Abstract
Mexico's 2024 judicial reform, which made it the first country to elect all judges by popular vote, has generated widespread criticism for allegedly threatening judicial independence and democratic governance. This Article challenges the prevailing narrative by arguing that many of these concerns overstate the reform's practical effect. Through a comparative analysis of Mexico's new constitutional framework and judicial electoral systems in the United States, the Article demonstrates that the reform incorporates structural safeguards—including balanced nomination powers, nonpartisan elections, restrictions on campaign financing, and continued judicial training—that set it apart from comparable American models. While acknowledging legitimate concerns regarding implementation and political transition, the Article concludes that the reform represents a more measured approach to judicial elections than commonly portrayed and may preserve judicial independence more effectively than critics have suggested.
Recommended Citation
Serratos, Oscar
(2026)
"Mucho Ruido y Pocas Nueces? Rethinking Mexico's Judicial Reform in Comparative Perspective,"
Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law: Vol. 16:
Iss.
2, Article 8.
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl/vol16/iss2/8
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