De Re and De Dicto

Authors

Robert E. Rodes, Notre Dame Law School

Document Type

Symposium Participant

Publication Date

1998

Publication Information

73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 627 (1998).

Abstract

Statements involving knowledge, intent, and the like may often be interpreted either de re (about a thing) or de dicto (about a statement). For instance, A knowingly took B's car can mean either A knowingly took a car that turned out to be B's, the de re interpretation, or A knowingly caused it to be the case that he took B's car, the de dicto interpretation. This paper takes up twelve cases whose outcome depends on which interpretation one gives to a governing principle. It suggests that since the two alternative interpretations are equally supported by the applicable language policy considerations must be brought in to resolve the cases.

Comments

Symposium: Premises and Conclusions:Symbolic Logic for Legal Analysis
Reprinted with permission of the Notre Dame Law Review.

Recommended Citation

Robert E. Rodes, De Re and De Dicto, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 627 (1998)..
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/241