Abstract
This Note catalogues and proposes solutions to both the traditional concerns of efficiency and fairness and the modern constitutional problems posed by the current dual enforcement structure. Part I will compare the two antitrust agencies on the basis of their structures, accountability, statutory authority, and enforcement procedures, as well as evaluate potential concerns with vesting either agency with the sole authority to enforce civil antitrust laws. Part II will evaluate the perils of the current dual enforcement structure, exploring both the traditional arguments about efficiency and fairness and the modern constitutional challenges. Part III will evaluate potential legislative solutions to the problem of dual antitrust enforcement authority in the United States. The constitutionality of the FTC’s status as an independent agency is again under serious question; it is time for Congress to seriously rethink and restructure civil antitrust authority accordingly.
Recommended Citation
Alyson M. Cox,
From Humphrey's Executor to Seila Law: Ending Dual Federal Antitrust Authority,
96
Notre Dame L. Rev.
395
(2020).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol96/iss1/8