difference in community wide juvenile offenses was attributable to Centro, rather than any to other significant interventions or to demographic and police reporting changes, can not be known for certain, for no scientific evaluation has yet been done. But the possibilities were intriguing. We wanted to further explore Sister Isolina’s belief that the most effective strategy against crime and delinquency is "to give the people in poor communities a sense of their own dignity and importance, assist them as they take advantage of their own resources to create a meaningful life for themselves and their children, and give them access to satisfying employment that enables them to support their families and communities with a sense of pride and dignity."

*Fairview Homes*

The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program was begun in Charlotte, North Carolina Public Housing in 1979. The Charlotte Public Housing Authority received almost $450,000 from four federal departments as part of the national Urban Initiative Anti-Crime Program.

The monies were used mostly to hire staff to run programs within Fairview Homes over two initial demonstration years. Persons employed included professionals, adult public housing residents who were “natural leaders,” and high risk youth who lived in the project. With the assistance of the Fairview tenant organization, a staff of 16 adult residents and former residents was hired. Jobs also were supplied for 48 high risk youth, aged 16 to 19.

The program provided residents job training and work opportunity in many management, employment, health and anti-drug services. Residents also were trained in ombudsman and advocate skills—so that they might leverage resources to continue the program after the initial funding ended. Employment was chosen to nurture personal growth, skill development and control over one’s environment and life.

An evaluation between 1979-1981 showed that calls for service to the police increased by 51% within the housing pro-
ject, while service calls in the rest of the Census tract did not increase. Crime rates in Fairview Homes as measured by police reports declined during the program; crime in the remainder of the Census tract and within the City of Charlotte rose. The most dramatic decreases in Fairview Homes, as measured by police, were in serious assault, robbery and burglary rates. Fairview crime rates based on interviews with residents also decreased. For the high risk youth employed, between their employment in the early 1980s and the late 1980s, only 3 of the 48 had been arrested for serious crime (drug dealing and assault), based on housing authority and police records.

Parallel to Centro, the Fairview program was founded on the assumption that public housing residents were competent to deal with their own problems. The evaluation observed that, “In those areas in which the commitment to involving residents as working partners in the program development and implementation was achieved, the greatest amount of success was experienced. Where residents were involved as partners with professional staff and management [of the public housing authority], the program reached and exceeded the goals. When the residents played only menial or limited roles only a partial achievement of goals could be found.”

The evaluation concluded, “Rather than talking to and planning for the residents of low income communities, programs seeking to serve these communities must begin to talk and plan with the residence for the services that will be offered.”

After the 1979 to 1981 period, Fairview Homes fought severe fiscal constraints. For example, federal cutbacks during the 1980s “snipped the drug and alcohol program just as it started to gain some headway. . . .” Yet, through funding from private foundations, local government and other sources, the program has continued in various forms and has been extended to other housing projects beyond Fairview, within the Charlotte Housing Authority. The existing initiative, called the Safe Neighborhood Awareness Program (SNAP), presently is funded at an average level of over $100,000 per year. Between 1985 and 1987, neighborhoods in the SNAP program experienced a decline in police-based crime rates of from 2% to 18%; police-based crime rates in the same size developments without SNAP programs increased from 32% to 64% during this same period.
The Argus Community

The Argus Community in the South Bronx was founded in 1968, the same year as Centro, by Elizabeth Sturz, a poet and former probation officer. Argus is a community-based center for high-risk youth, mainly Black and Puerto Rican. It provided "an alternative life program for adolescents and adults who have been on the treadmill of unemployment, underemployment, street hustling, welfare, substance abuse, crime and prison, and who saw no way out for themselves."

Through residential and nonresidential programs, Argus sought to offer some fundamentals too often lacking in the families and communities from which these youth came. It aimed to create an "extended family" of responsible adults and peers that could offer "warmth, nurturance, communication, and structure," and that would model and teach productive values. Within that "extended family" setting, the program offered prevocational, vocational and academic training, and worked to link those trained with employers in the city.

Over time, Argus added day care, family planning, health care and early education, which not only provided parenting assistance for the children of teen mothers in the program, but also sought to "teach the young mothers—and fathers—how to be good parents." Argus' founders believed that "angry, alienated teenagers can be pulled in, can be brought to the point where they no only do not steal and assault but have something of value to give to the society."

Argus briefings pointed out that the non-residential program, mostly for teenagers who were at risk but not yet in serious trouble, was designed as alternative life training to prevent the need for youth to end up in the residential program, for those some what older with more serious problems—today, especially drugs. So a full range of intervention evolved, from early prevention to treatment.

Some people are referred to Argus from throughout the city. Most come from the neighborhood. Argus youth are at higher risk than the clients of most other community-based youth agencies in New York City. Despite this extremely troubled clientele, the program has had encouraging successes.

The Eisenhower Foundation evaluated a cycle of the Argus day time, non-residential Living for Learning Center. Youth were assessed over 20 weeks of training and then over a follow-up period. Measures were taken before and after, 9 months apart, with 100 high risk Argus youth and 100 comparable youth who did not receive training. Argus youth had higher
salaries, paid more taxes, and received more job benefits than the comparison youth. To complement these findings, studies by the Vera Institute and the New York Criminal Justice Coordinating Council have shown that 67% of the Argus Community's enrollees attained nonsubsidized job placement in 1980. This is a much higher job-placement rate than for similar high-risk youth who are not involved with the program. These studies also demonstrated lower crime recidivism rates for Argus graduates than for graduates from almost any other program in New York City that works with such high-risk offenders.

_The House of Umoja_

Philadelphia's House of Umoja also was begun in the late 1960s, in response to high levels of gang violence among the city's minority youth. Under the leadership of Falaka Fattah, a journalist, and her husband, David Fattah, Umoja built on the idea that gang violence was in good part rooted in low self-esteem and a need for belonging among urban minority youth. Their response was to provide a "homelike setting" for a group of Black gang members that, like Argus, offered the support of an "extended family"—based, in Umoja's case, on an appreciation of the cooperative values of African culture. The House of Umoja offered a "sanctuary, a sheltered environment," that included counseling, involving the youth in household management, monitoring their school performance, helping them connect with jobs and training, looking after their needs in health, nutrition and recreation, and fostering a "sense of togetherness and group unity by imparting the values inherent in African culture." The program linked these efforts to "build self-respect, self-control, and a willingness to channel one's energy into a future based on education, employment, and family" with the development of several community-based enterprises in which those goals could be put into practice.

Over the 1960s, an average of 39 Black youth died on Philadelphia's streets, and hundreds more were maimed for life as a direct result of gang violence. Then the Fattahs negotiated a gang truce. By the mid 1970s, there was a dramatic drop in gang violence to 6 killings a year in 1976 and 1 in 1977. Although no scientific study of trends in gang violence was done, according to one _New York Times_ account, "Experts in criminal justice believe that the House of Umoja had a considerable role" in reducing gang deaths.

No control group studies over time have yet been made of Umoja youth. A less formal assessment has been made on a
representative sample of 15 high risk youth who lived at Umoja between 1971 and 1978. They had been diverted from the justice system to Umoja. Only one had served time in prison for any serious offense since joining Umoja. The 15 were primarily employed as laborers, machinists, community workers or retail salesman. A few had acquired some college or post high school training. They felt that their survival in a city as tough as Philadelphia had been made easier by their experience with Umoja. As with Centro, we believed that the basic notions underlying Umoja warranted careful evaluation.

Underlying Principles and Cost-Effectiveness Compared to Prison

Though different, these promising programs often shared common underlying principles. All sought to prevent crime and delinquency by addressing their causes—by empowering residents of high-crime communities, improving services or expanding opportunities for high risk youth, or some combination. The more youth-oriented programs often worked with young people in a supportive, nurturing and disciplined setting—for some, an “extended family” sanctuary off the street—which they regarded as a precondition for healthy individual development which was notably lacking in the lives of many of the youth they served. They often viewed improved self-esteem as a key instrument of change among disadvantaged youth—a step toward reducing drug abuse and crime, staying in school, becoming more employable, or recognizing that manhood or womanhood need not be defined by having a baby at age 16.

Because these were genuinely preventive programs, moreover, they also promised to be more enduring and more cost-effective than the superficial, reactive responses to crime and drugs that characterized too much of our public policy. They were certainly less costly. Today, for example, the annual cost per person is over $30,000 for New York state prisons and $22,000 for federal maximum-security prisons—but about $16,000 for Argus and Umoja residents, $13,00 for Job Corps, $2,000 for Argus nonresidents, and less than $1,000 for Centro nonresidents.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, some maintained that the prognosis was next to hopeless for high risk inner city youth—at least those past preschool age—and that the only alternative was incarceration. But these programs promised that comprehensive solutions could work for teenagers and young adults. We believed that it was urgent to find out more about how
effective programs to prevent crime, violence and drug abuse worked in the inner city—and which worked better than others.

3. The Neighborhood Program

When the Eisenhower Foundation began its work in the early 1980s, careful evaluations of preschool programs were in progress, and the Job Corps was demonstrating consistent success. But there were few attempts to see if the principles underlying successful community-based youth empowerment programs could be replicated and more carefully evaluated. We did not seek "cookie cutter" replications of the promising programs our early thinking. But we did hope that the underlying principles might be implemented in a flexible, locally tailored, reasonably low cost way. If this proved successful, we thought, then a broader strategy of youth reinvestment could be tested with inner city community organizations as the grassroots program operators.

At the same time, the Foundation was aware that neighborhood or block watches and citizen patrols (like the Guardian Angels) were being popularized in the early 1980s as citizen-based, non-criminal justice ways of reducing crime. Such programs often were called "community crime prevention" or "opportunity reduction." That is, they were designed to allow fewer opportunities for potential offenders to commit crime—because, for example, neighborhood residents would be organized to look out for suspicious behavior and report it to police. Such protective action, it was reasoned, was worthwhile, even though opportunity reduction didn't really address the underlying reasons why offenders were motivated to crime in the first place, as did youth empowerment programs like Centro, Fairview, Argus, Umoja and Job Corps. The opportunity reduction programs typified the national policy stress at the time on the importance of volunteers, the need for citizen self-reliance and the potential that "lean and mean" initiatives could not only compensate for the reduction in federal government domestic spending but could actually work better than past wasteful government programs. However, there were then few sophisticated evaluations available, especially of block watches, patrols, and other opportunity reduction efforts in severely deteriorated inner cities. There was only one carefully evaluated model of success—a block watch program which both reduced burglary and fear in a white working and middle class neighborhood in Seattle.
Accordingly, we decided to create a demonstration program to test the possibilities of both opportunity reduction and community-based youth empowerment in the inner city. We began the demonstration with an open mind—wanting to assess objectively what worked best, and what did not, so that future inner city programs could build on success—whatever direction it took us. We sought to apply the ideals of the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions but tried to be realistic about both the difficulty of achieving success in the inner city and the difficulty of measuring success through scientific evaluation.

The Planning Process

The Foundation selected 10 inner city non profit community organizations in poor urban neighborhoods for the demonstration program—in Baltimore, Boston, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Cleveland, Miami, Minneapolis, Newark, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.

To test the potential of a “lean and mean” approach, we kept seed funding to the community groups low—a total of about $50,000 to $70,000 per organization over a 30 month program—for 6 months of planning and 24 months of implementation. Past programs suggested that this was the minimum period over which results could be expected. Each inner city organization was to develop, within broad guidelines, its own design for tackling crime and violence in its local community. We called this a “bubble-up,” as opposed to a “trickle down,” process. We sought to empower local organizations to take the lead in defining anti-crime strategies best suited to their own capacities and the specific problems and conditions of the community. We did not ask for traditional proposals from these groups; instead, they were asked to submit a brief capacity statement outlining their past “track record” and their ability to take on an innovative crime-prevention project. Most of the organizations ultimately selected had considerable experience in economic development, low-income housing, or youth services.

Once the 10 community groups had been selected, a community assessment was undertaken, by outside evaluators. The assessment provided basic planning information for the program and a “baseline” for the evaluation of the program as a whole. The assessment became a basis for planning the local program, for it offered a broad picture of the problems seen by local residents as most pressing. Was drug dealing a major
problem? Were older people being mugged on the way home from shopping? Were local businesses threatening to leave unless the commercial area was made more secure? Through a series of “mini town meetings,” to which all neighborhood residents were invited, the community organizations “bubbled up” a program tailored to the community’s specific needs and concerns.

The Foundation did not dictate the substance of these programs, but required only that each organization work within a broad framework. Most importantly, each program was to empower youth and so address the causes of crime (for example, through employment training and “extended family” support from mentors and peers). Each was to reduce opportunities for crime (for example, through civilian block watches, civilian patrols or police foot patrols). There also was a concern with protecting and involving senior citizens, who were particularly vulnerable.

Community organizations were free to emphasize youth empowerment over opportunity reduction, or vice versa. Each group was required, as well, to develop “financial self-sufficiency,” in the sense of creating an ongoing mechanism to carry on the program for at least 12 months after the initial 30 months of support had ended (for example, through capitalizing local businesses or learning to be more effective at fundraising).

Instead of imposing solutions from above, then, we tried to expand the capacity of inner city nonprofits to come to grips with local crime problems. In that sense, the Neighborhood Program also was a test of the capacity of a national private sector “intermediary” organization (the Foundation) to provide meaningful support and assistance to diverse local organizations engaged in crime prevention.

All 10 programs were launched in inner-city neighborhoods characterized by relatively low income, most of which were severely disadvantaged. All but one (Minneapolis) had a very large minority population. All suffered serious crime problems and several were increasingly wracked by drug abuse over the course of the program. They were, in short, tough, “multi-problem” communities—the kind of communities in which viable crime prevention programs have traditionally been difficult to sustain.
The Locally Created Programs

During the course of the 30 months of the Neighborhood Program, the community groups "bubbled up" a wide variety of specific projects. These are only some of them:

_Baltimore's_ Neighborhood Housing Services organization (NHS), which had been primarily involved in housing rehabilitation and loan programs, started a youth athletic league that involved about 250 local youth in structured recreational activities. With a pressing drug problem in the community, NHS went on to hold community anti-drug workshops and crime prevention meetings, in cooperation with local police, and to recruit 200 residents as block watchers.

In _Boston_, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) used the Neighborhood grant to develop several youth Prevention Clubs, which enrolled from 40 to 60 "high risk" young people from the community at any given point. They operated out of DYC headquarters, which became a kind of extended family sanctuary. The most successful groups developed and produced anti-crack breakdancing performances at many local schools and events resulting in anti-crack videos which have been widely distributed. DYC also developed a successful community and family mediation program.

In the _Bronx_, the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes Community Housing Corporation (MBD), with a successful track record in community development through housing rehabilitation, used the Neighborhood Program grant as a way of supporting local housing and commercial development. MBD launched a successful civilian patrol that, with police support, operated three evenings a week, as well as tenant patrols in both MBD's own buildings and in local public housing. MBD also held crime prevention seminars for tenants and homeowners, briefly operated an employment referral service for the neighborhood, and established several youth activities, including Scout troops, school drug prevention programs sponsored by local police, and athletic programs.

In _Brooklyn_, the Local Development Corporation of East New York (LDC-ENY), near Bedford-Stuyvesant, also sought to link crime prevention activities with its existing emphasis on economic development. LDC-ENY had been formed to increase industrial job opportunities for
local residents: it used its Neighborhood Program grant primarily to develop block-watch associations—establishing 78 of them over the grant period. Later, LDC-ENY launched a biweekly youth council and an after-school program for youth which met four days a week.

In Cleveland, the St. Clair-Superior Coalition developed a court watch program which trained residents to attend trials and hearings in which neighborhood cases were heard. It also monitored local police services, organized several street clubs, and developed a weekly youth council.

In Minneapolis, the Whittier Alliance used the Neighborhood grant in part to continue its already existing effort to organize local block clubs, usually maintaining about thirty clubs at any one time. The program also hired off-duty police officers in a "summer beat patrol" program to patrol the neighborhood's commercial strip on summer evenings. The Alliance worked with the police to crack down on local prostitution by arresting customers and publishing their names in the community newspaper—an effort that significantly decreased prostitution arrests in the neighborhood. It targeted commercial "hot spots"—including two bars where fighting and drug dealing were rife—by putting pressure on the owners and the police to improve conditions. A youth director was hired after 12 months of implementation. Over 200 youth were placed in part-time jobs with local businesses and residents.

In Philadelphia, the Walnut Hill Community Development Corporation created a highly regarded victim-witness assistance program which trained 55 volunteers, in its first year, to help victims and witnesses negotiate the criminal court process. It organized 12 block clubs, revitalized a "Town Watch" civilian patrol, and, after the resignation of the first program director, later began a youth council and extensive recreational activities for local teenagers.

In Washington, D.C., the Neighborhood Program grant initially was sponsored by Jubilee Housing, a church-related group mainly engaged in housing rehabilitation in the Adams-Organ neighborhood. A spin-off organization, Around the Corner to the World, developed most of the anti-crime strategies, which focused strongly on economic opportunities and cultural awareness for local
youth. ACW fielded programs in youth leadership training, cultural programs, and community clean-ups, and, most ambitiously, launched a housing rehabilitation business operated by high risk youth and ex-offenders. Employees met each week as “team leaders” in an extended family setting and served as mentors for neighborhood youngsters.

The Evaluation Outcomes

The neighborhood prisons was evaluated by researchers from Northwestern University, Fordham University, Rutgers University and the University of Maryland. The evaluations asked several questions. Were the programs implemented as planned? Were any intermediate objectives met? Were they able to financially sustain operations at least 12 months after the initial 30 months of funding? Was fear of crime reduced? Ultimately, were crime, drug abuse or related community problems reduced among participating youth or on the community as a whole? Eight out of 10 programs were implemented as planned. [. . .] For the two groups that didn’t implement as planned, in Miami and Newark, the major reason appeared to be that the overall organization was large and did not give the anti-crime initiative continuing support at top levels of management. One result of the relative disinterest by top management was a turnover among directors of anti-crime programs.

Not surprisingly, all 8 of the groups which successfully implemented their workplans achieved at least one if not more of their intermediate goals—like improved self-esteem among participating youth, improved social cohesion among residents in the neighborhood, increased participation among residents in community activities, or improved perceived quality of life in the neighborhood.

Before the Neighborhood Program, no national inner city anti-crime community-based demonstration had incorporated the “financial self-sufficiency” requirement of continuing on after initial support. In the Neighborhood Program, all 8 of the community organizations which successfully implemented their workplans were able, with assistance from Eisenhower, to continue on. They raised nearly $300,000 in additional funding during the thirty months of initial program operations and just short of $1M thereafter. The largest single success in this respect was a $250,000 federal grant received by the Foundation for the Washington, DC program to capitalize its home
repair and weatherization business (about which more in Chapter 4).

In Brooklyn and the Bronx, income from economic development helped cover the costs of crime prevention efforts. Cleveland's St. Clair-Superior organization joined in a working coalition with 10 other local groups and secured funds from state and local government as well as private foundations. In Baltimore, a Self-Help Fund was established by corporations. In Boston, almost $200,000 was acquired from government, foundations, and corporations through traditional fundraising.

Eight of the original 10 programs continued on for more than 3 years after the end of the 30-month Neighborhood Program grant. For the nonprofits to demonstrate financial self-sufficiency also bought them time. Few anti-crime programs show measurable results in less than 30 months. Extra resources and hence extra time might allow the "bugs" to be worked out later, even if little success is apparent after 30 months. (For example, Project Redirection, the Ford Foundation teen mother program discussed later, showed little success after 24 months but clear success after 60 months.)

The most important question of any anti-crime program is whether it actually reduced crime or related anti-social behavior. Next best, was fear of crime reduced among neighborhood residents?

Although, as we shall see in a moment, there were measurement problems, small sample sizes, and limited comparison groups, anti-social behavior appeared to most clearly diminish in Washington, D.C. and Boston—where there was the greatest sustained focus on empowering youth and the most consistent attempt to replicate the principles underlying programs like Job Corps, Argus, Fairview, Centro and Umoja. This was especially encouraging given the short duration of the programs and the complex problems of the young people. In these two initiatives, a priority on youth empowerment was present from the very beginning. It was not added on towards the end of the program, as in some of the other communities. Working with the Eisenhower Foundation, the Washington, D.C. and Boston groups also leveraged far more resources than the other groups to continue their anti-crime programs after the 30 initial months of operations. It may be that the very nature of sustained youth empowerment—actually addressing the causes of crime—allowed these community groups and the Foundation to successfully raise monies. In turn, the greater level of funding may have helped to achieve success.
Next best, fear of crime was most clearly down in the Bronx and Brooklyn, and arrests for prostitution were down in Minneapolis. These three initiatives implemented a more intense and sustained focus on opportunity reduction and community organizing than any of the other sites. Less fear and fewer arrests do not necessarily mean less crime. But these positive indicators can help stabilize a neighborhood—and thus help retain businesses, bring in new investment and generate economic development. Before the Neighborhood Program, there were few examples of declines in fear through opportunity reduction in such devastated places as the South Bronx and East Brooklyn, so the community groups here have broken new ground. Like most of the neighborhoods in the demonstration, the South Bronx, East Brooklyn and Whittier communities experienced complex changes during the course of the Neighborhood Program—sometimes adverse ones, including an increase of drug-related problems in several of them—that made it difficult to isolate the impact of the programs on overall local crime rates.

The other cities in the demonstration experienced less success in reducing crime or fear when program neighborhoods were assessed statistically vis-à-vis comparison neighborhoods, although some programs showed slight progress. In comparison to Washington, D.C. and Boston, the programs in the other 8 cities focused more on opportunity reduction—or some mix of opportunity reduction, victim-witness initiatives and youth programming. In these 8 cities, the youth programming was less intense and less multifaceted than the youth empowerment of Washington, D.C. and Boston (e.g., athletic leagues rather than sustained jobs and supportive extended family settings).

The findings from the Neighborhood Program tend to converge with those of other recent studies in suggesting that opportunity reduction programs like neighborhood watch, by themselves, rarely reduce crime in the inner city. Sometimes, but only sometimes, do such initiatives reduce fear in the inner city. This is consistent with the conclusion of Northwestern in its evaluation of the Neighborhood Program that “traditional strategies [like opportunity reduction] do not work as well in high crime communities as in more middle class communities.”

We will more thoroughly discuss the limitations of conventional opportunity reduction later in this volume. But we also concluded that proactive citizen patrols and police foot patrols, in particular, can help support a broader strategy of youth empowerment and economic development in disadvantaged
communities. For example, we conclude that tenants should displace drug dealers from operating in public housing. Yet, without reduced high school drop out rates, effective job training, real job opportunity and therefore a vehicle to generate self-esteem, youth who live in the projects will remain vulnerable to drug abuse and drug market employment. They will simply walk across the street from the projects to run drugs. But if block watches and patrols are used to help tenants feel more safe so that mothers can walk from their apartments to nutrition programs and preschool centers, and if the increased public safety encourages corporations and local government to begin on-site job training leading to placement in permanent employment, then conventional community crime prevention makes sense as one part of a larger, more thoughtful and comprehensive, plan for an inner city neighborhood.

At the same time, we are more encouraged by the potential demonstrated by those programs that sought to achieve crime prevention by developing comprehensive strategies to meet the multiple needs of disadvantaged youth in their communities—by providing multiple services in an alternative, "street savvy" way or by linking youth to new opportunities for meaningful work in the community. As we will see in more detail later in this report, our own frustratingly limited—but encouraging—evidence from the Neighborhood Program on the potential of these "youth investment" strategies is increasingly backed by the results of evaluations of several other recent programs, in addition to those of earlier efforts like Job Corps, Argus and Fairview Homes. These point to broad underlying principles which, we believe, should guide new youth investment initiatives in the future. Some of those principles can best be illuminated by taking a closer look at the strategies of youth investment developed in the Neighborhood Program.

4. Youth Investment in Action: A Closer Look

To gain some deeper insight into the potentials—and some of the problems—of inner city community based youth empowerment programs, and to provide a more tangible sense of what they attempted and what they accomplished, let's look more closely at the experience of the two Neighborhood Program initiatives which were most intensively devoted to youth investment—Washington's Around the Corner to the World (ACW) and Boston's Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYN).
ACW: Individual and Community Change Through Youth Enterprise

The Neighborhood Program initiative with the closest affinity to community-based programs like Centro began through organization of residents against drug trafficking in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood of Washington, D.C. in the early 1980s. Called Around the Corner to the World because of the rich international ethnic mix of the neighborhood, the program then started several enterprises that employed high risk youths and ex-offenders. The most promising was a weatherization and home repair business. As operations developed, the Eisenhower Foundation, working closely with ACW, secured a $250,000 capitalization grant for the business from the federal Office of Community Services in the Department of Health and Human Services.

The Adams-Morgan neighborhood is a mixed area of the city undergoing rapid change, with a largely minority, low-income population increasingly joined uneasily by more affluent newcomers. Eisenhower’s community assessment found drugs and drug dealing to be the most serious crime problem perceived by residents and business people in the area. ACW emerged, as a recent program statement puts it, “in response to symptoms and causes of crime and the deterioration of a sense of community.” One section in particular—Reed-Cooke—had “witnessed dramatic changes resulting from gentrification, the breakdown of family structure, the absence of local leadership, and the hopelessness of poverty that has grown in the area.”

Accordingly, ACW saw its mission as the “empowerment of the low and moderate income residents,” to “revitalize the spirit of the entire community through a series of programs designed to promote community unity and youth-focused leadership development.” These goals would be accomplished through programs to develop cross-cultural awareness, civic involvement to ensure greater control over the decisions affecting the local community, and the economic development that would provide serious jobs and training for neighborhood youth in ongoing enterprises designed to meet community needs. ACW stressed:

Skills training and employment must exist; affordable business, housing and economic investment options must be made available; and leadership must be trained to mobilize and work with citizens for neighborhood self-reliance. A sense of ownership and self-sufficiency are intricately tied to self-esteem and community pride.
Early on, ACW managed to elect a slate of officers to their District of Columbia Neighborhood Planning Council—which not only involved youth in local decision making, but helped to channel some public funds into community youth programs. By the end of 1985, ACW's civic involvement had expanded to the point where it had 16 members in elected positions, and another 5 in appointed positions, in community agencies and organizations affecting the Adams-Morgan neighborhood.

The heart of the youth program was the development of the youth businesses—an effort that turned out to be encouragingly successful. The first of them, aptly called DC Doo, produced compost from horse manure gathered from a local stable and sold it—20 tons worth in the summer of 1984. The larger and more complex enterprise was the weatherization business—which, during the summer of 1985, hired 11 neighborhood youth full time and weatherized an estimated 4 or 5 houses a week.

In addition to being employed through ACW, workers met as an extended family peer support group to deal with work and personal problems in the offices of ACW, which served as a kind of sanctuary, or place to go off the street. They also became role models to younger people in the community—many of whom were being approached by drug dealers.

*Measures of Success.* Rutgers University evaluated the experience of 11 high risk young people who were employees of the business. Information was gathered from police records, interviews with participants, ACW staff, community leaders and business leaders in the neighborhood. When they were initially employed in the weatherization and housing rehabilitation business, the workers were between the ages of 18 and 26.

[... ] During the 12 month period before ACW employment, the young people accumulated 10 arrests. During an 18 month period of ACW employment, there were no arrests. During the 12 month follow-up after ACW employment, there were 3. Similarly, [...] police contacts with these 11 young people declined dramatically during the 18 month period of ACW and continued at about the same low level during the 12 month period after employment. (Police contacts do not always lead to arrests.)

During the 12 month period before ACW employment, only 1 of the 12 young people was employed or in school. [... ] During the 18 months with ACW, all remained employed. After this period, most remained employed (by ACW or elsewhere) or were in school. Independent living was defined as
establishing a household independent of the individual's parents. [...]. The number of young people who established households of their own increased from 1 to 9 after ACW participation.

There was no formal control group. But estimates by Washington, D.C. court personnel are that about 30% of youths on regular probation are re-arrested—much higher than for ACW participants (although the latter were somewhat older). During the period of time, 1983-1988, when the before-after comparisons were made for the ACW workers, the violent crime offense rate for the District of Columbia first fell and then sharply rose, ending slightly higher. The same occurred for property crime rates for the District as a whole. The violent and property rate trend also repeated itself over these years in the 3 Census tracts covering the ACW neighborhood. The increase beginning in the mid-eighties appears drug related. For example, a Rand Corporation study found that arrests for drug distribution in the District of Columbia as a whole increased by 77.4% from 1981 to 1986. In sum, although we were not able to form a scientific comparison group, the crime involvement of the young adults working for ACW dropped sharply while a very different pattern was developing in the neighborhood and District.

Interviews with ACW workers and their supervisors in 1986 found the supervisors agreeing that most workers improved in several skills. Employees felt that ACW had provided a supportive environment that encouraged personal growth and independence; this was felt more strongly by workers who had been in the program a year or more than by those who had worked for ACW for a shorter time. Many said that ACW provided new friends with whom they could spend time, off the job as well as on it, rather than spending most of their leisure time on the street.

Rutgers found encouraging suggestions that involvement with the program had several positive impacts on employees' lives and on the way they perceived their futures. All said the standard of living for themselves and their families was "much better" or "better" when they were involved with the program than before. Seven of 8 interviewed said that what they were doing for money before joining ACW was "hustling and working" and 1 said "working and gambling"; after joining, all 8 said "working." Only 3 described themselves as satisfied with their job skills before ACW; all 8 were satisfied while employed by ACW.
All of these workers believed that their jobs with ACW had helped them get ahead in life while they were with the program. Being in the program, moreover, made most of them more confident that they would go further in school. Before their participation in ACW, none knew of job opportunities within the Adams Morgan neighborhood. Before ACW, too, the majority did not feel confident about their capacity to be self-sufficient; during their stint with ACW, all became more confident. Prior to ACW, 6 of these workers said they had sold drugs at least “a few times”; the same number said they had never sold drugs during their employment with the program.

These results are illustrated in the comments of a 29 year old single parent interviewed by the Rutgers researchers. She had been a former work team leader and also a weatherization employee with ACW, and had been involved since ACW's beginning. She now has two children, a 13 year old daughter and a 10 year old son, who participate in many activities in ACW's new Skill Development and Learning Center for kids (see below). She told the Rutgers researchers, “Whenever the door is open, everyone comes in... and you couldn’t find better friends than Kevin, Jabali and Darnell” [ACW staff]. This parent saw ACW as a support network providing extended family relationships—an alternative to keep kids off the streets, help them develop positive attitudes, and dissuade them from drugs. She described the supports from the program as helping her become more self reliant, and was pleased at having moved with her children from her parents’ home into her own apartment.

Initially, ACW expected that the weatherization business would lose money. It didn't. There was a strong local demand for weatherization work, and the business quickly doubled, turning a substantial profit while providing over 400 families with free weatherization services by early 1985.

Rutgers reported that the business generated over $1,000,000 in contracts locally and provided weatherization, low-cost home remodeling and energy conservation support to over 1,000 low income renters, home-owners and nonprofit corporations. It trained and employed over 60 youth and young adults from inception in 1985 to 1988.

The success with individual youth in the context of success with the business led, in turn, to positive change in the Adams-Morgan community as a whole. A University of Maryland evaluation found that 93% of the ACW weatherization customers surveyed were satisfied with the work done and with the skills and courteousness of the workers.
One businessman interviewed by Rutgers concluded that ACW was "an asset to the Adams-Morgan area"—in part because its staff had demonstrated skills in finding non-confrontational solutions to community crises. A youth added, "ACW helps Blacks in the community come together to build individual and collective self-esteem instead of fighting and doing drugs." Perhaps also related, the Northwestern evaluation concluded that there may have been a slight decrease in fear among neighborhood residents as a result of ACW's youth work and its civic involvement. That involvement was carefully nurtured over time by gaining membership by ACW staff and trustees on local decision making bodies, like the Adams-Morgan Community Development Corporation, the Police Advisory Committee and the Neighborhood Planning Council. The ACW Executive Director said that "our whole civic involvement has become much more sophisticated—to enfranchise those who had been disenfranchised in our community."

Expanded community involvement also was expressed through the ACW Skill Development and Learning Center for neighborhood kids, begun after the business. The Center works with an average of 100 children and young people during any one year to provide tutoring and skills development in photography, computer and graphics, silk screen printing, photography, karate, modern dance and newsletter production. Other social and cultural events, which include trips to local museums, picnics, swimming, skating and other special events, help to foster growth and strengthen communication skills.

In 1988, ACW entered into a co-development agreement with the Hilltop Tenant Association, and the Adams Morgan/Mt. Pleasant Community Development Corporation to continue efforts to organize tenants and attract resources for a $2.5 million dollar project to purchase and convert a 24 unit rental property into a tenant owned low yield cooperative. ACW agreed to perform a substantial portion of the rehabilitation.

Individual and Community Change. ACW, more than any other non-profit community group in the Neighborhood Program, was able to demonstrate success, including fewer arrests with a cohort of specific at-risk youth as well as success, in the community as a whole, including consumer satisfaction and improved housing stock. The cause and effect relationships between individual change and community change seemed to work both ways. Individual change helped create community change—as when employees not only became less involved in anti-social behavior themselves but also repaired the physical environment and mentored kids away from drug dealers. Com-
munity change helped create individual change—as when positive perceptions of ACW by residents and businessmen made it easier to begin the Skill Development and Learning Center, which targeted specific children. In this focus on creating both individual and community change, ACW most resembles Puerto Rico's Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, among the programs from which we originally drew underlying principles. To date, very few public or private sector programs have been able to demonstrate the simultaneous individual and community success of Centro and ACW. Yet both are needed. […] 

ACW continues to confront many problems, with the biggest difficulties being the stop-start funding of contracts from local government and the reluctance of many funders to continue support past the demonstration stage. But, as the University of Maryland evaluation concluded, ACW offers important clues on “how economic and human capital development…can both be pursued, without either having to be sacrificed for the other.”

**DYC: Working Hands-on With Troubled Youth**

The Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) was established in the late 1970s, in a low-income, rapidly changing Boston neighborhood—racially and ethnically mixed, with large Hispanic, Black and White populations. DYC aimed to provide nontraditional services, activities, and advocacy for local youth deemed to be at high risk of delinquency, teen pregnancy, school failure and substance abuse—youth who were not being adequately served by more conventional social service agencies.

Given its existing commitment to youth services, an important part of DYC's ambitious effort under the Neighborhood Program grant involved the organization of at-risk young people into Youth Crime Prevention Clubs. The Clubs were designed to steer neighborhood youth away from the lures of street life and into structured activities to help them develop self-esteem, stay in school or find other educational alternatives. DYC youth use the space of the center as a physical sanctuary from the streets—an extended family that provides “positive role models for the youth in contrast to what was most visible to them on a daily basis.”

The demand for the Clubs was much stronger than anticipated. Within two weeks of the program start-up, over 50 neighborhood youth had become involved in the Prevention Clubs. Within a few months 4 Clubs had been established—2
for boys, 1 for girls, and 1 mixed. Although DYC had planned an elaborate recruitment process to pull young people into the Clubs, it turned out not to be necessary; they flocked into the Clubs on their own, usually drawn through word of mouth.

The Prevention Clubs offered a range of structured activities and projects for and by youth whose lives outside the program were often chaotic and insecure, some of whom had little going for them beyond street hustling and drugs. The 2 all-boys Clubs took part in a basketball league, and “for the majority of the participants it had been their first experience in organized sports.” The girls’ Club formed a performing dance group. The mixed club, perhaps the most popular, formed a breakdance group, the Electric Generation—also racially integrated—which focused its message on “freedom from drugs, freedom from crime, and racial harmony.”

The Electric Generation performed widely—at hundreds of events throughout Boston (schools, hospitals, churches, senior centers, on radio and television) and at a benefit in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Eisenhower Foundation. The anti-drug rap routines have been recorded on a video, “Stand Back From Crack,” which has been distributed nationally and which helped lead to a gang and drug abuse prevention grant from the federal Administration on Children, Youth and Families.

Several things are noteworthy about the character of these Clubs. “From the beginning,” as Northwestern University’s evaluation of the DYC program points out, “these groups were racially integrated and bilingual,” “about equally divided between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics.” The kids really do relate to one another, as any observer who spends a day hanging around the DYC headquarters can attest. There is a constant flow of young people in and out, with hugs, handshakes, amusement and good will.

This was a significant achievement in a community which—like all too many others in urban America—has been wracked by frequent racial conflict among its youth. As the evaluation notes,

The Dorchester community had a very heterogeneous racial composition and racial tensions were a major problem. Developing an integrated youth program was an important goal, rarely tried by other agencies, and an important accomplishment.

Moreover, a substantial proportion of the youth were extremely “high risk”—“basically street kids,” as the evalua-
tion puts it; kids who not only faced severe family problems, drug abuse and school failure but who had also been hard to involve in structured activities of any kind in the past. The level of deprivation many of them faced was extreme.

An example: the youth were supposed to check in daily with the DYC director; when they did they were offered a snack. The evaluation notes,

Originally, food was used partly to attract youth to the program, but it was quickly clear to staff that the availability of food was essential to the youth. For many, the cereal or other snack which they received at DYC was their first meal of the day, especially near the end of the month when food supplies at home became depleted.

It is not by chance, we think, that proper nutrition also is key to successful preschool and early intervention program for younger kids.

At any rate, the demand for the Clubs was highly encouraging. Indeed the Prevention Clubs could have enrolled more youth than they did—if the program had been able to hire enough staff. Early on, DYC met its initial objective of launching 5 clubs, and “in fact more youth were interested in participating in the program but there were not enough staff members to handle an increase in Club members.” In particular, it proved difficult to recruit and retain adult leaders for the Clubs. Given the minimal level of early funding, DYC depended on volunteers for this essential job; and though it provided a small stipend, “even with stipends it was difficult to find qualified volunteers.” The job was complex and demanding; it involved “counseling, group work supervision of performances, transportation, and monitoring of participants”—all, again, with a difficult clientele. Unsurprisingly, there was frequent turnover and burnout among the Club leaders and other DYC staff. Finding new ones was hampered not only by the general lack of money but by the “shortage of professionals in the field.”

Belonging to the Clubs meant abiding by clearly defined rules—no drugs, no crime or police contacts, no dropping out of school, no serious problems with parents. Initially, DYC hoped to closely monitor each youth, preferably on a daily basis, in order to provide a continuous source of guidance and support. But that proved impossible to do, again because of insufficient funds to support such a staff-intensive job. Though DYC did manage to help some youth find temporary shelter in extreme family crises, “the limited staff and the need to main-
tain activity levels for as many youth as possible seemed to override the goal of the more formal monitoring system."

Northwestern observed that the youth Clubs were well implemented—despite the lack of resources; and that they had succeeded in attracting their target group of high-risk street youth developing interracial activities, providing the youth with opportunities to develop and exhibit positive skills, and in "mainstreaming" them into activities in which many had never before participated. The program "filled an important gap in local youth programs, between those which were designed for youth who were 'basically going to make it anyway'...and those which were designed for youth already caught up in the criminal justice system." Unlike other agencies, DYC managed to deal with the "street culture" of these youth, while (as one respondent put it) "mainstreaming them into normal adolescents," where they had before been "just on the fringes."

In spite of insufficient funds for an ambitious program facing great need, DYC still was more successful than most Neighborhood programs in raising self-sufficiency monies to continue on after initial Eisenhower support. Over the years, DYC gained the respect of local Boston funders. To illustrate, in 1990 a fund raising luncheon for DYC was held at the Harvard Club, attended by many local foundations and corporations.

Measures of Success. Researchers from Rutgers evaluated the high-risk youth who went through DYC. They were able to collect considerable information on the youth who participated in the program, both at intake and periodically thereafter. They collected this information on 22 youth, of whom 9 also were interviewed at length. Their findings, though frustratingly limited, are encouraging. [. . .]

The youth studied were all between ages 12 and 19. 95% were from low-income families, 77% from single-parent families. Four of the 22 were homeless. About two-thirds were male; 13 were Hispanic, 6 Black and 3 White. According to the Rutgers evaluation, at intake 16 of the youth were involved in what DYC defined as "community problems"—that is, violent behavior, truancy, vandalism, graffiti, theft, and other behavior that could lead to the possibility of arrest. After entering DYC, only 6 were. At intake, 13 of the 22 had been involved with drugs or alcohol; 10 of those 13 remained drug free during their involvement with DYC. There were no pregnancies among the young women studied, in a neighborhood where teen pregnancy rates are estimated to be quite high. Three of 6 youth who had dropped out of school prior to joining the clubs...
were "reintegrated" into either traditional or alternative schooling.

Although a formal control group of youth proved impossible to find, comparisons to Boston as a whole and to Dorchester provide some helpful perspective. During the period in which the DYC youth cohort was tracked (1983-1987), Boston's annual school dropout rate averaged 16% (18% among Blacks and Hispanics), according to the Boston Public Schools' Office of Research and Development. Among the DYC enrollees, 28% had dropped out before or shortly after joining the program. Program staff convinced more than half of the dropouts to return to school. Overall the dropout rate among the participants fell to 14%, slightly lower than the City's average rate—a promising finding given the especially high risk population DYC enrolled.

Dorchester District Court statistics showed that 27% of the DYC enrollees had been arrested at least once, and they continued to have problems with the law even after joining the program, so that the number arrested after joining decreased only to 23%. While this decline is somewhat disappointing, it is important to realize that during this same period, the number of juvenile arrests in the Dorchester community had increased by 63%, from 386 in 1983 to 628 in 1987, according to the Boston Police Department.

A 1988 survey of Boston school children, conducted by the Rocky Mountain Behavioral Studies Institute, showed that, by the time children have reached the 9th grade, at least one third will have tried drugs (virtually half among those who have reached the 12th grade). We do not know what the proportion is among students who have dropped out of school—who are more representative of the DYC cohort—but it is reasonable to assume that it is significantly higher. The Rutgers evaluation reported that 59% of the DYC cohort had abused drugs or alcohol (that is, they were more than occasional users) upon entry into the program. Through 1988, 77% of the participants had managed to stay away from any form of substance abuse. This is particularly significant because the interviews by Rutgers showed that three-quarters of these at-risk participants had strong peer involvement in and fascination with drugs.

Many of the youth interviewed by Rutgers believed that the program had made an important, and positive, difference in their lives. One "credits DYC with saving his life"; another, a founding member of a DYC-sponsored rap group which is heavily involved in community anti drug activities, told the researchers that before he joined DYC "my opportunities con-
sisted of shooting drugs, gang-banging, selling dope, stealing and killing.” The researchers profiled one DYC youth they call “William”:

When William first came to DYC four years ago to join the break dance troupe, he was fifteen. At that time he had a drug problem with marijuana and crack. He also sold crack and was heavily involved in gang activities. . . . He became violent very easily and at one point threw a cinder block through the back window of a taxi-cab, trying to hit the passenger.

The DYC staff continued to counsel and work with William during this period. At no point did the staff tell William that he could not attend the center or continue to participate in DYC activities. . . . After a year of intermittent involvement, William dropped out of the center for 2 years, and during this period was arrested four times: twice for possession of drugs (crack) with intent to distribute, once for assault, and once for resisting arrest and physically assaulting a police officer. William admitted that he was “high” each time he was arrested.

After his last arrest, William called DYC for assistance. He decided to rejoin DYC and make the attempt to redirect his life. He is proud of the fact that he broke his crack habit “cold turkey,” without outside assistance. During the last two years he has been drug free, maintained steady employment and experienced no arrest or incidences of violence. William is a founding member of the DYC-sponsored anti-drug rap group, “One Nation,” and he attends the center daily. His future plans are to complete high school and go on to college.

Rutgers emphasizes that not every Prevention Club participant offers that kind of “success story”; not all “matured out” of serious trouble. But Rutgers concluded that the program “has unquestionably impacted in a positive and dramatic manner on the lives of the young people we interviewed”:

While we do not have an adequate comparison group, it is important to recognize that these participants entered the program in their pre-and early teens. Six already had been arrested prior to their participation. They were approaching a time when “anti-social” behavior would be more likely to occur, not less likely. . . . It appears that the program provided a structured yet supportive environment, during a turbulent time of life in a difficult neighborhood. Many of those interviewed talked
about DYC being a family, sometimes more of a family than the people they lived with.

DYC also ran family mediation counseling for people in the neighborhood. Although the mediation was not as central to the work funded by Eisenhower as the Prevention Clubs, it did serve as one program component. Over the mid-1980s the mediation program expanded the number of clients served while it consistently reached agreements among clients in about 75% or more of all the cases mediated.

By 1990, DYC was negotiating purchase of a much larger building for its headquarters, including a recording studio for new anti-drug videos, a practice stage for the performing groups to develop their acts, and a computer learning center. A new partnership also was developing with the Boston Police, who committed to community-based policing and possible police mini stations in the neighborhood.

5. **Practical Street Level Lessons**

From the beginning, the Neighborhood Program was designed to explore what worked best to reduce crime and drug abuse in inner cities. In turn, we planned to use this accumulating knowledge to help design the next generation of demonstrations that would build on the successes—and learn from the failures—of the earlier generation. The experience of the original influences on our programming—like Job Corps, Argus and Fairview—along that of our replications—like Around the Corner to the World, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes and the Local Development Corporation of East New York—has given us a great deal to work with as we move toward that next generation of programs—and as we think about what national-level policies will be most appropriate for the inner cities in the coming years.

The overriding lesson from the Neighborhood Program is that, like Head Start for children, multiple solutions can be successfully applied to reduce the multiple problems of high risk youth.

Comprehensive community-based programs providing both needed services and real opportunities for the young can be among the most effective—and cost-effective—strategies to reduce crime, violence and drug abuse in the inner city.

But we have also learned that some kinds of programs and strategies are more cost-effective than others in their relevance to national policy. Among the lessons we have learned through hands-on, day-to-day, street level implementation are these:
1. Inner city non-profit organizations can be efficient as the lead institutions to implement youth investment and community reconstruction.

2. Technical assistance increases the odds for success.

3. It is folly to expect success without adequate resources and facilities—"lean and mean" doesn't work very well.

4. Volunteerism is being oversold in the inner city.

5. Public sector agencies, including the police, have a crucial role in supporting community-based programs.

6. "Block watch," "neighborhood watch" and other conventional community crime prevention tactics are sharply limited in the inner city.

7. Higher standards of evaluation are needed to better guide program strategies and national policy, especially given the drug crisis and recent increases in crime rates.

Inner City Non-Profits Can Be Efficient as the Lead Institutions to Implement Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction

In spite of grossly inadequate resources, non-profit inner city organizations usually proved to be effective, sensitive and imaginative, we found, as the institutions that implement youth empowerment and other strategies on a day-to-day basis in the inner city. They often surpass for-profit organizations, business oriented coalitions (like Private Industry Councils) and government bureaucracies—as vehicles for change that are in closer touch with the people.

But a commitment must be made to expand the capacity of existing non-profits which undertake social development and youth empowerment. And the number of such organizations must be substantially increased if they are to have more national impact. It is clear from the Eisenhower experience that we cannot expect to tackle the wider, deepening problems of crime and drug abuse in America's cities on a shoestring—or in the short run.

Some of the community groups in the Neighborhood Program were social service and youth organizations—like the DYC. Others were physical economic development and housing rehabilitation organizations—like the Mid-Bronx Desperados Community Housing Corporation. We were able to demonstrate that successful workplan implementation, youth
empowerment, and crime or fear reduction can be accomplished by both types of organizations. This could have been more easily predicted with social service organizations like DYC—in that youth empowerment and drug and crime prevention are "softer" goals consistent with their experience. But the integration of these goals into "harder" housing rehabilitation organizations demonstrated that social and economic development are not at all incompatible within the same organization. (Such integration was not 100 per cent successful—as, for example, with one economic development organization, where staff was not entirely comfortable with youth "hanging around" the offices.)

Success among both types of groups—social and economic development—therefore adds to the number of community organizations which can be tapped in future youth empowerment programs. The economic development organizations are especially capable of partially financing ongoing youth empowerment, remedial education, employment training, drug prevention and crime prevention from stable income streams, like housing syndication (as was the case with the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes).

Among the 10 inner city organizations in the Neighborhood Program, success in implementing workplans sometimes appeared to be more frequent among smaller-sized institutions than among larger, multipurpose groups. For example, because the Walnut Hill Community Development Organization in Philadelphia was a young and modest sized organization, the program became an important part of its objective and there was great motivation among staff and trustees to success. At times, multi-service organizations with large budgets, as in Miami and Newark, seemed to let crime prevention become lost within many other priorities, which received more attention from top managers and trustees. The lesson for funders is that small is not necessarily cost-ineffective and that youth investment programming can simultaneously be a means to expand institutional capacity.

**Technical Assistance Increases the Odds for Success**

The Northwestern evaluators concluded that a key reason for the success of the inner city organizations in implementing the Foundation's Neighborhood Program across the nation was the Foundation's capacity to provide technical assistance, which usually is not available in an adequate form at the local level.
For example, the Foundation raised $559,000 in start up money for the 10 inner city programs and later helped raise $1,272,000 more to continue the 8 successfully implemented programs after 30 months of planning and operations. The Foundation funded and sponsored the needs assessment—and then facilitated the grass roots, "bubble up" planning process, including town meetings, whereby citizens tailored strategies to documented needs at each location. A technical assistance Guidebook summarized other existing programs from which ideas could be drawn.

Eisenhower helped guide implementation through site visits and paid for the consulting expenses of persons needed on-site to assist local program directors. The most popular form of technical support consisted of national cluster workshops, held periodically so all program directors could exchange experiences and “war stories.” Over 30 months, the Foundation sent 74 technical assistance mailings to all 10 sites, provided 79 instances of site specific technical assistance and responded to 115 requests for assistance. The staff had not expected the breadth of information requested nor the continued need for assistance. Implementation monitoring by the Foundation sought to insure that local milestones were reached. [. . .]

Northwestern found that the need for technical assistance provided by a national intermediary did not seem to diminish as a local program developed. “In many of the Neighborhood Program communities, the local organization continued to evolve crime prevention strategies and to request assistance in their new efforts.”

Eisenhower itself did not have sufficient resources for all the technical assistance which appeared necessary. For example, a need often remained for management training of community organization executive directors and anti-crime staffers, as well as for more specialized training for specific staffers—as in how to better link up on-the-job skill acquisition with computerized remedial education and job placement.

Neighborhood Program directors embraced the “bubble up” planning process—because it provided flexibility to truly target local problems and allowed people to develop a personal stake in the program working. They appreciated not having to respond to a “top down” “request for proposal”—the usual format, for example, by which the federal government specifies, in detail, what a locality must say to stand a chance of receiving money.
However, in retrospect, and given limited resources, the Foundation allowed community organizations to try too much. There was so much "bubble up" that some programs were watered down. For example, in some cases there were relatively unfocused mixes of opportunity reduction, superficial youth programs and victim-witness initiatives. Based on the evaluation findings, we will continue to encourage local creativity in the future, but also require a stronger focus on the underlying principles that appear most effective, based on our experience and other evaluations.

*It Is Folly to Expect Success Without Adequate Resources and Facilities*

The day-to-day realities of implementing the Neighborhood Program showed the shortcomings of the rhetoric of the 1980s that "leaner and meaner" inner city initiatives could be more effective. The initial Neighborhood Program budgets of $50,000 to $70,000, total, for 30 months, meant that program directors were paid between $15,000 and $25,000 per year and usually served as the only full time salaried crime and drug prevention staff. Yet a pervasive theme in the evaluation was that these resources were insufficient to accomplish the multiple tasks of the organizations.

This isn't surprising, given the depth of the problems these community groups sought to address. Over and over again, programs were frustrated, hampered, and sometimes stillborn because of insufficient funds for more paid staff, the absence of qualified, trained people to hire even had the funds been available, lack of space for program activities, and lack of money to pay for the most basic, essential supplies.

Even the two groups with which the Eisenhower Foundation was most successful in leveraging continuation financing, ACW and DYC, faced financial difficulties and constraints, especially as they tried to expand their activities. One reason is the cutback of government funds over the 1980s at all levels for inner city drug prevention and social development, combined with the inability of private corporations to take up the slack. Another is that public and private funders often lose interest in financing successful operations after initial demonstrations show success.

In East New York, despite help from several Vista volunteers, the project was "overwhelmed by the work," as a staff member put it: "There's too many things to do at one time; block organizing, clean-ups, meetings, fundraisers, the after-
school program and cleaning the office.” Several programs had trouble hiring, and even more trouble retaining, project directors—in part, as the evaluation notes, because of the “low salaries offered.” In Philadelphia, the Walnut Hill program had only one staff member for the first 10 months of program operations; the first project director “received a better job offer and resigned” after a few months’ work, as did the coordinator of an anti-crime and fear program for senior citizens. The program’s executive director commented that, “With nonprofits, it’s terrible. The pay is so low, especially for professional people. They’ll do it when they don’t have other opportunities, but when something better comes up you can’t blame them for taking it.”

These limitations had a fundamental impact on the character of many programs. According to the Northwestern evaluation, in Philadelphia the constant turnover of staff made it more difficult to maintain the momentum of the program and to develop a coherent framework within which program activities could be developed. In some instances, the program seemed to develop more in response to external conditions than to the internal plan of the crime prevention program for Walnut Hill.

In the Mid-Bronx program, a well planned employment information and referral service folded after a few months of operation, because there was insufficient staff available to run it and the economic-development specialist who served as its director left after a few months, with no one hired to take her place. An after-school program designed by Around the Corner to the World, similarly, never got off the ground because no one had “sufficient time for the many tasks involved in implementing a new program.” ACW’s youth leadership program had the advantage, albeit a small one, of one full-time member who was paid a stipend when project funds permitted, and of being able to draw on specific skills in local economic development possessed by some of the community residents on ACW’s advisory committee.

The low level of funding also meant that most programs had to cope with a lack of basic materials—vans, cars, recreation and office space. The Mid-Bronx Desperadoes’ successful civilian patrol was forced to plan its coverage of the neighborhood depending on whether it was able to borrow someone’s car. The lack of a vehicle on a steady basis meant that the patrol was mainly on foot, which naturally limited its range. “One member had voluntarily used his car for several weeks,” the site evaluation notes; “after a while, however, he became reluctant to continue this as no other member used his/her car
for patrolling." Another member donated a car to the patrol, but it needed repairs and insurance, and "the project director was still in the process of completing these arrangements at the end of the grant period."

Most youth programs required more space for "drop-in traffic" that could be used on a daily basis. This was consistent with the need for physical sanctuary that programs like Centro, Argus and Umoja view as essential to shelter youth from the chaos of inner city streets and drug dealing. Accordingly, almost all program directors had to find additional space, beside that available to the parent organization, for youth programming. Availability of space varied, depending at times on the willingness and the availability of local institutions to provide access without charging fees.

Volunteerism Is Being Oversold for the Inner City

It was hoped that the programs could make up for the paucity of formal resources and paid staff by drawing heavily on volunteer efforts from community residents. And the programs did indeed make creative and extensive use of volunteers. What is clear, however, is that creative efforts notwithstanding, a reliance on volunteerism is no substitute for adequately resourced programs and adequately rewarded and trained staff.

Today there is a widespread call for a return to the spirit of volunteerism in addressing America's urban problems. While we're sympathetic to the sentiment behind that approach, our experience—and it is by now extensive—tells us that while volunteers may be very helpful in the context of a well-designed and resourced program, volunteerism is crucially limited as a response to inner city problems—particularly given the nature of the communities that are hardest-hit by crime, youthful alienation and drug abuse.

A first problem found in many sites was a sheer inability to recruit a stable pool of inner city volunteers for program activities. Sometimes, this seemed to be mainly because most of those who might have been qualified for the tasks needed paid employment rather than volunteer work. The East New York program, for example, planned a volunteer subway station watch, to be trained and supported by the New York City Police, in response to residents' fears about crime at two local stations. But "despite considerable efforts, they had little success in getting volunteers. The project director attributed the lack of response to residents' need for paid work, as opposed to volunteer work, and the possible danger involved." In the
Mid-Bronx, according to the evaluation, "recruitment of volunteers appeared to be an almost constant activity for the program"—and one which therefore drew off an inordinate amount of the limited time and energy of the paid staff.

Despite these constant efforts, volunteer participation in most program activities fluctuated unevenly. A particular problem was that turnover among neighborhood residents made it difficult to maintain "both tenant associations and tenant patrols." Patrols would start up and work actively for a short time, then peter out unless they were re-activated by specific incidents in the neighborhood.

It was not surprising, then, that with some exceptions it appeared to be easier to recruit and retain volunteers in less disadvantaged neighborhoods. One example is the Whittier program in Minneapolis, formed in a community 86% white and with higher levels of education than most other program sites. The Minneapolis program maintained a relatively high level of volunteer participation, especially on its active advisory board, but as Northwestern evaluation notes, volunteers there were "predominantly white, relatively young and well-educated." Even so, the Whittier Alliance had some difficulty recruiting volunteers because of the high level of transiency in the Whittier area. At the Cleveland, St. Clair-Superior Coalition, similarly, most of the volunteers for the program's court watch effort were "white, senior women."

Drawing in effective volunteers is difficult even in more advantaged communities. For example, a 1989 national Washington Post-ABC poll found 85% of the respondents agreeing that "very few would be willing to join a community group against the drug problem."

Getting volunteers was all the more difficult in the poorest neighborhoods. The fact that they are resource-poor to begin with is part of the reason why they are faced with the problems of crime, drugs and deterioration of community life in the first place. In Philadelphia, some staff noted the special difficulty of recruiting volunteers because of the high proportion of female-headed households in the neighborhood. This meant that many women in the community would already have their hands more than full coping with family and work; it also reflected an often-noted decline of available working-age men in many disadvantaged inner city neighborhoods. Many Neighborhood Program sites found it particularly difficult to recruit male volunteers, and indeed in many projects the majority of volunteers were women. But it was still not easy to recruit women on a stable basis, either, in poor communities where substantial pro-
portions of local women were hard-pressed and already overburdened.

These recruiting difficulties meant that many organizations that had hoped to run some of their programs by relying heavily on volunteers were sorely disappointed. In East New York, though neighborhood youth responded eagerly to an after-school program, it turned out to be very difficult to get their parents involved. Our community group had hoped that parent volunteers would take some of the load off the program staff and Vista workers, and more generally that "parents would become involved in the crime prevention program through their children." But only one parent volunteered to help with the after school program, and few contributed to fundraisers sponsored by the Vista workers to buy supplies for the program. Other carefully evaluated programs in high-crime neighborhoods, like the national Violent Juvenile Offender Program, have experienced similar problems in mobilizing volunteers.

It wasn't only other commitments or lack of energy that kept potential volunteers away from many Eisenhower neighborhood program activities. In several sites, the program launched projects—like civilian patrols or block organizing against drug-dealing and youth crime—that were inherently dangerous, and were made more so, as we'll see below, because offenders and drug dealers, far from being outsiders to the community being organized, often were local residents themselves—living on the same block, perhaps with eyes and ears at block meetings. In general, much of the job of achieving public safety in these high-risk communities—a job often unreflectively thought to be especially appropriate for volunteers—is tough and dangerous work, which can put participants in real peril. That fact underscores our next lesson—the need for better linkage of community programs with police and other formal public services.

Public Sector Agencies, Including the Police, Have a Crucial Role in Supporting Community-Based Programs

The other side of the limits to volunteerism is the great—and often underappreciated—importance and potential of the public sector in supporting inner city youth investment, economic development and crime prevention. The taxpaying citizen should remember that perhaps the two most cost-effective national crime prevention programs ever created—Head Start and Job Corps—are in the public sector.
Following in the community and youth empowerment tradition, Eisenhower's initial approach tended to emphasize the need to develop locally-based institutions that would be in some ways alternatives to public institutions in the cities; partly because of the high cost of public services, in an age of fiscal constraint, but partly also because of the widespread sense, at all points of the political spectrum, that many urban public agencies, from schools through police to city government, were inadequately serving the people of the inner city. We continue, of course, to stress the enormous potential of grassroots, “self-help” efforts. But our experience also affirms the vital role of public services, as Head Start and Job Corps underscore.

Most of the Neighborhood Program sites made important and sometimes extensive use of the resources and expertise offered by public and semipublic agencies, from the federal government down to neighborhood planning councils. Without that help, the programs could not have accomplished what they did. This suggests that in the future, we should strive to make the linkages between community-based organizations and public institutions even stronger and more consistent. As will be noted later, some foreign countries, like France, are far ahead of the U.S. in forming community, public and private coalitions at the local level to combat drugs and crime.

Several neighborhood sites used VISTA workers to fill staff functions, including Cleveland, Minneapolis and especially Brooklyn, where several Vistas were usually at work at any one time. In Brooklyn, indeed, the Vistas were crucial; according to Northwestern, without them the program “would not have been able to complete the extensive work on block organizing,” and it is unlikely that it could have developed its after-school center, open four days per week, without the Vista workers—especially “given the lack of adult volunteers.” The Vista workers, however, according to the various site reports, were sometimes inadequately prepared or trained to take on some of the multiple and complicated tasks the programs called for. What this suggests is that there may be great potential for a stable source of nationally funded workers to aid nonprofit organizations in the cities—but any new National Service program will need to boost their level of training and support.

Several local programs prospered by developing solid working relations with a wide range of public agencies. In Washington, D.C., all of ACW’s entrepreneurial projects for neighborhood youth were done in conjunction with governmental agencies and/or other local organizations—including the U.S. Park Service, the District of Columbia Energy Office
and the Major's Summer Youth Program. The most successful of the projects, the weatherization business, was only fully launched via the $250,000 capitalization grant from the federal Office of Community Services—which not only enabled the business itself to prosper but enabled it to support other program activities.

The availability of public capital of this kind is especially crucial for inner-city community organizations, because private capital, in these "risky" neighborhoods, is often almost impossible to obtain. When it is committed, the capital primarily flows at market or above market rates, for projects that can be easily liquidated—such as real estate and other types of physical development.

Police. Working relations with local police departments in many communities significantly bolstered the efforts of the nonprofit organizations. In the Bronx, the police worked regularly with the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes, providing training and support for patrol volunteers, sponsoring an Explorer Scout troop for local youth, and establishing police-sponsored substance abuse programs in local schools. In Minneapolis, the Whittier Alliance, with donations from a number of local businesses, hired off-duty police officers as a Summer Beat Patrol to police the area's main business sections several evenings a week. The Police Department did most of the administrative work for this program, which resulted in increased prostitution arrests and an apparent decrease in fear of crime in the area. Police in Whittier also served on the program's advisory committee and task forces and provided information on local crime conditions; in turn, the program helped the police develop better referral systems for dealing with non-police matters.

But it seems clear that the nature and severity of the crime problem in many inner city communities calls for an even more carefully developed relationship between community organizations and police. Neighborhood Program experience suggests that this is especially crucial because of the increasing role of drugs dealing in the life of the inner city. In East New York, for example, it was sometimes difficult to do the work of block organizing effectively because of the threat of harassment or retaliation by drug dealers. According to the program's director, the drug dealers have become aware of the East New York Crime and Fear Prevention Program and use their best efforts to intimidate Vistas and people in blocks who appear to be cooperating with the Vistas' block organizing efforts. Most of the Vistas refuse to go on certain blocks in fear of their personal safety.
In Washington, D.C., Jubilee Housing, the original sponsor of the program that later was taken over by Around the Corner to the World, initially took a hard-line approach to drug dealing. Dealers were evicted from Jubilee buildings. But there was some concern and even resentment among residents who felt that they were “being asked to take on the responsibilities of police officers in the issue of drug dealing,” and that the police “were not providing the same services to the Adams-Morgan community as they did to other communities. Emphasizing the importance of stronger backup from the police of community-based anti-crime work, one resident pointed out that, after all, “we don’t wear badges, the police do.” Many thought it was too dangerous to ask residents to engage in anti-drug surveillance in a community with such a serious and pervasive drug-sales problem. At issue, in short, is where the responsibility for public safety falls, and how much of that responsibility can realistically or legitimately be expected of groups of ordinary citizens—who are not only not trained to cope with dangerous situations but also, of course, pay taxes to support public agencies which are.

There is little evidence that community-based policing in the form of foot patrols reduces crime per se. Evaluations in cities like Flint, Michigan, Kansas City, Missouri, Newark, New Jersey, Houston, Texas, and New York all point to this conclusion. There are some findings that there is a reduction in resident fear of crime as a result of police foot patrols. This occurs mostly in middle class urban neighborhoods, not inner city locations. Hence, we are not suggesting that an increased police presence can by itself effectively attack the crime and drug problems on these communities. But it can help the community deal with them. Wherever it is tried, community policing remains popular with citizens. A police show of force can at least keep dealers on the move and help protect the operations of inner city non-profit based youth empowerment and economic development efforts. This is especially true to the extent that police departments have stopped simply reacting to crime after it has occurred, and have begun to analyze the underlying problems which cause the crime, so that proactive prevention strategies can be put in place. For example, in Newport News, Virginia, a police-community partnership reduced the burglary rate in high crime public housing by 35% over 2 years. This was done not through more arrests, but, for example, through improving maintenance of the housing projects, among other preventive rather than reactive strategies.
Such innovation is called “problem oriented policing” in the U.S., building on the thinking of Professor Herman Goldstein. But it also has affinities to Japanese police prevention traditions—where, for example, police mentor youth and residents “consult” with police over domestic violence. (We will consider the potential role of these innovations further, below).

_Schools._ The Neighborhood Program suggested, as well, the need to explore more fruitful partnerships between community organizations and schools. One of the many rationales for community-based organizations is that they often can provide the kind of remedial education, with mentoring and peer support, which many failing inner city school systems are not capable of providing. Yet, at the very least, school facilities can be used after hours for community program activities. Schools, after all, already have the kind of space—for classroom and athletic activities, in particular—that is desperately hard for community organizations to find elsewhere. Because the facilities already are in place and unused for large portions of the day and week, they can be an extremely cost-effective resource.

But school districts were not always supportive in the Neighborhood Program—a pattern too often noted by other community-based initiatives, like the Violent Juvenile Offender Program (discussed in Chapter 3). In East New York, for example, plans for an after-school tutoring program were halted by the requirement that the program pay “custodial fees” for the use of local schools, which would have amounted to about $5,000 a year, far more than the program could afford. (An after-school program was begun later in the schools, with up to 120 youth attending daily.)

DYC’s experience with local schools in Boston was more positive and more complex. According to the Rutgers researchers, the program “developed and maintained an excellent relationship with local schools.” DYC offered several services to local school systems, including in-house counseling and crisis intervention for students and their families, gang violence intervention, drug counseling and drug prevention education.

As this suggests, schools can be a crucial and important resource for community-based programs—and vice versa. Much as with the police, the task is to begin to develop more effective links to community-based organizations. Consequently, the Foundation is exploring some promising new relationships in its second generation of programming (Chapter 6). In addition, the Foundation is examining ways to co-target on the same youth both school-based multiple services, like those
offered by the national Cities in Schools program, and community organization-based services. [. . .]

"Block Watch," "Neighborhood Watch" and Other Conventional Community Crime Prevention Tactics Are Sharply Limited in the Inner City

Closely related to the limits of volunteerism as a strategy for approaching urban crime, drug abuse and violence is a more general limitation of those strategies which focused primarily on tactical community organizing in block watches or other more traditional kinds of community crime prevention, at the expense of developing strategies that addressed these communities' needs for such more strategic and "structural" efforts as youth empowerment, extended family "sanctuary," education, job creation and job placement.

There is a substantial difference between the often vague idea of "involving" the community in defending itself against crime and the idea of community self-determination in the larger and deeper sense of the overall development of the social and economic potential of a community—development within which some defensive strategies, of course, can and should have a place. Our experience, indeed, suggests that it is very difficult to accomplish the goals of community organizing against crime even on their own terms without tackling some of the deeper problems of the community.

These limits stem directly from the social and economic characteristics of disadvantaged inner city locales. First, the Neighborhood Program experience suggests that—as in the case of volunteer participation—it is difficult to keep strong defensive crime prevention organizations in a deprived community afloat in face of economic disadvantage, residential instability, or lack of consistent interest among the residents. In Cleveland, the evaluation notes that the persistent problem of residential turnover "meant that streets continually needed to recruit new residents." The "apathy of residents" was described as "one of the major frustrations" the East New York program. In many of these neighborhoods, economic insecurity and residential instability limited the consistent pool of residents who could be reliably expected to participate. This was compounded in some neighborhoods by a deep-seated alienation among many residents and a sense that community efforts wouldn't make much difference. In East New York, "Many residents were reluctant to talk with the Vistas, assuming they were social workers, police officers, or other government workers,"
and in addition "some residents seemed to feel that they were unlikely to accomplish much or to be tired of the effort that changes required. One active member of a block association explained, "People come and promise you things and then nothing happens, so you get disappointed. There are lots of things that need to be done, but you also need someone with the power to get it done." "For various reasons, then," the evaluation concludes, "the Vistas found it difficult to recruit members for the block associations."

The tactical model that often underlies block organizing efforts in particular often seems to rest on a set of presumptions about residents' energy and stability that is more appropriate to a stable middle-class or working-class neighborhood than to poorer communities with higher transiency, lower resources and fewer social networks. But it is precisely those communities that most suffer from urban violence. Our experience in this regard is supported by a growing body of other recent research.

For example, in a recent review, Professor Dennis Rosenbaum of the University of Illinois warns that, in spite of widespread publicity by advocates, most scientific evaluations of block and neighborhood watch show "either no effect or increases in crime rates in the experimental areas after the intervention." As for fear, with the exception of one neighborhood in London, "fear of personal crime and property crime either were unaffected by neighborhood organizing or showed significant increases relative to controls." Similarly, a recent national study of neighborhood watch programs, funded by the National Institute of Justice, concludes, "The neighborhoods in which programs exist are predominantly middle-income, racially homogeneous areas" whose populations consist mainly of "long-term residents living in single-family, owner-occupied homes."

Differences in community structure may also underpin significant differences in residents' views of what the goals of community crime prevention should be—indeed what crime prevention means. To some extent, as other research has also found, block-organizing tactics in particular are likely to be more attractive to people with higher incomes and more time for participation in community activities; poorer residents may be more concerned with adequate police protection on the one hand and with efforts to deal directly with the longstanding social and economic ills of the community, on the other. This split clearly affects the character of residents' participation in crime prevention activities. In the Whittier programs, for
example, one of the most successful in recruitment, few members of the organization came from lower-income households; few were parents and few were from minority groups.

Nor is this problem only one of apathy or lack of energy. Often its roots lie still deeper in the social structure of violence-torn urban neighborhoods. For example, in some Neighborhood Program communities it was difficult to get residents organized to fight crime, and especially drug dealing, because many offenders or drug dealers were also community residents—sometimes living on the same street, or the same block. For one thing, this created some danger to residents, who felt that dealers would be able to keep tabs on who was involved in the block associations—and perhaps retaliate against them. In the St. Clair-Superior Coalition neighborhood in Cleveland, for instance, a resident noted that “people were afraid to speak out. People seem to know who commits the crimes, but they’re reluctant to speak up.” In East New York, where drugs were a pervasive problem, the program became increasingly involved in dealing with drug sale locations. This was particularly problematic, as numerous residents were either dealers or users and residents were afraid to give information directly to the police about drug dealers.

Beyond the sheer worry about potential harm or retaliation, the Neighborhood Program evaluations reveal an even deeper issue. In East New York, for example, drug dealing was “also a difficult problem to discuss in some block associations, because some members or friends who were suspected dealers or users.” Traditionally, some community crime prevention approaches have tended to define the people who cause the problems—“street” youth, drug abusers, dealers—as “outsiders” to the community. But that perception is clearly inappropriate for many urban communities—and especially, of course, those that are hardest-hit by drugs and violence. For it is, after all, from these communities that many offenders, hard-drug users and drug dealers come. Not only do they live in close proximity with other residents; more crucially, they are someone’s son, brother, uncle, or friend. Moreover, many move in and out of illegal activities in the course of their lives. There is, therefore, rarely a clean hard line between “the community” on one side and the offenders who trouble it on the other. Partly for that reason, many people in disadvantaged communities, while insisting in their right to adequate police protection, also want to see serious efforts that address the deeper causes of crime—and are often skeptical about the value of the “pull
the wagons together” approach to crime prevention that characterizes some community anti-crime programs.

This tension was particularly apparent in Washington, D.C. Efforts to organize low-income housing tenants to do "something" about drugs were not markedly effective and generated some resentments and resistance in the community—in part because residents thought that the job should be done by the police, in part because of the sense that drugs reflected deeper community problems, especially affecting the young, that should be directly addressed. The director of Around the Corner to the World was consequently concerned that the program’s anti-drug efforts “should unite the community, not divide it”; block watch programs in particular might cause division because “family members and friends were frequently involved in the drug problem.” Accordingly, he proposed a range of strategies that included political lobbying to make the area a higher priority for law enforcement, providing employment opportunities, and launching an anti-drug educational campaign. The weatherization business employment program was the most effective part of this richer and more comprehensive anti-drug strategy.

The Northwestern evaluation found that, outside of crises, it was difficult to sustain interest in conventional opportunity reduction, because its goal is a non-event—the absence of crime. This is much less a problem in youth reinvestment programs, like ACW and DYC, because less recidivism and crime are only a part of an overall package of tangible success, which includes staying in school, feeling better about yourself, getting a diploma, getting a job, improving the community (for example, through housing rehabilitation), helping other youths, and moving into independent living.

Accordingly, in many Neighborhood Program locales, there was a notable imbalance between the frequent lack of enthusiasm for such things as block watch meetings or “business watch” efforts on the one hand—and the frequent enthusiasm for more tangible strategies, especially youth empowerment activities, on the other—even though many youth activities in many places, save for ACW and DYC, were well meaning but superficial. In many sites where they were attempted, efforts to provide some form of recreational, employment or educational activity for local youths had more “takers” than they could handle. Those activities seemed to meet a real and pressing need that was keenly felt in their communities. With some exceptions, that need was less keenly felt for “community organizing” approaches to crime prevention.
Nor do more conventional community crime prevention tactics pay sufficient attention to domestic violence. Domestic violence and child abuse are woven like a red thread through many low-income urban communities; they are a critical part of the community's crime problem, and one that is especially troubling because of its potential to generate further violence in the future, as children in violent and abusive families grow up. A successful workshop on violence against women at the St. Clair-Superior Coalition was well-attended; but on the whole, many programs shared the tendency, all too common in America, to think of the crime problem almost exclusively in terms of "street" crime perpetrated by "outsiders." Violence in the family is only poorly addressed, at best, by conventional block-watching strategies; like drug use and drug dealing, an effective community response will have to address its deep roots in the social fabric of inner city communities.

Block watches, in particular, often seem appealing to urban policy-makers, and to funders, because they are believed to promise significant results at very minimal cost—especially given their reliance on resident volunteers. But our experience shows that to be a false promise and a false economy: some of our Neighborhood Program initiatives relied heavily on block watches and still cost $50,000 to $70,000 over 30 months of planning and implementation, with minimal impact.

In terms of enthusiasm generated in devastated inner city areas, one partial exception was the patrol launched by the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes. The evaluation does not show that it reduced crime community-wide. But it both sustained a relatively high level of resident participation and, according to Northwestern's evaluation, may well have diminished fear in the neighborhood. This finding is consistent with the conclusion of Professor Dennis Rosenbaum that there is no certain evidence from other evaluations that volunteer patrols have more of a long term effect on crime, even though some citizens feel less fearful.

We believe that, at least for the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes, the proactive nature of the citizen patrol had a place in securing the neighborhood for economic development. "It's not a no man's land any more," one patrol member said; "it's a no-nonsense place." And for another member, "The patrols are out there and if kids are hanging around or acting up, the patrols make them break it up. I've never seen that in a neighborhood before. It really makes a difference." [...]

6. **The Next Generation of Eisenhower Programs**

When the Foundation's street level lessons are combined with innovative programs over the last decade run and evaluated by others, we can frame reasonably well a wise direction for new youth investment programs and creative national policy for the 1990s.

**Accumulating Evidence**

In addition to the "street-level" lessons known from our own program, we have been inspired by the accumulating evidence of success in several programs run and evaluated by others over the last decade. Some of the most impressive other programs of the 1980s which dispelled the myth that "nothing works" for the disadvantaged included: JobStart, Project Reduction, the Violent Juvenile Offender Program, the School Transitional Environment Program, the Door, City Lights, the Phoenix Program, the "I Have A Dream" Program, and Cities in Schools. Consider each briefly:

**JobStart.** JobStart targeted disadvantaged school dropouts aged 17-21 who read below the eighth grade level. The program provided basic education, occupational training, support services such as child care and transportation, and genuine job placement assistance for long term employment. These multiple solutions were implemented through community-based organizations, Job Corps centers, vocational schools and community colleges. Youth who participated in the program showed significant improvement in attaining high school and General Education Diplomas compared to control groups. After the first 12 months of evaluation, arrests were lower for program youth than control youth, but statistical significance has not been reached. Ongoing evaluations are assessing for longer run employment gains, crime reduction and related outcomes.

**Project Redirection.** Project Redirection focused on teen mothers 17 or younger who lacked a high school diploma or an equivalency degree. Most were eligible for receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Implemented in several locations, the program's approach was comprehensive, seeking to enhance the teen's educational, job-related, parenting, and life-management skills, while encouraging these young people to delay further childbearing until they had become more self-sufficient. The program's strategy was to link participants with existing services in the community and to support these "brokered" services by providing workshops, peer group ses-
sions, and individual counseling in the program setting. It also paired teens with adult community women, who volunteered to provide ongoing support, guidance, and friendship both within and outside of the formal program structure. Five years after entering the program (and 4 years, on average, after leaving it), Project Redirection participants, while still disadvantaged, had more favorable outcomes than a comparison group of young mothers in the areas of employment, earnings, welfare dependency, and parenting skills; their children were at a developmental advantage, compared to controls.

The Violent Juvenile Offender Program. The Violent Juvenile Offender Program was implemented from 1981 to 1986 through neighborhood-based organizations in the Bronx, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and San Diego. Each local version of the program involved an ongoing needs assessment through which neighborhood resident councils planned and revised their efforts. Each local program was required to include violent-crisis intervention, mediation, family support networking, and youth skills development. After 36 months of planning and implementation, serious juvenile crime decreased in 3 of the 6 targeted neighborhoods, compared to their respective cities. Most of the programs developed means of financial support to carry on all or part of the effort after federal funding ended.

The School Transitional Environment Program. The School Transitional Environment Program was established for high risk youth, generally low income and minority, entering large senior high schools. It was designed to reduce the difficulty of transition by such students from smaller feeder schools, usually junior highs, to the more complex senior high environment. Core academic subjects and homeroom were taken mostly with other high risk students. Core and academic classrooms were kept close together, so in a way a familiar physical space was created. Homeroom and academic teachers received extra training to enhance their academic and emotional counseling skills. There was extra one-on-one counseling of students. Special team meetings of teachers in the program were held regularly. In some cases, there was extra counseling staff. The mentoring was complemented by student peer sessions to discuss common problems. The extra cost was low. Statistically, program youth had significantly lower dropout rates, fewer absences and higher grades than controls, in several locations.

The Door. For almost 20 years the Door has been supplying multiple, integrated services at a center for high risk youth in New York City. The Door has had several evaluations. All
have been positive though none have yet had control groups. Nonetheless, some of the changes among program youth have been so dramatic that it is difficult to conclude that the program was not responsible, in part. For example, in one 3 year study cited in a National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) monograph on model programs, 40% of Door participants either stopped using drugs or significantly reduced their use. In another study, there was a significant increase in self-esteem among persons who participated in the program for at least one year.

City Lights and the Phoenix Program. City Lights in Washington, D.C. and the Phoenix Program, in Akron, Ohio appear to be successful at involving failing students with behavior problems in academic and vocational training programs, remediating their educational problems and reducing behavior problems. City Lights, developed by the Children’s Defense Fund, is a community-based program for emotionally disturbed and delinquent youth aged 12 to 22 that incorporates crisis counseling; individual, group and family therapy; and a comprehensive, computer-aided instructional curriculum. Though evaluation of the program has just begun, it has achieved a 90% attendance rate during its first two years, despite the history of chronic truancy that characterizes most of its students. Similarly, the Phoenix Program has succeeded in returning 90% of its students to the public schools, and recidivism rates of its participants have declined.

“The I Have A Dream” Program. Eugene Lang's private sector “I Have A Dream” program originated when Mr. Lang returned to his elementary school in East Harlem and promised to pay the college tuition of every graduating sixth grade class member who finished high school and qualified for higher education. As of 1989, about two-thirds of the kids in this class had received high school diplomas or General Education Diplomas. More than half were enrolled at least part time in public and private colleges; only 1 was in prison. School dropout rates—and correlated crime—were far higher for comparable young people in East Harlem. A former Deputy School Superintendent said, of Mr. Lang’s six grade class, “If 50% of those kids are going to college, its a small miracle.” The key seems to be not only the assurance that college will be paid but the special attention and mentoring that Mr. Lang provides.

Cities in Schools. Cities in Schools is a drop out prevention program which operates out of schools or alternative locations in over 30 communities across the U.S. The key to Cities in Schools is the repositioning of existing public and private
agency service providers into multi-service school locations. There, they serve alongside teachers, as a coordinated team. Typically, the team includes social workers, employment counselors, recreation coaches, educators, health professionals and volunteer mentors. Students at risk of dropping out are referred by teachers, school administrators, probation officers, parents and others. A mentor case manager is assigned to each student. The case manager provides services and brokers the services of others on the team. Long term control group evaluations have not been undertaken. Cities in Schools reports point too much lower drop out rates than the national average of 30%.

Some Common Elements

JobStart, Project Redirection, The Violent Juvenile Offender Program and the School Transitional Environment Program all have been evaluated with sufficient scientific rigor, in our view—as have Job Corps, the Argus Community and Fairview Homes, among the early influences on the Foundation which were discussed in Chapter 2. The Door, City Lights, the Phoenix Program, “I Have A Dream” and Cities in Schools all are extremely promising, but should be more rigorously evaluated, we believe—as is the case with Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, the House of Umoja, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative and Around the Corner to the World, among the other early influences discussed in Chapter 2.

There are many individual variations among these programs (which we view as a positive sign of locally tailored solutions). Yet they often share common elements—like sanctuary, mentoring, nurturing, social support, cultural heritage or other group identity, peer pressure, discipline, pursuit of high school degrees or G.E.D.’s, employment training and employment placement. Like Head Start, these multiple solutions usually result in multiple outcomes—higher self-esteem, staying in school, parenting at a later age, improving life management skills, becoming more independent and less welfare reliant, being more employable, and getting less involved with drugs and crime. Most definitely, not all of these good outcomes happen in all of these programs—and sometimes evaluators are frustrated by lack of consistency—but the broad pattern is for considerable simultaneous change.

Most of these initiatives are based in community organizations, although some are located in schools or junior college. Some are residential, some are not and some have both
options. (More comparative cost-benefits are needed.) The age range is from pre-teens to young adults, so the phrase "juvenile delinquency prevention" doesn't fit very well. Most of these programs try to change individual youth, but a few (like Centro and Around the Corner to the World) more ambitiously also try to create change in the community.

A number of these programs include some combination of what official service bureaucracies call "primary prevention" (changing the setting or strengthening resistance before any negative behavior by high risk individuals), "secondary prevention" (redirecting individuals who have started getting into relatively minor trouble) and "tertiary prevention" ("treatment" of individuals who have been officially adjudicated or otherwise labeled by the criminal justice, welfare and health care systems).

_Eisenhower Demonstrations for the 1990's_

With an eye to this accumulating evidence and the common elements which often appear associated with success, the Eisenhower Foundation has embarked upon a second generation of programs to begin the new decade. These innovations incorporate a more consistent focus on the kinds of inner city youth investment strategies which we believe hold greatest promise.

Cities affiliated with the Foundation's second generation include Albuquerque, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Portland (Oregon), San Juan, Washington, D.C. and Wilmington (Delaware).

Specific empowerment strategies continue to "bubble up" from grass roots planning, rather than "trickle down" from distant regulations. These new initiatives are not "crime and drug abuse prevention"—which is too narrow a way of understanding what really happens. That is part of their goal. But more broadly, the second generation Eisenhower-affiliated programs will, in different ways:

Employ or mentor high risk youth with sufficient extended-family-like discipline and social support (including remedial education) to reduce crime and drug abuse while they increase school completion and future employability;

Empower inner-city neighborhood non-profit groups to operate the programs, organize local residents, integrate crime prevention with economic development,
bring in creative problem oriented community policing, and link up with schools;

Develop financial self-sufficiency in order to ensure that program activities can continue.

**Increased Resources.** As these guidelines make clear, the second round of Neighborhood Programs continues many of the principles of the first—but with some important additions and shifts of emphasis.

We have increased the level of funding for each site—in order to concentrate limited resources rather than spread them too thinly to support adequate staff and programming. New programs will be better equipped to hire additional staff. And we are upgrading our capacity to generate continuing financing of demonstrations after initial funding.

**Employment Training and Placement.** The second round of sites also has a stronger and more consistent emphasis on employment and social supports for high-risk youth. We’ve seen that this was one of the most promising successes of programs like Job Corps, Argus, Fairview Homes and ACW; we want now to generalize it to all new demonstrations. This emphasis is, we believe, also backed by evidence from many of the other programs cited here on the paths into—and out of crime, drug abuse, and other problems among the inner city young. The role of stable work opportunities stands out as crucial in that path—but research, for example by the Vera Institute of Justice in New York, suggests, as well, that for youth in poor neighborhoods, many of whom have been subjected to chaotic and deprived family lives and inadequate schooling, more is needed than just the provision of an opportunity to work. Consequently, following the experience of programs like Argus, ACW, and DYC, we will emphasize the provision of essential supports offering guidance, discipline, and the modeling of productive and cooperative values. As part of that support, the programs will typically include training in basic educational skills.

For junior high school age youth, too young for employment training, the goal of staying in school or succeeding in alternative community school settings will be furthered by the use of mentor role models—for example minority professionals who have left the inner city but who wish to play a role in empowering the disadvantaged. The mentoring will help form a bridge for junior high school youth to proceed to senior high, and to an age when employment training is appropriate.
Our emphasis on building intensive social support, counseling and discipline into these programs reflects growing evidence that they can make a significant difference—provided that they are of sufficient quality and consistently implemented. But employment training for high school age inner city youth, even buttressed by a wide range of social and personal supports and remedial education, will be frustrated unless it is carefully linked with actual jobs in the public, private and nonprofit sectors. The Foundation’s new demonstrations, therefore, are seeking to develop viable economic enterprises in the community, and/or to build strong links with existing employers in the area. Ultimately, we want these programs to begin moving toward the kind of community economic self-determination that has been the long-range goal of the Foundation from the start.

Defensive measures and conventional community crime prevention tactics can still have a place—but we now plan to ensure that any efforts at citizen patrols and innovative policing, for example, be more clearly linked with a focused strategy of community revitalization than was usually the case in the first generation of Neighborhood Programs.

More Attention to Drugs. We also are paying more specific and consistent attention to drug abuse and drug dealing. As we’ve seen, these were a major concern at most of the Neighborhood Program sites, and they became more urgent over the course of the program as the “crack” epidemic struck many program cities. Indeed, many Neighborhood Program staff described drugs as the central problem in their communities and the greatest obstacle to program efforts. But only a few developed strategies directly aimed at reducing drug use, though somewhat more tried to develop ways of coping with drug dealers. We think that the epidemic of drugs in most inner-city communities calls for more concerted attention in this next round of demonstrations—particularly toward linking innovative strategies of drug abuse prevention and treatment with broader strategies of education, community economic development and effective, supported job training and other structured activities for youth. Without such linkages, the destructive role of drugs in the lives of young people and in the community as a whole may undermine any efforts, even good ones, to develop the community economically or to train and motivate the young.

As with anti-crime strategies generally, we do not wish to impose a top-down vision on the new programs of exactly what a community-based approach to preventing and treating drug abuse should look like—especially because there are currently
few clear guidelines for dealing with the "new" drug abuse that heavily involves "crack" cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine and other drugs for which long-established treatment strategies do not exist. Our approach will be to let local communities "bubble up" new kinds of anti-drug strategies—while simultaneously enhancing our capacity to provide technical assistance and information on what is being tried elsewhere—and what is working.

**Police Support of Community Organizations.** Given our finding of the need for more supportive and innovative policing to help deal with the drug problem, we now are developing new ways to link police more closely with the youth development, anti-drug, and employment generation efforts in our program communities. We do not envision simply asking for more police in the community—but rather, building on some of the most encouraging examples of creative policing in the United States and overseas, to develop new ways in which police can support the work of community-based groups.

For example, in Japan, police teach martial arts to neighborhood youths "to help make them better citizens." The thinking behind such, in effect, early intervention is not unlike new experiments in the United States by the Police Executive Research Forum on problem oriented policing. Such policing allows police, for example, to be nurturers in support of at risk youth facing many personal problems.

Japanese police are organized into "kobans"—police mini-stations at the neighborhood level. Police are assigned to the same substation, and therefore neighborhood, each day. In some places, the kobans are residential. A police officer lives there with his wife and family. Whether residential or nonresidential, the koban allows assigned officers to associate with others in the community—as their neighbors. This helps create trust by citizens of police and vice versa. Citizens even come to the koban for "personal guidance"—for example, when a woman seeks help from a husband who is physically abusing her.

In their work as early interveners as well as good neighbors, the Japanese police are far better prepared than American police. While American police cadets are typically trained for 3 to 5 months before going on the streets, Japanese police are trained for 1 to 2 years. That training is also in much greater depth. Accordingly, we will advocate for training reform, beginning at the FBI National Academy course for top police executives.
Surely we cannot simply take a model from another country, particularly one so different as Japan, and impose it in the American inner city context. But new ideas can be generated when American police are exposed to foreign methods, and then culturally appropriate solutions for American inner cities can be generated. That is why the Eisenhower Foundation brought police chiefs, other top police officials and American inner city community leaders to Japan to observe Japanese policing methods as a prelude to our next generation of inner city youth empowerment programming.

**Examples of Second Generation Programs**

Second generation Eisenhower affiliated programs are choosing to implement youth empowerment in a variety of ways. To give just a few examples, in San Juan, Wilmington (Delaware) and Portland (Oregon), partial replications of some of the principles underlying Centro and Umoja are underway. Baltimore and Washington, D.C. are giving priority to police supported economic development linked to youth empowerment. Chicago and Albuquerque are forging community organization-school alliances with active business support.

**Replications of the Principles of Centro and Umoja.** The original Centro program, located in Ponce, Puerto Rico, is extending to other locations on the island, including the Caimito community outside of San Juan.

The program, which is non-residential, is preparing high risk teens and young adults from the neighborhood for grammar school and high school equivalency examinations offered by the Department of Public Instruction. In addition to academic instruction, the program seeks to develop supportive social skills and values that will mitigate against delinquency, drug abuse and unemployment. For example, a new tree reforestation initiative is teaching skills marketable on the island. Plans are also being made for an adolescent mother center. A grant from the federal Office of Substance Abuse Prevention will help expand these new initiatives.

The overriding goal remains “the integral development of the person within the community.” Caimito, as Ponce, perceives itself as “a large family without distinction of colors or creed.” As in the original Ponce program, “advocate” mentors will serve as intermediaries between police and youth who are on the verge of serious trouble with police. Youth who are diverted from the juvenile justice system will work for Centro in Caimito. Some eventually may become advocates; the evalu-
ation will follow how "service recipients" can become "service providers." A residence has been built on the grounds of the Caimito Center. A police officer lives there with his family to better insure, Centro hopes, close, day-to-day and neighborly relationships among high risk youth, advocates and police. The officer is a graduate of a new police human relations training program.

In Wilmington, the Juvenile Awareness Education Program is partly building on the experience of Umoja, as well as on other ideas. Youth diverted from the criminal justice system as well as youth recruited from the neighborhood are involved. A block of two-story row houses is being renovated. Some buildings were opened in 1990, and local cable television coverage then was used in a 2 hour fund raising telethon. When fully operating, there will be both day and residential programs that include psychological assessment and treatment, individual and group counseling, remedial education, GED instruction, life skill training, pre-employment skills training, job training, entrepreneurship development, gang arbitration, community outreach and cultural/recreational activities. Each young man participates in an 8 month "rites of passage" Young Lions Manhood Training Program, one-on-one with an adult mentor. These tasks must be completed:

1. Stay in junior high school, establish a measurable educational objective and achieve it.
2. Read the autobiography of a famous Black leader.
3. Complete a business project or work experience that establishes the notion of being industrious.
4. Demonstrate the ability to save money and account for a full month of financial activities.
5. Complete a family/community volunteer project.
6. Create a personal program of physical fitness and complete an obstacle course.
7. Identify a "life philosophy" in writing and through verbal presentation.
8. Complete training to become a counselor to and role model for peers.
9. Participate in a spiritual awareness activity and participate at least monthly in existing family spiritual awareness programs, if any.
10. Participate in 75% of all educational activities offered via the Young Lions programs.

Each Young Lion trainee takes an oath at a public ceremony in front of adults and peers. He promises a "full commit-
ment to "discover myself and my responsibilities as a man in this society," agrees to "respect myself and others," and pledges to "remain drug free and avoid situations and groups that may result in my conflict with those in authority."

The Portland program is being developed in response to an "invasion" of the "Bloods" and other gangs which originated in Los Angeles. A Hope for Youth Conference, organized by neighborhood groups and the Mayor's Office of Neighborhoods, brought together minority leaders, community organizers, business leaders, the founders of Umoja, the President of the Eisenhower Foundation and the Portland Police—led by Tom Potter, the Captain who was a member of the Foundation's delegation to Japan. The Conference helped mobilize citizen and financial support and was well covered in the local media. It is a good coalition building, public awareness expanding and fund raising model for future replications in other cities.

The community education generated money for property acquisition, building rehabilitation and program staff. Initial commitments by the Mayor's Office led to substantial private sector matches.

As in Wilmington, Portland will carry out day and residential extended family variations and a rites of passage youth empowerment process. The Founders of the original Umoja, in Philadelphia, will be the first Portland "house parents," and will remain in Portland as long as it takes to locate and train suitable local parents. Participants (aged 12-15) will become involved both through criminal justice diversion and neighborhood outreach. Mentors will be recruited from among Black police, but also from among ex-inmates. Later down the road, Captain Potter may coordinate problem oriented community policing and Japan-inspired innovations in the same neighborhood as the residential buildings.

As we have seen (Chapter 2), these influential models—Centro and Umoja—have never been fully evaluated by researchers. By working with the new variations from the beginning, we hope to be able to provide a depth of evaluation that will shed new light on their effectiveness. In addition, the Foundation's coordinated case study evaluations will document the inevitable rough and tumble through which the principles of early and now well known models are tried in other locations. How long will it take, with what success? Will the original concepts be adhered to or reconfigured? What is the effect of vastly different social, cultural and political environments (like Portland and Wilmington)? Is public acceptance and
funding more forthcoming when the replication is near the original model (as in Caimito and Wilmington) rather than "imported" over many miles (Portland)? What is the relative cost-effectiveness of residential and non-residential components? How will it compare to residential versus non-residential Job Corps?

**Youth Empowerment and Economic Development.** The Baltimore Jobs in Energy Project (BJEP) is an inner city community-based housing rehabilitation, weatherization, youth employment and social service organization in South Baltimore. The executive director and the Baltimore Commissioner of Police were members of the Eisenhower Foundation’s delegation to Japan. As a result of the delegation, the Baltimore police have agreed to operate a police koban substation in a large, abandoned old Victorian police station which Baltimore Jobs has rehabilitated through support from Baltimore funders and the Eisenhower Foundation.

Instead of being called a “ground breaking,” the ceremony opening the building, led by the Mayor, was called a “bar pulling.” The old police station still had cells in it. In one cell, staff cut half way through the bars and painted over the saw marks. In front of local TV news cameras, the Mayor pulled the bars out, symbolically showing that there are alternatives to imprisonment. Because one use of the space will be for community-based remedial education, the theme of the ceremony was “turning bars into books.” The police substation is one part of the building. Another part hosts other community organizations, which pay rent. This helps to ensure the economic self-sufficiency of the program. Still other parts of the building include the offices of Baltimore Jobs and its employment training initiatives for high risk youth. One of those training initiatives will be run by the Police Department. The police who maintain the Department vehicles will conduct an auto maintenance employment training course for high risk youth.

Police foot patrols and problem oriented policing which operate out of the building are designed to reduce fear of crime and thus help BJEP’s efforts toward economic development—largely in the form of the residential reconstruction, which helps employ high risk youth. Police and program youth will share the same entrance way—a modest use of environmental design to increase communication and reduce mistrust. The re-opening of the police station as a youth center has become a source of pride among residents. It signals improved community/police relations. And it illustrates an innovative
way to overcome the not uncommon problem of neighborhood resistance to community based operations moving in.

Throughout the Foundation's second generation, we will assess new ways of securing neighborhood resident and city zoning commission approval of nonresidential and residential community programs. We hope that the notion of including a police substation in or on the grounds of extended family sanctuaries, as in Baltimore and San Juan, will become a national model. There already are other precedents. For example, in New York City, resident opposition to a facility in Chinatown was overcome through negotiation of a community meeting space and a storefront police precinct in the building. The Foundation will convene a national workshop among community organizations and city officials to share successes and so expand community-based facilities in the future.

Through new grants from the federal Office of Substance Abuse Prevention and other agencies, Baltimore Jobs is integrating drug abuse prevention into its development-empowerment-police support framework. Options are being created for each participating youth. Thus, for example, a 17-year-old girl referred by the principal at Southern High School who is experiencing chronic failure in school might choose from among one or more of these options: Training in auto mechanics and job retention skills from Police Department professionals, working on basic literacy with intensive tutoring and support from an older woman mentor, joining regular hiking trips in a state park, brainstorming with the Youth Center's Idea Team, helping on a Service Corps project to plant trees on a barren lot, and spreading an anti-drug message through community performances with a Youth Center-based dance troupe. A 13-year-old boy referred by the juvenile justice system who has been involved in violent or delinquent acts can consider: Joining weekly youth-to-youth counseling groups, meeting with local police officers at the Youth Center koban, exploring engineering careers and the associated education and skills needed, receiving regular assistance with his math homework, being involved in policy-setting and decision making as a member of the Youth Center Steering Committee, and making home visits with a police officer mentor to educate neighborhood residents about signs of youth substance abuse and delinquency. [. . .]

Community-School Innovations. Youth Development, Inc. is a community organization in Albuquerque which operates a dropout prevention program located in two high schools. Students at risk of dropping out are referred by regular school teachers
and counselors. Youth Development then provides one-on-one classroom instruction, counseling and family problem solving. A work experience program exposes students to real world jobs and motivates them to stay in school to qualify for employment. Students earn their way out of the program by improving their grades and attendance. Seed funding from the federal Departments of Health and Human Services and Labor have been leveraged against continuation funding from the local Private Industry Council.

Preliminary findings from an ongoing Eisenhower Foundation evaluation are encouraging. Only 1 of 38 youth referred to the program because of high risk of dropping out actually did drop out after 9 months. Twenty nine improved their grades, and there was an average 11% increase in the number of days attending school.

In Chicago, our affiliated community organization, Youth Guidance, is operating programs out of Roberto Clemente High, Austin Community Academy and Bowen High. Major corporations supply equipment, personnel and technical assistance to teach state of the art vocational training that is linked to usable, marketable skills for the inner city teenagers. The Hyatt Corporation is advising the Clemente program on food service training. Bell and Howell is guiding the Austin program in telecommunications opportunities. The Bowen program is focusing on office technology. The practical job skill training is used as an incentive to motivate kids to attend classes and stay in school. We do not expect far reaching program impacts for at least 36 months, based on past experience.

In the future, the Foundation will explore how the corporate and Private Industry Council linkages in Chicago, Albuquerque and similar programs can be better integrated with multiple support services located in the high schools.

7. A NATIONAL POLICY OF YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION

We are encouraged by the promise of these new program directions. But as we look back at the Eisenhower Foundation’s experience over the last decade and forward to the future of American cities, we cannot be as encouraged by the trajectory of national policy. We have been made painfully aware of the limits of that policy as we worked with inner-city neighborhood organizations in the 1980s to fight crime, violence and drug abuse.
The Neighborhood Program was begun during a period of urban retrenchment—a period of systematic withdrawal of resources, and attention and concern from the urban disadvantaged. The federal government slashed many existing urban programs, including many of the most innovative and promising. It cut not only some ineffective programs that seemed to promise only continued dependency and stagnation for the urban poor—but also many of those that sought to contribute to self-sufficiency and self-determination.

The retrenchment, as we’ve seen, constrained in myriad ways the neighborhood organizations with which Eisenhower worked. It diminished the already meager resources available in communities to attack the deepseated problems of violence, youth alienation, and drug abuse—and it simultaneously contributed to the worsening of the problems themselves.

Deterioration

For the crisis of the inner cities we set out to address has indeed deteriorated since the start of the 1980s—much less the end of the 1960s, when the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions drew their already stark and troubling portraits of America’s drift into “two societies.” Some of the changes are glaringly apparent. The drug problem has escalated relentlessly, destroying individuals and families, besieging communities, and massively straining the resources of public and non-profit institutions in the inner cities. Overwhelmed criminal justice systems are strained beyond capacity.

Urban rates of criminal violence in many cities now are up to—and sometimes even beyond—their former peaks in the early 1980s. The number one cause of death nationally among young Black males is murder (not accidents or diseases). Beneath such horrific symptoms lie deeper changes, less explosive and visible but no less devastating, in the underlying social and economic conditions of the inner cities. A few examples serve to sketch the magnitude of that devastation:

*Half* of black children under 6 were below the poverty line in 1988.

The poverty rate among Hispanic children rose by 36% between 1979 and 1988.

The average poor person in the cities is much *farther below* the official poverty line than twenty years ago.

The urban poor are far less likely to *escape* from poverty than they were in the late 1960s.
Forty percent of Black children are raised in fatherless homes.

Since the 1960s, the percentage of white high school graduates enrolled in college has gone up, to almost 60%, while the percent of Blacks has gone down, to about 35%.

Policy Failure

These tragic facts—and we could easily list many more—tell us clearly that, in terms of national impact, the human resource and urban policy we have followed for the past decade has been a dismal failure. Too often, that policy has been based on the belief that we could revitalize the cities and narrow the gap between the "two societies," not by the concerted action called for by the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions, but by cutting back on public services and public commitment and hoping that the fruits of an expanding private economy would "trickle down" to the poor. It became fashionable to say that the inner city's problems had been caused by over-generosity—by too much compassion, too much commitment. Volunteerism was said to be the solution for domestic problems but heavy spending the solution for international security problems. The state of the cities after more than a decade of these policies in action has by now made abundantly clear the limits of these views. We believe it is past time to return the Commissions' vision of "massive, compassionate, and sustained" action to the forefront of the public agenda. We have tried the alternative. It has failed.

Because of this legacy of neglect, the U.S. has fallen behind some European countries and Canada in the seriousness and creativity of its solutions to the problems of drugs, disadvantaged youth and the inner city. For example, in major cities, the French have organized networks of local elected officials, government administrators and private sector leaders. They identify needs, plan action and carry it out. The action plans focus on the people who commit most of the crimes—particularly the young—and include remedial education, job training and job placement as part of the solutions. Cities where these networks function well have reduced crime.

Based on the European experience to date, a recent report to the federal government of Canada recommends, "Canada should be addressing the extent to which its social, educational and economic programs are adequately focused on crime prevention at the local and national level." Importantly, this
report was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice in Canada, which apparently is showing a willingness to construct solutions far beyond the criminal justice system as part of national policy.

Meanwhile, the United States is in great danger of falling still further behind—with consequences that will affect not only the inner cities but the nation as a whole. We believe that enough is known to move forward boldly to reverse the decline of the cities and reclaim the inner-city young. This will require consistent and farsighted leadership at the federal level.

Only at the federal level can enough dollars be earmarked to make a national impact on the inner city. This level of funding will, in turn, leverage substantial private, state and local dollars if we create or reform institutional mechanisms that target funds from the federal to grassroots levels. Bureaucratic heavy handedness will destroy the chemistry needed to tailor local solutions to local needs.

With sufficient resources and flexible federal-local delivery vehicles, a carefully conceived and comprehensive strategy can reach a wide enough segment of the inner city disadvantaged to create a kind of “critical mass”—that will launch deteriorating communities into an upward spiral of increasing organization and achievement and their disinvested youth into a cycle of increasing self-esteem, education and employability.

More specifically, these priorities should be placed high on the national and federal agenda:

The extension of early education to all eligible children and the reform of inner-city schooling;

The creation of a Youth Investment Corporation to replicate inner city successes with older high risk youth, leverage public against private funds, and create a Harvard Business-type management school for staff of inner city youth empowerment and social development non-profit organizations.

The reform of existing school-to-work transition ventures to better integrate training, social support and job placement.

The commitment to a broad strategy of economic development that creates jobs for high risk youth through public investment in infrastructure rehabilitation and affordable housing as a human right, not as an economic commodity.
The enhancement of national drug control strategy—to place more demand side priority on prevention in the inner city and to expand treatment.

Early Intervention and Urban School Reform

Intensive preschool appears to be among the most cost effective crime and drug abuse prevention program yet devised, along many other benefits, as we have been told by the corporate executives on the national Committee for Economic Development. Yet, whereas more than 50% of the nation’s higher income families ($35,000 and above) enroll their 3-year-olds in preschool, the enrollment rate is only 17% for lower income families. It is noteworthy, if frustrating, that the Kerner Commission called for “building on the successes of Head Start” more than twenty years ago. Today, there is almost unanimous agreement among knowledgeable observers that Head Start operates well and that the program should be expanded to the 4 out of 5 eligible disadvantaged children who are left out at current funding levels. The cost would be about $4.8B more per year (about the cost of 8 stealth B-2 bombers). A Ford Foundation panel has recommended that at least one-half of the new slots should be full day programs for children with working parents, and we concur.

A hopeful model for how a federally financed Head Start program for all might be further enriched in part through local government and private sector funding matches is Project Beethoven on the South Side of Chicago, created by businessman philanthropist Irving Harris. Working with families in Robert Taylor Homes public housing who send their children to Beethoven Elementary School, Mr. Harris has combined prenatal care, home visits, help with nutrition and counseling to enable teen mothers to complete school and obtain job training. Their infants are prepared nutritionally, psychologically and socially to enter school. All services are integrated, and available right on the premises of Taylor Homes.

Inner City School System Reform. But effective multiple solutions cannot stop with prenatal and infant care. One promising comprehensive elementary school plan is for states, localities and the private sector to create variations of the Rhode Island Children’s Crusade. The state of Rhode Island is providing state college scholarships for low income pupils, combined with academic and remedial help from third grade through high school. The only requirements are that parents allow state monitoring of report cards and that students obey the law,
shun drugs, avoid early pregnancy and don't drop out. Pupils will be tutored and paired with mentors throughout primary and secondary school. When old enough, top performers will secure summer jobs, where they will serve as role models to others.

The plan, which is contingent on the state matching funds with the private sector, builds on New York State Liberty Scholarships for low income students—but enrolls them at any earlier age and provides educational and social assistance. The idea originates from Eugene Lang's private sector "I Have A Dream" program, described in Chapter 6. Through the "I Have a Dream" Foundation, the idea is spreading throughout the country. We believe that locally tailored variations of the Rhode Island, New York and Eugene Lang concepts, with adult mentors, should be embraced by all 50 states, and should be financed at the state, local and private sector levels. The federal government can disseminate information and might make modest seed grants to set up state systems.

Our position is consistent with the recent report, Saving Urban Schools, by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Carnegie calls for strong federal leadership, backed by actual federal financial support from a proposed National Urban Schools Program, modeled in spirit on the Rural Extension Act that was enacted years ago to assist American farmers. Although federal funds would seed local reform, Carnegie believes that state and local governments have the prime responsibility for the fiscal health of public education. One reasonable guideline is one new federal reform dollar for each eight state and local dollars. This is a modest increase over the 7% Washington presently pays for public education.

Carnegie advocates a national policy of greater equity in urban school financing—which means more money for inner city schools—and a commitment to educate all children, even those from the most difficult backgrounds. Beyond early education and enrichment, Carnegie calls for new local governance procedures. If, after a reasonable period, a specific urban school fails to meet objectives which have been clearly agreed upon in advance, officials from the school system have the power to intervene. Carnegie believes that the range of such intervention should include professional consultation, new leadership in the specific school, and, in the extreme, the closing of the school.

Similarly, the Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development has urged that national policy must proceed beyond early education and pay more attention to continuity with middle
school youth aged 10 to 15. The Council points out that, while youth in this age range are vulnerable to failure and high risk behavior, they are still impressionable and can be influenced—as we have seen, for example, with the progress of youth at the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, many of whom are in this age range. Consequently, the Carnegie Council calls for federal leadership to encourage local change. Rigid class schedules should be replaced with cooperative learning in which students work together in small groups. Teams of about 125 students and 5 or 6 teachers should remain together throughout middle school, until students advance to high school. A core academic program should promote critical reasoning and include community service. California and Florida have begun implementing many of these changes, and the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation is funding demonstration programs to revamp middle schools. Policy planners need to follow the experience of Clark closely and build on its lessons.

We endorse these school-based reforms; the call by the nation's governors for "annual report cards" on students, schools, localities, states and the federal government; and the goal enacted by the nation's governors of making the U.S. first in math and science scores world-wide by the year 2000.

According to a recent poll by the National School Boards Association, urban schools are taking an increasingly active role in providing services against drug abuse and related problems, particularly when family support is inadequate. This is a welcome trend. It should be reinforced through expansion of the multiple solutions in school locations provided by programs like Cities in Schools and the Chicago Youth Guidance and Albuquerque Youth Development programs which the Eisenhower Foundation currently is evaluating.

But we also believe that inner city community organizations like Argus, Centro, DYC and ACW must be empowered to play a stronger role, as partners with parents and schools—especially given that there often are serious bureaucratic impediments to reform in many local school systems and because remedial education and social support often can be more effective in these supportive community alternatives than in schools.

The Youth Investment Corporation

The existing federal Head Start agency provides a vehicle to implement multiple solutions to the needs of very young children. But there is no agency at the national level to provide
leadership and seed funding for day-to-day operating programs (not experimental demonstrations) that solve interrelated dilemmas for older high risk youth.

It is time for a new, dynamic, creative implementing agency—a Youth Investment Corporation. As we propose it here, the Corporation will replicate the principles underlying success at a sufficient scale to begin to create a national impact.

*The LISC Model.* In the early 1970s, the Ford Foundation created the private sector Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC). The purpose of LISC is to generate neighborhood based economic development in the private sector—operating through non-profit community development organizations. LISC has celebrated its tenth anniversary and has been described as "way ahead of the learning curve" by corporate executives assessing progress on anti-poverty programs. Here we have one effective non-profit model of a national intermediary organization in the private sector that can deliver funds and technical assistance to community-based organizations. The Youth Investment Corporation will take on a similar role in supporting youth empowerment and social development in the inner city.

The back pages of this report contain draft federal legislation—the Youth Investment Act of 1992. The Corporation will leverage public against private sector loans and grants, finance replications of successful youth empowerment programs, expand the number of inner city community organizations which can implement such programs, and improve their executive functioning through a new Youth Management Training Institute.

There are some youth organizations which have been well established over many years, have substantial budgets and include affiliates in many cities. The YMCA, YWCA and Boys and Girls Clubs are examples. We do not rule out financial assistance to such groups by the proposed Youth Investment Corporation. But the financial focus will be more on younger, smaller, more neighborhood-based and specifically inner city groups, like ACW and DYC, which show promise but need an infusion of capital and management training so that they can reach a critical mass of operations and financing to proceed on their own, integrating social and neighborhood development in a reasonably concentrated geographic area. The Youth Investment Corporation will work with emerging groups of this kind and also help create and finance new organizations, especially as they can spin off from established groups and especially
when there is an established leadership base in the neighborhood.

The need is great for an infusion of day-to-day operating funds to local groups. To create a national impact, we need many more organizations like Argus and DYC. They need to be financially healthy. Even the best existing programs often continue to struggle financially. This is not due necessarily to insufficiencies within the organizations. Instead, too many public and private funders prefer to finance initial demonstrations, but not continuing operations.

Grants will be necessary for many new and emerging organizations. But when there is sufficient capacity in an organization, the Corporation will make loans, as well. Here, a revolving loan fund might be appropriate. Following the example of LISC's Local Initiatives Managed Assets Corporation, the Youth Investment Corporation can consider a mechanism to purchase sound loans. This can increase the velocity of lending by the Corporation.

The Rouse Model and For-Profit Linkages. The Rouse Corporation, chaired by nationally known developer James Rouse, channels some of its profits to the non-profit Enterprise Foundation, which rehabilitates housing in low income communities. Similarly, the Youth Investment Corporation will make grants or loans to inner city non-profits which create or strengthen for-profit entities. Over time, the for-profits will generate income streams which can at least partially finance the operations of the parent non-profit social development and youth empowerment activity.

The non-profit/for-profit linkages will be crucial to generate more financially self-sustaining mechanisms at the grassroots level. In this way, the Youth Investment Corporation will not just "throw money at the problem." We have sufficient experience not to claim that creating or strengthening viable for-profits in the inner city will be easy. Nor will it be any easier to link them to non-profits. But the Rouse experience, combined with the non-profit structure yet business-like operating style of organizations like the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes in New York and the Marshall Heights Community Development Organization in Washington, D.C., already provide a solid point of departure.

Based on the principles that we have found to underlie success, the Youth Investment Corporation will fund creation or enhancement of comprehensive programs that are evaluated to yield less crime, less drug abuse, less welfare dependency,
fewer adolescent pregnancies, higher self-esteem, more school completion, more successful school to work transitions, more employability, and more economic and psychological self-sufficiency among targeted high risk youth.

We will not expect all organizations to achieve all of these objectives. But each should have multiple outcomes, based on locally tailored need. Another objective will be success in the for-profit activity (which will be a source of employment for the youth). To have a national impact, we recommend that the Youth Investment Corporation initially be funded at $500M per year. The Corporation will leverage at least $1 in private sector, state and local government hard cash matches for each federal $1 granted to local community-based organizations for youth empowerment.

Above and beyond federal seed funding and local cash matches, the Corporation will co-target funds and programs from other public sector agencies to the same neighborhoods. Federal examples include Job Corps centers, training via the Job Training Partnership Act, discretionary Department of Education grants to schools in the neighborhood, economic development grants from the Community Services Administration and the Economic Development Administration, human services grants from the Office of Human Service Development of the federal Department of Health and Human Services, public housing crime prevention grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, resources from the Small Business Administration, and ACTION grants.

Management Training. As part of the overall Youth Investment Corporation, a Youth Management Training Institute will provide a sort of Harvard Business School or Wharton School for executives and staff of inner city social development and youth empowerment organizations. Such business schools will be asked to provide pro bono assistance in establishing the curriculum and training staff. (Business school staff also will need to learn more about inner city organization values and operating realities.) As we found in the initial Neighborhood Program, the need for more efficient management is great. More resources are needed, but, even with them, well meaning and often charismatic program operators are not necessarily good managers. We hope that improved administration, managerial, staff and financial management skills can, therefore, stretch scarce dollars, whatever the funding level, and mitigate against "burnout."

There already is a national Management Training Institute for non-profits. It is focused on economic development agen-
cies. There is a year long training curriculum. Each cohort of trainees spends some time together learning as a group. The rest of the year is spent applying lessons learned back in the community, with on-the-spot technical assistance visits by Management Training Institute and staff. The Youth Investment Corporation will use this strategy as a point of departure for designing training suitable to staff of non-profit organizations oriented more specifically to youth services and social development.

A Public-Private Hybrid. As we envision it, the Youth Investment Corporation will be private sector and non-profit, but authorized and appropriated through the public sector. Only public sector resources, in our experience, are sufficient to make a national impact. The most logical public appropriating agency probably is the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS already has funded more programs (albeit mostly demonstrations) on youth empowerment than any other federal agency. During the 1980s, for example, HHS and the federal Department of Labor sponsored far-sighted demonstrations for high risk youth in over 30 locations—including start-up funds for Eisenhower's affiliated second generation Albuquerque, Chicago and Wilmington programs. During the same decade, the HHS Office of Substance Abuse Prevention gained experience in some promising youth investment-type demonstrations and the Surgeon General of the United States, whose office is located in HHS, created a new policy that perceives violence more as a public health problem than a criminal justice issue.

This is not to rule out the possibility of a Youth Investment Corporation appropriated through the U.S. Department of Labor (which has begun a promising urban youth opportunities program) or the U.S. Department of Justice (which could creatively build on the Canadian Ministry of Justice's receptivity to social development, above). Or appropriations could be channeled to the Corporation as an independent agency, following the original federal funding mechanism of the National Co-op Bank.

A private sector institution will, based on our experience, implement more efficiently and rapidly than a public sector institution. It can better leverage corporate and other private sector funding than a purely public agency, and can promote youth investment via videos and written reports with a more business like image. There also may be increased tax-related opportunity accruing to corporate-like "packaging" of the institution. For example, it might be possible to enact a federal
tax credit to corporations which provide loans and grants to the Youth Investment Corporation.

A private sector entity will allow assembly of a talented, dedicated private sector staff, with private sector salaries and a commitment to remain with the institution for a sufficient time—at least 5 to 10 years—to make a national impact. By contrast, Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the federal bureaucracy stay on the job for an average of about 20 months. This makes it more difficult to develop a long term program of carefully implemented and cost-effective reform.

In sum, we propose a public-private hybrid which incorporates appropriate features of both sectors. Public funding can insure sufficient national impact and oversight to insure priority on the truly disadvantaged. Private sector flexibility and managerial cost-effectiveness can better deliver the change.

Local Targeting. Local community organizations will only receive grants if the local public and private sectors, working cooperatively, ensure that all qualified are placed in employment that has potential for leading to permanent labor market jobs, not just temporary make work. The Corporation will encourage jobs in the immediate inner city neighborhood of the community organization and a mix of employment in both service provision and economic development. This will help promote development of the immediate inner city economy and help to start the rehabilitation of housing and the inner city infrastructure, so jobs and resources don’t “leak out.”

The Corporation will encourage local grant recipients to negotiate problem oriented policing with the mayor. This will help stabilize the neighborhood to for economic development and stabilize the lives of youth monitored by police. [...]

We also note the new Neighborhood Based Initiatives plan proposed for the state of New York. The idea is for all relevant prevention and treatment services for poor women and their babies to be available at one place. Guidance is to come from a Neighborhood Cabinet that includes government and neighborhood representatives. If the Initiatives develop as promised, there is a potential to further integrate them with youth empowerment services facilitated by the Youth Investment Corporation.

Inner city non-profits will be required to involve and build leadership among youth in their immediate neighborhoods. These will not be programs designed to divert youth from all over the city. By making the new innovations neighborhood specific,
the Youth Investment Corporation will seek to create an interactive process between positive change among specific individual youth and positive change for the community as a whole.

The Corporation will educate the public and legislators on how programs have succeeded. It will encourage state and local legislators to adopt their own plans for implementing model programs, whether the implementing vehicles be state or local Youth Investment Corporations or other innovations.

Reforming Existing School-to-Work Training and Placement

The Youth Investment Corporation will provide a new, focused implementing vehicle that expands the capacity of community-based non-profits to train and place high risk youth. The principles for that training and placement already have been articulated through the private sector JobStart demonstration program funded by the Ford Foundation and other institutions.

Job Start. Over the late 1980s, JobStart targeted disadvantaged school dropouts aged 17-21 who read below the eighth grade level. As noted in Chapter 6, the program provided basic education, occupational training, support services such as child care and transportation, and genuine job placement assistance for long term employment. This comprehensive strategy was run through community-based organizations, Job Corps centers, vocational schools and community colleges. Youth who participated in the program showed significant improvement in attaining high school and General Education Diplomas compared to control groups.

Early evaluation evidence suggests that JobStart is more effective in the inner city than local programs implemented under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), the primary current federal operating mechanism for training high risk youth. JobStart does not "cream" the most qualified youth, as do some JTPA programs, but succeeds with those in greatest need. JobStart links basic education to occupational training, while most JTPA-funded agencies do not. JobStart understands that, to be successful, employment training must be complemented by other supportive social services—like mentoring and counseling. This connection is not sufficiently built into all operations encompassed by JTPA. JobStart uses community based non-profit organizations as vehicles for education and training much more than the present JTPA system. JTPA disburses federal money to local Private Industry Councils, which are non-profit, but usually led by corporate-oriented officials
and not indigenous nonprofit minority leaders. This organizational structure does little to empower inner city residents by giving them real ownership in management. In JobStart, “success” is measured in terms of longer run employability, job retention and earnings. In JTPA, “success” is measured in terms of immediate job placement, even if the placement proves to be short-lived. JobStart provides more assistance than JTPA in obtaining jobs after training.

These findings are reinforced by Harvard Kennedy School Professor John D. Donahue, who concludes in his recent book, *The Privatization Decision*, “There is no compelling evidence that the Job Training Partnership Act system, on balance, makes much difference for the employment, earnings and productive capacity of American workers.”

*Other Guides To Success.* In addition to JobStart, several related, innovative job training and placement programs for high risk youth in the 1980s have been positively evaluated and should be integrated into reform of the federal job training systems, in our view. For example, the Comprehensive Competencies Program, an individualized, computer-based learning system that teaches basic educational skills, has been incorporated at some JobStart sites. The Summer Training and Education Program (STEP) uses federal funding and is operated jointly by school officials and employment and training personnel. STEP offers youngsters who are behind in school half days of work and half days of intensive remedial education, together with “life-planning” sessions. Jobs for America’s Graduates is a school-to-work transition program for at-risk high school students that is sponsored by leaders from business, state governments, labor, and education. The Eisenhower-affiliated Youth Development program in Albuquerque and Youth Guidance program in Chicago are related examples of such in-school, business-assisted vocational training that is combined with learning basic verbal and math skills and placement after graduation in the industries represented.

Project Redirection, the Ford Foundation-supported mentoring initiative which has been evaluated as significantly reducing the high school drop-out rate for single teen mothers, also suggests that a coordinated training and job placement program for single teen fathers will further stabilize the lives of the couples. Recent research at the University of Chicago shows that single teen high risk parents are more likely to marry if the father is employed and the mother has finished high school. Marriage encourages stable two-parent family life,
which reduces the risk of crime and other negative behavior by the children.

Nor should we forget that one of our original influences, the residential Job Corps, has been demonstrated as a far more effective alternative to JTPA for training, placement and crime reduction of high risk youth. Currently, 14 states and 12 cities operate year-round Youth Corps that incorporate various elements of the Job Corps experience. Other states and communities operate summer programs. An evaluation of the California Conservation Corps found that the work of Corps members generates a positive economic return. (The current craze of “boot camps” as diversion programs for delinquent youth incorporates some elements of Job Corps discipline but little in the way of effective remedial education, training and placement.)

In sum, to coordinate with our proposed Youth Investment Corporation, the JTPA system should be reformed so that local sites operate more like JobStart, Comprehensive Competencies and variations on Job Corps which better link education, services, training and placement into permanent labor market employment. Recently, JTPA was partially reformed along these lines. But more legislative restructuring is in order—including more delivery of training and placement through inner city non-profits, rather than through the existing, nonempowering Private Industry Councils.

Demographic Trends. Without significant reform of existing federal training and placement of high risk youth, we will miss a rare opportunity to place such youth in the private labor market, based on projected demographic trends over the 1990s. The U.S. Census Bureau reports an 8% decline in 18-year-olds from 1989 to 1990 alone. The number of 18-year-olds will not again reach 1989 levels until 2003. Consequently, companies over the 1990s will be forced to reach out as never before to inner city minorities, many of whom will be unskilled. Companies will have an incentive to train the disadvantaged and to support reform of existing JTPA job placement. This is already happening in programs like Youth Guidance in Chicago. Cities and regions which have the most success in training entry level applicants will have the advantage—over both American and foreign competition. Basic skills in English and math will be essential. But the level of training will have to rise even more—because international competition demands more and more skills. Even simple clerical work now often requires computer knowledge.
Will we reform JTPA and related education wisely—to address the fact that functional illiteracy is 20% in the U.S. and less than 1% in Japan? Or will the emerging private sector job slots be filled by persons other than the currently disadvantaged? Now is the time for top government labor officials to decide. It will take federal, state and local public sector leadership to work with corporate executives to create a more receptive climate in the private sector for the placement of high risk youth.

The Minimum Wage. The minimum wage—which represents society’s effort to establish a floor below which market forces should not be allowed to drive down the living standards of workers—has declined sharply in real value after inflation. For those who work full time at the minimum wage, it has become increasingly difficult to support a family even at the poverty line. We are convinced, based on both simple logic and our own street experience, that we cannot overcome inner-city poverty, or the social impoverishment and isolation that goes with it, by providing below-poverty-level jobs. That is an obvious contradiction in terms. Research has shown over and over again in recent years that too great a proportion of new jobs created in the American economy have been low-paying and unstable. That will continue to be true of the largely service oriented jobs that are expected to dominate new job creation in the next decade. Those jobs cannot hold families together, build a vibrant community economy, or offer an attractive future for the disadvantaged young. A new human resources and urban policy must begin to raise the floor of earnings to a level sufficient to provide the basis for dignity, self-esteem and self-determination. We believe that the current legislative compromise, which restores part of the real value of the minimum wage, is a step in the right direction. But it does not go far enough, because the proposed levels by 1992 will remain substantially below what they were a decade earlier, in real terms. As a first step, the minimum wage should be fully restored to its 1981 purchasing power.

Expanded Funding and Oversight. We endorse the recommendations of the Ford Foundation’s recent report, The Common Good, which concludes that, as in public education, local communities should design and coordinate programs based on existing models, like JobStart and Comprehensive Competencies, and tailored to their needs. At the same time, the federal government needs to carefully consider the recommendations of the William T. Grant Foundation to increase the number of high risk JTPA youth served and to begin at least 30 to 50 new
Job Corps centers. The Grant Foundation proposes expanding from 5% to 10% the number of eligible JTPA high risk youth served (at a cost of about $1B). But the feasibility of expanding to at least 25% (at a cost of about $3B) also should be explored. The real percentage of youth served at this level of funding can be much higher, in our view, if the public sector generates new jobs for at-risk youth in housing and interstate highway repair (below), and if the proposed Youth Investment Corporation helps to coordinate job creation.

If there are significant cuts in the size of American armed forces (see Chapter 8), then the need is even greater for more civilian job training and placement among high risk youth. To manage the training-placement linkage more cost-effectively and to insure that street level implementation resembles Job-Start, a federal office responsible for overall policy and programmatic direction of the government's youth employment efforts needs to be re-established, along the lines of the short-lived Office of Youth Programs in the Department of Labor over the late 1970s. State and local governments need similar coordination.

A "Community Enterprise" Development Strategy for the Inner City

We can call for a significant corporate response to the labor market demographics of the 1990s. But as the Vera Institute in New York has concluded, because of insufficient private sector placement of minority disadvantaged youth, public sector job placement has been essential. Combined with this experience is the pressing need for urban housing, infrastructure revitalization and associated services.

Consequently, we believe that a new human resource and urban agenda must include a concerted plan to develop the "whole community" through providing long-term, stable public sector employment opportunities that address genuine local needs. Without a major new commitment to this vision of public-private local development, we will neither rebuild local labor markets—thereby providing real and challenging work roles for the young—nor deliver the services and reconstructive efforts so urgently needed in the inner cities.

Public Needs. There is clearly no shortage of public needs to be met through local community enterprise. The mile-long collapse of Interstate 880 during the San Francisco earthquake of 1989 was only one of the more tragic illustrations of decrepit urban infrastructure across the nation that urgently needs reconstruction—and that could supply tens of thousands of
new economic development jobs to properly trained youth presently at high risk of drug abuse and crime.

As one astute observer wrote,

Our cities are in dire need of rebuilding, especially at the core. In most major cities, the great supplies of housing built to accommodate the influx of migrants, from rural areas and abroad, in the early part of this century are long overdue for rehabilitation or replacement. Our public facilities are in similar need of repair. In the coming years, these needs will multiply almost beyond measure. If we begin now to repair the decay of the past and meet the needs of the future, we can create hundreds of thousands of new jobs directly, and indirectly, millions more.

The description sounds like any one of many written about urban America in the 1980s; but the writer was Robert Kennedy and the year was 1967. What has mainly changed is that these public needs have deepened in the ensuing two decades.

The Kerner Report, too, citing "vast unmet needs" in education, health, transportation, recreation, public safety and other services, called for direct public job creation—"one million new jobs in the public sector"—as a key response to the deterioration of urban labor markets and the erosion of opportunities for the young. The Violence Commission, similarly, called for public or non-profit job creation to provide a range of community services, from job counseling to family support, from drug abuse treatment to infrastructure repair.

A Bubble Up Non Profit Enterprise Strategy. We have been encouraged by renewed national concern about the urgency of inner city economic development. But we are skeptical of some of the current calls for refurbishing strategies of urban development which—like enterprise zones—depend on luring private for-profit corporations into poor communities by promising to relax wage and other regulations and lower taxes. That "trickle down" approach has been tried; it has had little success, especially compared to our "bubble up" approach of directly empowering non-profit minority community organizations. It has led to scandal, like the money misspent by the Wedtech Corporation in the Bronx. The private market has repeatedly pronounced its judgment on the current condition of the inner cities. Without substantial change, these communities will remain too volatile, their work forces too poorly skilled and unstable, to attract private enterprise consistently, on the level required to turn around the economic base of the
community and to provide fulfilling jobs at living wages for local residents. And as recent studies both in the United States and in Great Britain indicate, the hidden costs of enterprise zone strategies in lost tax revenues actually render them prohibitively expensive, in terms of costs per jobs created. Nor will such a strategy directly address the pressing service needs of these communities.

On the other hand, we believe that a process of economic development led by entrepreneurs in the private non-profit sector can revitalize the inner city in ways that can, in the long run, make private for-profit investment feasible and attractive—and simultaneously create a strong local market for the products of private enterprise. Most critically, in addition to highway reconstruction by the Department of Transportation, we need a renewed federal commitment to the construction and rehabilitation of low income housing, with non-profit organizations as the primary contractors.

Our draft legislation for a national Youth Investment Corporation also suggests the considerable potential for linking non-profit organizations to for-profit affiliates or subsidiaries, following the lead of the Enterprise Foundation and the Rouse Corporation. Such linkages, in our view, should be basic to a community enterprise strategy.

_Housing as a Human Right, Not a Commodity._ As conditions deteriorated in the inner cities in the 1980s, consultants and developers for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) profited. Under the present system of low income housing construction and rehabilitation, almost everyone involved in the housing sector—real estate developers, builders, mortgage lenders, investors, and landlords—seeks a profit on the commodity. Practices in the private housing sector increasingly add costs to housing, from land development, through every stage of construction or rehabilitation, to final sale. In response, the Institute for Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. recommends a national housing program that treats housing not as a commodity but as a human right. The plan transfers the development, construction, rehabilitation and management of housing from the profit to the non-profit sectors.

The Foundation's own street level experience (along with that of many local community development corporations) shows clearly that housing construction and rehabilitation can be a major component of community economic regeneration and also a key sector for the creation of jobs and supportive services for high risk youth. Several non-profit organizations
with which the Eisenhower Foundation has worked have established an impressive track record in undertaking home repair and rehabilitation, developing housing, or in fostering retail, manufacturing and light industrial development, coupled with associated social services. Examples are the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes Community Housing Corporation in the Bronx; the Local Development Corporation of East New York, in Brooklyn; Baltimore Jobs in Energy; and Jubilee Housing, the Marshall Heights Community Development Organization and Around the Corner to the World in Washington, D.C. Of course, it is the business of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and James Rouse's Enterprise Foundation to catalyze such non-profit development. They partner with scores of qualified groups, which should become the foundation of the new direction for HUD proposed here.

Details of a non-profit sector housing development and rehabilitation plan have been introduced in Congress. They provide a point of departure for new legislation in the 1990s that departs from our present policy which, in effect, "bribes" for-profit developers to build low income homes. The timing is ripe for considering new alternatives, given that HUD is committed to cleaning up the current scandal among developers and consultants, and to creating more tenant management in public housing.

It will take a decade to expand beyond existing non-profits and develop enough new non-profit organizations to address housing needs for the poor. And there will be great pressure from the for-profit constituency of HUD to keep money flowing to it. So we do not here recommend an immediate, dramatic increase in housing rehabilitation and building by non-profits in one year or two. Rather, we recommend a program over the 1990s through which HUD expands the non-profit sector's capacity and involvement in the $10B which the federal government now spends annually on low income housing. As success is demonstrated, the non-profit constituency will be further built up.

Ultimately, though, we must face the realities that housing is expensive and that much more low income housing is needed—as is demonstrated by the homelessness which our allies abroad cannot understand and our competitors use to critique our system. For example, public housing may improve through tenant management, but such management must be accompanied by dollar investments. In 1991 some 700,000 current rental-subsidy contracts expire; failure to renew them will cause severe hardship.
Over the 1980s, HUD’s overall yearly budget authority fell from $38B to $15B. We suggest that budget authority be rein-stated incrementally to the $38B level at the same time that the number of non-profit community organizations is enlarged, the capacity of existing models is expanded, and management training of non-profit executives is enhanced. Initial incre-ments of expanded budget authority for non-profits can be undertaken in recognition that the HUD scandal already has cost tax payers an estimated $6.9B in Federal Housing Admin-istration losses alone, according to the Secretary of HUD. Because the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation already have proven themselves as effective, private, high leveraging vehicles for building and rehabilitating housing with non-profit community organizations, we recommend that HUD build on these models in administering the new non-profit program.

As will be the case with our proposed Youth Investment Corporation, HUD can require that each local non-profit housing development and rehabilitation organization create a for-profit subsidiary that feeds revenues into the parent organization. The result can be a balance between tapping entrepreneurial potential and insuring that inner city develop-ment is not used simply to benefit the affluent.

The goal is to harness the development process to create job opportunities for high risk youth which, when combined with reformed job training, remedial education and counseling, can generate a powerful housing-driven program that recon-structs the inner city, shelters the poor, empowers non-profit organizations, and reduces crime and drug abuse. Up to now, HUD has done little to recognize, in this way, the vast potential of housing development for empowering high risk youth.

Tenant Empowerment and National Impact. One of our initial influences, the Fairview Homes public housing crime preven-tion program in Charlotte, North Carolina (Chapter 2) was in fact based on job creation and tenant empowerment. It has already been declared a model program by HUD—through special recognition and awards made in 1985 and 1987.

There currently is much talk about empowering public housing tenants, but unless tenant management and ownership are expanded from a few exemplary programs to most public housing projects around the nation, unless tenants are ade-quately trained to manage, unless job training and opportunity for project youth are realized, and unless funds are provided for coordinated social and economic development, our experi-ence predicts little national impact.
Along the same lines, volunteerism, block watches and tenant patrols are being advocated for public housing without adequate recognition of their limitations. HUD policy should be revised to better recognize that such traditional policy, especially block watches, can only work as a small part of a multiple solutions youth investment strategy, like Project Beethoven in Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago. Similarly, HUD, as a bricks-and-mortar agency, has always been vulnerable to rhetoric about increased and expensive hardware, locks, lighting and physical redesign to make space more "defensible"—even though such "security" does nothing to change the motivations of high risk housing project youth. The relative high costs of physical changes at times have led to misuse of funds. As part of current, welcome reforms, HUD leadership now has a genuine opportunity to proceed beyond that limited, traditional bricks and mortar mind set.

Drug Abuse Prevention, Drug Treatment and National Health Policy

The national Drug Control Strategy is a commendable beginning. It is an initial response to an American dilemma that must be resolved over a great many years in a thoughtful, bipartisan way. Leaders on both sides of the aisle in Congress agree with the Executive Branch that the policy will need to be revised and refined over time.

As part of the continuing dialogue, the Foundation recognizes that a comprehensive plan must acknowledge all levels of need. Surely strong supply side drug enforcement is crucial—nationnally and internationally. As part of the supply side response, we have advocated more creative, problem oriented policing in inner cities to support the work of youth empowerment organizations, to protect them against the violence associated with drug dealing, to keep dealers off-balance and on the move, and to help stabilize the neighborhood for economic development.

The Foundation's experience also suggests that the initial National Drug Control Strategy is unnecessarily daunted by the crisis of the inner city, where both drug use and dealing are most intense. We believe that present policy needs to be balanced more with the lesson that, especially in the inner city, demand creates supply.

Drug Prevention. We already have spelled out a demand side prevention policy to reduce drug use among high risk youth in the inner city. The common elements which appear to underlie successful programs must be applied in a variety of
locally tailored ways, and combined with problem oriented policing. Though we favor expansion of non-profit organizations as the implementing vehicles, there are myriad ways of applying sanctuary, mentoring, peer influence, social support, discipline and related principles which involve parents, the schools and churches in concert with government agencies.

As long as inner city conditions and opportunity fail to improve significantly, we can, based on past experience, expect the demand for drugs to continue, regardless of which psychoactive substance currently is fashionable among users in a particular location. (Drugs were a severe problem in the inner city long before the currently declared drug crisis.)

It is not difficult to illustrate the threat of new drugs. Although not widely popular on the U.S. East Coast, methamphetamine—"crank"—has been used for over a decade on the West Coast, mostly by persons on the bottom of the economic ladder and often among kids who have school problems and abusive parents. Crank is highly addictive, with a much longer lasting high than crack cocaine. According to Congressional testimony by Dr. Elliott Currie of the Institute for Study of Social Change, University of California, Berkeley, crank is a "drug that you can make in your bathtub using a few inexpensive industrial chemicals, and it doesn't take a genius to do it: In the Western States, it is routinely made by people who're low-skilled, poorly educated, sometimes nearly illiterate."

The implications are profound. As U.S. Senator Sam Nunn has stated on ABC's Nightline, even if supply side interdiction were 100% successful in stopping drugs from entering the U.S., "in three months" there would be alternative, U.S.-made drugs on the street market to respond to continuing demand by users.

From the perspective of this report, some of the reasons for inner city drug use are similar to the reasons for drug dealing. As Dr. Terry Williams, of the City College of New York, discusses in a recent book, there are few legal labor market options. Unlike Wall Street and Madison Avenue, in East Harlem, with an unemployment rate of over 16%, the drug economy can be perceived as "an equal opportunity employer." In spite of the brutality of the business, drug dealing may raise self-esteem more than, in the words of one East Harlem observer, "being exploited by the white man" or working as a supermarket bagger. Even if you are scared and want out of the drug business, peer and gang pressure can keep you in.
The community-based programs described in this report are successful precisely because they respond to these street realities. The mentors and big brothers in these programs are listened to when they expose the lies of big money to be made in crack dealing. Remedial education, job training and placement in a supportive setting combine to provide viable legal options that make street sense. Peer influence to follow gang rules is rechanneled into peer influence, for example, to pursue Simba Manhood Training, as is being done by the Juvenile Awareness Education Program in Wilmington, Delaware. Of course, to call for more demand side options is not to excuse drug dealing. We reiterate the need for tough law enforcement.

**Drug Treatment.** There is relatively little good information from sound evaluations available to guide national policy on inner city drug treatment. We are, therefore, encouraged by the increased commitment to treatment as part of the new National Drug Control Strategy.

Available evaluations suggest that “therapeutic communities” should be part of a comprehensive national treatment policy. The term therapeutic community is generic, describing a variety of residential programs serving a wide spectrum of drug and alcohol abusers. In comparison to other methods of drug treatment, therapeutic communities coordinate multiple solutions in a single setting—vocational counseling; work therapy; education; recreation; group, family and individual therapy; and medical, legal and social services. The primary “therapist” is the community itself—consisting of mentors, staff and peers who role model successful personal change. The treatment process involves initial orientation, primary treatment during which participants progress from junior status to role models, and gradual reentry into society. The residential program at Argus (Chapter 2) is a therapeutic community.

Examples of successfully evaluated therapeutic communities include Abraxis, begun in Philadelphia; Daytop Village, begun in New York; Gateway House, begun in Chicago; Phoenix House, begun in New York; Second Genesis, begun in Chicago; and medical, legal and social services. The primary “therapist” is the community itself—consisting of mentors, staff and peers who role model successful personal change. The treatment process involves initial orientation, primary treatment during which participants progress from junior status to role models, and gradual reentry into society. The residential program at Argus (Chapter 2) is a therapeutic community.

Examples of successfully evaluated therapeutic communities include Abraxis, begun in Philadelphia; Daytop Village, begun in New York; Gateway House, begun in Chicago; Phoenix House, begun in New York; Second Genesis, begun in Washington, D.C. and Stay 'N Out, begun in New York. All were created as heroin treatment programs and were positively evaluated as such. All now have switched much more to cocaine treatment, but cocaine-specific evaluations have not been completed. Typically, about two-thirds of the treatment populations of such successes are 21 years or older, though an increasing number of therapeutic community programs (like Abraxis) focus on adolescents. Many of the elements which the
Eisenhower Foundation has identified as common among successful inner city prevention programs also appear to underlie therapeutic communities established for treatment.

Still, the surface has barely been scratched when it comes to treatment innovations in the United States. There are a total of 5,000 existing treatment centers of all kinds. Most are short term and outpatient. There is as yet little scientific proof of their cost-effectiveness. There is poor coordination in terms of channeling the estimated 4 million addicts into them. A majority of treatment slots still are for heroin users. Yet they now are far outnumbered by cocaine addicts and multiple abusers—who require different treatment strategies. And there is insufficient attention to the special needs of the disadvantaged and women.

We do know this. Something close to a consensus has emerged that significantly more funding is required to close the gap between treatment need and availability among the disadvantaged. Without it, hard drugs will continue to ravage families and communities in the inner city; drug-related violence will continue at levels that place many neighborhoods in a state of siege. Unless we begin to turn that situation around, it will undermine all of our other efforts to develop the inner city economically and socially. Expanded drug abuse treatment, intensive outreach and aftercare need to be linked closely with youth enterprise development, family supports, intensive remedial education and other services. For example, a high official at the National Institute On Drug Abuse has observed that, "For many addicts, it's not rehabilitation; it's habilitation. They don't know how to read or look for work, let alone beat their addictions." As with the Foundation's second generation of prevention programs, much more needs to be learned about the relative effectiveness of residential versus day treatment. And community-based facilities need to build in more neighborhood police substations to encourage acceptance by neighborhood residents, who otherwise would fear for their safety.

Treatmet and Health Care. Underlying the inadequacy of present drug treatment funding and facilities is the absence of sufficient health care for millions of the "working poor." Coupled with reductions and limitations in Medicaid programs in many states, this has meant that many of the most basic drug abuse, mental health, nutrition and preventative health needs of inner city residents have been increasingly neglected. Today, Medicaid reaches fewer than half of those below the official poverty line. One result is that too many of the disadvantaged, because of poor health or mental health, could not participate
fully in community redevelopment even if its economic underpinnings were in place. And the lack of adequate care has put hundreds of thousands of poor children on the street with unresolved health and mental health needs—deeply compounding the alienation, volatility and drug involvement of all too many youth in the inner city. Our own experience in community programs like DYC affirms the crucial importance of these preventive services. That is why, in Puerto Rico, at one of the original influences on the Eisenhower Foundation, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre incorporated a community health care system in support of its delinquency prevention ventures. National polls show a broad and growing consensus on the need for a more comprehensive and more equitable system of health care—and a willingness on the part of Americans to pay for it. It is past time to transform that consensus into action.

8. FINANCING POLITICALLY FEASIBLE INVESTMENTS IN YOUTH AND THE ECONOMY

Our experience has been that the most cost-effective, least bureaucratic way to create urban change is to design programs locally. When people have a stake in designing and planning a program, they will work harder to successfully implement it.

As proven vehicles for implementing change, inner city non-profit organizations typically are closer to the people than more distant, more bureaucratic agencies. The non-profits are channels for genuine popular participation. Our evidence is that community organizations can deliver services more efficiently and at lower cost than other institutions.

Whatever the sources of new monies, we therefore favor direct funding to community non-profits whenever feasible, and the future development of far more of such institutions.

Next closer to the people and therefore next most preferable as the institutions creating change are city based public and private programs. Here the lesson for increased cost-effectiveness is not to base programs "downtown," but in neighborhood-based offices of city government and private agencies, like the Neighborhood Based Initiatives plan proposed in the State of New York (Chapter 6).

Local and State Investment

Local strategies can and should be financed, in part, by local means. If, for example, state and local authorities were to reallocate just 5% of the $44B annually spent on the criminal justice system at their levels of government to community-
based non-profits, the amount would be over 4 times that of
the proposed national Youth Investment Corporation, funded
$500M a year initially.

In another example, highly relevant to the policy proposed
here, the Governor of Oregon recently proposed "the most
significant—the most effective—anti-drug, anti-crime, pro-edu-
cation strategy (in America)." It is expansion of pre-school to
every child in Oregon who needs it, financed by earmarking
30% of the state's lottery dollars. Indeed, over the 1980s more
than 30 states increased taxes to maintain and increase social
programs, including a broad range of youth and education ini-
tiatives. And, from experience, we know that community based
groups are creative in identifying new sources of revenue. For
example, ALTERBUDGET, a coalition of nearly one hundred
community based social service agencies in New York City,
developed a proposal for an increased hotel room tax in order
to bridge the gap between revenues and needed social services.
Today, many local organizations, working with mayors, find
that time spent analyzing local budgets and identifying loop-
holes and waste is valuable in finding additional funds.

Federal Investment

At the same time, when adjusted for inflation, federal
investment in youth and related programs has declined by a
quarter or more over the 1980s. In 1981, New York City
received 16% of its total revenue from the federal government;
by 1990, only 9.6%.

This is the opposite policy of the Kerner and Eisenhower
Commissions, which saw the federal government as the only
institution with enough resources and, potentially, the moral
authority to reverse the crisis of two societies, more separate
and less equal. They called for significant new allocations that
would supplement, not supplant, prior Congressional appro-
priations, and asked for sustained funding at these levels over a
long period of time.

A credible strategy for local development, then, must pro-
vide national-level resources on a scale sufficient to address the
deepening needs of local people and communities, in order to
make that empowerment real rather than simply rhetorical.
American taxpayers should not acquiesce to insufficient federal
responsibility. In the face of the growing economic impover-
ishment and social devastation of many urban communities, we
cannot substitute calls for more volunteers for a real commit-
ment to broad-scale, job-creating community economic devel-
opment. We cannot substitute vague pleas to "get the neighborhood organized" for a real commitment to channel federal resources to investment in the youth who are the life-blood of the community. We have seen—in our own programs and in the best of others—that enormous creativity can be unleashed by putting local community groups in the lead. But we are frankly fooling ourselves if we imagine that they can do the job on the cheap.

Federal dollars for urban problems can be made more effective if they are directly targeted to the levels at which strategies are best formulated. This means direct federal grants to city government and to even more decentralized neighborhood organizations. For example, federal, anti-drug block grant money is routed through states, and this has produced some inequities. In 1989, more than 50% of drug arrests in Wisconsin were in Milwaukee, which received only 11% of federal money allocated to the state. For the same year, Los Angeles had 20% of the drug arrests but received only 6% of the state allocations from the federal government.

A $10 Billion Per Year, 10 Year Federal Budget

The amount of new federal spending focused on disadvantaged high risk children and youth that is needed per year over a minimum 10 year period to create a national impact depends on success in reforming and better co-targeting existing federal education, employment and economic development programs. If significant progress on such reform is forthcoming in the practical ways that we propose here, then a reasonable beginning for a national program is slightly more than $10B per year in federal spending for each of 10 years. These should be new funds, above and beyond federal fiscal year 1991 spending. They should be carefully targeted to the disadvantaged—for preschool for all eligible ($4.8B), the Youth Investment Corporation ($500M), and job training and placement reformed to implement JobStart-type initiatives locally and expanded to more eligible youth ($3B). All of these initiatives can be considered as demand-side drug abuse prevention. In addition, we propose at least $2B more per year on coordinated drug abuse treatment that is integrated with the multiple solutions for multiple problems concept. This estimate does not include returning housing development and rehabilitation to the levels of the 1970s, repairing our Interstate highways, providing adequate medical care to the disadvantaged (all federal responsibilities) and urban educational reform in inner cities (which has
more local and state responsibility). It assumes an equal amount of new expenditures from state government, local government and the private sector combined. It assumes that corporate America will significantly expand permanent labor market opportunities for high risk youth in the 1990s, even though more job opportunities must be provided by the public sector in urban infrastructure reinvestment and low income housing rehabilitation and construction.

These are our ultimate goals. To increase their political feasibility, we recommend that the $10B per year increase be implemented incrementally. We recommend $2B more per year, so that, after 5 years, total spending on these federal programs will be up by $10B per year. Such a schedule will allow for managed growth and orderly administrative expansion of capacity. A similar incremented process makes political sense for the related federal reforms in housing, infrastructure and medical care, and for matching state, local and private sector financing.

Understanding the Federal Budget Deficit

Where will we find the federal funds?

To answer this question, we must recognize simultaneous fiscal demands. In particular, given the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, the federal budget deficit must be reduced at the same time that youth investment and community reconstruction are pursued.

We must be honest about the size of the deficit. [...] The Congressional Budget Office projected a fiscal 1990 deficit of over $200B that rose to over $240B in fiscal 1991. This increase is in contrast to the projected decrease in the deficit from about $140B in fiscal 1990 to about $130B in fiscal 1994, if we count surplus revenues from the Social Security Trust Fund. But it is highly misleading to count the Social Security surplus—and to use that surplus to pay for government operating programs, including military hardware. The Social Security monies were not intended to hide the true deficit, but to guarantee pension benefits for today's taxpaying workers when they retire.

Reducing Defense Expenditures

If, then, we acknowledge the magnitude of fiscal change necessary on a number of fronts at the same time, the most likely source of new revenue is from defense reductions.
In 1969, the Presidential Violence Commission proposed financing inner city reform through the "peace dividend" expected at the end of the Vietnam War. The surplus monies never materialized. Today, with the Soviet threat and Eastern European tensions reduced, there is similar talk. Learning from the past, we must make every effort to transform the emerging peace with Moscow into a genuine peace dividend for American society, while we continue to maintain a secure defense that is adequate for present realities.

The current argument for American military cuts is based in part on confirmation by the Central Intelligence Agency that the Soviet Union has delivered on promised initial defense cuts and that greater Soviet military cuts are in fact, quite possible. Also key has been an improvement in the capability of U.S. and allied intelligence, making it possible to increase the number of days of warning that the West has before a projected all-out Soviet attack. "Warning time drives strategy and strategy drives the budget," concluded the Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Sam Nunn.

MIT professor emeritus, William W. Kaufman, a defense analyst for several U.S. defense secretaries, has concluded in a Brookings Institution study that the U.S. can reduce its defense budget from $305B per year to $160B per year over the next 10 years without undermining its global commitments or its position in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Professor Kaufman concludes that a total of about $500B can be saved over 10 years. The first step in the Kaufman plan "would be to halt the rush to produce a next generation of weapons that is now in the acquisition pipeline—at a cumulative cost of more than $117 billion."

Professor Kaufman's recommendations for the Army for the first five years of his plan are to cut one active-duty division in the United States and to reduce force levels in Europe through a new conventional-forces reduction agreement with the Soviets. He also would postpone high-technology battlefield weapons development.

For the Air Force, he proposes to scale back the B-2 stealth force to 13 bombers and conduct rigorous testing; cancel the C-17 cargo plane and buy more C-5B transports; defer production of the Advanced Tactical Aircraft; cut back the F-15E fighter jet and build some B-1B bombers to carry air-launched cruise missiles.

For the Navy and Marines, the Kaufman plan is to eliminate 2 of the 14 aircraft carrier battle groups; cancel the SSN-
When it comes to strategic programs, the Kaufman recommendation is to cancel the MX Rail Garrison strategic missile and the Midgetman missile and focus on maintaining a survivable strategic deterrent based on Trident ballistic-missile submarines. He would continue a limited number of B-1B bombers and B-52s carrying air-launched cruise missiles and maintain land-based Minuteman III missiles. He would cancel the new-generation D-5 Trident II missile.

There are many other supporting voices across the political spectrum. Reductions in the Strategic Defense Initiative are high on many lists. Conservative columnist James J. Kilpatrick has concluded, “When do we get out of this madness we are caught in? We can’t keep maintaining this war machine without a plausible enemy.” The three past chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified before Congress that the U.S. does not need to deploy the MX and Midgetman missile systems. Former Reagan Administration Defense official Lawrence J. Korb has urged a well-thought-out plan to contract the armed forces “in recognition of the political-fiscal realities” in a changing world. The editors of Business Week observe that, “In a $4 trillion economy with a $1 trillion federal budget there is surely room for some shifts in spending” — including a shift “away from guns and toward people.” The conservative British Economist magazine has argued that the U.S. can do without two more aircraft carriers in “today’s slightly simpler world.” The President of the Carnegie Corporation for the Advancement of Teaching reminds us that this reduction would finance all the inner city education reforms needed for the entire country. A recent Senate Budget Committee report stated that the Pentagon has stockpiled at least $30B of spare parts, uniforms and other equipment that it does not need. The report also finds that the Defense Department still has orders in for $1.8B more in supplies that its own auditors say should be canceled. A recent Harvard Business School study has concluded that $40B a year can be saved through improved management and quality control. Yale historian Paul Kennedy has argued in The Rise and Fall of the Great Industrial Powers that, if too large a proportion of resources is diverted to military purposes, national power weakens in the long run because of internal decay.
The federal government now spends about one-sixteenth as much on all employment and training activities as it does on military procurement alone. The costs of a single weapons system, the B-1 Bomber, in 1987 exceeded the total costs of all federal employment and training programs. But the massive numbers in the defense budget look very different when seen from the perspective of community programs which must hold candy sales to help finance drug abuse prevention. At current estimates, the cost of a single MX missile would pay for an anti-crime, anti-drug program on the scale of the initial Eisenhower Neighborhood Program more than one hundred times over. Funded at $500M per year level, the Youth Investment Corporation costs $5/6 of one B-2 stealth bomber.

Changes of the magnitude proposed by Professor Kaufman can significantly reduce the federal budget deficit and finance the $10B per year federal youth investment and community reconstruction plan proposed here. We must resist cosmetic change and defense number games. Reductions must be in actual outlays, not merely budget authority. Savings must be based on actual outlay reductions, not merely smaller increases in future budget projections.

Redirecting the Military-Industrial Complex to Empower the Disadvantaged

In the 1990s, we can expect formidable resistance to reductions from both the military and its corporate suppliers. Cuts in troops are relatively easy politics, but cancellations of giant industrial contracts are more complex. The challenge is to rechannel a reduced military into helping to resolve our drug and inner city crises. Likewise, the challenge is to avoid defense contractors plant closing and consequent unemployment by retooling for other production, including work to help repair the urban infrastructure (as well as production to upgrade other industries, like electronics).

After the American invasion of Panama in 1989, we saw pictures of U.S. forces aiding in rebuilding that country. Military personnel advised Panamanians on management, planning, law enforcement and infrastructure repair. Why cannot the Armed Forces do the same for the inner city? The Pentagon has a role in supply side interdiction of drug traffickers. But to the extent that the Defense Department now needs to justify appropriations, even at reduced levels, why not play a role in demand side prevention and treatment? For example,
the Armed Forces can help design and construct and repair community-based facilities.

By the same token, defense contractors can construct modular housing based on space technology. It can be installed for community based residences, non-residential youth empowerment, administrative offices and protective police community based mini stations—as well, of course, as for sheltering the homeless. Cooperative ventures can be formed with non-profits for this task. Inspired leadership from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraged by the Congress, can help create such a metamorphosis.

*Retargeting Federal Domestic Programs*

The deficit-reducing belt tightening of the 1990s places a heavy burden on already underfunded domestic programs. But some reallocations are possible, given what the Foundation has learned in the last decade. For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 granted the Attorney General greater latitude to seize currency and other property connected with illegal drug trafficking and money laundering. As a result, the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Fund has grown dramatically—from $27M in 1985 to over $500M in 1989. Most of these monies presently are used for supply side anti-drug initiatives. We believe that at least 50% each year should be reallocated to demand side prevention and treatment.

The Secretary of HUD has proposed elimination of HUD discretionary programs. These monies could be applied to our proposed $10B per year in new expenditures. In addition, because we already have identified many common elements underlying successful programs for high risk youth, some discretionary funding earmarked for more experimental demonstrations at the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of Human Development Services) and Department of Labor (Manpower and Training Administration) could be reprogrammed for implementing operating programs that replicate success. When combined with discretionary Justice Department funds and monies from the Asset Forfeiture Fund, these HUD, HHS and DOL resources could finance much of the $500M per year Youth Investment Corporation operating program to implement what we already know to work.
Raising New Revenue

The President's Council on Competitiveness has estimated that each 1-cent increase in gasoline taxes would bring in roughly $1B annually to the Treasury. A 25-cent per gallon increase would raise about $25B a year, or roughly 5 times what the federal government now spends on employment and training activities of all kinds. That sum could fund an inner-city program on the scale of the entire four year span of the Eisenhower Neighborhood Program about every 25 minutes. And it would leave us with gasoline prices still far lower than those in most European countries.

We can add several billion dollars a year to that amount by increasing excise taxes on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes—while simultaneously decreasing alcohol and tobacco-related health costs as well as the complex social costs associated with them. These taxes have decreased sharply, in real terms, in recent decades; adjusted for inflation, taxes on alcohol are only about one-fourth of what they were in the early 1950s, taxes on cigarettes closer to half. It is estimated that doubling them would raise roughly $10B each year. An additional $20-30B could be drawn in by moderate taxes on speculative securities transactions. What all of the latter strategies have in common is that they divert monies from unproductive (and often destructive) consumption to socially vital expenditure. Other things equal, taxes on gasoline, alcohol and cigarettes tend to be regressive, falling proportionately harder on the poor than on the affluent. But targeting the revenues specifically to programs for low-income communities would surely help offset that concern—and would insure that new revenues are actually spent on the most pressing problems.

The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee has in fact proposed new taxes on alcohol, tobacco and gasoline that would raise $100B a year. The Senate Minority Leader has endorsed the proposal.

...[O]ver the 1980s, the rich grew richer and their effective federal tax rate declined. The poor grew poorer, and their effective tax rate increased. The federal tax system grew less progressive. These shifts were unprecedented in the post World War II era.

For example, the tax rate for taxpayers who earn more than $208,510 a year now is 28%—compared to 33 percent for those earning between $78,350 and $208,510 annually. At the least, the marginal rates should be the same. Accompanying such more equitable taxation, it has been proposed that a 10%
corporate income surcharge be imposed on the top 10% of all corporate tax payers, along with a 10% income surcharge on the top 5% of individual tax payers. Together, these changes would raise $20B more per year.

In another plan, adding a 38% income tax bracket for single filers with taxable incomes of $101,600 or more (and joint filers with $169,350 or more) would raise $101B in the next 5 years, according to the Congressional Budget Office. This option would affect only the richest 1 million tax payers. Along the same lines, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee has proposed an increase in the tax rate of the wealthiest Americans, whose incomes have grown faster than their taxes, to bring in $44B more per year. The Senate Minority Leader also has endorsed this plan.

The Economic Argument Is Also a Moral Argument

In finding revenues from these and other sources, we seek what really is only a modest shift in priorities. The shift is economic as well as moral. How can we find $166B to bail out the savings and loan industry—but say we cannot find less than one-tenth that amount per year to invest in our children and youth who are at risk? How can investments in inner city infrastructure decline sharply while Federal Housing Administration losses alone amounted to almost $7B, as part of the HUD scandal? Will the federal government pay $400B for a mission to Mars but not invest across the street in crack addiction treatment for pregnant mothers to reduce a District of Columbia infant mortality rate that is three times the national average? Our national savings rate is 3% of GNP, compared to 18% in Japan. Can we continue to pay $185B per year interest on the national debt and do little to increase the savings that is needed to finance investment in the economy?

We believe that it is abundantly clear that a policy sensitive to youth investment can reduce the social deficit while it simultaneously reduces the fiscal deficit, by creating a more healthy and productive economy.

Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction Are Politically Feasible

Considerable support can be found from public opinion polls for the positions proposed here. For example, a national 1985 Gallup Poll found that over half believe that police will not solve the crime problem. A national 1986 *New York Times* poll found 87% believe that what we're doing isn't working to
reduce crime. In a 1986 Harris National poll, three quarters of Americans surveyed said they were prepared to pay higher taxes to provide more day care and education. In a study of American attitudes that same year, Mr. Harris concluded that “people not only want to help children generally, they want particularly to help the children who are living in poverty.” From 1985 to 1988, the proportion of respondents in a national New York Times/CBS poll who thought drugs were “the most important problem facing this country today” rose from 1% to 54%. The proportion of respondents who answered “war and defense” declined from 23% to 1%. In a 1989 Washington Post/ABC national poll, 76% believed that spending for the federal anti-drug program should be increased. The U.S. Secretary of Transportation has found a willingness among the public to raise taxes for highway reconstruction. One 1990 New York Times/CBS national poll found 68% to believe that the nation’s education is not improving. Another 1990 New York Times/CBS poll found that 71% believe the federal government “hasn’t shown enough concern for the homeless.” Still another national 1990 poll from the same organizations found that 62% of Americans want the peace dividend resulting from U.S. military cuts spent “to fight problems such as drugs and homelessness”—not on various alternatives, such as cutting taxes.

From the beginning, Sergeant Shriver, first director of the agency that began Head Start, sought to “write Head Start across the face of this nation” so that it was immune from political destruction. He marketed Head Start by insisting on multiple goals. This insured a diverse constituency. Conservatives liked the notion of “investing” in children so that they could be “self-sufficient.” Liberals liked early intervention that countered disadvantage. Shriver succeeded—despite the conventional wisdom that it is hard to rally support for programs targeted on the poorest Americans. Head Start’s broad constituency sustained the program politically until long term evaluation proved its cost-effectiveness—and therefore deepened support even more.

Because we have been guided by the preschool concept of multiple solutions for multiple problems, it is equally possible to construct multiple constituencies for youth investment coupled with inner city reconstruction. And we need to remember that the formula simultaneously is a demand side anti-drug strategy.

Much already is in place. Many of the principles underlying Argus, Around the Corner to the World, Centro, Fairview
Homes, Umoja, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, Job Corps, JobStart, and Project Redirection are the principles of Robert Kennedy's Mobilization for Youth. Yet the Wall Street Journal has praised Argus as "an inner city school that works." Ronald Reagan met personally with and praised the Founder of Centro, Sister Isolina Ferre. The Fairview Homes public housing program was begun in 1979 as a Carter Administration urban initiative, yet was given awards as a national model program by the Reagan Administration in 1985 and 1987. In the Bush Administration, the Secretary of HHS declared that there should be "a thousand Umojas." The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, which has an impressive bipartisan spirit, has heard testimony from the successful Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, and similar programs.

We believe that, today, a broad segment of the American public has come to agree with these truths: Americans need an effective defense. And a tough criminal justice system that works to reduce drugs and crime. But we can respond to Soviet cutbacks and reduce deficit creating, ineffective weapons that can't possibly protect us. We can make defense management more effective. Military reductions can reduce the true deficit and still finance domestic reform that will complement our progress on arms limitations and our victory over Communism in Europe. Citizens have a right to police protection, not just volunteer block watches, which don't necessarily reduce crime in the poorest areas anyway. Police are a crucial public service, especially to combat the heavy violence associated with drug street warfare. We should make police more efficient and train them better. But we also should know that more and more prisons, above present levels, will not produce less and less crime. Cheaper and yet more effective in actually reducing crime is investment in human capital for the future of the American economy. Corporate executives already have told us that investment in preschool for poor children is our best investment in a stronger America. Similar investment in youth reduces crime more than anything else yet tried. That investment will also help us create qualified youth for the private and public labor forces, at a time when the overall population is aging, there is intense competition from abroad and too few young people are qualifying for work. By training and placing disadvantaged youth, we will also increase the taxpayer base needed to reduce the budget deficit. We will increase workforce productivity and create economic growth, which is itself a crucial source of "national security." We will insure
that the nation can pay Social Security to older Americans. The skills of the young can be directed at desperately needed U.S. infrastructure development—including repair of highways and construction of housing. This benefits all Americans, not only the poor.

**Visual Imagery and Youth Investment**

Part of our task must be to bring these messages more consistently and forcefully to the American people. In this age of the 30-second sound byte and the simplistic slogan, getting across the more complex realities of the inner city—and the potential of programs and policies to invest in our youth—is a tough challenge. We need to bring to bear the best resources of the media—visual and print—in an inspiring campaign to move the priorities of the nation by demonstrating clearly that there are alternatives to the bleak urban reality that confronts us today.

The challenge is to “image” the complex notion of “youth investment and community reconstruction.” We have demonstrated logically through scientific evaluations that the concept works. But more Americans must understand it. And trust it. The leaders of successful programs must become household images, on television, billboards and ads. Persons who already are known and respected by the general public, or who hold respected titles, must be visually associated with the success. Michael Jordan and Joe Montana need to appear with the directors of Argus and the Dorchester Youth Collaborative. Edward James Olmos, portrayer of the Mexican-American calculus teacher who created self-esteem among his students in the film *Stand and Deliver*, should join Bill Cosby in communicating how investment in minority youth will expand the work force for corporations while it reduces drug abuse. The CEOs of the corporations should endorse youth investment as a national extension of pre-school that will avoid greater costs in the future. New York Police Commissioner Lee Brown should communicate to much larger electronic publics his often-made statement that employment is perhaps the best policy to reduce crime. Pop stars need to dance across Job Corps or Project Redirection sites on Friday night television videos.

One objective should be to make at-risk youth themselves aware of real programs that could work for them. A broader objective should be to educate the adult voting public, legislators and executive officials—public and private—on what really
is needed, to create a climate for serious change, not a reliance on “just say no” slogans or blockwatch ads.

It is said that 10 years are needed before a solid new idea or positively evaluated program becomes familiar to and accepted by the mass public. We must begin now with a fresh collaboration among community groups, government and corporations. Imaginative new ads are needed on the nation’s air waves, cables, and billboards. Much of the media design should be by community organizations, like the Dorchester Youth Collaborative (which already has produced several excellent videos). The messages should be transmitted pro bono, though perhaps encouraged by some new tax credit or other incentive. The television output needs to be during prime time, or close to it, not at 2:30 in the morning.

Leadership, Not Small Scale Dreams

Ultimately, federal political leadership is required. The leadership should not be guided by daily public opinion polls or media consultants. We speak of the courage of the Republican President who issued the Emancipation Proclamation or the Democratic President who one hundred years later caused the Civil Rights Act and the voting rights act to be passed.

John Kennedy became one of our most popular presidents by urging people to ask not what the country could do for them, but rather what they could do for their country. Those words have not become a cliche. The nation need not settle for incremental wishes and small scale dreams. We believe that, if the American people again are asked for creativity, energy and sacrifice to restore our economy, youth, cities, infrastructure, and education, there will be a tremendous response.

Similarly, even more leadership than at present is required from the nation’s governors and mayors. Such leadership is illustrated by the New York State Neighborhood Based Initiatives plan and the Oregon plan to provide preschool for all who qualify. Along similar lines, Southern governors have significantly reduced infant mortality over the last five years, demonstrating, in the words of columnist David Broder, that there is little justification for the defeatist attitude that “social problems of this dimension are insoluble.”

The Two Societies Mirror Challenges From Within

In the late 1960s, the Eisenhower Violence Commission declared its conviction that “this nation is entering a period in which our people need to be as concerned by the internal dan-
gers to our free society as by any probable combination of external threats.” Over 20 years later, some of the external threats have diminished. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and Czech President Vaclav Havel have addressed Congress, the Berlin Wall has come down, and there is Constitutional change in the Soviet Union. But the internal threats—what the Violence Commission called “challenges from within”—have become even greater, fulfilling the prediction made by the Kerner Commission, of two societies more separate and less equal. The present, with its symptomatic drug crisis, has never been more propitious to take up the challenge of the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions and to affirm, once again, that “there can be no higher priority for national action and no higher claim on the nation’s conscience.”
THE YOUTH INVESTMENT ACT OF 1992

(A) The Congress finds that:
(1) Crime and drug abuse in the United States continue at intolerable levels, despite massive investment in courts and corrections.
(2) Depending on which definition is used, the number of truly disadvantaged Americans is between 2 and 10 million. The highest rates of crime and drug involvement in the nation are among young people in this population. A disproportionate number live in inner cities. These are high risk urban youth.
(3) Present policy against crime and drugs among high risk urban youth is short run, fragmented, categorical and insufficiently coordinated.
(4) The United States is falling behind many other nations in developing preventive strategies for high-risk youth.
(5) Evaluations suggest that one of the most effective inner city crime and drug prevention initiatives is early intervention and preschool among the truly disadvantaged, as illustrated by Head Start, the Perry Preschool Program and Project Beethoven.
(6) Evaluations have found that the same multiple-solutions-for-multiple-problems approach that works well for early intervention and preschool works among high risk urban youth aged 8-18.
(7) These multiple solutions encompass computer based remedial education; other special education; mentoring and discipline via big brothers, big sisters and counselors; peer pressure; employment training; supportive services in an extended family sanctuary away from the streets; and school-to-work transitions to employment in the permanent primary labor market—with jobs having upward mobility. Positively evaluated programs which implement many of these principles are illustrated by (but not limited to) the Argus Community in the South Bronx and Job Corps, Job Start and Project Redirection nationally.
(8) A strategy based on such multiple solutions often creates many of these outcomes, at the same time: less crime, less drug abuse, less welfare dependency, fewer adolescent pregnancies, higher self-esteem, more school completion, more successful school-to-work transitions, more employability, more economic and psychological self sufficiency, and greater likelihood of becoming tax paying citizens.
(9) Evaluations have shown that inner city non-profit community organizations are effective vehicles for implementing these solutions and empowering high risk urban youth.

(10) Though a strong criminal justice system is essential, programs which implement the multiple solution principles identified under article 7 tend to reduce crime and delinquency more and at a lower cost than prison.

(11) This "youth investment" strategy needs to be replicated on a wide national scale—through a private, national institution for inner city youth reinvestment that is modeled in part on the success in inner city economic development of the private sector national Local Initiatives Support Corporation and Enterprise Foundation.

(B) It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to create a National Youth Investment Corporation in the private sector. Public sector funds shall be authorized and appropriated through the Department of Health and Human Services.

(C) The Directors of the Corporation shall consist of three persons from national non-profit organizations; three from local indigenous, non-profit, inner city community based organizations; one member of Congress; one Governor; one Mayor; two corporate executives; and a Chairperson.

(D) The objectives of the Corporation shall be to:

(1) Finance and technically assist non-profit community organizations in developing comprehensive youth investment strategies based on the principles identified in article (A)(7).

(2) Leverage at least $1 in non-federal cash matches for each federal $1 committed.

(3) Co-target other federal funds to the same organizations or neighborhoods, above and beyond funds specifically appropriated for or matched to the Corporation. In particular, at the federal level, co-target Job Corps Centers, Job Training Partnership Act training, discretionary Department of Education funds, discretionary Office of Human Service Development funds of the Department of Health and Human Services, Community Services Administration funds, Department of Housing and Urban Development discretionary and public housing crime prevention funds, Small Business Administration programs, and Economic Development Administration funds to the same non-profit organizations and neighborhoods.

(4) Require as one condition for local grants that, above and beyond local cash matches, the private and public sectors, working cooperatively, place high risk youth in jobs that
lead to permanent stable, primary labor market employment (not make work) in the immediate inner city neighborhood of each non-profit community organization that receives support from the Youth Investment Corporation. Encourage a balance of job creation in economic development and service provision.

(5) Encourage as one condition of local grants that, above and beyond local cash matches, police be deployed in problem oriented policing to support the youth investment strategies specified in article (A)(7) and to stabilize the target neighborhood to promote economic development that will generate private and public sector jobs for high risk youth.

(6) Require as one condition for local grants that non-profit community organizations which receive funds from the Youth Investment Corporation must design initiatives, like Project Redirection, to keep single teen mothers in high school, and must employ single fathers on the condition that they financially support their infants.

(7) Train the employees and trustees of the local non-profit community organizations which implement local programs in modern management and leadership methods. Create a national Youth Training and Management Institute within the Youth Investment Corporation.

(8) Expand the operating capacity of existing non-profit community organizations and provide seed financing for new ones.

(9) Establish for each funded local non-profit community organization a for-profit entity that can help finance the non-profit in the future, much like the for-profit Rouse Corporation helps finance the non-profit Enterprise Foundation.

(10) Evaluate local initiatives.

(11) Educate legislators and the public on the successes of model programs and replications of their underlying principles. Promote the organization and financing of state and local Youth Investment Corporations.

(E) Of the funds federally appropriated for the Youth Investment Corporation, 60% will be targeted as direct grants or loans to new and existing non-profit community organizations working to empower high risk urban youth based on the underlying principles specified in article (A)(7). These funds must be matched 1 to 1 with non-federal government funds. 20% will be allocated to management training, youth leadership training and related technical assistance. 20% will be allo-
cated to planning, coordination, financial leveraging, evaluation, administration and educational activity by the Youth Investment Corporation. The Corporation will target at least 70% of its funds, loans and assistance to those urban areas with the highest populations of high risk disadvantaged youth. For any six year planning cycle, no more than 20 urban areas will be targeted. At its discretion, the Corporation can target up to 30% of its funds to non-urban areas with high concentrations of disadvantaged youth.

(F) The Corporation will provide grants, loans and assistance directly to local non-profit community organizations. As a condition of non-federal matches, the Corporation will coordinate with executives of local government, who will be encouraged to create local networks of appropriate agencies to work in support of targeted non-profit community organizations.
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