Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1943

Publication Information

18 Notre Dame Law. 338 (1942-1943).

Abstract

With the growth of American federalism and the passing of the doctrines of laissez faire as axioms of economic and political legal theory, the Congressional function magnified. Throughout the last decade the multiphased problems of Congress has necessitated the creation of administrative commissions to perform-the policies of the legislature. Congress continues to declare the law and determine the legal principle to control in given cases. In the same breath of legal creation it goes farther and provides for an administrator or commission to vitiate the doctrine set-out. The transfusion of power from the national legislature to the administrator promotes sensitive Constitutional objection. Close followers of the separation-of-powers doctrine forget that Montesquieu lived in an era much less affected by a complex federalism than our present conditions present. Despite the conflict arising over the delegation of legislative power, overwhelming authority will admit the delegation of a ministerial function to an administrative group. This harmony discords, however, when the question of statutory standards arises. How much discretion may the established board enjoy? To what extent must they be kept on the puppet-strings of Congress? Recent decisions continue to reflect contrary opinion. From the conflict we may make some conclusions.

Comments

Reprinted with permission of Notre Dame Law Review (previously Notre Dame Lawyer).

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