81 Mo. L. Rev. 1075 (2016)
This essay explores what judicial review of agency interpretations of law would look like if the Supreme Court abandoned Chevron deference in favor de novo review. It concludes that such an alternative regime has appealing features, but may not bring as much immediate, practical change as many critiques or defenses of Chevron presume. The largest change would come from how we think about law and policy in the administrative state. The theoretical scaffolding that would uphold a regime of non-deferential review is far more classical in cast than the moderate legal realism underwriting Chevron. The more traditional character of this orientation may also shed light on the rise and (partial) fall of Chevron in administrative legal thought.
81 Mo. L. Rev. 1075 (2016).
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