How We Broke Impeachment and Why We Need to Fix It: Presidential and Cabinet Level Impeachments, 1974–2024

Authors

Perry H. Apelbaum

Document Type

Article

Abstract

From 1974 to 2024, the House of Representatives initiated a total of 6 presidential and cabinet level impeachments—4 more than were brought in the Nation’s first 185 years. In the aftermath of the “gold standard” set during the Nixon impeachment inquiry, the process has experienced a steady decline in fairness and effectiveness and increase in partisanship, with the result being the weakening of our constitutional system of checks and balances.

During this period, impeachment proceedings have become more frequent and less meaningful, rarely led to disclosures of significant non-public information, and not resulted in conviction by the Senate The procedural rights provided to the Minority and the President are now a shadow of the rights provided in the 1974 Nixon impeachment inquiry; DOJ legal precedents make it too easy for Presidents to deny Congress documents and testimony; and the courts are hesitant to intervene to resolve the inevitable interbranch disputes.

This state of affairs is not solely attributable to one party or one branch of government, rather both parties and all three branches bear responsibility. Ironically, following the Supreme Court’s July 1 decision in Trump v. United States—limiting a former president’s culpability for criminal behavior while in office, the need for a fairer and less partisan impeachment process is greater than ever.

Beginning with the Nixon impeachment inquiry in 1974 and continuing through the Mayorkas and Biden impeachment investigations in 2024, this Article compares the process governing impeachments in terms of House investigatory and Senate trial procedures, Executive Branch responses, and the role of federal courts. For the first time, this Article identifies and analyzes the legal and political factors which have led to the deterioration of the impeachment process over the last five decades. Based on this analysis, this Article proposes a comprehensive set of reforms for all three branches, including proposals to ensure Congress has the necessary information to consider impeachment when presidential misconduct is otherwise immune from prosecution.

Recommended Citation

Perry H. Apelbaum, How We Broke Impeachment and Why We Need to Fix It: Presidential and Cabinet Level Impeachments, 1974–2024, 51 J. Legis. 193 (2025).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol51/iss2/3