Abstract
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court’s decisions involving the permissible uses of non–Article III federal tribunals have repeatedly invoked two competing theories. A “historical-exceptions” or “formalist” model would insist that only Article III judges can exercise federal adjudicative power except in three categories of cases that history marks as exceptional. A rival approach, often labeled “functionalism,” would allow further deviations from the historical norm if they are supported by sound practical justifications and do not threaten the fundamental role of the Article III judiciary within the separation of powers. This Article explores the relationship between theory and practice in explaining why neither the historical-exceptions nor the functionalist paradigm has prevailed entirely over the other despite the vastly greater appeal of the former, when viewed in the abstract, to an increasingly originalist Court.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Non–Article III Federal Tribunals: An Essay on the Relation Between Theory and Practice,
99
Notre Dame L. Rev.
1691
(2024).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol99/iss5/1