Document Type
Response or Comment
Publication Date
1995
Publication Information
81 Va. L. Rev. 2377 (1995)
Abstract
Many of the other participants in this Symposium have written extensively about surrogacy. Not only have they contributed to the debate, in some instances they have framed it. In some respects, therefore, I merely thank all of them and chime in. Unlike my fellow panelists, however, I do not think surrogacy merits an enthusiastic, positive response.
In this Comment, I propose to restate objections to specifically enforceable surrogacy contracts from a family-law perspective as well as from the philosophical or psychological roots of family law. I will then reexamine the problems of surrogacy from a contractarian, law-and-economics perspective, showing how these same perceived problems can be framed in this language as well. As with abortion, one's "priors," as economists call them, predetermine judgments about surrogacy, so that what we write here probably will not change anyone's mind about whether surrogacy is good or bad. For my own part, my philosophy might fairly be characterized as an endorsement of "maternalism." .
Recommended Citation
Margaret F. Brinig,
A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement,
81 Va. L. Rev. 2377 (1995).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/353
Comments
Copyright by Virginia Law Review Association. Reprinted with permission.