13 J. Bus. L. 321 (2011)
This article explores the rise of the corporate compliance monitor as a condition for settling violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) — a setting in which federal prosecutors routinely impose monitors. If U.S. enforcement authorities maintain their current approach, the reality is that companies facing liability for violating the FCPA are likely to have a monitor imposed on them as part of a settlement agreement. From the U.S. government’s perspective, monitorships make sense for companies that violate anti-bribery laws, making it important for offending corporations to learn how to deal with monitors. Pulling from the authors’ extensive experience with three major FCPA compliance monitorships, as well as their work assisting clients operating under an FCPA monitorship, this article aids in that process. It also hopes to help monitors themselves, as well as the prosecutors who appoint them, in making the monitorship a more constructive feature of an FCPA settlement.
F. J. Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root,
Somebody's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better,
13 J. Bus. L. 321 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1105