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SENATE GRIDLOCK AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

Carl Tobias*

One crucial locus of gridlock is appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals, which have grown extremely contentious, as the circuits resolve disputes about controversial issues and can effectively be tribunals of last resort for designated areas. Continuous Republican and Democratic charges, recriminations, and divisiveness have roiled the process for decades. The bench constitutes 179 judgeships; however, seventeen remained vacant at President Barack Obama’s second inauguration notwithstanding his pledge to end the “confirmation wars” by asiduously consulting senators. Laboring without ten percent of the appellate court members subverts prompt, inexpensive and fair case disposition and undermines citizen respect for selection and the government. These propositions demonstrate that upper chamber gridlock and circuit appointments merit review, which this piece undertakes.

Part One explores the conundrum. The assessment concludes that it derives from rampant partisanship and skyrocketing caseloads, which necessitate more judicial positions; they enlarge the number of vacancies, which complicates selection. The paper next descriptively and critically recounts developments in Obama’s tenure. Scrutiny reveals that appointees principally comprised very qualified ethnic minority and female jurists who averaged fifty-five years of age upon nomination. Their confirmations improved diversity and signaled the realization of a career judiciary while marginally widening the experience and age range of the appeals courts. Determining that Obama has proffered sufficient, highly competent individuals, whom the Senate Judiciary Committee has robustly approved, to facilitate processing, but that the chamber has neglected to expeditiously vote on many, this Arti-

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cle canvasses promising ideas that will enhance selection and counter gridlock.

I. THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION DIFFICULTY

A. Introduction

The history of the appointments predicament requires limited consideration in this Article because the concern’s origins and development have experienced comprehensive investigation elsewhere and the contemporary situation is most relevant. The problem actually comprises two aspects. One salient element has been the persistent vacancies dilemma, which resulted from expanding federal court jurisdiction and soaring dockets initially manifested throughout the 1960s. These enlarged the regional circuit and district court judgeships, radically increasing the quantity and frequency of open posts while slowing confirmations. Another essential dimension of the modern vacancy conundrum is political and can be ascribed to conflicting Republican and Democratic control of the White House and Senate that commenced about a quarter century ago.

B. The Persistent Vacancies Problem

Congress enhanced federal jurisdiction around the 1960s. It criminalized much behavior and recognized numerous federal civil actions, developments that have contributed to accelerated cases and concomitant burgeoning appeals. Congress mainly addressed the rises by expanding...
judgeships to the present complement: 179. A study of the decade and a half following 1980 concluded that appointment times rapidly mushroomed. Circuit nominations demanded one year and confirmations three months, and both perceptibly increased. Conditions acutely worsened subsequently. For example, nominations consumed practically twenty months while appointments reached six months in 1997—the earliest year of President Bill Clinton’s last term—and in 2001—the starting year of President George W. Bush’s inaugural administration. The specific periods closely resemble Obama’s term and merit systematic comparative analysis.

The numerous and convoluted steps and number of participants in the contemporary nomination and confirmation processes mean that a certain amount of delay seems inevitable. Presidents and staff charged with responsibility for picking appellate nominees traditionally consult home state elected officers, pursuing much support and constructive advice regarding putative choices. Nevertheless, administrations conventionally insist on assuming the substantive lead when mustering nominations for those vacancies because the circuits, except D.C., include multiple jurisdictions and the courts’ opinions encompass broader application than district judgments. Numerous officials concomitantly adopt commissions which may assist recruitment by canvassing possible nominees and swiftly proposing several capable applicants. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) performs thorough “background checks.” The American Bar Association (ABA) evaluates designees’ core qualifications and rates the candidates, a useful service that it has provided since the mid-1950s. The Department of Justice (DOJ), especially the Office of Legal Policy (OLP), might help screen aspirants, while DOJ prepares nominees for the Senate confirmation process. The Senate Judiciary Committee analyzes potential court members, stages hearings

which probe selections, and carefully reviews and casts votes on them; nominees approved may have chamber debates, when necessary, preceding floor ballots.

C. The Contemporary Dilemma

Article II’s wording could suggest, and preeminent observers maintain, that the Framers intended senators to cabin unwise administration judicial choices; yet politics has suffused the process since the nation’s establishment.11 Politicization severely multiplied after President Richard Nixon staunchly pledged to demonstrably improve “law and order” by nominating “strict constructionists”12 and increased most prominently once Judge Robert Bork lost his dramatic 1987 Supreme Court nomination fight.13 Acrimonious, crippling partisanship substantially rose, while divided government and the fervent hope that the party lacking White House control might secure the next presidential election and, consequently, make future appointments, supplied consummate incentive to procrastinate. Administrations, chamber and committee leaders, and numerous senators were partly responsible for multiple downward spiraling problems.

Rather slow nominations may explain the dearth of confirmations. In early 1997 and 2001, Presidents Clinton and Bush submitted relatively few circuit prospects, and opponents directly leveled vociferous criticisms at many.14 Both White Houses nominated more lawyers in sizable clusters near pertinent recesses; this stymied action.15 Elected officials who forwarded persons somewhat delayed the pace. In jurisdictions without senators from the


12 DAVID O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988); accord Goldman, supra note 11, at 207 (citations omitted); Roger Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 275 (1997); Slotnick, supra note 4, at 228.


15 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 1997 and 2001); see also James Oliphant, Obama Losing Chance to Reshape Judiciary, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/15/nation/la-na-obama-judges15-2010mar15. Each failed to nominate for all openings, but nominating more than would be processed
chief executive’s party, identifying the officers and treating specific participation requests consumed large amounts of time. Bush’s minimal consultation undercut selection, and the drastically curtailed examination which Republicans accorded Clinton nominees might have fostered Democratic paybacks. Accentuated controversy respecting ABA activities confounded appointments. In 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the Judiciary Committee chair, discontinued formal American Bar participation regarding committee evaluation, although Clinton always used the material.

During Bush’s first weeks, he suspended ABA rankings prior to nominations, a decision which routinely stalled confirmations because Democrats invariably requested the assessments’ completion ahead of merits votes.

The Judiciary Committee deserved partial responsibility for the small number of appointments when the panel failed to diligently study, conduct hearings, and vote on, more nominees. The Committee usually arranged panel hearings respecting a sole pick every month the chamber was in session. However, in 1997 and 2001, few jurists won confirmation, essentially due to resource inadequacies and multiple compelling political elements.

was futile. They calibrated speed and scrutiny, as controversial nominees can delay the process.


such as the opposition’s ideological critiques lodged at circuit nominees. Additional pressing congressional business and the Senate’s unanimous-consent procedure, which allows a lone member to halt ballots, explicate stymied nominee floor consideration.

The persistent and modern openings concerns have numerous deleterious impacts. Both aspects severely pressure courts and frustrate counsel and litigants, who must compete for scarce judicial resources. Numbers of appeals proceed slowly because complex and expanding prosecutions mean that some district jurists conduct no civil trials, forcing a multitude of civil litigants to wait interminably. Throughout 1997, stunning case growth and protracted vacancies required that a few circuits suspend oral arguments. Voluminous, complicated dockets and remarkably long vacancies created so much difficulty then and in 2001 that Chief Justice William Rehnquist astutely employed the unprecedented concept of publicly insisting that the executive branch and Senate, which different parties controlled, fill the seats.


II. Obama Administration Judicial Selection

A. Descriptive Evaluation

Obama artfully crafted appointment plans, concentrating on numerous activities related to the courts. He speedily drafted White House Counsel experienced attorney Gregory Craig and other impressive lawyers who recruited designees. Vice President Joe Biden’s lengthy Judiciary Committee service permitted him to offer many cogent insights, especially about smoothly confirming nominees. The selection group foresaw and skillfully handled numbers of relevant matters, in particular a new Supreme Court vacancy, by delineating pertinent qualifications and compiling “short lists” of extraordinary possibilities. This White House assigned the Counsel’s Office major appellate court responsibility and gave the DOJ several duties involving nominee preparation for the Senate process. Obama reinstated ABA scrutiny before making nominations. He determined that the ABA furnishes valuable perspectives; early inquiries unearth salient concerns, aiding chief executives and prospects in conserving resources and confining any embarrassment.

Obama instituted concerted efforts to vastly improve ethnic, gender, and sexual-preference diversity. He comprehensively approached less conventional organizations, such as minority, community, and women’s groups, which have copious information about numerous worthy candidates, as well


as politicians, especially certain minority and female lawmakers. They searched for, considered, and recommended innumerable qualified people of color, women, and out lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) counsel, helping specific designees navigate the appointments gauntlet.

The President emphasized bipartisanship through rigorous consultation, seeking useful guidance from Democratic and Republican Judiciary Committee members and political figures in states which encountered vacancies before nominations. Many implemented commissions that ably picked numbers of exceptional individuals whom the officials suggested to the chief executive and whom he chose, but initiatives amply varied when they denominated preferences, ranked, or tendered a single candidate. Most applicants possessed strong capabilities and contributed plentiful diversity vis-à-vis ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and ideology. Creating new, and revamping extant, commissions, thoroughly interviewing and proposing choices, and efficaciously canvassing the input devoured limited resources; Obama’s assistants expended considerable time seeking advice from both parties.

The White House controlled appointments. Courts of appeals include several contiguous jurisdictions and have perceptibly less frequent vacancies, which senators effectively deem more important, because circuits are essentially last resort for ninety-nine percent of filings and decide complex questions regarding issues including terrorism and constitutional


interpretation. The Administration encouraged legislators to send multiple candidates and chose a nominee from the particular state in which the vacancy arose. Obama evidenced immense deference to politicians, basically assimilating many circuit and trial level appointments.

The chief executive issued short press releases when gradually nominating a few attorneys simultaneously, unlike predecessors. He correspondingly depoliticized selection by, for example, personally introducing only Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, the tradition governing most prospective Justices; both were sworn in at the Court, not the White House, a gesture that had enormous pragmatic and symbolic value primarily respecting separation of powers. These measures departed from Bush’s reliance on the White House to stage a ceremony when announcing the initial circuit nominees. The Obama Administration’s conciliatory approach finds


36 See supra text accompanying note 15; see also Editorial, Congress Needs to Stop Stonewalling on Federal Court Vacancies, Wash. Post (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/08/AR2010090806476.html (describing Obama’s nomination of smaller groups of candidates).


38 Toobin, supra note 29, at 120; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the Bench, N.Y. Times (May 10, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/10/us/bush-appeals-
expression in a promise to stop confirmation wars by aggressively consulting each party and submitting a multitude of fine consensus possibilities.\textsuperscript{39}

Often before nominations, and invariably subsequently, the chief executive and chamber members, namely the leadership, attempted to cooperate. In facilitating efficacious processing, the White House and the Justice Department coordinated avidly with Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Judiciary Committee chair, who schedules panel hearings and votes; Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.), the Majority Leader, who plans nominee Senate floor consideration; and their Grand Old Party (GOP) counterparts, Senators Jeff Sessions (Ala.), whom Charles Grassley (Iowa) succeeded in 2011, and Mitch McConnell (Ky.).

The committee promptly instituted searching analyses with thorough questionnaires, comprehensive hearings, and fast votes. Both parties cooperated actively on nominee examinations. For instance, when Leahy diligently convened a hearing so fast that Republicans lacked enough preparation time, he quickly set another; when the party sought a pair of sessions for Professor Goodwin Liu, whom it determined was controversial, Leahy generously acceded.\textsuperscript{40} The Ranking Member conscientiously deployed the rare action of granting two Fourth Circuit nominees, Judges Albert Diaz and James Wynn, a sole hearing.\textsuperscript{41}

Republicans coordinated less attentively than the political figures might, nonetheless. The lawmakers systematically held over panel ballots seven days


without meaningful explanation for nominees the committee in turn perfunctorily reported the following business meeting. Sessions even delayed review of Judges Diaz, Wynn, and Barbara Keenan, although he glowingly complimented the jurists’ qualifications and the Fourth Circuit urgently required that nominees assume the court’s sustained openings.42

During 2009, floor activity proceeded slowly. The chamber approved merely three nominees. Reid incessantly pursued cooperation with McConnell and his colleagues, yet they effectively did not reciprocate. The Minority Leader insistently opposed ballots for pending designees until Sotomayor’s appointment; no pick was confirmed by August.43 He entered few specific voting concords on appellate prospects.44 Leahy said that his party consumed months after nominees won the committee’s approval carefully seeking accords on many people who in turn easily captured appointment. Illustrative was Second Circuit Judge Gerard Lynch; the jurist waited twelve prolonged weeks before attaining confirmation ninety-four to three.45

42 Hearing, supra note 41; Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on Barbara Milano Keenan to be a Judge for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9c2809e547688f2735da15120db; Nomination of Barbara Milano Keenan, Nominee to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63004/html/CHRG-111shrg63004.htm; Senate Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg., (Oct. 29, 2009): see id., Oct. 22, 2009 (holding over Keenan); id., Dec. 17, 2009 (Sessions found Democrats’ urging Keenan’s confirmation like a child who murders his parents and complains that he is an orphan); id., Jan. 21, 2010 (holding over Diaz and Wynn); id., Nov. 29, 2012 (providing one recent example of GOP holding over 5 nominees); Ingram, supra note 27 (providing other examples).


The GOP reserved much debate time on selections but employed practically none and insisted that the Senate hold roll call votes for distinguished aspirants who ultimately polled extensive support. Judge Beverly Martin illuminates the concepts; Republicans demanded one hour, yet needed minutes, after which the chamber approved the jurist ninety-seven to zero. The unanimous consent process enables a lone member to stall nominees. Placing anonymous holds or those with minimal reasons on seasoned noncontroversial candidates violates a lengthy tradition. It makes nominee advocates file cloture petitions, wasting scarce debate time; protracts vacancies; and confounds swift, economical, and fair case resolution. The abominable machinations implicating Judge Keenan elucidate these problems because the able, uncontroversial nominee waited four months until the chamber agreed on cloture ninety-nine to zero and confirmed her by the identical margin.

During 2009, Democrats sought cloture for one nominee essentially when promoting a Senate ballot; that provoked Republicans and delayed related wonderful choices. This initiative, as with Keenan, vividly epitomized strident partisanship. In March, Obama attempted to elevate Southern District of Indiana Judge David Hamilton, the chief executive’s first nominee. He proposed the jurist after meticulously consulting Indiana

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Senators Richard Lugar (R) and Evan Bayh (D), who in fact promptly, convincingly, and “enthusiastically supported” confirmation, due to his impeccable record on the district bench and well qualified ABA rating. Obama forwarded the judge, exemplifying a pledge to leave the “confirmation wars behind us.”

Despite Hamilton’s strengths, GOP politicians opposed the jurist. Sessions alleged the President “chose to set an aggressive tone” with his initial nominee, the ex-board member for the Indiana chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), while arguing this nomination was extremely “controversial” because the judge harbored a “political agenda,” subscribing to precepts, which included a “living” Constitution and “so-called empathy.” Sessions orchestrated a filibuster, but ten Republican colleagues joined Democrats’ adoption of cloture after robust, frank debate. Central was Hamilton’s opinion regarding legislative prayers during Indiana statehouse proceedings. The Ranking Member strenuously urged that the nominee had authorized Muslim, not Christian, prayers. The majority lawmakers accurately disputed Sessions’s characterization, asserting that the nominee plainly respected the Court’s jurisprudence. Bayh, whom Hamilton earlier served as Indiana gubernatorial counsel, mounted efficacious defenses against the unfounded criticisms, proclaiming that the jurist “is not hostile to religion or Jesus . . . [and] was baptized . . . by his father,” a longtime minister. Senators approved Hamilton, yet nine GOP members voting


50 156 Cong. Rec. S904, supra note 43; Fletcher, supra note 44; Savage, supra note 39; Toobin, supra note 4.

51 Savage, supra note 39; see also Kendall, supra note 29; Savage, supra note 38; Toobin, supra note 4.


53 155 Cong. Rec. S11,421–22 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009); Ingram, supra note 8; Milbank, supra note 48; Savage, supra note 39.


for cloture ultimately rejected the preeminent judge even while appreciating that the nominee deserved a chamber ballot.\(^{56}\)

The year 2010 and later years resembled the first. The Senate minority party continued directly invoking automatic holds related to dynamic nominees whom the committee reported the succeeding meeting and putting chamber secret and unexplained holds on very competent, noncontroversial possibilities with home state politician support; McConnell frequently eschewed time accords. Keenan’s ninety-nine to zero cloture and confirmation votes, discussed above, were pernicious specific illustrations. However, a plethora of analogous examples slowed consideration. The GOP afforded five 2010 picks ballots only upon the year’s end; the Fourth Circuit’s Diaz waited thirteen months, although the North Carolina senators lauded him and won unanimous roll call appointment by championing the accomplished jurist on the floor; 2011 witnessed merely nine confirmations; and the minority improperly kept lawyer Edward DuMont and Professor Victoria Nourse, meritorious nominees, stalled more than one year for panel hearings the candidates never received while it addressed Eleventh Circuit Judge Adalberto José Jordán like Keenan.\(^{57}\)

In 2009, Obama mustered a dozen, and subsequently proffered twenty-nine, stellar circuit nominees.\(^{58}\) During his beginning year, the chamber approved three prospects while the committee reported six others. The following year, thirteen had appointments, with the committee approving four more. During 2011, nine were confirmed, and the panel reported three others. Finally, last year, five captured Senate approval and four more committee approval.\(^{59}\) Obama proposed Sotomayor promptly when Justice David

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\(^{56}\) 155 CONG. REC. S11,544, 11,552 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2009); see Kate Phillips, Hamilton Confirmed for Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E6DC103FF933A15752C1A96F9C8B63; infra note 88 and accompanying text (affording effects of cloture’s use).


\(^{58}\) Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 2009–2013); see DOJ OFFICE LEGAL POL’Y, supra note 57 (detailing nominations); Savage, supra note 38 (same); infra note 91 and accompanying text (same). See generally Doug Kendall, Fill the Bench Now, SLATE (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/fill_the_bench_now.html (discussing nominations from President Obama).

\(^{59}\) Appointees in 2009 were Davis, Hamilton, and Lynch; 2010 were Denny Chin, Diaz, Greenaway, Keenan, Raymond Lohier, Martin, Scott Matheson, Mary Murguia, Kathleen O’Malley, Stranch, O. Rogerie Thompson, Thomas Vanaskie, and Wynn; 2011 were Susan
Souter chose to retire and Kagan as quickly for Justice John Paul Stevens’s vacancy; expeditiously processing both Supreme Court nominees was imperative. 60 Thirteen possibilities are experienced Clinton district jurists, two are capable magistrate judges, 61 and seven nominees currently are prominent state court jurists. With half on benches, that phenomenon apparently portends the institution of a career judiciary. 62 Many earned the best ABA ranking: well qualified. 63 These judges improve ethnic, gender, and sexual-preference diversity in the circuits: eight are African Americans, four are Asian Americans, four are Latinos, fifteen are women, and a single candidate is openly gay. 64

Carney, Morgan Christen, Bernice Donald, Christopher Droney, Henry Floyd, James Graves, Stephen Higginson, Jimmie Reyna, and Evan Wallach; and 2012 were Andrew Hurwitz, Jordán, Jacqueline Nguyen, Stephanie Thacker, and Paul Watford. DOJ Office Legal Pol’y, supra note 57; Savage, supra note 27.

60 The crucial need to have all Justices for the 2009 term was exacerbated with the September 9th argument over Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See, e.g., David G. Savage, Hilary: The Law Changer, 95 A.B.A. J. 24 (2009) (discussing Citizens United); Robert Barnes & Dan Eggen, Court Rejects Corporate Political Spending Limits, Wash. Post (Jan. 22, 2010), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-01-22/politics/36798985_1_corpora-
tions-free-speech-majority-cast (same); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. Times (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html (same); Toobin, supra note 39; see also supra note 37.

61 The thirteen are Robert Chagigny, Chin, Donald, Droney, Greenaway, Jordán, Martin, Murguia, O’Malley, and Vanaskie, and the 2009 appointees. See supra note 59. The Magistrate Judges are Robert Bacharach and Patty Shwartz. Nguyen was also an Obama district appointee. See DOJ Office Legal Pol’y, supra note 57; Emily Bazelon, The Supreme Court’s Painful Season, N.Y. Times (Aug. 5, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/magazine/the-supreme-courts-painful-season.html (discussing President Obama’s Supreme Court Justices); Sherilynn A. Ifill, Storming the Court?, The Root (Nov. 18, 2009, 6:43 AM), http://www.theroot.com/views/storming-court (arguing that President Obama should appoint liberal judges to counter conservative judges).


64 Davis, Donald, Graves, Greenaway, Lohier, Thompson, Watford, and Wynn are African Americans. Chin, Liu, Nguyen, and Sri Srinivasan are Asian Americans. Diaz, Jordán, Murguia, and Reyna are Latinos. Carney, Christen, Donald, Caitlin Halligan, Keenan, Mar-
B. Critical Evaluation

1. Positive Aspects

The White House’s leadership reaped particular advantages. Obama confirmed two sterling Justices and thirty preeminent court of appeals jurists while concomitantly sending eleven additional competent individuals; the panel duly reported all who secured committee ballots. Thorough, early, and persistent consultation with home state politicians sustained the smooth nomination and confirmation of quite a few talented picks and circumscribed the divisiveness and corrosive paybacks which have long subverted the appellate process.\(^{65}\) For instance, ten Republicans supported Hamilton’s cloture petition; senators may have believed that the President’s nominee was entitled to an up or down vote.\(^{66}\) More cooperation seemingly facilitated appointments, increasing public regard for the executive, chamber, selection, nominees, confirmees, and circuits.\(^{67}\) The administration calibrated multiple priorities well. It sagely emphasized appeals courts over district courts, given the comparative importance of appellate tribunals, and particularly emphasized prominent numbered circuits, especially the Second and Fourth, in light of their vacancies.

Promoting candidates who are court members necessarily furnishes benefits. Most significant, the judges have acquired copious pertinent expertise, so appointees can immediately assume the critical task of resolving gigantic appeals court dockets. The nominees present full records that the White House, FBI, ABA, Senate, and citizens easily discover; many impressive Obama prospects and confirmees enjoy the finest ABA ratings.\(^{68}\)

Improved ethnic, gender, and sexual-preference diversity confers numerous advantages. The skilled people of color, women, and LGBT jurists serving on the regional circuits professionally discharge the usual judicial responsibilities, yet supply distinct related benefits. The jurists augment how colleagues understand and treat complex questions about matters including...
capital punishment and corporate speech, while the judges possess salutary different perspectives respecting associated fields, notably criminal and employment law, which they often confront. Some minority, female, and LGBT confirmees and nominees can broaden ideological diversity; the jurists apparently concur with empathy and a living Constitution. Insofar as possible candidates have moderate views, Obama could justify this; he essentially nullified ideology’s salience and might now want to balance conservative appellate judges. Persons of color, women, and LGBT court members narrow ethnic, gender, sexual-preference, and similar biases that plague the justice system. Circuits which resemble America inspire expanded public confidence. Diversity’s increase also can underscore the administration’s


commitment to enhancing the situations of minorities, women, and LGBT individuals throughout the legal profession, the courts, and society.  

2. Negative Aspects

Obama’s concerted efforts provided advantages, but some features seem to require improvement. A crucial dimension was alacrity: confirmations and nominations respecting prolonged openings moved less expeditiously than is warranted. For example, in the chief executive’s beginning year, he appointed a sole Fourth Circuit jurist, although numbers of posts did continue unfilled.  

The administration could have set priorities more appropriately. The initiative expended on this court undermined actions which involved related tribunals. The Second Circuit had a larger percentage of vacancies, four “judicial emergencies” and a nominee in March 2010.  

The White House submitted no one for multiple, critical Ninth and D.C. Circuit positions until then, while seventeen were open at Obama’s Second Inauguration, more than were at the November 2008 election. However, court prioritization is effectively more art than science. The Second Circuit was only in a predicament during August 2009, when Sotomayor received confirmation and her preeminent colleague assumed senior status. The Ninth Circuit depends predominantly on twenty-eight active court members and substantially on sixteen consistently productive senior jurists, and the D.C.

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77 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for 2009); see also supra notes 41–42, 45, and accompanying text (detailing unfilled posts).

78 Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 2009–2010). Obama emphasized the Fourth Circuit’s “judicial emergencies,” defined as vacancies (1) in which adjusted filings per panel exceed 700 or (2) in existence more than eighteen months having adjusted filings between 500 and 700. Id. at Judicial Emergencies; see Oliphant, supra note 15.

Circuit warrants peculiar attention because the compelling nature of its appeals essentially makes the court the nation’s second most important.\textsuperscript{80} To the extent nominations and confirmations proceeded slowly, the president and certain aides bear a modicum of responsibility. Some ideas directly explicate the complications with nominations. Reducing partisanship and consulting home state political leaders appeared useful, yet the concepts seemingly imposed temporal expenses and promoted compromises. Applying merit commissions, which sought out, investigated, and proposed capable lawyers, analyzing the selections closely, denoting terrific picks, and negotiating with Obama took remarkable energy. Comprehensive White House attempts to collect and synthesize massive input from elected officers, coordinate promising activities, cautiously scrutinize prospects, and offer strong possibilities drained scarce resources. A trenchant illustration was the delicate process for reallocating North Carolina one judgeship earlier assigned to South Carolina.\textsuperscript{81} Pervasive administration consultation and the consummate deference accorded senators may have noticeably restricted the President’s flexibility to mold the courts by nominating and confirming the sorts of jurists he preferred.\textsuperscript{82} Symptomatic was the Maryland and Virginia politicians’ behavior; the Democratic senators contravened norms when professing a single aspirant.\textsuperscript{83}


\textsuperscript{82} His views on molding the bench are unclear. Dahlia Lithwick, \textit{What Does He See in Her?}, Slate (May 13, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/05/what_does_he_see_in_her.html; supra note 72; see also Toobin, supra note 29, at 297–98 (describing unclear views on molding the bench); Illi, supra note 61 (describing same); Kendall, supra note 29 (describing same).

Considerable responsibility for dilatory action could be ascribed to the GOP, which cooperated less than it might. The party automatically held over numerous committee votes a week absent stated reasons, much less persuasive contentions, for talented nominees who smoothly earned panel approval seven days later, conduct apparently meant to limit confirmations for partisan advantage. Sessions candidly acknowledged that the principal Republican tactic basically comprised “delay and conquer” when he answered queries implicating stalled nominees: the Ranking Member claimed Democratic political figures have a rather effective “strategy, if they get out aggressively pushing back, they can create the perception that we’re delaying a lot of nominees, and so it will be harder for us to delay.”

The floor proved the major bottleneck. GOP senators permitted no ballots on six people whom the committee reported across 2009; subsequent years were comparatively analogous. They essentially ignored Democratic pleas urging cooperation from McConnell and the Republican caucus, but the ambitious efficacious White House congressional agenda seemed to impair the confirmation voting dynamics. A number of members wielded anonymous chamber holds and those lacking convincing arguments for qualified uncontroversial nominees, while the party requested copious debate time yet used significantly less and pursued Senate roll call ballots governing able designees whom the politicians easily confirmed. The majority sometimes adopted cloture to force votes, although the petitions were relatively unprofitable because seeking cloture infuriated the GOP, enhanced delay when it required thirty precious debate hours, and concomitantly slowed ballots for numerous additional candidates.

These activities, primarily McConnell’s refusal to enter voting concords and his colleagues’ incessant employment of secret and unexplained holds

84 See supra notes 42, 52, and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.


87 Until recently, holds were extraordinarily rare. Aron, supra note 54; supra note 47 and accompanying text; see Letter from Sen. Claire McCaskill to Sen. Harry Reid and Sen. Mitch McConnell (Apr. 22, 2010); infra note 142. For debate times and roll call votes, see supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Letter, supra note 34 (listing debate times and roll call votes).

88 See supra notes 43–48, 53, 56, 66, and accompanying text; see also Senate Rule 22 (2012); Kendall, supra note 58; supra notes 48–52, 54–55, and accompanying text; infra notes 127–28, 140, and accompanying text.
for impressive noncontroversial picks, had several consequences.\footnote{89} The behavior profoundly lengthened dilatory appointments, mandating cloture and consuming floor time, abolished civility’s remnants, and correspondingly exacerbated the already inflamed confirmation wars. Numbers of endeavors assessed made nominees suspend careers, prevented superior prospects from thinking about bench service, deprived many circuits of judicial resources which they desperately required, impeding quick, economical, and fair case disposition and increasing pressure on sitting jurists, and lessened public regard for court selection and each government branch.

Fewer judges won confirmation during Obama’s initial year than under other presidents since the 1960s, while appointments have demanded seven months, but the confirmation and nomination processes could have improved later.\footnote{90} Emblematic are Clinton’s appointing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and seven circuit jurists and choosing twenty-one more possibilities in 1993, and George W. Bush’s 2001 confirmation of six appeals court members and proposal of twenty-nine more nominees, statistical parameters which dramatically rose the succeeding year.\footnote{91}

Conditions that Obama and the chamber lacked material ability to control actually explain delayed confirmations and nominations. Crucial was promptly filling Justice Souter’s vacancy, an initiative that preempted lower court action over months; similar necessity propelled the effort to replace Justice Stevens.\footnote{92} The president incurred the critical “start-up” expenses for


\footnote{91} Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5 (for years 1993-1994 & 2001-2002); see also supra notes 14-26; infra note 92.

\footnote{92} 2010 circuit activity was greater. 156 Cong. Rec. S6991 (2010); supra note 60 and accompanying text; see supra text accompanying note 37. The year 2009 was like 1993 when Ginsburg replaced Justice Byron White; her approval took less time due to consultation. Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96–3, Easily Affirms Judge Ginsburg as a Justice, N.Y. Times (Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easily-affirms-judge-ginsburg-as-a-justice.html; see also Orrin Hatch, Square Peg Conessions of a Citizen Senator 179 (2003); Stras & Scott, supra note 7, at 1902–04.
properly instituting a government. During his beginning year and much of the next, members neglected to confirm sufficient upper-echelon DOJ officers, particularly for OLP.93 Attacking myriad intractable complications, especially the recession, the Iraq and Afghanistan circumstances, and the Guantanamo situation, which previous chief executives bequeathed, also consumed huge resources.94

Appointing nominees who serve on courts appears to impose certain detriments, even while the idea yields multiple advantages, namely the comparative ease of tracking important qualifications and conveying applicable experience. For instance, critics question the advisability of effectively converting the appellate bench into a “career judiciary” like that most European nations have adopted.95 Commentators rely upon the American convention which plucks jurists from a multitude of sources, including the plaintiff and defense civil bars, federal and state criminal practitioners, and legal scholars; they contribute wide-ranging perspectives and skills. A few expert critics inquire whether the desire of numerous judges to be elevated may not under-cut independence or wonder about mounting bureaucratization.96


Commentators emphasize related attributes that confirmees and nominees possess. Critics ask why merely one candidate is thirty-nine and the cohort averages fifty-five, contending GOP appointment of younger jurists supplies much beneficial circuit longevity and excellent picks when Supreme Court Justices decide to retire.\textsuperscript{97} Observers ponder the ideological viewpoints which some confirmees and prospects hold, deeming them excessively liberal or conservative. Astute commentators urge greater balance, intimating that ample resistance even to centrists, like Judges Davis and Hamilton, shows that compromise on ideology has been a less productive strategy while Republican presidents assiduously suggested conservative appeals court jurists.\textsuperscript{98}

This appointments evaluation concludes that Obama and the chamber implemented many efficacious procedures which should promote accomplished judges’ confirmations. However, the analysis determines that nominees might be canvassed with additional speed, in particular given the voluminous openings. The last Part, thus, carefully assesses practices for swiftly considering numbers of possibilities submitted and curbing gridlock.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMPTLY FILLING THE APPELLATE VACANCIES

A. The Executive and the Senate

Obama and both parties’ senators effectuated manifold crucial policies and should keep applying the constructs and other valuable ideas to the circuit process and the numerous specific vacant posts.\textsuperscript{99} The chief executive and the Senate conscientiously identified and handled concerns raised by acute politicization. For example, Obama consciously acted in ways that


\textsuperscript{99} The best remedy may be enough new positions to seat all judges now authorized. Tobias, supra note 1, at 569. Others only limit irreducible time restraints. For many ideas, see Mann & Ornstein, supra note 47; Goldman et al., supra note 27; Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice and Consent, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 783 (2006); Tobias, supra note 1, at 552–73.
essentially depoliticized fundamental constituents of selection. The White House and congressional leaders attempted to coordinate and innovate, reconcile conflicting views, predict and creatively mediate stubborn disputes, and cease or ameliorate conduct found not profitable. Appointments officials will most easily consolidate the best approaches, if the chief executive, legislators, and staff continue assertive communications prior and subsequent to nominations.

Politicians in jurisdictions that encountered unoccupied seats cooperated with the President and a multitude of colleagues respecting substantial issues, especially directly assuming principal responsibility to send potential nominees. When openings in fact materialized, lawmakers delineated several competent picks, encompassing the impressive administration nominees. Officers established commissions which recommended aspirants, yet developing some panels stalled confirmations, although that may be one fixed cost in a nascent presidency and with concomitantly altered Senate composition. Therefore, the political figures might survey numbers of analogous committees prescribed earlier and, when indicated, recalibrate endeavors by improving transparency while effectively safeguarding privacy. Constructive illustrations are the entities that Wisconsin officials sponsored the past third century and California Senators Dianne Feinstein (D) and Barbara Boxer (D) invoked over George W. Bush’s tenure. The commissions essentially improve appointments for circuits wrestling with multiple empty positions and combat sustained deadlocks, as the panels help galvanize consensus.

100 See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.

101 For example, Democrats clarified they would assume the lead when Texas senators kept the Bush panel. See supra note 33; see also H. Thomas Wells Jr., No Time for Tension, No Room for Rancor, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2008, at 94.

102 When the GOP opposed a quick hearing, Leahy held a second, while Sessions deviated from tradition by agreeing to one hearing for two nominees. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41; see also Toobin, supra note 4.

103 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 101 and accompanying text.

104 See supra notes 31–32, 61–64, 68, and accompanying text. But see supra text accompanying notes 31, 83.


Sharp filing increases after 1990, when the most recent comprehensive judgeships act passed, dictated the U.S. Judicial Conference request to authorize a dozen new slots.\textsuperscript{107} Because the courts’ policymaking arm grounds suggestions regarding more posts on conservative work and case load estimates and the circuits have dire needs for additional jurists who remedy docket crises, Obama and Congress must adopt thorough legislation.\textsuperscript{108} Supplemental judgeships could prove rather inconsequential, should gridlock persist.\textsuperscript{109}

Despite the benefits shown, the procedures used were not entirely successful. Thus, the President and officers may want to concurrently scrutinize various practices which the White House and the lawmakers instituted, refine or delete less effective techniques, if necessary, closely analyze sound concepts previously employed, and cautiously screen, while perhaps applying, innovative untested solutions.

**B. The Executive**

The last three presidents have similar responsibility for the present difficulties.\textsuperscript{110} Obama enunciated broad, critical goals and swiftly implemented efficacious policies which realized commendable objectives and should in essence carefully proceed as he started.\textsuperscript{111} This White House considered merit the polestar, tendered very qualified diverse nominees, and streamlined initiatives by restoring pre-submission ABA examinations which definitely illuminate confirmations and can avoid embarrassment.\textsuperscript{112} Obama
must keep retaining dominant responsibility for nominations and continue deferring to politicians, when appropriate, cultivating home state legislators and capitalizing on their informative guidance, accommodating cooperative Republicans, elevating jurists, and forecasting High Court vacancies. The President should also keep providing sufficient able people of color, women, and LGBT designees the committee smoothly reviews at a pace that insures efficient chamber investigation, and continue solicitude for Democratic party leaders and corresponding GOP analogues. However, controversial executive branch recess appointments in 2012 drastically undermined the sensitively calibrated White House activities, precipitating scathing reactions by minority party senators.


Obama concomitantly pursued special efforts to profoundly improve ethnic, gender, and sexual-orientation diversity, which his confirmations and nominations consistently represent, and must keep widening that diversity, as it can yield the advantages recounted. Obama’s circuit appointees and nominees could enlarge ideological diversity; he might weigh augmenting this because Republican presidents sent numerous conservatives and enhanced balance is warranted. Obama may effectively counter assertions that conferees and nominees hold comparatively liberal viewpoints by denominating moderates. Insofar as the prospects can spark efficacious interest group resistance and deleterious criticisms which resemble those both parties fired at each other’s White Houses, crucially slowing the process and driving rejections, he could assess somewhat conservative aspirants or correspondingly be pragmatic about how this opposition can detrimentally affect selection. These complications had accentuated relevance the last Congress, given Democrats’ reduced numbers and the machinations, which include procedural stalling, that normally constrict appointments over presidential election years. Indeed, McConnell ceased entering appellate nominee voting concords in June, and the chamber adjourned without casting ballots on more. Notwithstanding the larger Democratic majority and

117 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. Officials have proposed numerous diverse prospects, supra text accompanying note 32, as has Obama, supra text accompanying note 64; see Goldman, supra note 9 (recounting presidential records since Nixon).
118 He may review and refine his ideas and assess effective prior ones. Carter used panels, and Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton asked senators to suggest many strong women. See Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 F LA. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (1991) (discussing President Bush’s efforts to suggest more strong women); Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. Times (Aug. 23, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/23/us/unmaking-the-gop-court-legacy.html (discussing President Clinton’s efforts to suggest more strong women); supra note 105 (discussing President Carter’s use of panels to suggest more strong women); see also supra paragraph after text accompanying note 109.
119 See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. But see supra note 98 (discussing “erosion” of merits).
120 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
Obama’s second victory, the notions retain pertinence. The chief executive might also contemplate increasing diversity with respect to experience and age; Obama could name and confirm many strong attorneys who practice civil and criminal law, scholars, and younger candidates.\textsuperscript{123}

Another cogent idea would be rigorously proffering additional nominations the GOP can support. Prominent examples are Circuit Judges Diaz, Murguia, and Stranch, possibilities officials in their jurisdictions favored.\textsuperscript{124} The White House should consider proposing greater numbers of Republican appointees like Judge Henry Floyd whom the chief executive tapped after consulting home state officers and perhaps suggest more, capable individuals with party affiliations.\textsuperscript{125} Those notions may be effective for confirmations involving appeals courts, which have several protracted vacancies and gargantuan dockets, or encompass jurisdictions, namely Idaho, Kansas, Texas and Utah, with two GOP senators.\textsuperscript{126}

The President should continue following measured, nuanced policies, as mistakes erode credibility and can narrow appointments. Obama, whose touchstone is bipartisanship, must keep adopting conciliatory endeavors. Illustrative are robust consultation and his exceptional nominees; the submissions’ competence, mainstream points of view, and diverse backgrounds show why few have provoked significant controversy. If these actions lack


\textsuperscript{124} Bill Theobald, Nashville Attorney’s Appointment to U.S. Appeals Court is Confirmed, THE TENNESSEAN (Sept. 14, 2010), http://pqs.b.pqarchive.com/tennessean/access/2137361621.html;FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Sep+14%2C+2010&author=Bill&pub=The+Tennessean&edition=&startpage=n%3Fa&desc=Nashville+attorney%27s+appointment+to+U.S.+appeals+court+is+confirmed; supra note 57; infra note 132 and accompanying text; see supra text accompanying note 113; infra notes 133–35.


\textsuperscript{126} See infra text accompanying notes 133–35. For lengthy vacancies, see Tobias, supra note 81. For courts with long openings and many cases in states where officials differ, compromises or “trades” may work, as Georgia suggests. Bill Rankin, Vote Sets Stage for Changes on the Bench, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 21, 2012, at IA. Trades spark controversy. 143 CONG. REC. S5241 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Joe Biden); see GERHARDT, supra note 11, at 137–63.
efficacy because Republicans do not cooperate, administration personnel ought to contemplate applying relatively confrontational alternatives. For instance, should the GOP continue delaying numerous approval votes, the chief executive might use the bully pulpit in embarrassing the officials and holding senators publicly responsible, force confirmations by taking the divisive issue to the nation, or make unfilled seats a prominent election year question.\textsuperscript{127} Substantially analogous would be proffering skilled consensus nominees for all present court openings and selectively instituting circuit recess appointments; both devices could leverage Republicans through publicizing and dramatizing how chronic vacancies eviscerate justice.\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{C. The Senate}

The Senate must adopt cooperative practices, as the chamber shares responsibility with the past three administrations for the deteriorating condition of judicial selection and the numerous current openings. The GOP may want to remember that Democrats helped approve greater numbers of jurists when it controlled the presidency\textsuperscript{129} and citizens might now blame Republicans for severely prolonged vacancies.\textsuperscript{130} Accordingly, GOP members essentially need to be less confrontational. The senators may afford candid advice, if consulted; employ incisive debates, not filibusters; vote more expeditiously on accomplished centrist nominees and Bush confirmees Obama proposes; and recommend stellar choices when his prove unacceptable.\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{128} Unless the situation substantially worsens, Obama should not recess appoint judges, as many legal and political concerns explain its rare use. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; see Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985); William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 515 (2004); sources cited supra note 116. George W. Bush used similar ideas, such as renominating controversial picks, to press Democrats, but some concepts lack efficacy and Obama should eschew them. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 76, at 1052–54; Lewis, supra note 57; Toobin, supra note 4.

\textsuperscript{129} See Tobias, supra note 9, at 756–57. See generally Hartley, supra note 12. But see Hatch, supra note 8, at 1055–40 (discussing constitutional ways to appoint).


\textsuperscript{131} Bush, Obama, and others posit ideas to speed selection. Some, such as requiring judges to give earlier notice of intent to assume senior status and rigid dates for specific
Illustrations abound the last two congresses. Arizona Senators John McCain (R) and Jon Kyl (R) personally supported nomination of Judge Murguia, energetically assisting the fine pick to navigate the gauntlet.\textsuperscript{132} Utah Senator Hatch championed Professor Scott Matheson and deftly reassured Kyl, allaying concerns about the nominee’s constitutional principles, which seemingly persuaded the Arizonan to favor the superb prospect.\textsuperscript{133} Cooperation implicating Senators Lindsey Graham (R) and Jim DeMint (R) and Representative James Clyburn (D), active preeminent South Carolina leaders, underlay their proffer, and White House tender, of very competent Bush appointee Floyd, who easily captured approval.\textsuperscript{134} In contrast, for egregious scenarios—particularly those mirroring the Oklahoma appeals court vacancy, where GOP Senators James Inhofe and Tom Coburn apparently enjoyed nominal consultation—the President’s staff might, and ultimately did, readjust,commencing dialogue and canvassing Republican attorneys or names concomitantly deemed preferable by Inhofe and Coburn, who seemed receptive to overtures.\textsuperscript{135}

Judiciary panel evaluations have minimally frustrated confirmations. Democrats generously accommodated innumerable GOP requests. There

\textsuperscript{132} Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on Mary Murguia to be a U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, 111th Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REC. S10,986 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (showing Arizona senators’ similar treatment of Arizona Supreme Court Justice Andrew Hurwitz).


\textsuperscript{134} See supra note 125 and accompanying text. But see sources cited supra notes 31, 83; infra note 135.

was a hearing for one nominee the entire final month during the last Congress’s initial session and another convened respecting Liu, even though the party had comprehensively interrogated the nominee with a daunting marathon session, and returned Liu to the chief executive, the identical year. Nevertheless, the minority assiduously kept holding over numerous prominent submissions absent explanations, producing short confirmation delays. Therefore, Republicans must decrease the procedure’s invocation while seeking additional time only when clearly necessary. An example was a pragmatic request in the 112th Senate’s earliest meeting propounded by Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to delay numbers of votes, which arguably provided Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah), a new member, rather effective opportunities for treating candidates.

If the panel dramatically slows processing, senators possess numerous ways to speed assessment. The committee may expand ballots with relatively truncated analysis, one idea which Hatch, the ex-Chair, used, or discontinue hearings for noncontroversial people. Much tradition and some recent practice suggest distinguished nominees who lack controversy merit hearings and ballots, yet ideological criticisms protracted selection.

Nonetheless, the floor was the bottleneck. Restricted debates and votes explain the minuscule number of confirmations. Reid might propel action by initiating nominee consideration more swiftly following panel approval. The senator expeditiously pursued numerous debates and ballots regarding circuit aspirants; however, McConnell often directly rejected the importuning, essentially imposing filibusters. To the extent controversy which involves nominees means they languish across significant periods, Democrats should confine regular filibuster deployment by encouraging additional prompt rigorous chamber debates.


139 See Tobias, supra note 9, at 764–65, 774–75. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 353 (2005); Hatch, supra note 8, at 1039; supra note 22; infra text accompanying notes 143–49.

140 Debates are useful exchanges. 143 Cong. Rec. S2515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); 148 Cong. Rec. S7651 (daily ed. July 31, 2002); see supra text accompanying note 53. Hamil-
Accordingly, the GOP needs to cooperate. It must jettison stalling pertinent floor activity on capable uncontroversial nominees. McConnell should enter greater numbers of ballot agreements while correspondingly requesting less debate time and many fewer roll call votes when individuals present strong profiles and do not engender controversy. If McConnell actually keeps remaining adamant, as evidenced by his June decision effectuating the Thurmond Rule, Democrats could hold the party accountable. Leahy championed the viewpoints that all nominees whom the committee unanimously reports deserve immediate floor ballots while others approved have robust debates comparatively soon, but these rather ambitious concepts appear unrealistic, especially given the modern chamber’s poisonous straits.141

Democrats have properly applied conciliatory approaches, notably meaningful consultation with Republicans and the nomination of choices whom the minority favors, yet it did reciprocate less than was appropriate. Should the GOP persistently depend on confrontational alternatives which slow talented noncontroversial candidates, perpetuating the seventeen-judge opening rate, Democrats may aggressively employ cloture and institute related solutions. They could also contemplate drastic alterations, namely revamping procedures, specifically the 2011 determination which changed anonymous holds or the chief executive’s recent proposition that urged merits votes ninety days after making choices.142 Insofar as limited confirmations suggest partisan efforts to undercut the White House or retribution for quickly appointing the Supreme Court nominees and Democrats’ rejection of Bush possibilities, the majority should consider adoption of certain tools.
like the assertive concrete notions previously assessed, which the executive could apply.

In the end, senators must precisely calibrate the necessity for thorough scrutiny with promptly addressing the multitude of crucial appellate court vacancies and confirm impressive nominees. Democrats and Republicans can fruitfully question whether each might overemphasize ideology, just as both should have concomitantly eschewed the quixotic venture to ascertain if earlier nominees could be “judicial activists.” The parties correspondingly assume that the other derailed multiple Clinton and Bush nominees’ circuit appointments by routinely criticizing ideologies which designees held. Article II’s wording seemingly contemplates that politicians may review abilities, character, and temperament, but the phraseology does not countenance stalling premised on how selections might resolve appeals because this erodes judicial independence. Negligible disagreements with perspectives expressed through several cases or articles must infrequently eliminate individuals, views which numerous legislators have carefully espoused. ACLU


144 See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 20, at 256; Gest & Lord, supra note 24; see also Ingram, supra note 8; Kendall, supra note 29; Oliphant, supra note 15; supra notes 14–26, 64, 90–91, 121, 127, and accompanying text.


participation and lawyering may rarely be considered disqualifiers, just as Federalist Society involvement curtailed few Bush aspirants’ confirmation and nomination. One constructive antidote for these complications might be a presumption that skilled uncontroversial picks receive speedy approval or expeditious yes or no confirmation votes.

CONCLUSION

Appellate court vacancies undermine the delivery of justice. President Obama has implemented special endeavors to reduce partisan gridlock and stanch politicization with much vibrant consultation and the submission of competent diverse nominees, yet appointments have progressed less rapidly than is optimal. He should comprehensively examine and institute efficacious processes for hastening designee confirmation, while Republicans and Democrats must thoroughly cooperate with Obama and colleagues in seating judges. Each party needs to remember that it has fueled, and must concomitantly abandon, the counterproductive dynamics for the good of the appeals courts and the country.


149 Hamilton’s process reflects this. See supra notes 53, 66, 140, 147 and accompanying text. But see supra note 140 (showing that Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski was the only GOP senator to vote for cloture on Liu and Halligan). For many other ideas, see Shenkman, supra note 138; sources cited supra note 99.