Document Type
Conference Proceeding
Publication Date
1987
Publication Information
36 Emory L. J. 781 (1987)
Abstract
It is widely accepted that criminals should not benefit from the fruits of their crime. But it is equally accepted that the accused are innocent until proven guilty. There are three alternatives currently being evaluated for determining how legal fees shall be paid for organized crime—free market, political decisions, or judiciary determinations. This Article presents the argument that clients who might possess illicit assets should be able to pay them to a lawyer rather than forfeit them to the government. It discusses how legal forfeiture is handled within the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO) and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE), and examines the advantages and disadvantages of this proposed approach.
Recommended Citation
G. R. Blakey,
Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose?,
36 Emory L. J. 781 (1987).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/100
Comments
Reprinted with permission of Emory Law Journal: http://www.law.emory.edu/student-life/law-journals/emory-law-journal.html