Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2018
Publication Information
112 Nw. U.L. Rev. 789 (2018)
Abstract
The Constitution does not talk about precedent, at least not explicitly, but several of its features suggest a place for deference to prior decisions. It isolates the judicial function and insulates federal courts from official and electoral control, promoting a vision of impersonality and continuity. It charges courts with applying a charter that is vague and ambiguous in important respects. And it was enacted at a time when prominent thinkers were already discussing the use of precedent to channel judicial discretion. Taken in combination, these features make deference to precedent a sound inference from the Constitution’s structure, text, and historical context. This understanding informs the treatment of precedent in concrete disputes as well as the locus of authority over the rules of precedent within the federal system. It also explains why the Supreme Court may legitimately reaffirm constitutional precedents even when they are flawed.
Recommended Citation
Randy J. Kozel,
Precedent and Constitutional Structure,
112 Nw. U.L. Rev. 789 (2018).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1324
