Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1990
Publication Information
6 J.L. Econ & Org. 203 (1990)
Abstract
The diamond ring rapidly changed from a relatively obscure token of affection to what amounted to an American tradition. It is customary to explain such a shift in demand in terms of an increase in income, a change in relative prices, or a change in tastes. This assumes a stable legal setting that contracts are enforceable. But if the enforceability of a contract is problematic, what formerly was a relatively costly (hence unused) form of private ordering may become more viable (Kronman: 5). This paper looks at the change in America's demand for diamonds during the period 1930-1985, not as a Madison Avenue success story, but rather as a natural outgrowth of economic processes. The event beginning the movement toward diamond engagement rings was the abolition, with great fanfare, of a now relatively obscure cause of action called the "breach of promise to marry."
I have found some evidence that engagement rings were part of an extralegal contract guarantee, so that the "ring is a pledge to bind the contract to marry and it is given on the understanding that the party who breaks the contract must return it" (Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 K.B. 532). The change in demand for diamond engagement rings may therefore be explained by an increase in need for such a bond because of the abolition of a cause of action for breach of marriage promise.
Recommended Citation
Margaret F. Brinig,
Rings and Promises,
6 J.L. Econ & Org. 203 (1990).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/576
Comments
Reprinted with permission of Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.