Document Type
Response or Comment
Publication Date
2007
Publication Information
163 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 449 (2001)
Abstract
Sloof et al.'s [2006] elegant study of default breach remedies illustrates both the potential and limitations of experimental law and economics (ELE). Potentially, the rigorous methodology of experimental economics can provide fully controlled tests of relationships among legally significant variables. Human behavior is context-dependent, however. The validity of ELE would therefore be limited if it were, for example, to disregard legal institutions and context in an automatic adherence to all conventions of experimental economics.
Recommended Citation
Avishalom Tor,
On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law and Economics,
163 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 449 (2001).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/841
Comments
Reprinted with permission of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.