Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1998
Publication Information
73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 627 (1997-1998)
Abstract
Statements involving knowledge, intent, and the like may often be interpreted either de re (about a thing) or de dicto (about a statement). For instance, A knowingly took B's car can mean either A knowingly took a car that turned out to be B's, the de re interpretation, or A knowingly caused it to be the case that he took B's car, the de dicto interpretation. This paper takes up twelve cases whose outcome depends on which interpretation one gives to a governing principle. It suggests that since the two alternative interpretations are equally supported by the applicable language policy considerations must be brought in to resolve the cases.
Recommended Citation
Robert E. Rodes,
De Re and De Dicto,
73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 627 (1997-1998).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/241
Comments
Reprinted with permission of the Notre Dame Law Review.