Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1963
Publication Information
38 Notre Dame L. 263 (1962-1963)
Abstract
Over-all criticism of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, even as amended, must begin by noting the continuing inadequacy of its disclosure provisions. They are inadequate precisely because they do not require full and complete disclosure. It is clear that strong sanctions now exist which can, if used, deal well enough with such abuses as double dealing and outright thievery. Vigorous prosecution and adequate bonding will do about all that law can do where basic dishonesty is involved. Of greater importance to the ultimate beneficiary, however, is the possibility of incompetent, imprudent or irresponsible management. Only detailed regulation or detailed disclosure can deal with these problems, if they can be dealt with at all. A sound investment plan, for example, could perhaps be guaranteed by exposing the administrator's or trustee's judgment to public criticism or by articulating in detail a mass of regulations and guidelines. For those concerned with maintaining a healthy balance between private and public judgment, however, disclosure—effective disclosure—is the only acceptable alternative. The present Act, by requiring only category disclosure, and not touching many areas of plan management, adopts neither approach.
Recommended Citation
G. R. Blakey,
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962,
38 Notre Dame L. 263 (1962-1963).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/173
Comments
Reprinted with permission of the Notre Dame Law Review.