Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1989
Publication Information
5 Issues L. & Med. 301 (1989).
Abstract
Any social order that prizes individual autonomy is committed to collectively informing its autonomous members. A good working definition of "autonomy" is "self-determining free choice." What distinguishes "choice" from mere appetite or desire is deliberation upon known, available options and their probable consequences, and a practical equilibrium of external pressures for and against those options.
Even the most autonomy-driven society will conclude that some of its members - e.g., infants and persons with mental disabilities - are unable to choose for themselves. Autonomy for persons who are incompetent is inapposite because they are incapable of exercising free choice. Thus constitutional rights derived from our commitment to autonomy - which some courts say include the right to forego life sustaining medical treatment - are exercisable only through the "knowing and voluntary" choices of competent individuals. Distinguishing exactly who is competent, and whether particular proposals of competent persons are informed free choices, are collective decisions. "Collective" means society, acting through its common agent, the state and its laws. The law, and not those individuals, decides whether an effective exercise is made. At first glance then, autonomy would seem to require demonstrated assurances to society that any refusal of life-sustaining treatment is with the informed consent of the competent person affected.
Recommended Citation
Gerard V. Bradley,
Does Autonomy Require Informed and Specific Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment?,
5 Issues L. & Med. 301 (1989)..
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1862
