

2011

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Margaret F. Brinig

Notre Dame Law School, mbrinig@nd.edu

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Recommended Citation

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Belonging and Trust: Divorce and Social Capital

Margaret F. Brinig

In other work, I have discussed at some length how trust functions within ongoing marriages and families.¹ Marriages, I claim, “are viewed as good when the spouses trust each other. They founder when trust is no longer there.”² When a wife, typically, loses trust in her husband’s acting unselfishly and for the benefit of the marriage, she may file for divorce.³ Meanwhile, trust is the foundation for teaching children about love—love of parents for each other, love they have for you, and how God loves.⁴ The loss of trust that dissolution of marriage occasions is both immediate and carried from one generation to the next. This paper explores how that trust relates to belonging and to

¹ See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW AND COMMUNITY: SUPPORTING THE COVENANT 60–63 (2010); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “*I Only Want Trust*”: Norms, Trust, and Autonomy, 32 J. SOCIOECONOMICS 471 (2003).

² BRINIG, *supra* note 1, at 70.

³ Brinig & Nock, *supra* note 1, at 473. In fact, work by Liana Sayer and Susanne Bianchi shows that the wife’s satisfaction with the relationship predicts divorce, while his does not. Liana Sayer & Susanne Bianchi, *Women’s Economic Independence and the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination*, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 906, 932 (2000) (“Wives who believe that their marriages are troubled have odds of divorce twice as high as wives who do not believe their marriages are troubled. Women who feel that their marriage is unhappy have risks of divorce within the subsequent 5 years almost 2.5 times as high compared to wives who do not feel their marriage is unhappy . . . Interestingly, none of the husband’s predictors of marital stability is associated with higher risks of marital dissolution.”). Women most often file for divorce despite the possible financial losses. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “*These Boots Are Made for Walking*”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 127 (2000) (stating that women file about two thirds of the time). Other research, based on the National Survey of Families and Households, concludes that women are actually the ones desirous of ending the relationship (i.e., the predominance in filing behavior corresponds to dissatisfaction with the marriage). Sanford L. Braver et al., *Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and Theoretical Issues*, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993); see also Frequency Distribution of Respondents’ Reports of Which Spouse Wanted the First Marriage to End, by Sex: National Survey of Families and Households, 1987–88 and 1992–94, reprinted in Brinig & Allen, *supra*, at 159 app. The citation to the study is Brinig & Allen, *supra*, at 129. Another paper found that the same is true of a sample of divorces in Texas. James Alan Neff et al., *Divorce Likelihood Among Anglos and Mexican Americans*, 15 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 75, 83, tbl.1 (1991) (stating that Spanish-surnamed women filed 59% of the time).

⁴ Steven L. Nock, *Can Law Shape the Development of Unconditional Love in Children?*, in BEST LOVE OF THE CHILD (Timothy P. Jackson ed., forthcoming 2010); see also JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, LOVE AND ECONOMICS: WHY THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE FAMILY WON’T WORK (2001).

the related concept of social capital.

The argument, using statistics to bolster every step, is essentially that marital stability involves trust: trust by the spouses in each other, trust by each spouse in the institution of marriage, and trust by each in the support of the outside community. The married person “belongs” to the spouse, to the family, to the shared idea of marriage, and to the surrounding community, and this linked network supports the marriage. When any of these links of trust weakens or fails, the marriage becomes less stable.

I begin the argument with the links of trust that run between generations. Tables 1–3 show that the loss of trust continues between generations and reveal two ways that mechanism may work. A March 2010 Census report shows, among its other findings taken from the National Survey of Family Growth (2002), that while about half of all Americans between fifteen and forty-four cohabit at some point, they are significantly more likely to do so if their parents were not living together at the time the young people were fourteen.⁵ In other words, if the parents were not living together in an intact relationship at the time of the child’s adolescence, the child was less likely to move directly into marriage for a first union.⁶ Further, if the wife’s parents were divorced when she was fourteen, the wife in the present generation was 1.73 times more likely to herself divorce.⁷ This finding from the mid-1990s is echoed in the recent Census report (for women aged fifteen to forty-four, the probability of a first marriage surviving ten years is only two-thirds as high if the woman’s parents were not living together when she was fourteen).⁸ Venturing away from the respondents’ parents themselves, my earlier work with Steven Nock reported that respondents to the National Survey of Families and Households were 2.67 times more likely to divorce if they *lived in a state* where

⁵ The use of various ages at which respondents are questioned was determined by the way the questions were asked by the Census, the National Survey of Families and Households, and so forth. These arbitrary assessments should not change the findings in any systematic way. Since age fifteen is, in the vast majority of states, the earliest age in which people can marry, even with parental permission, the Census’s use of 15–44 for persons of childbearing age was probably not an accidental choice. The age of fourteen has legal significance as well, since in many states children may then choose with which parent they’d like to live if the parents divorce. But I am not sure that either reason swayed the Census Bureau in framing questions.

⁶ See *infra* Table 1 (noting the change in the “Ever cohabitated” column, which is between 47.5% and 60.8%).

⁷ See *infra* Table 2 (noting “Wife’s parents divorced”).

⁸ See *infra* Table 3.

the divorce rate was high in the year they were sixteen.⁹

Table 1. Relationship between parents' living arrangements and child's subsequent cohabitation

					Number of cohabiting partners		
Characteristic	Number in thousands	Total	Never Cohabited	Ever cohabited	1.0	2.0	3 or more
Parental living arrangements at age 14							
Two biological or adoptive parents	49,939	100.0	52.5	47.5	32.1	10.8	4.7
Other	11,622	100.0	39.3	60.8	39.5	13.6	7.6

Table 2. Odds of divorce as a function of marital status of the population in the state and year the respondent was 16¹⁰

Variable name	<i>B</i>	exp <i>B</i>
Cohabited before marriage	0.333 (0.131)**	1.395
Number of children	-0.489 (0.06)***	0.613
Husband's wages	0.001 (0.00)***	1
Wife's wages	0.001 (0.00)**	1
Husband is black	0.426 (0.186)*	1.531
Husband is Hispanic	-0.343 (0.258)	0.709
Husband is Asian	-0.438 (0.73)	0.645

⁹ See *infra* Table 2 (last lines); Brinig & Nock, *supra* note 1, at 483 & tbl.2.

¹⁰ Table adapted from Brinig & Nock, *supra* note 1, at 471, 483 & tbl.2. *B* is the coefficient in the regression equation. The standard error is in parentheses and indicates how closely associated with the value for *B* was each error the sample data generated. The statistical significance is indicated by the asterisks, with * for $p < .05$, ** for $p < .01$, and *** for $p < .001$. *P* is the probability that the correlation coefficient value was reached by chance. In the first line of Table 2, the ** therefore indicates that the likelihood the coefficient was accidental is only about 1%. When the result is a single value (divorce or no divorce), the exponent of *B* (or likelihood) is a measure of effect size—how much of a difference in the likelihood of divorce, say, does cohabiting before marriage make (here 1.395), with values in excess of 1 indicating that divorce is more likely to occur given cohabitation.

Husband is American Indian	-0.088 (0.561)	0.918
Spouses are of the same race	-0.012 (0.079)	0.989
Wife's highest level of education	-0.006 (0.03)	0.994
Husband's parents divorced ¹¹	-0.113 (0.154)	0.894
Wife's parents divorced	0.549 (0.136)***	1.731
Husband's age when married	0.017 (0.11)	1.017
Wife's age when married	0.19 (0.018)***	1.209
DIVPC (% divorced)	0.984 (0.059)***	2.675
SEPPC (% separated)	0.415 (0.092)***	1.514
NEVPC (% never married)	-0.012 (0.014)*	0.972

DIVPC, percent divorced in respondent's then state in year when respondent was sixteen; SEPPC, percent separated in respondent's then state in year when respondent was sixteen; NEVPC, percent never married in respondent's then state in year when respondent was sixteen.

*Table 3. Probability that a first marriage will remain intact (survive) at specified durations, by selected characteristics and with standard errors, for women aged fifteen to forty-four: United States, 2002.*¹²

	1 year	3 years	5 years	10 years
Characteristic	Probability of survival	Probability of survival	Probability of survival	Probability of survival ¹³

¹¹ Sayer & Bianchi, *supra* note 3, consider reasons for the dissymmetry between husbands' and wives' parents.

¹² CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH, ser. 23, no. 28, at 32 & tbl.16 (2010).

¹³ The average length of a marriage's duration if it ends in divorce was 8.2 years for men and 7.9 years for women in 2001. ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2001, 1, 9 tbl.6 (2005), <http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-97.pdf>. Figure 2 shows that the yearly percent of first marriages for women that end in divorce peaks at 4% between seven and eight years. *Id.* at 10 fig.2. This timing may affect the much larger spread between the two parental

Parental living arrangements at age 14				
Two biological or adoptive parents	0.95 (0.004)	0.86 (0.006)	0.79 (0.008)	0.67 (0.012)
Other	0.93 (0.008)	0.82 (0.019)	0.72 (0.021)	0.48 (0.045)

Taken together, the three tables show that if parents divorced, their children are more likely to cohabit.¹⁴ A marriage preceded by the child's cohabitation (whether or not solely with one's spouse) gives a greater likelihood of divorce.¹⁵ And when a child goes through adolescence with more examples of divorced people around (the proportion of divorced in the state when the child was sixteen), there's a separate, and in fact larger, likelihood that the child's eventual marriage will dissolve.¹⁶

Children of divorce may cohabit because they know, from personal experience, that marriage may not work out and they want to be absolutely sure before they make a more substantial commitment. They may also feel they can take advantage of all the good points and risk none of the bad points of marriage by cohabiting.¹⁷ In other words, they may have either a more cautious or a less sanguine attitude about marriage (or, I suppose, both). Once they cohabit, they are more apt to see their relationship in terms of the short-term, exchange model, in which they expect immediate reciprocation for anything they contribute to the marriage or the partner.¹⁸ It is then difficult to transition to marriage, with its unconditional giving.¹⁹ Similarly, children grow-

arrangements that occurs in the ten years (column 5) and five years (column 4) probabilities of survival. *Id.*

¹⁴ *Supra* Table 1.

¹⁵ *Supra* Table 2. While studies using U.S. data consistently show this, data from continental Europe show that cohabitation followed by marriage may be a more stable arrangement. Kathleen Kiernan, *Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe*, 98 *POPULATION TRENDS* 11, 19 tbl.11 (1999).

¹⁶ *Supra* Table 3.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, *Domestic Partnerships and Default Rules*, in *RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION* 269-83 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, *Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform*, in *RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY*, *supra*, at 305.

¹⁸ For another discussion of the problems of exchange, see Robert C. Ellickson, *Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth*, 116 *YALE L.J.* 223, 305 (2006) (concluding that intimate relationships are very difficult to maintain if based on tit-for-tat exchanges, for "temporary imbalances of trade are likely to arise").

¹⁹ See Steven L. Nock, *A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships*, 16 *J.*

ing through their teens with more divorce around may downplay the difficulties of divorce or may not have as much exposure to good, lasting marriages.²⁰

Prominent proponents of social capital theory argue that in neighborhoods where trust decreases and there is less social cohesion and more disorder, there will eventually be more crime.²¹ While this hypothesis does not go unchallenged,²² it is at least easy to follow. This paper will go still further, showing from recent Chicago divorces (Cook County divorces from late 2002–2007) that, holding other aspects of the community constant, disruptions in social capital also precede increased divorces. Thus, trust between spouses keeps marriages together.²³ Trust is more difficult to maintain without trust in the institution of marriage itself (as with the divorce of one's parents²⁴ or others one knows²⁵). As will be shown, generalized trust that others in your neighborhood will "be there for you" affects one's sense of belonging—even to a spouse—as well.

James Coleman used schools as one example illustrating his conception of social capital.²⁶ He argued that successful schools tended to

FAM. ISSUES 53, 56–57 (1995) ("[P]rior cohabitators have poorer quality marriages than those who did not cohabit prior to marriage."); Steven L. Nock, *Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior*, 27 SOC. SCI. RES. 235, 239–44 (1998) (discussing the role of turn-taking in marriage).

²⁰ See Brinig & Nock, *supra* note 1, at 484, 483 tbl.2 (showing that a 16-year-old residing in "a state with a high percentage of divorced adults" will have a "higher chance[] of divorce when [that] individual becomes an adult").

²¹ The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, *Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing*, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1527 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, *Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence*, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367 (1997); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, *Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows"*, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004); Robert J. Sampson et al., *Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multivariate Study of Collective Efficacy*, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997). Sampson and Raudenbush argued that disorder might "turn out to be important for understanding migration patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood viability," especially if it "operates in a cascading fashion—encouraging people to move (increasing residential instability) or discouraging efforts at building collective responses." Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, *Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods*, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637 (1999).

²² BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt, & Jens Ludwig, *Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment*, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); Steven D. Levitt, *Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not*, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004).

²³ Brinig & Nock, *supra* note 1, at 473, 474–76.

²⁴ See *supra* Table 2.

²⁵ See *supra* Table 3.

²⁶ James S. Coleman, *Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital*, 94 AM. J. SOC. S95 (1988). Another example in the article was the diamond market, where relationships functioned as extralegal and comparatively inexpensive sources of control. *Id.* at S98.

be distinguished by parents' connections to their children's school and to the parents of their children's peers. These connections, he reasoned, "closed the loop" between school, teachers, and parents, thus guaranteeing the enforcement of appropriate norms.²⁷ Coleman further argued that these kinds of connections—and the norm-enforcement authority that they enabled—helped explain Catholic high schools' extremely low drop-out rates in particular.²⁸ Conceivably, elements of this distinctive character also generate positive externalities beyond the classroom walls. For example, Catholic schools' emphasis on discipline inside the school might affect the behavior of teenage students, some of whom might be graduates, outside the school, in the surrounding neighborhood.²⁹ Additionally, the demands that Catholic schools make of parents may generate social capital by closing the network between parent, school, child, and neighborhood. More generally, a resident who counts on her neighbors to address community problems has less cause to seek to move to a new community; a resident who does not know her neighbors—or worse, does not trust them—tends not to enlist their assistance in efforts to address neighborhood problems.³⁰

Other positive effects of social capital are being considered currently in the public health literature.³¹ One study has determined that

²⁷ For more recent work along these lines see MIKE SAVAGE, ET AL., *GLOBALIZATION & BELONGING* (2005) (qualitative study of the nature of local belonging in a global world, focusing on northwest England); Gaynor Bagnall et al., *Children, Belonging and Social Capital: The PTA and Middle Class Narratives of Social Involvement in the North-West of England*, 8 SOC. RES. ONLINE 4 (2003), available at www.socresonline.org.uk/b8/4/bagnall.html (different patterns of generating social capital produced very different communities); Edward L. Glaeser et al., *An Economic Approach to Social Capital*, 112 ECON. J. 437 (2002) (finding that social capital first rises and then falls with age, declines with expected mobility, rises in occupations with greater returns to social skills, is higher among homeowners, falls sharply with physical distance, and is more pronounced among those who invest in human capital also invest in social capital, but also finding no significant effect of religious denomination).

²⁸ Coleman, *supra* note 26, at S115 tbl.2.

²⁹ *Id.* at S112–18.

³⁰ Chris L. Gibson et al., *Social Integration, Individual perceptions of Collective Efficacy, and Fear of Crime in Three Cities*, 19 JUST. Q. 537, 559 (2002) (“[S]ocial integration ha[s] the most important effect on individual perceptions of collective efficacy.”); Sampson & Raudenbush, *supra* note 21.

³¹ See, e.g., Jonathan Lomas, *Social Capital and Health: Implications for Public Health and Epidemiology*, 47 SOC. SCI. MED. 1181 (1998) (discussing a Canadian study of heart problems that suggests more concentration on levels higher than the typical individual one); Ichiro Kawachi et al., *Social Capital and Self-Rated Health: A Contextual Analysis*, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1187 (1999) (reporting more self-rated poor health among those with lowest levels of social trust compared on statewide basis); Sarah Wakefield & Blake Poland, *Family, Friend or Foe? Critical Reflections on the Relevance and Role of Social Capital in Health Promotion and Community Development*, 60 SOC. SCI. MED. 2819 (2005) (stating that it is important to be con-

social capital in Philadelphia,³² measured by questions similar to the ones I will use here, produced measurable health effects on citizens of the neighborhoods studied.³³ They found that adults with high social capital were less likely to report fair or poor health (10% of the high social capital group compared to 23.7% of the low social capital group).³⁴ On the other hand, adults with low social capital were nearly twice as likely to have been diagnosed with a mental health condition.³⁵ They were also twice as likely to be under extreme stress as those with high social capital.³⁶

This project extends the work of those working on connections between social capital and crime and social capital and health to consider its effect on neighborhood-level divorce rates in the city of Chicago. In order to make the connection, data was gathered from several sources. First, I obtained a complete sample of all divorces in Chicago beginning in September of 2002 and ending in December of 2007.³⁷ Second, the human capital data, described below, was obtained from the University of Michigan's Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).³⁸ This data, used to measure social co-

cerned with social justice and the potential negative consequences of social capital development; Canadian).

³² The Pennsylvania study cites to ROBERT PUTNAM, *BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY* (2002), for its variable choice. This work popularized the more academic piece of Coleman, *supra* note 26, which preceded it by three years. The citation appears in Social Capital Report at 11 n.4; and also is discussed in Kawachi et al., *supra* note 31, at 1191 (questions from the General Social Survey); and Lomas, *supra* note 31, at 1183.

³³ PHILA. HEALTH MGMT. CORP., COMTY. HEALTH DATABASE, *HEALTH IN CONTEXT: AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA* (2004). "The indicators used to create the scale included: respondents' sense of belonging in their neighborhood, sense of trust in neighbors, whether respondents felt that their neighbors were willing to help each other, whether neighbors had ever worked together, and whether respondents participated in community organizations, groups, and events in their neighborhood." *Id.* at 11 n.9. The authors grouped and clustered these to create a single index. COMMUNITY HEALTH DATA BASE, www.phmc.org/chdb (last visited Feb. 18, 2011)

³⁴ PHILA. HEALTH MGMT. CORP., *supra* note 33, at 9.

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ *Id.* at 10.

³⁷ RECORD INFORMATION SERVICES, <http://www.public-record.com> (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). There were 6,515 divorces in the sample. *Id.* Addresses were recorded and their census tracts identified, using batch geocoding from <https://webgis.usc.edu/Services/Geocode/BatchProcess/Default.aspx>.

³⁸ From a large number of the 343 neighborhoods studied, a sample of 6,000 residents answered questions about their neighborhoods. The neighborhood cohesion variables come from this dataset. For a description of the project, see Sampson & Raudenbush, *supra* note 21, at 615-16; FELTON J. EARLS & CHRISTIE A. VISHER, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, *PROJECT ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS: A RESEARCH UPDATE* (1997), available at <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163603.pdf>.

hesion, was originally collected by the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) in 1994-95.³⁹




Figure 1 Social Cohesion by Census Tract

³⁹ For a general discussion of the PHDCN and its relation to closed parochial schools, see Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, *Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and Education Reform*, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887 (2010). This paper demonstrates the relationship between the closing of Catholic schools and a decrease in various social capital variables (social cohesion, physical disorder, and social disorder). The paper discussing the extension of the model to crime in Chicago is Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, *Catholic Schools and Broken Windows*, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 10-04, SSRN abstract no. 1629904 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564254&download=yes. For this paper I have selected only one measure of social capital discussed in the papers with Garnett. While social and physical disorder are obviously connected to at least minor levels of crime such as vandalism and disorderly behavior (and may even be measuring it), their relationship to divorce is at best not obvious. On the other hand, social cohesion, at least on the extended family and friends level, does matter for marital quality. For two measures of how this works, consider that covenant marriages in Louisiana had more attendees than standard marriages. The covenant marriage couples were signaling their greater commitment to each other, and had, on average, the full support of their families. They so far are divorcing at a lower rate as well. BRINIG, *supra* note 1, at n.177. A Study by Rose Kreider of interracial couples found that when black men were married to white women, the marriages were most successful when the wife saw her mother frequently (and when the husband was religious). *Id.* at 165 & n.102. I obtained similar results, for the other two social capital variables, social and physical disorder. The coefficients for social disorder were, as expected, significant and positive. Those for physical disorder were negative and significant. Apparently women, who largely file for divorce, are reluctant to do so as the neighborhood becomes less safe. The other values in both sets of equations performed as they did for social cohesion. Results are available upon request.

A third source of data, socioeconomic in nature, was obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses at the level of census tracts.⁴⁰ To deal with what economists call an endogeneity problem, what is called an instrumental variable was used: whether or not a parochial school in the neighborhood closed before collection of the social cohesion data. That is, because divorce may well cause social disorder as well as being caused by it,⁴¹ we needed to identify some data that would be unlikely to itself be affected by lack of cohesion. For this reason, I include variables obtained from the Archdiocese of Chicago⁴² and the Official Catholic Directory⁴³ on pastors and the closing of Catholic schools in the City of Chicago, 1984–2004. The idea is that while school closings precipitated by a lack of pastor connection might influence social capital in neighborhoods, neither socioeconomic changes nor social capital predict such things as the age of the pastor or whether he left his assignment sooner than the customary six years.

⁴⁰ For this I used software provided by Geolytics.

⁴¹ See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, *THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER* 115–17 (1999). This could be because many divorcing people also move, and there is usually less social capital in a new neighborhood. See Lynn Magdol, *The People You Know: The Impact of Residential Mobility on Mothers' Social Network Ties*, 17 J. SOC. & PERS. REL. 183 (2000). Studies discussing the disruption include Elisabeth L. Terhell et al., *Network Dynamics in the Long-Term Period After Divorce*, 21 J. SOC. & PERS. REL. 719 (2004) and Matthijs Kalmijn & Marjolein Broese van Groenou, *Differential Effects of Divorce on Social Integration*, 22 J. SOC. & PERS. REL. 455 (2005).

⁴² Paul Simons, *Closed School History: 1984–2004*, ILLINOISLOOP.ORG, http://www.illinoisloop.org/cath_closed_school_84_04.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).

⁴³ Much of the publicly available data came from THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY (for years 1984–2004), an annual publication that lists each school in each diocese and archdiocese, with parish information and the name of the pastor, as well as giving lists of all the members of religious orders with their year of ordination. THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY enabled us to know when each pastor arrived in, and left, a parish. It also provided information on parishes led by “administrators” who were not priests. For 2008, Sr. Paul gave us a copy of the Archdiocese of Chicago 2008 Directory. This also listed the religious sisters as well as phone numbers of the various convents and religious houses, which we called for people who we couldn't identify. Other people, such as some of the lay principals, were tracked by using internet searches or the encyclopedic memory of Sr. Farley. Information on clergy abuse comes both from the official archdiocesan website, *Priests with Substantiated Allegations of Sexual Misconduct with Minors*, ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO, http://www.archchicago.org/pdf/ten_year_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (listing information from 1983–1993), and by a larger collection (including some unsubstantiated reports), *Accused Priests Who Worked in the Archdiocese of Chicago*, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG, http://www.bishop-accountability.org/il_chicago/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).




Figure 2 Divorce Rate by Census Tract, 2002–2007

We begin by showing a simple correlation of divorce and social cohesion, measured at the neighborhood level. The fact that the result is negative and statistically significant (and large as far as these things go) alerts us to the possibility of a connection between the two. Though there could be other explanations, like divorce causing the lack of social cohesion, or some other factor causing both results, the statistical significance indicates that they are related more than by chance.⁴⁴

Table 4. Correlation between Census Tract Level Divorce Rate and Social Cohesion

	Social Cohesion
Divorces per married couple in census tract	-.117***

Because one can only divorce if previously married, the number of married couples in the census tract was used to create a local divorce rate. Inclusion of both accounts not only for those available to divorce but also those who might be available for later relationships. They might include sources of advice about marriage and divorce and others who might influence the success of a marriage such as children and the elderly. Some socioeconomic variables known to be related to di-

⁴⁴ A zero coefficient would mean that there was essentially no relationship between the two sets of data. A coefficient of ± 1 would indicate that the relationships was exactly reciprocal, that is, that as one increased, the other would decrease by the same amount.

voice are racial proportions in the census tract (more divorces among African-Americans,⁴⁵ and fewer among Hispanics⁴⁶), and unemployment (typically more divorces in periods of unemployment⁴⁷). Here are the descriptive statistics for the data used for this study.

*Table 5. Descriptive Statistics*⁴⁸

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Black population 2000 census	.0000	.9980	.336392	.4114901
Hispanic population 2000 census	.0000	.9696	.275913	.3080762
Unemployment rate 2000 census	.0099	.3712	.118844	.0845804
Social cohesion	2.9248	4.1107	3.376081	.2727141
Total divorces	.00	43.00	5.9167	6.02441
Divorces per married couple 2000 census	.0000	.2416	.015731	.0215330
Valid N (listwise)				

⁴⁵ CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, *supra* note 12, at 12:

Hispanic men had the highest probability that their first marriages would last 10 years or more (75%)—higher than any other race and ethnic group and higher than Hispanic women. The probability of non-Hispanic black men's and women's first marriages remaining intact for at least 10 years was about 50%. This compares with probabilities of 64% for white men's and women's first marriages, 68% for Hispanic women's first marriages, and 75% for Hispanic men's first marriages remaining intact for at least 10 years.

Id.

⁴⁶ Min-Ah Lee & Kenneth F. Ferraro, *Perceived Discrimination and Health Among Puerto Rican and Mexican Americans: Buffering Effect of the Lazo Matrimonial?*, 68 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1966, 1966 (2009). According to the 2000 Census, Mexicans made up 70.4% of Chicago's Hispanic Population. BETSY GUZMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, 7 & n.14 (2001), available at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf>.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Morten Blekesaune, *Unemployment and Partnership Dissolution* (Inst. Soc. & Econ. Res. ISER Working Paper Ser. 2008-21), available at <http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/publications/working-papers/iser/2008-21.pdf> (reporting that British longitudinal data is higher by 33% for male unemployment and 83% for women).

⁴⁸ The panel consisted of 186 observations X 6 years for each, or a total of 1,116. Each observation counted the divorces in a single year in the census tract. There were a total of 6,603 divorces in the city, 6,515 of which were in census tracts of interest.

Chicago may be the most residentially segregated city in the United States.⁴⁹ While blacks currently make up about thirty-five percent of the population, they are heavily concentrated on the south and west sides of the city.⁵⁰ Whites make up nearly twenty-eight percent but live largely on the north side,⁵¹ while Hispanics, now approaching thirty percent of the population, are scattered to the northwest and southwest sides of the city center.⁵² Unemployment ranged from very low in some census tracts to nearly ten times the 2000 national average of 4.0 percent.⁵³ Social cohesion varied less, with both mean and median in the 3.3 range and a small standard deviation.⁵⁴ While the total divorces varied considerably, this could be because there were fewer marriages (or people residing) in some census tracts. However, the divorces-per-married-couple, or divorce rate, still exhibits a wide variance (more than twice the rate for divorce per year).

Perhaps the most informative table in this paper follows as Table 6. This shows the results of sequential estimations (called a Two-Stage Least Squares Model) of social cohesion, measured in 1995, and the divorce rate (divorce per married couple) for partial year 2002 and complete years through 2007. It would not be surprising to see strong relationships between the socioeconomic variables and this local divorce rate since other studies typically find them. What interests us here, however, is the relationship between the divorce rate and social cohesion. If the social capital theory can be extended to include the neighborhood environment's effects on people's family-level relationships, the prediction would be a negative effect: the less social cohesion, the more divorce. That is just what we find in Table 6.

⁴⁹ Azam Ahmed & Darnell Little, *Chicago, America's Most Segregated Big City*, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 2008, at 1.

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION, 1940S TO DATE, available at <http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm> (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).

⁵⁴ The median was 3.33.

*Table 6. Divorce Rate in Chicago Census Tracts, 2002–2007
(Multiple Stage Regression)⁵⁵*

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficients	Beta
	B	
(Constant)	.036 (.000)***	
Percentage Black in census tract, 2000	.009 (.000)***	.176
Percentage Hispanic in census tract, 2000	-.013 (.000)***	-.176
Unemployment rate, 2000	.020 (.001) ***	.073
Perceived social cohesion	-.007 (.000)***	-.088

While the predictive value of this equation is quite limited—it does not explain a large amount of divorce,⁵⁶—it is at least suggestive of two things. The first is that socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood do apparently have some influence on individual decision-making about marriage and divorce.⁵⁷ The second is that social

⁵⁵ The displayed coefficients are actually a function of three equations estimated simultaneously. The first predicts whether or not a Catholic school closed in the neighborhood in years between 1985 and 1993, as a function of the racial characteristics of the census tract (Black and Hispanic share of population, 1990 Census), some parish characteristics (whether or not the pastor was an administrator serving out of rotation, or there was a parish clergyman accused of abuse, and the length of time since the pastor's ordination) and the poverty rate in the census tract. The second predicts perceived social cohesion in the neighborhood measured in 1994–95 as a function of the Catholic school closing, between 1985 and 1993 and the socio-demographic characteristics noted above, weighted by the number of neighborhood persons appearing in the survey sample. The third, visible, predicts the number of divorces as a function of racial characteristics in the census tract, 2000, the unemployment rate in 2000, perceived social cohesion as estimated above, population and the number married (both 2000). Not visible but included in the model are a series of year dummies that account for trends in the data.

⁵⁶ R^2 (adjusted) = .118, system R^2 = .343. Perhaps the reason it does is not obvious. Marital distress is to a large extent the individual couple's issue. Divorce has long been hypothesized to occur in the cases where spouses are badly matched. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker et al., *An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability*, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1157 (1977). It also may occur when wives feel emotionally unsupported by their husbands or when they become economically independent, Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, *supra* note 3, at 937, or when they cannot have children or have children of the "wrong" sex, Sara Raley & Suzanne Bianchi, *Sons, Daughters, and Family Processes: Does Gender of Children Matter?* 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 401 (2006). Divorce can of course follow domestic violence, addiction, or serious illness, none of which are accounted for in the equation.

⁵⁷ This can be seen from the table because the standardized coefficient (Beta) for perceived

cohesion, controlling for other general characteristics of a neighborhood, does have an effect on marital stability. This effect is more significant than the unemployment rate in the neighborhood. As expected, when unemployment increases, so does the divorce rate.




Figure 3 Relative Effects on Divorce Rate

How much does this mean, in real terms? In Figure 3, I've charted the socio-economic variables and social cohesion using the minimum and maximum values of each, showing the effect of that single variable (obtained from the regression coefficients in Table 6 above) on the constant. Table 6 shows that yearly divorce rate, 2002–2007, will increase from .036 to .045, an increase of twenty percent, if the percentage Black moves from zero to 100 percent. Since there is always some amount of social cohesion (and it always helps reduce the divorce rate), moving from the low value to the high value decreases divorces from about .015 to about .007, a decrease of slightly more than fifty percent. This is certainly meaningful.⁵⁸

social cohesion is -.088, while that unemployment is .073. The standardized coefficient for social cohesion is about half that of the percentages of African-Americans or Hispanics in the census tract.

⁵⁸ Although it did here, divorce does not always run in the same direction as unemployment. As Bradford Wilcox noted in the National Review, “[D]ivorce is down (modestly) in the first full year of the Great Recession.” Wilcox stated that “a large minority of couples are developing a renewed appreciation for the social and economic support that marriage and families can provide.” *Interview: Love in an Economic Downturn*, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Jan. 5, 2010), <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/228896/love-economic-downturn/interview>.

What Does This Mean About Belonging?

Social capital, the web of trust that means we belong to communities, here considered as social cohesion, or trust in one's community, has an effect on marriages that may be surprising. However, if it is seen as another measure of belonging, or an indication of the support the spouses can receive from their community, it makes sense. Married couples belong to each other. As the song from the film "Shrek" says about the traveling sweetheart, "I'll be so alone without you/Maybe you'll be lonesome too, . . . [for] you belong to me."⁵⁹ In some ways, parents also belong to their children.⁶⁰ I believe Professor Hafen would be comfortable with thinking that they belong to the communities in which they live, so that when these communities lose cohesion, marriages lose valuable support and some increased number of them will dissolve.⁶¹

⁵⁹ JASON WADE, YOU BELONG TO ME (2001).

Fly the ocean
 In a silver plane
 See the jungle
 When it's wet with rain
 Just remember till
 You're home again
 You belong to me

Oh I'll be so alone without you
 Maybe you'll be lonesome too

⁶⁰ That is, parents' marriages will affect their children. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, *Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce*, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 11 (1990) ("Children typically bear substantial psychological and economic costs for a decision in which they have no role."); Linda J. Lacey, *Mandatory Marriage "For the Sake of the Children": A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott*, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435, 1440-42 (1992). In this sense, belonging is made explicit by, of all things, the property distribution provisions of the Marriage and Divorce Act, which allows courts to set aside some share of the marital property specifically to protect the children.

⁶¹ As Dean Hafen wrote some years ago, "In addition, the law's ultimate goal in supporting family ties is the sustaining of ongoing relationships, not merely the crude determining of who is right and who is wrong, who wins and who loses." Bruce C. Hafen, *The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests*, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 470 (1983).